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A M ERICAN P OWER AND INTERNATIONAL THEORY AT  
THE  COUNCIL  ON FOREIGN REL ATIONS,  1953 –  54
Between December 1953 and June 1954, the elite think tank the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR) joined prominent figures in International Relations, 
including Pennsylvania’s Robert Strausz- Hupé, Yale’s Arnold Wolfers, the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s Kenneth Thompson, government advisor Dorothy 
Fosdick, and nuclear strategist William Kaufmann. They spent seven meetings 
assessing approaches to world politics— from the “realist” theory of Hans Mor-
genthau to theories of imperialism of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin— to discern 
basic elements of a theory of international relations.
The study group’s materials are an indispensable window to the develop-
ment of IR theory and illuminate the seeds of the theory- practice nexus in 
Cold War US foreign policy. Historians of International Relations recently 
revised the standard narrative of the field’s origins, showing that IR witnessed 
a sharp turn to theoretical consideration of international politics beginning 
around 1950 and remained preoccupied with theory. Taking place in 1953– 54, 
the CFR study group represents a vital snapshot of this shift.
This book situates the CFR study group in its historical and historiograph-
ical contexts and offers a biographical analysis of the participants. The book 
includes seven preparatory papers on diverse theoretical approaches, penned 
by former Berkeley political scientist George A. Lipsky with the digest of dis-
cussions from the seven study group meetings. American Power and Interna­
tional Theory at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1953– 54 offers new insights 
into the early development of IR as well as the thinking of prominent elites in 
the early years of the Cold War.
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Good fortune pervades this volume, perhaps more than most. First, dis-covery of the documents reproduced here was entirely by accident: I had 
traveled to Princeton in early 2014 to push forward a project on the role of 
think tanks in postwar US foreign policy, not the history of International Re-
lations (IR) and the Cold War social sciences. Scrolling through the superbly 
curated archive of the Council on Foreign Relations— for which Daniel Linke 
and all the staff at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library deserve praise— I 
was excited beyond reason to see the papers of a “Study Group on the Theory 
of International Relations, 1953– 54.” Working with the documents has been 
a labor of love since, a side project frequently taking me away from my main 
work on the institutional architecture of American hegemony. I could not 
have hoped for such a stimulating academic hobby.
Second, the papers would likely have remained just a file on my laptop 
had it not been for the good fortune of encouragement from Inderjeet Parmar, 
my favorite scholar of said institutional architecture of American hegemony. 
Listening to me extol the virtues of the study group records, Inderjeet, against 
a good deal of hesitation on my part, urged that I seek publication. So too 
did my longtime friend Jack Gunnell over frequent coffees in Davis, which 
sadly ended after Jack packed up and headed back to the East Coast. Encour-
agement and affirmation of the documents’ interest also came from a group 
of IR historians who took the time to read the papers— and write their own 
assessments— for a roundtable at the 2017 meeting of the International Stud-
ies Association in San Francisco. My sincere thanks to Luke Ashworth, Emily 
Hauptmann, Adam Humphreys, Felix Rösch, Or Rosenboim, Brian Schmidt, 
Bob Vitalis, and Jon Western.
Colleagues and staff members here in the remarkably congenial Depart-
ment of Sociology at the University of California– Davis deserve a note of 
thanks for their support in all my endeavors. I hope the centrality to the study 
group of Columbia sociologist Robert MacIver and Dorothy Fosdick of Smith 
College will provide sufficient evidence that I have not strayed too far be-
yond the discipline’s thankfully porous borders. My IR friends— Jon Acuff, 
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Introduction
The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on  
the Theory of International Relations, 1953– 54
Over seven months between December 1953 and June 1954, the presti-gious think tank the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) held a study 
group dedicated to the theory of international relations (IR). The group 
brought together select members of the CFR and prominent thinkers on in-
ternational affairs. Some are still well- known to scholars of IR, like Yale’s Ar-
nold Wolfers and Kenneth W. Thompson from the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Others have faded from prominence but were influential at the time, such as 
leading political scientist Robert Strausz- Hupé, from the University of Penn-
sylvania, and Dorothy Fosdick, an early member of the Policy Planning Staff 
at the State Department before a long career as advisor to Democratic sena-
tor Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Together, the experts collected at the CFR spent 
some thirty- five hours dissecting a variety of approaches to the study of world 
politics, from the new “realist” theory of Hans Morgenthau, to the theories of 
imperialism of Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter, to the psychological per-
spective of Harold Lasswell. The group’s aim was to discern the basic elements 
of a theory of international relations.
Hidden until now in the CFR archives at the Seeley G. Mudd Manu-
script Library at Princeton University, this volume reproduces the digests of 
discussions from the study group. Also presented are seven papers that laid 
the groundwork for the group’s conversations. The author of the preparatory 
papers was George A. Lipsky, a former University of California– Berkeley po-
litical scientist spending the academic year 1953– 54 at the CFR as a Carnegie 
Fellow. Lipsky’s papers introduced the topic to be considered at each meeting, 
with the discussions ranging far beyond the thinker at hand to the nature of 
international relations itself, the possibilities and limits of theory, the place 
of values in theorizing international relations, and the role of the scholar in 
foreign policy making.
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In this introduction to the documents, I ask why should scholars care to 
remember a seemingly obscure Council on Foreign Relations study group almost 
seventy years later? The answer is that the materials of the CFR study group 
are an invaluable resource for historians of IR, students of US foreign policy 
during the early Cold War, and historians of social science. The documents 
suggest insights for two literatures in particular, one within IR and one in the 
broader history of the social sciences.
The first literature impacted by the discovery of the Council on Foreign 
Relations study group is that over the origins of IR and IR theory specifically. 
In recent years, a group of revisionist historians of IR have questioned the 
standard narrative of the field’s origins, showing, among other things, that IR 
did not emerge fully formed after the First World War, as the common dating 
of IR’s founding to the creation of the first chair of International Relations at 
Aberystwyth in 1919 holds.1 The revisionists have also debunked the myth 
that the interwar years witnessed a “Great Debate” between realists and ide-
alists over the nature of power in world affairs and the possibility for interna-
tional organization, the first of a series of titanic struggles that was for a long 
time held to have structured IR’s subsequent development.2 Rather, much of 
IR’s disciplinary architecture, particularly the centrality of theory to the field, 
were post– World War II constructs, exactly the timing of the CFR study group 
detailed here.
Publication of the materials from the CFR study group on theory thus 
offers an opportunity to reassess the current state of the historiographical 
art in IR. In particular, it allows us to reassess the arguments of historian 
of IR Nicolas Guilhot,3 who has analyzed a more well- known conference 
on theory held in May 1954 at the Rockefeller Foundation. Guilhot shows 
how the Rockefeller conference was the centerpiece of a “realist gambit” 
aimed at heading off the incorporation of IR into an increasingly behavior-
alist American political science. The gambit, on the part of a group of self- 
defined realist scholars, centered on the thought of Hans Morgenthau, who 
promoted a non- behavioralist theory of international relations grounded in 
a prudential form of realpolitik.
The existence of the CFR study group is evidence of a more widespread 
turn to theory in postwar thinking about international affairs in the United 
States than the notion of a realist gambit suggests. In short, the group suggests 
that the realist gambit was a crucial stimulus to the birth of IR theory after 
World War II, but it was not the only one. Theory had captured the imagina-
tion of a wider range of scholars and institutions, as indicated by the discus-
sions held at the CFR in the winter and spring of 1953– 54.
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What remains from Guilhot’s realist gambit thesis when juxtaposed with 
the CFR study group? As I detail further below, while the turn to theory can-
not solely be accounted for as a realist gambit, many of Guilhot’s arguments 
remains intact when placed alongside the study group: the CFR group shares 
with the Rockefeller group a rejection of a narrow behavioralism, in the con-
text of a defense of liberalism and democracy, mounted, importantly, from 
scholars either hailing from Europe or well- versed in European intellectual 
culture. Together, rediscovery of the study group promises to further enrich the 
revisionist account of the origins of IR theory in America.
The second literature impacted by the CFR study group is a debate over 
the influence of the Cold War state on the social sciences in America. Located 
primarily in history, sociology, and science and technology studies (STS), a 
now expansive literature has traced the emergence of what has been termed 
the “military- academic complex,” or for historians Mark Solovey and Hamil-
ton Cravens “Cold War social science.”4 In academic fields from anthropol-
ogy to area studies and linguistics and the behavioral sciences, the growth in 
funding opportunities associated with the expansion of the Cold War state 
significantly shaped research priorities and disciplinary trends.5 For Solovey, 
“A variety of professional, financial and institutional opportunities encour-
aged social scientists to produce the right sort of knowledge for the Cold- War 
related tasks at hand.”6
One might expect maximal impact of the Cold War state on the discus-
sions at the CFR given the prominence of geopolitical competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union at the time when the meetings were 
taking place. In fact, the CFR group throws up puzzles for the Cold War social 
science thesis. The digests reveal multiple explicit traces of the Cold War. 
Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were, as might be 
expected, common illustrations of theoretical points. At a number of places 
in the discussions the participants were sidetracked into a discussion of con-
temporary US- Russian relations, a tendency other members tried to prevent.7 
Elsewhere the inherent evils of communism as the participants saw them be-
came the focus.
Yet the Cold War did not dominate the discussions, which ranged well 
beyond contemporary US foreign policy, and it defied the political times by 
including an analysis of Marxist theories of imperialism. For the most part, the 
Cold War remained an implicit backdrop to the conversations, not their main 
focal point. The CFR study group on international relations theory thus rep-
resents further evidence of IR’s problematic relationship to policy relevance.8 
An issue of periodic concern in the discipline, the study group adds weight to 
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the sense that IR has never fully embraced a policy- driven mission, even as it 
has taken advantage of government and foundation funding to form itself as 
an academic field.
In the remainder of this introduction, I provide an overview of the study 
group and situate it at the intersection of work on the historiography of IR and 
history of the social sciences in Cold War America. I begin with a description 
of the study group and its historical context. What was the reasoning behind 
the study group’s creation? Who participated? Who turned down invitations 
to the group and why? What did the group talk about? What conclusions, if 
any, did they reach about the most suitable way of theorizing international 
relations? The chapter then turns first to the implications of the group’s discus-
sions for disciplinary history, before examining the significance of the group as 
an artifact of IR’s position within the Cold War social sciences. The introduc-
tion concludes with a series of biographical sketches of the study group’s key 
members, followed by a plan of the rest of the volume.
The 1953– 54 CFR Study Group on the Theory of  
International Relations
“The Council on Foreign Relations, in its three decades of work, has ordi-
narily concentrated its attention on concrete international issues,” Columbia 
University professor Robert MacIver told invitees to a Council study group 
on the theory of international relations convened in December 1953. But 
“[r]ecently, it has seemed . . . that there would be merit in examining some of 
the basic assumptions on which the foreign policies of this country and oth-
er countries are predicated.”9 MacIver, a sociologist by profession, had been 
tasked with chairing such a group, which would set to work with the aim of 
identifying the most suitable theoretical basis for the study of world politics.
The original idea for the Council to sponsor a systematic study of the the-
oretical aspects of international relations came from Council member Henry 
L. Roberts.10 Roberts was one of the “younger men” of the Council very inter-
ested in the group and eager to participate, according to the records.11 Several 
of them, such as eventual rapporteur John Blumgart, had been involved since 
early staff discussions with Lipsky, and according to William Diebold, director 
of the Economics Program and long- time member of the Council, had shown 
“themselves to be excellent critics.”12 Their interest was surely vital in per-
suading more senior members to support the study group.
The reason for their interest was likely the promise of continuing and shap-
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ing the CFR’s formative role in postwar international relations. The group was 
explicitly designed as a “complement or sequel” to Grayson Kirk’s The Study 
of International Relations from 1947, a CFR- sponsored survey of teaching and 
research in international studies in America’s colleges and universities. Kirk, 
perhaps predictably, found American higher education in need of serious 
investment if future leaders were to have adequate knowledge of the rest of 
the world.13 Whereas “Grayson was interested principally in method and sys-
tem” the study group on theory would “deal with the subject matter from the 
point of view of a political scientist.”14 A handwritten note under these words 
suggested the aim of the group was to inquire why “men— especially policy- 
makers— act as they do?”15
In his introduction to the group for the invitees, MacIver noted how “For 
many years Wilsonian idealism dominated American thought.  .  .  . Then a 
reaction set in and writers who emphasized power politics and “real” national 
interests came to the fore.”16 Continuing, he said that some of the newer, 
realistic approaches “stressed national power; others have underlined the role 
of geography or economic considerations. More recently Christian morals and 
natural law have been propagated as the true foundations of foreign policy.”17 
As a result of these “great debates,”18 MacIver went on, the CFR considered 
it a pressing task to “examine these and other approaches  .  .  . and to judge 
their adequacy as methods of understanding the phenomena of international 
affairs.”19
Dedicating a study group to international relations theory meant a real 
investment of time and resources by the Council. As Peter Grose, the Coun-
cil’s biographer, explains, study groups were the Council leadership’s answer 
to the question of how and how far to shape public opinion when it came to 
matters of foreign affairs.20 Unlike more informal “discussion groups,” the aim 
of study groups was to produce a “written analysis with policy conclusions by 
a single author.”21 The aim was not a public statement by the group or the 
CFR as a whole: “Rather, as the method evolved, the designated author would 
guide discussions, present tentative analyses to be considered and criticized by 
fellow experts and peers, and polish and assemble them in writing under his 
sole responsibility.”22 The format of the study group explains the prominence 
of George Lipsky to the discussions represented below, and the lack of a final 
statement laying out the group’s conclusions. As Grose notes, “Rarely would 
the group leaders attempt to negotiate agreement on a consensus that, in most 
cases, would have to be compromised into blandness.”23 What we are left with 
then is a tantalizing record of discussions on the nature and purpose of inter-
national relations theory, rather than a finished product.
6 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
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The study group on theory was a deviation from the more common pattern 
of convening on pressing issues of the day. Groups convened in 1950– 51, for 
example, to discuss topics like “Anglo- American Relations” and “Questions of 
German Unity.”24 The historical backdrop to the study group on international 
theory offered plenty for the Council to discuss. The early 1950s saw the Cold 
War and its domestic implications reach fever pitch: the Korean War contin-
ued until July 1953, shortly followed by the CIA- backed overthrow of Iranian 
prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh; the failed uprising in East Germany 
in June 1953; and the height of McCarthyism in America and McCarthy’s 
demise, which began in early 1954. Yet the dramatic events in the background 
are little mentioned in the group’s discussions, remaining a context rather 
than an overriding preoccupation of the participants.
The hosting of a study group suggested serious and sustained interest in 
the topic at hand. During the War, the CFR had taken on a direct role in re-
lation to US foreign policy through its study groups with the “War and Peace 
Studies”— dedicated to issues deemed vital to the American war effort— 
which became increasingly integrated into the State Department and eventu-
ally subsumed entirely.25 While until now lost to the intellectual history of IR, 
we can be sure of the importance of the group to the Council’s leaders and at 
least a subset of its members.
George A. Lipsky and the Formation of the Study Group on Theory
The immediate stimulus for the study group on international theory’s forma-
tion was a request from Berkeley political scientist George A. Lipsky, who had 
been awarded a Carnegie Research Fellowship for the year 1953– 54, to be 
spent at the CFR. The involvement of the Carnegie Corporation in stimulat-
ing consideration of international relations theory in the early 1950s should 
come as no surprise. Carnegie was a generous benefactor of the Council and 
had made an annual grant to the War and Peace Studies, which was also fund-
ed by the other great philanthropic organization at the time, the Rockefeller 
Foundation.26 Lipsky’s receipt of a Carnegie fellowship fits with what histori-
ans of IR know about the structure of funding in international studies in the 
late 1940s and 1950s, with legally inclined scholars gaining funding from the 
Carnegie Endowment and other organizations like the American Society of 
International Law.27
Lipsky, MacIver told the group, had been studying the problem of theory 
in international relations “for some time,” including in a book on the interna-
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tional thought of sixth president John Quincy Adams.28 In his prospectus for 
the study group, Lipsky noted, “The study of international relations as a disci-
pline is of relatively recent origin. Quite naturally, therefore, it has been occu-
pied with the gathering of substantive and descriptive data.”29 The next step 
was to discern some firm theoretical principles, a cause considered pressing not 
only for disciplinary reasons but because practitioners used implicit theoretical 
schemas. The existence of multiple competing theories was thus potentially a 
debilitating problem in US foreign policy, since “alternations of emphasis in 
a field where adequate understanding is vital to national and human survival, 
emphasize the great need for a continuing systematic theoretical analysis.”30 
The purpose of the group was thus to aid Lipsky in his work.
The format for seven meetings that took place between December 1953 
and June 1954 was discussion, punctuated with dinner and cocktails, covering 
the thought of six prominent theoretical approaches, followed by a general 
stock- taking session. For each meeting, Lipsky circulated a paper that formed 
the topic of conversation. A more free- flowing discussion continued into the 
evening.
The participants represented a selection of scholars, government advi-
sors, members of the CFR, and Council staff members (see table 1). A more 
extensive set of biographical sketches is provided later in this introduction. 
What should be emphasized at this stage is the professional diversity of the 
group. The only individuals that may have been considered well- known as 
IR theorists were Arnold Wolfers and, perhaps, Kenneth W. Thompson. The 
others represent a cross- section of diverse fields and non- academics, includ-
ing individuals from business and government. Their membership, however, 
is evidence of their prominence within American foreign policy circles in the 
early 1950s.
The group’s racial and gender homogeneity is far less surprising, given 
what IR scholars now know about the systematic silencing of African Ameri-
can and women international theorists historically and in later historiograph-
ical work.31 Dorothy Fosdick’s inclusion is, therefore, noteworthy as the ex-
ception that proves the rule. So sought after was Fosdick’s membership that 
the CFR bent the informal rules that had until that time kept “lady members” 
from joining. As Council member William Diebold explained to MacIver, “It 
would probably require action” by the Council’s Board of Directors to change 
the rule that female members could not join study groups, “and in any case to 
make an open breach of the rule would be difficult, since we are often pressed 
to let much less qualified women participate in some of the things we are do-
ing.”32 By listing Ms. Fosdick as the secretary and hence staff, which Council 
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officer William Diebold explained “in Council parlance was an honorary po-
sition just below that of the Chairman . . . [that] would not entail any clerical 
or administrative duties,”33 Fosdick would be able to take part in the group’s 
deliberations.
The Council was not entirely successful recruiting for the study group. As 
Diebold warned MacIver in a letter of 5 November 1953, “I am reasonably 
Table 1. Members of the CFR Study Group, and Other Attendees
Name (alphabetical order) Brief biographical information
(Group members)
John Blumgart American Committee on United Europe
Edgar M. Church Shearman, Sterling and Wright
Dorothy Fosdick Formerly of the Policy Planning Staff and Instructor in 
Sociology at Smith College
Hajo Holborn Professor of History, Yale University
William W. Kaufmann Professor, Princeton University Center of International 
Studies
George A. Lipsky Carnegie Research Fellow, CFR, formerly Assistant 
Professor of Political Science, UC- Berkeley
Robert M. MacIver Professor of Sociology, Columbia University
Isidor Rabi Professor of Physics, Columbia University
Robert Strausz- Hupé Professor of Political Science, Wharton School of  
Business, University of Pennsylvania
Kenneth W. Thompson Rockefeller Foundation
R. Gordon Wasson Investment banker, J.P. Morgan and Co.
Arnold Wolfers Professor of International Relations, Yale University
(Others)
Byron Vincent Dexter CFR staff member
William Diebold Director of Economic Affairs, CFR
Charles Burton Marshall Formerly of the State Dept.
George S. Franklin Jr. CFR staff member (1945– 1971)
Grant S. McClellan CFR staff member
Gerhart Niemeyer CFR staff member, formerly of the State Dept.
Paul Zinner CFR staff member, formerly of the State Dept.
Walter Mallory CFR staff member
Charles M. Lichenstein CFR staff member
Henry L. Roberts CFR staff member
William Henderson CFR staff member
John Armstrong CFR staff member
Source: CFR archives, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
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sure that a few people will turn us down. For instance, George Kennan has 
been refusing most invitations lately.”34 Diebold enclosed a letter, sadly no 
longer with the study group documents, of possible substitutes. In the end, 
Kennan evidently did turn down the invitation, as did Kennan’s substitute, a 
Mr. Cohen, along with a Mr. Bennett.35
More concrete is that Diebold and MacIver did not consider or failed to 
recruit George N. Shuster, Frank Tannenbaum, and William E. Hocking to 
join the group. Shuster was president of Hunter College in New York and 
chairman of the US National Commission to UNESCO at the time of the 
study group.36 Tannenbaum was an Austrian- born criminologist and historian 
at Columbia University, known for his work in creating the Farm Security Ad-
ministration during the New Deal era.37 Hocking was a retired Harvard philos-
opher, trained by Josiah Royce.38 Finally, MacIver and Diebold also discussed 
the importance of having “a clergyman” member, relatively unsurprising given 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s stature within American foreign policy circles after World 
War II. There too, they appear to have failed.
The choice of thinkers to engage was contentious, and it changed as the 
meetings progressed. Early in first meeting, for example, Arnold Wolfers sug-
gested studying concepts rather than authors, while political scientist Robert 
Strausz- Hupé opposed the tentative list of theorists, saying he believed that 
“many of the listed authors were simply elaborators of previous theories; [E. 
H.] Carr, for example . . . , seems to be a restatement of Hegel.”39 But eventu-
ally the first six meetings covered: (1) the international thought of E. H. Carr 
as the exemplar of historical theorizing; (2) Hans J. Morgenthau, as a means 
of approaching the issue of the national interest; (3) the scientific approach of 
Harold D. Lasswell; (4) geopolitical theory, via the work of Yale political sci-
entist Nicholas Spykman; (5) the theory of empire, approached through the 
thought of Lenin and Joseph Schumpeter; and finally (6) Wilsonian idealism. 
The final meeting was a general assessment of theory in international relations 
and an attempt to draw some conclusions from the study group’s work.
The Realist Gambit Revisited: The CFR Study Group  
and the Origins of IR Theory
The Council on Foreign Relations study group on the theory of international 
relations took place in the midst of a sharp uptick in interest in the theoretical 
aspects of world politics. While today the taken- for- granted core of IR, before 
10 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
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1950 theory was largely absent from the field. This was true even for early 
texts now deemed groundbreaking.40 The group therefore represents a unique 
window into the origins of IR theory.
A 1946 survey of International Relations by Waldemar Gurian, a Notre 
Dame political scientist and editor of the prestigious Review of Politics, for ex-
ample, made no mention of theory. For Gurian, the study of International Re-
lations “involves geography, economics, international law, history, anthropol-
ogy, demography, social psychology (study of mass emotions, public opinion, 
propaganda), and comparative government.”41 Prophetically, Gurian made a 
point of stressing that “It would be fatal if the study of international relations 
were to be determined solely by professional and specialistic interests.”42 Sim-
ilarly, in 1949 Frederick Dunn of the Yale Institute of International Studies 
conducted a survey of “The Present Course of International Relations Re-
search” that made scant reference to theory.43
But by 1952, when Kenneth W. Thompson published “The Study of Inter-
national Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments,” theory was front and 
center.44 The first edition of Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations had appeared 
in 1948,45 and Columbia Professor John H. Herz’s Political Realism and Political 
Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities three years later.46 Noting how the 
primary methodological approach to the study of international relations in the 
interwar period had been that of diplomatic history, Thompson complained, 
“The price which was paid for this rigorous, objective and non- generalized ap-
proach to the field was the absence of anything corresponding to a theory of 
international relations.”47 Thompson was concerned that the dominance of 
the diplomatic history approach left the study of contemporary international 
relations to journalists: “The ‘bible’ . . . became The New York Times.”48
A Google Ngram search reinforces a survey impression that serious inter-
est in the theory of international relations only began a few short years before 
Lipsky, MacIver, and co. gathered in New York. The term international relations 
theory was essentially unknown before 1950.49 The related terms theory of in­
ternational relations shows a large spike in popularity in the 1950s, following its 
emergence in the 1920s.50 The term IR theory, however, emerges only much 
later in the 1980s.51 While far from exhaustive, these data help demonstrate 
the emergence and sedimentation of a specific thing called international re-
lations, known increasingly by the acronym IR. In other words, in the 1920s 
the emphasis was on the theory of international relations understood as a feature 
of the world, whereas by the 1950s it was international relations theory under-
stood as a growing body of (at least potentially) theoretical knowledge. By the 
1980s, IR was not just a body of knowledge but a coherent disciplinary social 




For historian of IR Nicolas Guilhot, the turn to theory was driven by an attempt 
on the part of “a number of scholars, policy practitioners, and public intellec-
tuals” to “defin[e] IR as a separate field based on a distinct theory of politics.”52 
Drawing on the archival record of another conference on international theory, 
held at the Rockefeller Foundation on 7– 8 May 1954, Guilhot describes the ac-
tivities of a group of scholars— including Chicago political scientist Hans Mor-
genthau and Morgenthau’s friend and former colleague Kenneth W. Thompson 
from the Rockefeller Foundation— who made a “realist gambit” aimed at defin-
ing IR itself by providing the field a realist theoretical cornerstone.
The group who gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation hoped to head 
off the absorption of IR into political science, which, as a number of scholars 
have shown, was becoming increasingly behavioralist in orientation in the 
postwar period.53 The theory of IR, for Guilhot, was developed by this real-
ist group as a way to secure a space for an alternative vision of politics and 
scholarship to the behavioralist paradigm.54 Following the theoretical work 
of theorist Hans Morgenthau from the University of Chicago,55 together with 
others such as theologian Reinhold Niebuhr,56 a realistic approach to politics 
placed in the center the struggle over power and the inherently tragic nature 
of human social life. Realists thus opposed as hopeless the attempt to replace 
political with scientific forms of solving collective problems, such as the inter-
war League of Nations. While such instruments might foster trust, they could 
never replace the need for constant vigilance in the defense of the national 
interest. As Guilhot explains, because for realists like Morgenthau politics was 
“ultimately impervious to rationalization, its best rational rendition was under 
the form of prudential maxims, not scientific principles.”57
Alongside other revisionist accounts of IR’s history,58 Guilhot’s investiga-
tions have turned commonsense understandings of the field’s history on their 
head. For scholars entering IR in the 1980s and 1990s, realism was the chief 
mainstream approach to world politics. The reasons were twofold. First, real-
ism was supposedly the distillation of centuries of political wisdom, connect-
ing such thinkers as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bismarck, battle 
hardened by the First Great Debate in IR between realism and its idealist or 
utopian alternative. Guilhot proves this was only partially true and wholly 
manufactured. Second, realism was popular because it was considered ade-
quately scientific in ways competing theories— the much- maligned idealism as 
well as later “traditional” approaches— were not.59 Realism was thus thought 
to represent dispassionate objective knowledge of world politics with a strong 
lineage.
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Guilhot’s attack thus takes aim at the centerpiece of IR. He shows that 
contrary to received wisdom, “realism” was neither separable from the devel-
opment of the field of IR after 1945 nor ever a genuinely scientific approach. 
In fact, common wisdom is wrong on both counts. Rather than offering a 
suitably scientific approach to the study of international affairs, the realists 
gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation in fact put forward realism as a defense 
against the growing dominance of scientism within political science. IR theory, 
for Guilhot, is best “understood as a case of intellectual irredentism, resist-
ing its own integration into American social science.”60 Moreover, while the 
“early IR theorists [the Rockefeller group] referred to traditions and historical 
lineages that had been repressed under the rule of pragmatism and empirical 
social science (whether Augustine, Machiavelli, or a pre- rationalist views of 
politics),”61 realism was very much tied to concerns located in mid- twentieth- 
century American politics and society.
Beyond the Rockefeller Conference
Guilhot’s intervention has been highly productive, but discovery of the CFR 
group calls for a reassessment of its central claims since, clearly, thinking 
about international relations theory in America in the early 1950s went be-
yond the small but influential group that gathered at the Rockefeller Foun-
dation. Although a Council study group had been proceeding for six months 
prior to the Rockefeller conference, and that there was significant overlap in 
membership— namely former Policy Planning Staff member Dorothy Fosdick, 
Rockefeller Foundation consultant Kenneth W. Thompson, and Yale political 
scientist Arnold Wolfers (see table 1)— almost no trace can be found of the 
realist gambit in the archival record.62
The lack of any mention of a realist gambit is doubly curious because ac-
cording to Guilhot, Thompson was the central figure behind the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s decision to host the 1954 conference.63 Hired by Rockefeller 
Foundation president Dean Rusk as a consultant in 1953, Thompson was 
keen to influence the Rockefeller’s funding of IR programs away from a nar-
row behavioralist focus. Yet if this was such a central theme of the Rockefeller 
conference, why did Thompson make no mention of it at any point? Why did 
neither Fosdick nor Wolfers?
Of course, the issue could have been discussed at the group’s dinners, of 
which the archival record is silent. Equally possible is that the decision by 
the Carnegie Corporation to fund Lipsky’s year at the CFR was part of an 
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anti- behavioralist gambit organized at the foundation level, also absent from 
the documents. But if so, it remains curious that there was no mention of 
the realist gambit in more than thirty- five hours of on- the- record discussion. 
Also curious is that Lipsky’s theoretical interventions as well as the theories 
discussed during the study group’s meetings were not limited to realism in the 
vein of Morgenthau and Thompson.
Why then was there no sustained cross- fertilization between the Rockefeller 
Foundation conference and the similar set of discussions going on in New York 
at the CFR? Two non- mutually exclusive explanations suggest themselves: first, 
Thompson was deliberately concerned to keep the discussions separate; or their 
separateness was so evident that spending the study group’s valuable time elabo-
rating on a related set of conversations would have been impolitic. Whichever is 
correct, it would seem clear that the notion of a realist gambit does not exhaust 
the reasons for a turn to theory in the 1950s. To be sure, a realist gambit was 
being made in the manner and for the reasons Guilhot describes. But the turn to 
theory was broader than the realist gambit allows.
If the existence of the CFR study group on theory proves that the realist 
gambit of Morgenthau, Thompson, and co. was a reason— but not the sole 
reason— for the turn to theory in thinking about international relations in the 
early 1950s, much of Guilhot’s interpretation of the origins of IR theory in the 
early 1950s nevertheless remains intact when juxtaposed with the documents 
of the CFR study group. In particular, the CFR group highlights the crucial 
role played by émigré scholars in the formation of IR theory, scholars steeped 
in long- standing philosophical traditions less prominent in America, in the 
context of a practical defense of liberalism against totalitarian alternatives 
that occupied an array of thinkers in the United States after the war. Also 
highlighted at the CFR and Rockefeller Foundation meetings is the elite in-
stitutional context of IR theory’s birth and its inherently conservative nature. 
Finally, George Lipsky’s attempts at fashioning a theory of international rela-
tions lays bare the practical difficulties faced by both groups when set in the 
context of the practical power of science in the American political and social 
disciplines, then as now.
The Nominalist Gambit: Lipsky, Liberalism, and  
the Search for Theory at the CFR
Over the course of his seven preparatory papers for the study group, George 
Lipsky developed a position on the theory of international relations he la-
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bels “nominalist.”64 Lipsky’s thinking was inspired by his engagement with 
the work of one Karl Pribram,65 a government economist at the United States 
Tariff Commission who in 1949 published Conflicting Patterns of Thought.66 
Pribram’s book is dedicated to the delineation of four general patterns of 
thought he terms universalistic, nominalistic, intuitional, and dialectical. Of 
the four modes, Pribram privileges the nominalistic because in his words— 
which Lipsky reproduced almost verbatim in his background work for the CFR 
study group67— only nominalism “has rejected [the identity of thinking and 
being]” and accepted that “to grasp the order of the universe must proceed by 
way of assumptions and purely hypothetical concepts— whose verity cannot 
be postulated but whose usefulness must be demonstrated.”68
In the terminology of today’s IR, Lipsky’s view of theory might be labeled 
proto- constructivist: knowledge for Lipsky is perspectival and purposive, rath-
er than objective and disinterested. Humans have an imperfect grasp on the 
world and it is only through trial and error that they move forward tentatively. 
Lispky, following Pribram, criticizes in particular the universalistic pattern of 
thought— which characterizes religion and dogmatic scientism— for falsely 
believing in the ability to gain direct access to the order of the universe. For 
Lipsky, like Pribram, no such direct access is possible. Instead, knowledge is 
composed of the piecemeal addition of facts collected from testing hypotheses 
that are limited in scope and provisional. Thus, Lipsky explains to the study 
group, when it comes to theory the “disposition of this writer is to understand 
a general theory in a nominalist manner as an organization of hypotheses con-
cerning the nature of objective reality.”69 Theory is less ultimately true than 
tentatively true.
Like common criticisms of constructivism,70 Lipsky’s nominalist theory 
does not resemble theory at all to our contemporary eyes. Nominalism rep-
resents rather a meta- theoretical perspective on the nature of knowledge 
and hence theory. Therefore, while Lipsky states that his theory “is designed 
to explain the objective world of reality,” his nominalism seems to militate 
against precisely the type of theory we understand as theory. Unlike the real-
ists like Morgenthau, for whom international relations is a struggle for power 
between states, Lipsky does not make similarly strong claims about the object 
or objects of international relations, of what international relations consists. 
From a nominalist perspective there can be no ultimate statement of what 
international relations is. Tellingly, this includes politics, since, “The study 
of international relations transcends any confining discipline and is an area 
where data focus with relation to particular problems that cannot be called 
exclusively or even basically political.”71 In particular, philosophical issues are 
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not, in Lispky’s opinion, to be considered adjunct issues that can be discarded: 
“basic philosophical problems are immediately involved in this field.”72
From a nominalist perspective it follows that there can be no single and 
unified theory of international relations. As Lipsky states, although “One is 
tempted to assert that a search should be undertaken to find a final theory of 
international relations,” this “could only be achieved in the presence of total 
knowledge. Man will not achieve this result in the foreseeable future.”73 As 
Lipsky continues, “If these propositions are true, there cannot be a theory of 
international relations that will be sufficiently operational for all men as to 
deserve the designation the theory of international relations.”74
But whereas Lipsky’s nominalism is opposed to realism on the existence 
of a clear— “realistic”— referent object for international relations, in multiple 
other ways Lipsky’s nominalism has deep connections with the realists and 
the broader context of IR’s birth, as Guilhot describes. Lipsky’s attempts at 
the CFR to develop a nominalist theory of international relations demon-
strates that the search for theory was not simply an attempt to defend IR as a 
multidisciplinary academic field but was rather reflective of the character of 
international relations as an elite social space, crossing academia, the world of 
think tanks and the media, and into government and the intergovernmental 
sphere, where international relations are practiced. As such, the search for a 
theory of international relations reflected the priorities of and social forces 
acting upon American elites at the time: namely the search for an intellec-
tually supported defense of liberalism and liberal democracy against serious 
challengers, a search heavily influenced by the influx of émigrés from Europe 
before and after the war.
In this the Rockefeller and CFR conferences are more similar then they 
first appear. An initial comparison is unfavorable to the CFR group: the 
Rockefeller conference boasts greater name recognition both within IR, espe-
cially Morgenthau, and in the history of American foreign policy, including 
Paul Nitze, the architect of containment,75 and future secretary of state Dean 
Rusk (1961– 69) (see table 2).76 But later notoriety should not hide the similar 
positions of the elites gathered at the two sets of meetings.
From the Rockefeller Foundation group, Don Price, Dean Rusk, and Ken-
neth W. Thompson were administrators at the Ford and Rockefeller Foun-
dations, respectively, and Robert Bowie and Dorothy Fosdick were then cur-
rent and former members of the Policy Planning Staff. The CFR group had 
Thompson and Fosdick, but a broader array of academics. The only major 
difference was the prominence of journalists and public intellectuals James 
Reston and Walter Lippmann at the Rockefeller meetings, while the CFR’s 
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ties to Wall Street and business was represented by banker R. Gordon Wasson 
and lawyer Edgar Church. As Guilhot notes, therefore, the CFR study group 
also signifies an attempt to retain a role for elite nonspecialists in international 
relations quite distinct from later understandings of theory.
Like their Rockefeller counterparts, Lipsky and his CFR colleagues also 
faced the predominant scientism of the early 1950s within which they were 
making claims to theory, knowledge, and explanation. Both were trapped by 
the need to speak the language of science and the search for theory while 
simultaneously questioning and in large measure rejecting then popular no-
tions of science. The concept of explanation, for example, clearly means for 
Lipsky something quite different than the approaches that seek to subsume 
unique events and recurring conjunctions of variables under general causal 
laws. Since direct knowledge of such laws is impossible from a nominalist per-
spective, Lipsky’s use of the term “explain” does not refer to the subsumption 
of observed acts under causal laws.
More broadly still, the CFR and Rockefeller groups shared an intellectual 
background in the United States concerned with defending liberalism and lib-
eral democracy. This context goes well beyond the later IR liberalism focused 
on intergovernmental cooperation and the coordinating role of international 
organizations and into the mid- century zeitgeist chronicled by Ira Katnelson.77 
For Pribram, an adequate defense of democracy cannot be based on a univer-
salist pattern of thought alone since “[t]he natural temper of democracy is 
empirical.”78 By this Pribram means that democracy is based on a fiction that 
is not universally valid but practically useful, appealing to individual interests. 
A corollary is that persuasion and education, rather than dogma, are the only 
Table 2. Rockefeller Conference June 1954 Attendees
Robert Bowie, Policy Planning Staff (PPS)
Dorothy Fosdick, former PPS
William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago
Reinhold Niebuhr, Union Theological Seminary
Paul H. Nitze, Foreign Service Educational Foundation
Don K. Price, Ford Foundation
James B. Reston, New York Times
Dean Rusk, Rockefeller Foundation
Kenneth W. Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation
Arnold Wolfers, Professor of International Relations, Yale University
Source: Guilhot 2011, 239.
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permissible methods of influencing the views of communities and peoples. 
“A strong case can be made for a defense of nominalist methods, quite inde-
pendently of the logical validity of other patterns. In all democracies, freedom 
of thought and individual liberty have ranked among the highest social values. 
Experience shows that hypothetical thinking provides the safest logical foun-
dation for the experience and protection of these liberties.”79
Although he drew heavily on Pribram in 1953– 54, it was not until later, 
in A Formula for Liberals (1972), that Lipsky explicitly developed a nominalist 
theoretical defense of liberalism. There “liberalism” refers to a “political phi-
losophy insisting upon the preservation of individual areas of freedom within 
which he may associate himself with others in groups in the creation of a 
tentative, non- dogmatic consensus.”80 Lipsky asserts that a “formula for liber-
als” can “be constructed on the proposition that there can be a sound theory 
which will operate as a continuing restraint on government so that it does not 
become a vehicle of interests which are adverse to the individual.”81
Lipsky’s “formula” for liberals is then a theory in the sense of being a phil-
osophical defense of democracy as the proper vehicle for truly liberal gov-
ernance, a theory in the sense we might use political theory, not empirical 
theory. As he goes on, “It must be emphasized that the correctives that may be 
required to improve our society do not require the acceptance of any author-
itarian panacea.”82 No authoritarian political philosophy— fascist, socialist, 
communist, or any admixture of them— can be liberal, however efficient or 
effective. The role of his formula is to provide a robust, philosophically driven 
vehicle to remind scholars and statespeople of this fact.
Lipsky’s formula is thus similar to, yet at the same time starkly different 
from, the realism of Morgenthau and the Rockefeller group in revealing ways. 
Both are, for example, elitist and quite conservative in their vision of foreign 
policy and how it should ideally be made, a fact emphasized by Guilhot about 
the Rockefeller group.83 Whereas Morgenthau foregrounds the role of the pru-
dent statesperson as the proper practitioner of realism and protector of the 
national interest,84 in A Formula for Liberals, Lipsky shows a marked concern 
for the role of the intelligentsia versus the “newly enfranchised” masses by 
emphasizing that his is a formula for elite politicians as defenders of a never- 
ending process by which something like a common or “national” interest 
emerges. Having both “a descriptive and a manipulative function[,] [i]t is the 
responsibility of an intellectual elite, recognizing the limitations upon human 
knowledge, to build and fight for a nominalist theory that is designed to justify 
democratic processes.”85
Such statements were, of course, likely to resonate at the Council on For-
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eign Relations, a key node in the field of elite power in the United States, then 
as now. They remind us that when analyzing the CFR study group— like that 
which gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation— the scholar is not only as-
sessing the actions of scholars engaged in an intellectual project, but elites in a 
political project. The interconnections between the American state, business, 
the academy, and organizations like the CFR— unique in their breadth and 
scale— is one of the most signal features of the American political context.86
Lipsky, and the CFR group as a whole, were then bound to be both drawn 
to yet ultimately dissatisfied with Morgenthau’s realism. Realism had a pru-
dent aspect that was attractively tentative, conservative, and elitist, preserv-
ing a prominent place for the historically and philosophically informed states-
person, presumably a member of the CFR one could easily add. In the study 
group documents Morgenthau thus gets a good reception.87 But the sense from 
many participants is that the theory is in the end overblown. Lipsky warns 
that if the theorist exceeds proper scope in his or her generalizations, “the 
theorist passes beyond the function of the social scientist (or the democratic 
statesman) and becomes the religious leader, the metaphysician, or political 
fanatic preoccupied with imposing his values on reality.”88
The conceptual centerpiece of realism, the national interest, is a particular 
weak spot. Not only does it focus unnecessarily on the nation and the state— 
which, it is noted, have only been around for two hundred years or so— it is 
philosophically indefensible since each political community defines the na-
tional interest differently.89 Once again, Lipsky’s disposition is “to understand 
a general theory in a nominalist manner as an organization of hypotheses con-
cerning the nature of objective reality,” but “the terms in which man may 
know reality must forever fall short of totally revealing reality.” Therefore, 
“Although essence or substance of reality may be assumed, nothing meaning-
ful may be said about it as a totally comprehended truth.”90 Proclaiming, as 
does Morgenthau, that international relations ultimately consist of the strug-
gle over power to achieve the national interest is in the end too universalist a 
pattern of thought for Lipsky.
In place of the prudent search for the national interest and its ongoing 
defense in the anarchical environment of international politics, Lipsky sub-
stitutes “non- doctrinaire empirical liberalism” based on “an intellectual pref-
erence for the relative and the tentative.”91 Even the prudent statesmen, we 
might say, can sometimes get it wrong. For Lipsky, consequently, “The alter-
native to the self- limiting democratic process is the application of the au-
thoritarian assumption that the decision of leadership can be and has been 
produced by a process that can distinguish between good and evil in the ul-
timate sense.”92 Liberalism requires instead policy making through trial and 
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error, popular mandates, education and persuasion, the never- ending search 
for popular consent, which can be withdrawn as well as given.
In place of the prudent statesperson, Lipsky substitutes the leader aware of 
when and where to draw on expertise:
The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon provid-
ing ends and means; in the role of statesmen, upon applying means to desired 
ends. The ideal would be a combination to discover and apply in the same 
person or persons. An approach to the ideal is the collaboration of the theorist 
whose expertise includes capacity to gather sufficient and relevant data and 
organize them, particular those relating to the political conditions influencing 
the statesman’s activity, and the statesman with the capacity to recognize nec-
essary expertise when he sees it. This collaboration requires some combination 
of amateur and professional capacity in both.93
Lipsky’s formula for liberals remains nascent in his preparatory papers in 
1953. By the end of the meetings he has elucidated a theory of theories, while 
hoping that this could inform an actual theory, which remains out of reach. 
Only later does he develop what counts as a clearly normative theory covering 
the best mode of governance and its practical implications.
It is perhaps not surprising that, unlike Morgenthau’s realism, Lipsky’s 
nominalist theory of international relations has passed largely into obscurity. 
Lipsky’s is a call for a certain type of constrained— or in IR scholar Daniel 
Levine’s words, chastened— form of expertise.94 Lipsky’s expertise is a form of 
knowledge aware of its limitations. No single theory, derived from supposed 
verities of international life— be they the struggle for power, the effects of 
geography, or the needs of effective political communication— can nor should 
seek to provide total knowledge to fully comprehend and control internation-
al life. Lipsky’s is a call for a self- denying ordinance, directed at IR scholars 
and to scholars and statespersons in general. No one likes a self- denying or-
dinance; it does scholars little good in their attempt to speak to power and 
define the scope of their competence, and it does policy makers little any good 
in their political projects. Yet its philosophical merit would seem undeniable 
and well worth revisiting.
International Relations: A Cold War Social Science?
If the CFR study group on international relations theory took place during a 
period of growth and consolidation of the field of International Relations, its 
20 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
broader backdrop was a massive and rapid expansion of the social sciences in 
the United States. In the words of evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin, 
the “Big Truth” about the Cold War is that it “was responsible for an unprec-
edented and explosive expansion of the academy.”95 As Mark Solovey notes, 
to illustrate, the American Sociological Association had around one thousand 
members in the early 1900s. By the 1970s, the number was above 14,000.96 
Sociology’s impressive growth was typical of the other social sciences like psy-
chology, political science, and economics.
The Second World War, and the New Deal before it, had witnessed ex-
ponential growth of the American state, with unprecedented opportunities 
for social scientists. As Marshall Planner Jacques Reinstein later comment-
ed, to cite just one example, when he was close to finishing college in the 
mid- 1930s the “New Deal agencies . . . were proliferating like mushrooms.” 
Ambitious men and women like Reinstein spent a good deal of time “hanging 
around personnel offices, trying to get interviews, one after the other.”97 After 
the war, some like Reinstein stayed in Washington, but many others returned 
to college campuses, which themselves witnessed a boom in admissions from 
returning servicemen funded by the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act— 
the GI Bill— and spurred by the institutionalization of government support of 
the sciences through the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
in 1950.98
Recent years have seen a corresponding rise in historical attention paid 
to the interrelationship between the trajectory of the social sciences and the 
development of the American state after 1945, especially its expansion during 
the Cold War.99 Authors contributing to this literature have traced the deep 
interconnections between Cold War concerns, the provision of state and pri-
vate funding to the social sciences, and the changing visions of the appropri-
ate scope, methods, and boundaries of social science disciplines. Modifying 
President Eisenhower’s famous phrase, scholars like Sonia Amadae, David 
Price, Ron Robin, and Joy Rohde— to name just a few contributors to this 
generative research agenda— have highlighted episodes like the rise of ratio-
nal choice theory at the RAND Corporation in the late 1940s and the use 
of psychology to study populations deemed susceptible to communist propa-
ganda. Solovey explains that “many historical accounts have argued that the 
social sciences were, indeed, altered in significant ways in accord with these 
Cold- War inflected visions” of the proper relationship between academia 
and the state, captured in such labels as the “Politics- Patronage- Social Sci-
ence” or “Military- Intellectual complex,” and the “militarization” or “weap-
onization” of social science. For Lewontin, consequently, “When liberal and 
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Left academics think of the Cold War, they think of research agenda warped 
by the ideological fervor and political pressures of American foreign policy, 
and of professional and personal lives ruined directly and indirectly by anti- 
communist witch- hunts and pusillanimous academic administrators.”100
More recent historical scholarship, however, has cautioned the need to 
resist the assumption that the social sciences were uniformly impacted by the 
Cold War, and that the imbrication of the social sciences with the American 
state was the sole or even primary influence on their development in the pe-
riod.101 The various social sciences interacted with the state in highly diverse 
ways, with many scholars having little to do with the funding streams and 
projects historians have analyzed. In other words, the social sciences in the 
mid- twentieth century were not passive receivers of government priorities; 
disciplinary change occurred for broader reasons, both internal and external, 
and many scholars pursued their own research agendas away from the priori-
ties of the Cold War state.
In this section, I use the scholarly debate over the impact of the Cold War 
state on the social sciences as a foil to continue introducing the CFR study 
group on the theory of international relations. To what extent does the study 
group prove or disprove IR’s status as a “Cold War social science?” Given that 
the topic was international affairs and foreign policy, we might expect there 
to be significant or even predominant traces of Cold War concerns. Was that, 
in fact, the case? If not, what subjects did preoccupy the group’s participants.
Four central issues emerged in the discussions: the nature of international 
relations as an object of inquiry; knowledge and the corresponding status of 
theoretical vis- à- vis practical knowledge; the role of values in international 
relations theory; and the nature and purpose of theory. These four issues do 
not exhaust the contents of the debates, but they do capture their most salient 
features, not least because IR scholars to this day frequently disagree on these 
very questions. In each case, I show they spoke to broader and more long- 
standing concerns in the social sciences including IR’s status in 1953– 54 as a 
Cold War social science.
The Nature of International Relations As an Object of Inquiry
Members of the study group considered one of their core tasks to be determin-
ing the nature of international relations. William Kaufmann made the point 
strongly during the first meeting’s discussion. The “first step” in thinking about 
international relations theory, he argued, “is to define the ‘animal’ . . . [:] the 
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field of international relations.”102 Alongside, or even prior to, the question 
of theory, then, was the issue of object: what is international relations? What 
does the term cover?
Kaufmann’s suggestion was to “begin with the idea that one is dealing with 
a system or society.”103 Such a call should have been familiar to the participants. 
The notion of “international society” or the “society of nations” was common 
in prewar scholarship on international relations, and, indeed, in its practice 
through such international organizations as the League of Nations.104 A sys-
temic perspective, however, was a more recent and more prominent influence.
As historian Hunter Heyck has shown, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed 
a broad convergence across the social sciences on the power and appropri-
ateness of a systemic perspective, which came to redefine “the central con-
cepts, methods, tools, practices, and institutional relations of postwar social 
science.”105 Spurred by the influx of social scientists into government service 
during the New Deal and the Second World War, and by the “organization-
al revolution” in twentieth- century business, what Heyck terms the “age of 
system” was characterized by the rise of control technologies, understood as “de-
vice[s] or formalized procedure[s] that [are] used to coordinate the operations 
of multiple components so that they function as a single unit.”106 As historian 
Joel Isaacs has chronicled, the creation of the interdisciplinary Department 
of Social Relations at Harvard provided a fulcrum for formation of systemic 
approaches in sociology and related fields and for the work of key figures like 
Talcott Parsons and Clyde Kluckhohn, and within the area of political sci-
ence and IR, Karl Deutsch.107 Between approximately 1920 and 1970, Heyck 
shows, “virtually every field of social science re- conceptualized its central ob-
ject as a system defined and given structure by a set of processes, mechanisms, 
or relationships.”108
It might be expected then that the CFR study group would adopt such a 
systemic perspective as the basis of their discussions. Indeed, strong traces of 
systems theory are evident in the digests, primarily through the discussion 
of Chicago political scientist Harold Lasswell and David Easton, one of the 
earliest and most forceful proponents of a systems perspective to the study of 
politics. The group felt Lasswell’s approach— which centered on the inter-
action of political psychology and mass communication— was powerful and 
innovative, despite the opaque style of its author.109 As a tool to understand 
the psychological basis of liberal democracy, Lasswell’s work was considered 
to have significant merit, not least because Lasswell was said to be gaining 
political influence at the time. As CFR member Charles Burton Marshall 
impressed upon the group, Lasswell was then currently popular within the 
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halls of power, as “many members of the ‘new team’ in Washington refer to 
Lasswell as an authority for their views on how policy should be articulated 
and communicated.”110
The study group ultimately felt that international relations was a broader 
object than Lasswell’s psychological approach allowed for. “Professor Wolf-
ers,” moreover, felt “that to apply a theory of individual behavior to national 
behavior is a non- sequitur.”111 With the movement away from Lasswell, the 
idea of a systemic or macro- level societal approach failed to gain a foothold in 
the group’s discussions. In 1953, IR was evidently still some years away from a 
full engagement with systems theory, indicated by the appearance in 1957 of 
Morton Kaplan’s System and Process International Process, and Kenneth Waltz’s 
turn to systems theory, as described by IR historians Daniel Bessner and Nico-
las Guilhot.112
The reason a systems perspective did not catch on is telling, however. Over 
the course of the study group, attempts to fix the nature of “the animal”— in 
Kaufmann’s terms— on one single aspect of world politics were countered by 
members asserting the importance of other facets and repetition of the theme 
that international politics is too complex to be reduced to a single system, 
however elaborate. Soon after noting the potential for an approach focused on 
constellations of states, for example, Rabi himself asked “what ‘international 
relations’ covered. Does it not include international commerce and invest-
ment?”113 Most pressingly, the role of foreign policy makers or practitioners 
repeatedly intruded, impeding considerations of international relations as a 
coherent entity. Kaufmann noted the imperative to include the political pro-
cess in any attempt to explain international outcomes.
Beyond the notion of system, the study group explored other conceptual-
izations of international relations as an object of analysis through their discus-
sions of the theoretical approaches of Carr, Marx, Wilson, and others.
The idea of the “national interest” gained significant attention. Several 
objections, however, were quickly raised to an equation of the search for and 
fulfillment of the national interest and the scope of international relations. 
The objections equate to what contemporary IR scholars view as the nonob-
jective, or socially constructed, aspects of the national interest and, indeed, 
the state itself as a political unit. As Lipsky interpreted Morgenthau’s argu-
ment, “the national interest .  .  . is a subjective abstraction that will receive 
differing content depending on the outlook of the individual employing it.”114 
Elsewhere, Chairman MacIver noted that “The state . . . , which is the chief 
object of inquiry in international political theory, is not a datum in nature but 
rather a construct for serving certain ends.”115 Thus, while the search for the 
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national interest could be viewed as part of international relations, it was too 
narrow as a picture of the whole.
The case of geopolitics provides a further example of the distillation of one 
crucial aspect of international relations deemed insightful, but ultimately in-
appropriate as the foundational feature of the object “international relations.” 
Kenneth Thompson was particularly drawn to the approach. Thompson felt 
that “there was some merit in thinking of the elements of international pol-
itics as a pyramid with the geographic element constituting its base”116 and 
that “There is little doubt that this country has suffered from failing properly 
to appreciate the geographic factor” in international politics.117 But the group 
appears ultimately to have agreed with Lipsky’s conclusion that prediction 
based on geography could too easily slip into self- fulfilling prophecy. Geog-
raphy mattered, in other words, but was not the only aspect of international 
relations with which a proper theory of the subject must deal.
Finally, of all the conceptualizations of the fundamental nature of interna-
tional relations, Marxist theory— and particularly imperialism— got as close 
as any to garnering general agreement by the group, which must strike us as 
surprising given the political climate of the early 1950s. For Robert Strausz- 
Hupé, for example, “Marx offered a superbly intelligent theory.”118 Hajo Hol-
born agreed, noting that “while he was, of course, by no means a Marxist, 
he had the feeling that Marxism has been, in some respects, underrated. As 
a theory of history, or perhaps of political sociology, it had created certain 
insights which were an advance over previous concepts.”119 Holborn argued 
that Marxism had “contemporary relevance . . . when one notices the extent 
to which US foreign policy appears to be based on perverted Marxist notions. 
This country’s economic and technical assistance programs seem to be largely 
predicated on a theory of economic determinism, yet US policies fail to recog-
nize the power of ideas and the interrelationship between ideas and material 
welfare in attempting to influence behavior abroad.”120
In the end, however, the Marxism fell afoul of its political distastefulness 
for many of those gathered. The topic was whether the United States could 
be understood as an imperialist power. Thompson argued that “if imperialism 
is defined as an alteration of the status quo, then direct [American] action 
in countries like Italy or Guatemala could be termed imperialist.”121 Dorothy 
Fosdick, however, “questioned whether US intervention for the purpose of 
liberating a nation which had succumbed to Communism could be termed 
imperialist.”122
In sum, there was much enthusiasm expressed about coming to some clear 
understanding of the nature of “the animal” as a first necessary step in the the-
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orization of international relations. There were also clear traces of the systems 
theory in the waters of American political science in the early 1950s. But no 
agreement emerged on the question of what such an understanding would 
look like. The group stumbled over multiple insightful yet partial perspectives, 
concluding that no single approach or master concept could grasp the whole 
in all its complexity, especially its historical specificity and the crucial role of 
policy makers in international affairs.
The Nature of Knowledge and the Status of Theoretical  
Vis- à- Vis Practical Knowledge
During the group’s discussions, considerations of the object of analysis— 
international relations— frequently slipped into the nature of knowledge itself. 
In other words, behind or at least alongside the question of what international 
relations is lay the issue of how one comes to know international relations. The 
group’s conversations thus offer a case to examine the position of IR with-
in broader trends in the postwar social sciences concerning the meaning of 
knowledge and the type of knowledge the social sciences should aim for.
In particular, the study group offers the opportunity to assess the impor-
tance of behavioralism, as we have already seen. Based on recent historical 
work on IR and other fields, there are reasons both to expect behavioralism to 
be adopted and to expect it to have been rejected by the participants in the 
CFR study group.
The rise of behavioralism in America is a prominent theme in histori-
cal work on Cold War social science. Centered on the RAND organization, 
Robin shows how a key group of behavioralist academics collected around the 
study of conventional warfare, as opposed to the more well- known nuclear 
strategists, the famed “Wizards of Armageddon.”123 At RAND, behavioralists 
like Nathan Leites developed ideas such as the “operational code” as tools to 
explain the foreign policy behavior of foreign elites, drawing on psychology as 
an inspiration. Largely absent, Robin notes, were humanists, who were suspect 
due to both understanding of communism and the fact that “the humanities 
prized the past and put a premium on experience. Such concepts had no place 
in the military- academic complex.”124
The members of the group were “guided by a defining mission to transform 
American society and control global trends,”125 a mission that had been nur-
tured by similar educational training. Many, indeed, had been students of Har-
old Lasswell at the University of Chicago in the 1920s.126 The group shared 
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“a pervasive reluctance to ascribe to others any social or cultural trait that 
behavioralists could not identify within American society.”127 To illustrate, 
Robin cites the example of a late- 1940s study for the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) on “leadership in early communities” to highlight the absurd effects: a 
study of urban Philadelphia that did not consider the context to be culturally 
specific.128 How, Robin asks, “did behavioral scientists come to monopolize the 
function of interpreters and developers of modern culture”?129
Either to affirm its value or to reject it, therefore, we might then expect be-
havioralism to have been very much on the table at the study group meetings. 
As we have already seen, what we actually witness in the meeting digests is 
little attention to behavioralism, but not because the group coalesced around 
a non- behavioralist realist perspective, as Lipsky attempted to persuade the 
group of the merits of a nominalist understanding of theory as the proper phil-
osophical underpinning of a theory of theories of international relations.
Many of the members would have preferred not to spend so much time on 
the subject of knowledge. Hajo Holborn, for one, made clear at one stage that 
“The group had been convened to discuss theory of international relations, 
not theory of knowledge.”130 MacIver similarly “expressed the opinion that 
the group would have a hard time reaching agreement unless it avoided meta-
physical questions.”131 Nonetheless, the issue emerged at each of the meetings, 
and Lipsky’s defense of a nominalist position suggests a view of knowledge 
struggling against the greater certainty of realist and behavioral perspectives 
more prominent in mid- twentieth- century social science.
Lipsky’s defense of a nominalist position remains, however, very much rel-
evant to contemporary thinking about the nature of theory and knowledge in 
international relations, particularly new trends within broadly speaking con-
structivist work that stress the centrality of practice, practical knowledge, and 
prudence in international relations. A nominalist perspective by and large 
accords with accounts that highlight the socially constructed rather than ob-
jective or given nature of knowledge. For practice theorists in particular, much 
social action in international relations is neither based on consequentialist 
nor norm- governed reasoning, but is rather habitual, everyday, and taken- for- 
granted. Yet Lipsky posed an interesting question to this literature: Is there 
a fundamental difference between the knowledge of the statesman and the 
scholar?
Lipsky disagreed with political scientist David Easton, who had then re-
cently articulated the view that the two were distinct.132 Lipsky claims instead 
that “The theoretician may be distinguished from the practitioner of power 
for some purposes [but] they should not be distinguished for all, even main, 
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purposes. The knowledge they work with is or should be basically the same, 
that is knowledge to be understood in terms of a scientific systematics.”133 In 
relation to the supposed “prudence” of the statesman, for Lipsky, “I have no 
way of discovering what prudential knowledge is; nor has any theorist ever 
presented me with any test for separating qualitatively the kind of knowledge 
that the scientist gathers and the kind that the statesman should act by.”134
Lipsky’s rejection of any difference in the type of knowledge of the states-
man and academic leads him to espouse a position close to Plato’s call for 
philosopher- kings: “The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, 
is upon producing ends and means; in the role of the statesman, upon applying 
means to achieve discerned ends. The ideal would be a combination of capac-
ity to discover and apply in the same person or persons.”135
Contemporary work on practical knowledge, however, suggests that there 
is indeed a difference between the knowledge of the policy maker and the aca-
demic, only that the difference is practical rather than philosophical. As Wil-
liam Kaufmann noted of Morgenthau’s theory, “Morgenthau confuses, Profes-
sor Kaufmann felt, his position as an observer with that of a would- be policy 
maker.”136 While philosophically the knowledge of the policy maker and the 
scholar is the same, their distinct social locations makes all the difference. 
Indeed, even Lipsky acknowledges that the difference “between theoretician 
and statesman is that the former does not have to make decisions as to the 
means that are to be employed to achieve particular value goals or situations 
and the latter does have that most difficult task.”137 His final plea “is for great-
er awareness on the part of the natural collaborators, theorist (scientist) and 
statesman (practitioner of theory) of the nature of the scientific process, for 
greater awareness of what they are or should be doing.”138
The Role of Values in International Relations Theory
The third major issue confronted by the study group was the role of values 
in international relations and International Relations theory. Value- freedom 
cropped up numerous times during the discussions. We should not be surprised. 
The role of values has been a persistent source of contention in the social sci-
ences, back to the methodenstreit of the late nineteenth century. By extension, 
value- neutrality has been key to long- standing debates over the relationship 
between the state and the academy, and whether the term “Cold War social 
science” is an appropriate umbrella term for developments in America after 
1945. The role of values has been central to those in favor of the designation 
28 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
“Cold War social science,” due in large part to the prominence of episodes like 
the Project Camelot affair, which placed the role of government- funded social 
science in American foreign policy firmly in the political spotlight during the 
mid- 1960s.
As historian Joy Rohde recounts, Project Camelot was a counterinsur-
gency campaign in 1964– 65 funded by the Special Operations Research Of-
fice (SORO), a multiyear research institute created by the army in 1956 and 
housed at the American University in Washington, D.C.139 SORO was de-
signed “to be a hybrid institution that would seamlessly meld social scientific 
expertise with the operational concerns of army officers,” and it carried out 
numerous empirical studies on the ideas and doctrine of real and potential 
enemy populations, with the aim to “usher gradual, stable change toward and 
American- led world order.”140 Along these lines, Project Camelot aimed to 
study counterinsurgency techniques in real conditions in Latin America. That 
was before, that is, Chilean scholars realized the study was being paid for not 
by American University, but by the Pentagon,141 raising criticism that spread 
to the Chilean government and critics of the military- industrial- academic 
complex in the United States, “who hoped to draw attention to the problems 
of militarization in social science and American foreign affairs.”142
Historian Robert Proctor, has shown, however, that the meaning of value- 
freedom or value- neutrality has changed over time, which cautions against 
careless contextualization or periodization of the form in which it emerged 
during the study group’s conversations. Value- neutrality, Proctor argues, “far 
from being a timeless or self- evident principle, has a distinctive geography: 
‘value- freedom’ has meant different things to different people at different 
times.”143 “Slogans like “science must value- free” or “all knowledge is po-
litical” must be understood in light of specific fears and goals that change 
over time,” he goes on. Arguments for value- neutrality “may be a response 
to state or religious suppression of scientific ideas; value- neutrality may be a 
way to guard against personal interests obstructing scientific progress. Value- 
neutrality may reflect the desires of scholars to professionalize or to specialize; 
value- neutrality may conceal the fact that science has social origins and social 
consequences. Neutrality may provide a path along which one retreats or a 
platform from which one launches an offensive.”
In sum, “value- neutrality” to those who raised the issue at other times and 
places might not have meant the same thing as at the CFR in 1953 and 1954. 
Indeed, voices in favor of value- neutrality were muted at the CFR meetings, 
which accords with the general skepticism shown toward more objective and 
formalized understandings of both international relations and knowledge de-
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tailed above. As group chairman MacIver noted, the supposedly value- free 
methods of the natural sciences “could not be utilized by the social scientist. 
The fields of investigation are not analogous.” The example he drew on was 
the state, “the chief object of inquiry in international political theory.” For 
MacIver, the state “is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving 
certain ends.”144 As such, it was “shot through with value.”145
Physicist Isidor Rabi disagreed. When confronted by Lipsky as to his rea-
soning, Rabi expressed the view that the question of the role of values in 
theory “is an aesthetic question, not one related to the problem of knowl-
edge.”146 Lipsky used the opportunity to explore further the implications of 
his nominalist understanding of theory. Nominalism, he suggested, asserts the 
nonidentity of thinking and being, which, it follows, implies that the function 
of value is related to the indeterminacy of knowledge, since if a “theory is 
complete, if it explains all phenomena, then value is irrelevant since absolute 
predictability exists and one would not value or desire that which one knows 
is impossible.”147 As a further implication, “all statements of ends are attempts 
to freeze the status quo, a situation, on the time continuum. This is an impos-
sible task at best, and there is no scientific basis for asserting the goodness of 
such an illusion.”148
The issue reared its head during the discussion over the reality of “realism” 
and the question of the national interest. In terms that might have come from 
debates in political science and IR from the early 1990s,149 Carr, Lipsky sug-
gested, “underestimates the power of ideas.” Interests come from ideas, Lipsky 
asserted. “Interest is not a tangible thing that exists externally; it is related to 
a theory and value system.”150 Again, if Carr saw revolution as an inevitable 
feature of international change it was because, for Lipsky, he must desire it: 
“Carr is basically a man of violence who, driven by his desire for the fulfill-
ment of a revolution, defined in his own terms, has not taken the time to be 
philosophically precise.”151
Value- freedom, for Lipsky, was not appropriate, since “It is the academic 
theorists or the political leaders who lead in giving reality to interests by de-
fining them, by producing theories outlining them.”152 Thus,
In this light, single or multiple causes, long- range explanations or predictions 
of what will occur are highly questionable ventures, especially in history and 
the social sciences. To the extent that long- range predictions are undertaken 
in these areas, they tend to admit value preferences under the guise of science. 
What man predicts in history, beyond his scientific capacity to know, is what 
he wishes to happen.  .  .  . A sound methodology can propose to do no more 
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than provide a dynamic guide to assist the analyst in distinguishing between 
the suggestion of possibilities and the prophecy of the course of history.153
Yet there was a limit to the rejection of value- freedom, which emerged 
particularly during consideration of the theoretical contribution of none oth-
er than Harold Lasswell. Lasswell, Lipsky’s preparatory paper explains, thinks 
social science should be able to help teach society what to value and how to 
realize values.154 Poles apart from Morgenthau, it explained, Lasswell wanted 
to develop a policy science of political science: a management science, which 
could tell leaders how to manipulate political society to want international 
organization.155 Drawing on Freudian psychology and the notion of id, ego, 
superego, transposed to the level of the state, Lasswell’s desire was for the so-
cial scientist to be able to “make recommendations with more confidence re-
garding the development of an elite appropriate to the needs of a society that 
aspires toward freedom.”156 Lasswell’s policy science was aimed at supporting 
and promoting democracy through the creation of democratic personalities. 
Although the group found the approach unsuitable as a basis for a theory of 
international relations, “Lasswell’s contribution is or could be enormous. At 
least here is a forthright attempt to embody a discipline in the social sciences 
within the framework of science in the conventional sense.”157
At one stage of the meetings, Charles Burton Marshall— who later became 
a noted IR theorist158— shared his impression that he “thought that the group’s 
discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theory often wan-
dered from one yardstick to another . . . sometimes an aid to understanding, 
sometimes for advice to policymakers.”159 Marshall gave voice to precisely 
the predicament the study group approached but had no way to overcome 
over the course of their meetings. Thus “Professor Wolfers observed that po-
litical scientists would like to be able to perform two functions: the capacity 
for fairly accurate prediction and the capacity to make constructive political 
choice.”160 Holborn “suggested that a lesser, but perhaps more practical, objec-
tive of international relations theory than that suggested by Professor Wolfers 
is the counseling of shorter- range improvements in relationships between na-
tions.”161 And Rabi asked, “Is [the theory of international relations] a theory 
which attempted to define what was good and bad in a global sense? Or is it a 
theory which would be suitable for guiding policy- makers?”162
The concern with offering relevant policy advice is telling. It is perhaps 
less surprising that value- neutrality was not trumpeted by Lipsky and the study 
group, as value- neutrality was quite simply a good fit in the context of orga-
nizations like the CFR. While sharing the moniker “think tank” with Feder-
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ally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) like the RAND 
Corporation, organizations like the CFR and the Brookings Institution are 
in reality quite different, straddling as they do the boundaries between the 
government, academia, and the world of business. As Robin notes, FFRDCs 
like RAND were a new intellectual format, which “appeared to be creative, 
uninhibited meeting points between government clients and innovative 
scholars for solving the nation’s problems.”163 As such, RAND’s government 
clients apparently preferred behavioralists, who “claimed supposedly value- 
free skills.”164 Unlike RAND et al., the knowledge the CFR and similar orga-
nizations, like Brookings, provide to policy makers may be nonpartisan, but it 
is not value- free.
The Lure of Theory
The final issue central to the study group’s discussions was the nature of theory. 
What was “theory” when it came to international relations? What was it for? 
Not surprisingly given what has been said above about organizations like the 
CFR, members of the group thought that at the heart of the task of answering 
these questions was settling on an account of the relationship between the 
theorist and the policy maker. Should the theory of international relations 
offer “shovel ready” advice to the decision maker, or merely guide them in the 
exercise of their judgment?
The study group concluded in June 1954 without clear agreement on the 
proper parameters and unmistakable attributes of a theory of international re-
lations. Seemingly mutually exclusive notions emerged alongside one anoth-
er. On one side were voices sympathetic to Lipsky’s, for whom theories were 
necessarily partial, multiple, and practically oriented, militating against the 
possibility of a theory of international relations. On the other were accounts 
of theory more in line with natural science models, where the task of delineat-
ing the core aspects of international politics were precisely what a theory of 
international relations should aim at.
For Lipsky, theory was primarily “a basis for practice.” Policy makers, he 
argued, employ theory, however implicitly.165 A primary function of theoriz-
ing international relations, then, is to engage in a “A constant process of re-
finement in the understanding of this implied theory.”166 At the same time, 
Lipsky’s nominalism led him to caution against what is in other philosophical 
terms referred to as “reification” or the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” 
The role of the theorist of international relations, then, is to uncover the 
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implicit theory held by policy makers “without letting it become ossified or 
stereotyped.”167 That, he opines, “would be an advance in knowledge.”168
Others espoused a form of theory closer to the natural science model. Pro-
fessor Kaufmann, for example, “thought a sounder criterion [for the value of a 
theory] is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish the 
observer with a greater capacity for understanding the political process and 
hence the ability to “predict” in a more limited sense.”169 As might be expect-
ed from a hard scientist, Rabi was eager to narrow down the scope of interna-
tional relations so as to facilitate conceptualization along a model familiar in 
physics. “[F]rom his own point of view,” he made clear, “a theory starts with a 
number of concepts elaborated to simplify the material with which the theory 
is concerned. Relations between these concepts are also an inherent part of a 
theory. The concepts are then tested with reference to their predictive value 
for the future or their predictive value in the past.”170
Rabi’s understanding of science seems to have been for the group a clear 
touchstone around which to discuss the uniqueness of international relations. 
For CFR staff member Zinner, “With regard to the question ‘what is theo-
ry?’ . . . the following definition might be considered appropriate; ‘a theory is 
a generalized explanation pertaining to a set of related phenomena.’”171 For 
Strausz- Hupé, professor at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, as a young science international relations was like “botany in the time 
of Linnaeus . . . concerned more with classification than experimentation. To 
evolve further, International Relations must create criteria for measuring the 
phenomena of politics. As yet, however, no adequate means for testing has 
been found.”172
Yet at the same time as affirming Rabi’s commonsense model, Strausz- 
Hupé raised a fundamental question about its suitability for the study of inter-
national affairs. The role of prediction in any theory of international relations 
once again raised the issue of the normal science model’s suitability. Rabi him-
self, for example, noted that full predictability is a big aim for IR since even 
in physics “most so- called prediction is merely extrapolation on the basis of 
previous experience.”173 Therefore, “Professor Kaufmann thought a sounder 
criterion is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish 
the observer with a greater capacity for understanding the political process 
and hence the ability to ‘predict’ in a more limited sense.”174 As already noted 
above, others at the meetings— notably Lipsky and the chairman, sociologist 
Robert MacIver— were skeptical about the importance of prediction, however 
limited, to theory.
The existence of disparate, perhaps even opposed or mutually exclusive 
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understandings of theory did not go unacknowledged. As Marshall expressed, 
“the group’s discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theo-
ry often wandered from one yardstick to another.”175 At some points theory 
meant an aid to understanding, he showed, sometimes for advice to policy 
maker. Theory remained, then, an elusive goal, shared by the group in the 
abstract more than in the detail.
The CFR study group on international relations shines a much- needed 
light on the development of the field of international relations and its position 
within the military- industrial- academic complex. Of more interest than the 
multiple notions of theory is the question of why despite very different under-
standings of theory, the diverse members of the study group could nevertheless 
agree that theory remained of vital importance to the field of international 
relations. What does that tell us about the role of the Cold War in the devel-
opment of IR?
The CFR study group took place at a time of increased interest in interna-
tional affairs in the United States, an effect of America’s emergence as a global 
power during the Second World War. Newfound global primacy stimulated 
the creation of an expansive institutional architecture of world power, which 
included the academic specialty of International Relations (IR). As historian 
of IR Brian Schmidt has shown,176 individuals considered experts in interna-
tional relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s were not only located in uni-
versities, but in think tanks, the government, philanthropic foundations like 
the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations, and, through organizations 
like the CFR, in business too.
IR’s “in- between- ness” or interstitiality, I would argue, underpinned both 
the strong lure of theory and the difficulties in agreeing on what a suitable the-
ory would look like. To highlight IR’s interstitiality in the postwar years is not 
simply another way of saying that IR had not yet undergone disciplinary spe-
cialization. IR had indeed not undergone disciplinary specialization, but the 
point goes further. Both the CFR study group and the Rockefeller Foundation 
conferences featured participants that today we would not consider IR special-
ists at all, but policy makers and elites with an investment in foreign affairs. 
Yet at the time they were thought suitable participants not merely to speak 
about the practice of foreign policy, but the theory of international relations.177
As historians of IR have shown, the specific importance imparted to the-
ory within that context lay with theory’s capacity to provide a core to the na-
scent field. As Schmidt suggests,178 there was a feeling of urgency among many 
IR specialists in the early 1950s to define the subject of international politics 
by developing a distinct theory, since the “very act of defining international 
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relations, both as a distinct realm of political activity and as a separate and 
autonomous field of study, is inherently theoretical.” Thompson himself noted 
elsewhere that “It is frequently said that one test of the independent character 
of a discipline or field of study is the presence in the field of theories contend-
ing for recognition by those engaged in thinking and writing.”179 Theorizing 
IR and defining international relations as a field thus went hand in hand.
While there was much interest in Lipsky’s nominalist “theory of theories,” 
defining international relations as— in Schmidt’s words— a “distinct realm of 
political activity and as a separate and autonomous field of study” was precisely 
what a nominalist approach did not do. Hans Morgenthau’s emphasis on the 
national interest, and the reality of power politics as the proper domain of IR, 
provided such a theory. Lipsky’s nominalist approach was weak by comparison. 
Unlike Morgenthau’s realism, it neither defined the nature of international 
politics “as a distinct sphere of political activity,” nor did it represent a strong 
and coherent position on the role of the scholar of IR in relation to their sub-
ject matter around which the group’s diverse membership could converge. The 
power of a realist approach was later amplified by the more structural realist 
theory of Kenneth Waltz, which further delimited the domain of IR and its 
object of study.180
From this perspective, the study group represents an early episode in what 
Stanley Hoffmann would a few years later term IR’s “long road to theory,” the 
ongoing search among scholars of international relations for a theoretical core 
to their field.181 As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach and others have 
detailed, an almost obsessive quest for theory is in many ways the defining 
feature of IR’s development during the Cold War and after.182 Paradoxically, 
therefore, it might be suggested that IR’s very proximity to the state in the early 
Cold War helped insulate it from the more overt politicization scholars have 
detailed of other cognate social science fields. Through theoretical reflection, 
IR scholars sought to identify a unique contribution IR could make to the 
conduct of American foreign relations.
The Study Group Participants: A Biographical Analysis
Thus far I have said much about the group’s formation and the content and 
context of its discussions. But who were the participants? Why were they cho-
sen as authorities on theory and international relations theory more specifi-
cally? In the remainder of this introduction, therefore, I inquire into the turn 
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to theory not by theory, but by the theorists— actual or potential— brought 
together in New York in 1953– 54.
George Arthur Lipsky (1912– 1972)
Born in 1912 in Seattle, George Lipsky studied at the University of Wash-
ington and the University of California– Berkeley before serving in the army 
(1942– 46).183 After a stint as an instructor at West Point, he returned to 
Berkeley as an assistant professor in political science. In 1950, he published a 
study of the political thought of President John Quincy Adams,184 which ap-
pears to have been broadly well- received.185 Lipsky left Berkeley shortly before 
beginning the CFR fellowship in the fall of 1953.
Lipsky was a good match for a Carnegie Fellowship, which again was inter-
ested in funding scholars with an interest in legalistic analyses of international 
politics. He had edited a volume just before joining the CFR on the work of 
legal theorist Hans Kelsen.186 In his introduction, Lipsky notes that Kelsen’s 
project was to eliminate the problem of natural law from the science of law. 
Natural law, for Kelsen, is a metaphysics of law, in which description and eval-
uation are deeply and problematically intertwined. For Kelsen, natural law 
had no place in a dispassionate legal science. The pure theory of law Kelsen 
was developing thus excluded morality and was based instead on positive law 
as characterized by the hierarchy of legal norms acting in society. Given the 
prominence of international legal scholarship among scholars of world politics 
in the 1940s, and Morgenthau’s own engagements,187 Lipsky’s shift from inter-
est in international law to the theory of international politics is a recognizable 
transition.
Lipsky’s interest in developing a theory of international relations waned 
after the study group, however. He published a version of the working paper on 
the international relations theory of Harold Lasswell in the Journal of Politics 
in 1955, but none of the other working papers, or a promised book manuscript, 
saw the light of day. Lipsky’s interests shifted to East Africa and the Middle 
East, and he published surveys of the economy and culture of Saudi Arabia188 
and Ethiopia. After leaving the CFR, he spent a year as a visiting instructor 
at Yale before beginning a long and successful career at Wabash College in 
Indiana, where an undergraduate prize in political science still bears his name. 
Lipsky remained at Wabash until his death in 1972.189
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Robert Morrison MacIver (1882– 1970)
Sociologist Robert MacIver’s appointment as chairman is surprising from the 
present- day vantage point, yet in addition to the social connections he en-
joyed on account of his location in New York, MacIver’s work on politics and 
political theory qualified him for the position.190
Born in 1882 in Stornoway, Scotland, and educated at the universities of 
Glasgow and Oxford, MacIver emigrated in 1915, becoming a political scien-
tist at the University of Toronto. Moving to Barnard College in 1927, MacIver 
joined Columbia in 1929, where he stayed until 1950, holding the presidency 
of the American Sociological Association in 1940.
There is no record of MacIver and Lipsky’s connections before the study 
group, but the two shared a broadly humanist approach that may have further 
supported the choice of MacIver. In The Web of Government (1948), MacIver 
described politics as more of an art than a science and explored the myths and 
techniques through which man “has outdistanced all other animals and made 
himself lord of creation.”191 By techniques, MacIver means “the devices and 
skills of every kind that enable men to dispose of things— and of persons— 
more to their liking.”192 By myths, he meant “the value- impregnated beliefs 
and notions that men hold, that they live by or live for. Every society is held 
together by a myth- system, a complex of dominating thought- forms that de-
termines and sustains all activities.”193 The Web of Government thus focused in 
a proto- social constructionist way on the emergence of the state, the bases of 
authority in law and social forms, and the changing structure of governmental 
organization over time.
As his ASA obituary notes, MacIver distrusted the move toward academic 
specialization and “sought to define an integrated social science that could 
understand people in their economic, political, and social aspects simultane-
ously.” Drawing more on classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle) and theoret-
ically inclined sociologists like Émile Durkheim, MacIver “focused instead on 
human agency, methodological diversity, and ethical issues.”194 MacIver had 
attempted to develop at Columbia a premier generalist sociology department 
based on the name recognition of members Robert Merton and Paul Lazars-
feld. As Elzbieta Halas shows, in this endeavor MacIver had much success, 
despite the prominence of Chicago and subsequently Berkeley overshadowing 
MacIver’s contributions to American sociology.195 The reason, most likely, is 
the increasing predominance of the strongly quantitative methods associated 
with Lazarsfeld, which occurred to MacIver’s regret.196 MacIver “pitted his po-
lemical strength against the use of natural science methods in sociology, espe-
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cially of quantification and measurement,” but in many ways he was swimming 
against the tide within the discipline and beyond.
Dorothy Fosdick (1913– 1997)
Educated at Smith College and Columbia, Dorothy Fosdick joined the State 
Department in 1942 after teaching sociology and politics at Smith.197 Fos-
dick served on the US delegations to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco 
Conferences and for the preparatory committees for first three UN General 
Assemblies. In 1948, she was appointed to the new Policy Planning Staff,198 
created by Marshall in spring 1947 under the direction of George Kennan. 
Fosdick left government in 1953 following the Republican victory and be-
came a writer for the New York Times and a consultant with NBC.
Fosdick was the daughter of religious leader and pacifist Reverend Dr. 
Harry Emerson Fosdick and the niece of Raymond Fosdick, the prominent 
international lawyer and supporter of the League of Nations. But she came 
to hold more tough- minded foreign policy views than either. Fosdick advised 
Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1952, but in 1954 she 
met Washington Democratic senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, becoming his 
principal foreign policy advisor until 1983. Fosdick and Jackson “were both 
cold war liberals who were committed to government support for social caus-
es at home and a strong, intrusive government abroad.”199 Jackson’s position 
on the Senate Armed Services Committee gave him and by extension Fos-
dick significant influence. Fosdick worked principally in the background as a 
speech writer and close confidante of Jackson and as leader to a group of later 
prominent individuals who began their careers on Jackson’s staff, including 
Richard Perle (assistant secretary of defense, 1981– 87) and Elliott Abrams 
(assistant secretary of state of for inter- American affairs, 1985– 89, and advisor 
on human rights to George W. Bush from 2001).
Fosdick gave expression to her foreign policy views in the 1955 book Com­
mon Sense and World Affairs, where she argued for the application of princi-
ples common in American society, like “Whoever says he has the solution to 
our problems speaks too soon” and “Fashioning your methods in light of your 
end is prudence.”200 Fosdick’s emphasis on prudence, together with the role 
of power, raises obvious comparisons with both Morgenthau and Reinhold 
Niebuhr (who had been a family friend and mentor she had met while grow-
ing up in faculty housing of the Union Theological Seminary, where Niebuhr 
taught). Fosdick was in agreement with Niebuhr’s belief that, as her New York 
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Times obituary put it, “evil is a palpable world force that must be resisted and 
overcome,” which “became the geopolitical creed of a generation of cold war 
theorists.”
Fosdick’s emphasis on preparing the ordinary citizen for participation in 
foreign policy deliberation, however, is a telling departure from Morgenthau. 
The reason is that Fosdick displayed a commitment to liberalism and democ-
racy that was distinct from Morgenthau, both intellectually and perhaps prac-
tically. Like Lipsky and MacIver,201 her writings indicated a concern for the 
maintenance of liberty and democracy at home.202 In her 1939 book, What Is 
Liberty?, Fosdick interrogated the various uses of the term “liberty” in contem-
porary political discourse. Arguing that the word afforded no fixed definition 
yet rested at the base of the individual’s desire for control over his or her 
self- expression and its means, she asserted the need to think separately of the 
ways of maximizing liberties in the different economic, cultural, and political 
spheres.203
The question of the nature of liberty was not merely intellectual, however, 
and placing Fosdick into the context of liberal politics in the 1940s and 1950s, 
rather than a seemingly timeless debate within IR between “realists” and “lib-
erals,” is telling. Liberalism was still recovering from the deep divisions that 
had emerged during the late 1940s, when liberals had split on the question of 
the possibility of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, leading lib-
eral favorite and former vice president Henry Wallace to split from the Dem-
ocrats and run as a Progressive Party candidate in 1948.204 The significance 
of her father was that his Riverside Church was backed by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and was, according to Fosdick’s obituary, a “bastion of New York 
liberalism.” Niebuhr was prominent in the anticommunist wing of liberalism, 
strongly tied to New York City (which Morgenthau was apart from in Chica-
go), and was a founding member of the anti- Soviet Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA),205 which tried to define the nature of liberalism and whose 
members came to have significant influence over the Kennedy administration.
Hajo Holborn (1902– 1969)
One of the most vocal members on the question of the theoretical basis of 
international relations was Yale historian Hajo Holborn.206 Born in Berlin in 
1902, Holborn was a student of Friedrich Meineke at the University of Ber-
lin, receiving his doctorate in 1924 (at the age of only twenty- two). After 
spending time in Heidelberg, he returned to Berlin to the Carnegie- funded 
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Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, where fellow study group member Arnold 
Wolfers was also employed.207 Holborn, it should be stressed, was chair in 
international relations at the Hochschule. He was dismissed in 1933 by the 
Nazis but had already left for the UK, reaching the United States in 1934. 
Holborn spent six years at Tufts University (1936– 42) before joining Yale at 
the end of the conflict. A historian of Germany, Holborn was the president of 
the American Historical Association in 1967.
Holborn had written his habilitation on the history of the Reformation 
period, but after joining the Hochschule he returned to modern diplomatic 
history and “became attracted to the methods of the study of international 
relations which had been developed in the Anglo- Saxon countries.”208 The 
Political Collapse of Europe209 is the clearest example, a book that for historians 
Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern became the “standard treatise on the decline 
of the Great Powers in Europe, whose early dominance [Leopold Von] Ranke 
had authoritatively depicted.”210 More important for the study group perhaps 
is that a version of the book appeared in the journal World Politics,211 where 
Holborn also published on the subject of American foreign policy and Euro-
pean integration while the study group was ongoing.212
Holborn’s academic credentials were then more than adequate for inclu-
sion in the CFR study group. But so too were his connections with the world of 
policy making. During the war Holborn worked for the Research and Analysis 
Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (1942– 46), where he counseled a 
softer line than the tough approach that became the Morgenthau Plan for the 
pastoralization of Germany.213 Holborn later consulted for assistant secretary 
of state John Hilldring on US policies toward occupied Germany and Japan.214 
As a German, Holborn was a perfect go- between for the US government with 
German leaders.215
William W. Kaufmann (1918– 2008)
The importance of resisting equating name recognition within IR as it devel-
oped later with prominence in the field of international relations in the early 
1950s is nowhere more telling than with William Kaufmann. An advisor to 
secretaries of defense between the 1960s and 1970s, during the late 1940s 
Kaufmann was one of the RAND Corporation nuclear strategists later dubbed 
the “Wizards of Armageddon,” alongside others such as Herman Kahn and 
Albert Wohlstetter.216
Born in New York in 1918, Kaufmann attended the same Connecticut 
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school as John F. Kennedy, before going to Yale to study international rela-
tions.217 Kaufmann joined the faculty of the Yale Institute for International 
Studies (YIIS), which uprooted for Princeton in 1951. According to historian 
Fred Kaplan, YIIS— which also housed study group member Arnold Wolfers, 
as well as other early IR theorists William T. R. Fox, Frederick Dunn, and 
sociologist Nicholas Spykman— was then a “prime mover” in thinking about 
the implications of nuclear power for world politics.218 Funded by the Rocke-
feller Foundation and several other corporations like J. P. Morgan and Union 
Carbide,219 YIIS provided a link between the East Coast schools and the Uni-
versity of Chicago, where in addition to Morgenthau both Bernard Brodie and 
Quincy Wright were spearheading a more realistic approach to the study of 
international relations. The latter was engaged in a sixteen- year study on the 
causes of war, a topic most students of international affairs had ignored during 
the 1930s.220
Kaufmann’s influence over US nuclear strategy came later, during the 
early 1960s, when he was hired as one of new secretary of defense Robert 
McNamara’s “whizz kids.”221 His hiring was based, at least in part, on the chal-
lenge he and others offered during the late 1950s to the government’s strategy 
of “massive retaliation,” which many were beginning to view as impractical 
and morally indefensible. Kaufmann cautioned a more flexible response and 
the building up of conventional weapons.222 But Kaufmann is interesting for 
us in the way he embodies some crucial links in the interstitial field of inter-
national relations in the early 1950s. YIIS was thus connected to Princeton, 
where Professors Edward Mead Earle and Klaus Knorr worked, and to the State 
Department and the Pentagon. Brodie, for example, had been a friend of Chi-
cago economist Jacob Viner, who was both influential as a theorist and advisor 
on trade policy and a believer in the potentially peaceful effects of the atomic 
bomb.
Robert Strausz- Hupé (1903– 2002)
The case of Robert Strausz- Hupé further confirms the disjuncture between 
later notoriety within IR and influence in the interstitial field of international 
relations from the 1940s onwards. If known at all today, the University of 
Pennsylvania political scientist is recognized as the author of Geopolitics: The 
Struggle for Space and Power,223 which was representative of a resurgence of 
interest in geopolitical thinking in US international studies, best exemplified 
by Yale IR scholar Nicholas Spykman’s America’s Strategy and World Politics.224 
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But Strausz- Hupé was also the author of a number of works on US foreign pol-
icy that put him at the forefront of both the national debate and the emerging 
political science writing on international politics in the postwar years. These 
included the 1941 book Axis America: Hitler Plans Our Future, The Balance of 
Tomorrow: Power and Foreign Policy in the United States (1945), and The Zone 
of Indifference (1952).225
Strausz- Hupé was born in Vienna and moved to America in 1923, joining 
the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania in 1940, supposedly after piquing 
the university’s interest during a campus lecture on “the coming war.”226 His 
position within the academic study of IR was solidified with the publication, 
with Georgetown’s Stefan T. Possony, of the textbook International Relations in 
the Age of the Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship (1950), which was 
popular enough to run to a second edition in 1954.227
Evidence of Strausz- Hupé’s broader influence, however, can be gleaned 
from the trajectory his career took after the CFR study group ended in 1954 
and beyond disciplinary political science. The following year, Strausz- Hupé 
founded the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which later began publishing 
the public engagement journal Orbis, which remains influential today. During 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, Strausz- Hupé also had a long stint in govern-
ment, including ambassadorships in Sri Lanka, Belgium, Sweden, to NATO, 
and finally Turkey. This suggests significant influence within the field of Inter-
national Relations in the first decades after 1945.
Kenneth W. Thompson (1921– 2013)
Alongside Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson is the protagonist in Nicolas 
Guilhot’s account of the birth of IR theory at the Rockefeller conference. 
Born in Des Moines, Iowa, in 1921, Thompson served in the army between 
1942 and 1946 before studying at the University of Chicago (upon the sug-
gestion of Quincy Wright), where he received his PhD in 1950.228 Thompson 
spent the first half of career (1953– 74) at the Rockefeller Foundation before 
taking up a professorship at the University of Virginia, which he held until 
2006 and where he also directed the Miller Center of Public Affairs.
At Chicago, Thompson came under the influence of both Wright and 
Morgenthau, whom he considered “the pivotal and dominant figures” of “the 
Chicago School of International Thought.”229 Morgenthau called Thompson 
“his best student”230 and coauthored with him a selection of readings in IR 
that appeared shortly after Thompson received his PhD.231 The analysis pre-
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sented in Thompson’s most well- known work Political Realism and the Crisis of 
World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy (1960) certainly bears 
out Morgenthau’s praise.232
Once again, however, Thompson’s theoretical contributions inform us less 
about the field of international relations (both in the early 1950s and since) 
than does his biography: the trajectory that indicates how he was shaped by 
and in turn shaped the field. Thompson later argued that his signature inter-
est in international relations was the interplay between theory and practice, 
which he in many ways embodied at institutions like the Rockefeller Founda-
tion and Miller Center.233 As he noted, “because of my allegiance to both the-
ory and practice, I have never been entirely at home in either world,” feeling 
the scorn of academics when a practitioner, and vice versa. Along with a fear 
of professionalization, this feeling led to consistent concern with finding ways 
to “close the gap” between the two worlds.234 As only one example, in 1959 
he published a book with Nitze for the Foreign Policy Association (FPA)’s 
“Headline Series” titled Great Decisions, 1960— U.S. Foreign Policy— Ideals 
and Realities.235 Likely a product of interactions stimulated first by the Rocke-
feller conference, the book represents yet another institutional link between 
theory, philanthropy, and a hybrid institution like the FPA that conducts re-
search and outreach while trying to influence policy.
Arnold Wolfers (1892– 1968)
In the vast number of works re- examining the work of the early IR theory over 
the past two decades or so, it is surprising that Yale’s Arnold Wolfers has been 
largely passed over.236 Born in St. Galen, Switzerland, and trained as a jurist, 
Wolfers spent 1924 to 1933 (when he left Germany) at the Hochschule für 
Politik.237 While there, Wolfers developed a center of international studies us-
ing, as noted above, both Rockefeller and Carnegie money, and he was joined 
for a time by Hajo Holborn. In the United States, Wolfers joined the faculty 
at Yale, where he stayed until 1957.
Wolfers produced a number of important works, many collected in his 
1962 Discord and Collaboration. He is most commonly known among contem-
porary scholars for the distinction he drew between “possession goals” and 
“milieu goals” in national foreign policies.238 Possession goals are things a na-
tion wants to keep intact, like territory or membership of an international 
organization, and which the state must compete to achieve.239 Milieu goals 
are different, concerning the shaping of a state’s foreign policy environment, 
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like promoting international law.240 Without milieu goals, Wolfers argues, in-
ternational affairs would be closer to the Hobbesian world and peace would 
be impossible.
Wolfers has been termed a “reluctant realist.”241 Yet while the breadth and 
subtlety on display in his writings in trying to assess the complexities of foreign 
policy justify such a label, when compared to more hard- nosed writings in 
early realism, the term does little to capture his influence and thus his social 
capital within the emerging field of international relations after the war. Wolf-
ers was active beyond the academy, including being a member of the CFR and 
advising the government.
During the war, for example, Wolfers consulted with the Office of Strate-
gic Services from 1943– 45, acting as a key node in the network that saw Yale, 
and the Institute for International Studies, provide an outsized proportion of 
individuals to positions at the State Department, the OSS, and other gov-
ernment agencies.242 As Master of Pierson College, one of the residential col-
leges at Yale that represented the center of campus life, Wolfers would be the 
designated host when important visitors came to Yale, which they frequently 
did. In particular, the YIIS strengthened links between the university and the 
State Department.243 As historian Robin Winks notes, Wolfers also stood at 
the center of a group of scholars referred to as “the State Department,” which 
met regularly to discuss world affairs and which included Corbett, Kirk, Dunn, 
Spykman, and Yale economist Richard Bissell, who would later direct the 
Economic Cooperation Administration, the organization founded to run the 
Marshall Plan.244
After the war less clandestine matters intervened as Wolfers founded the 
journal World Politics in 1948. At the time, as was discussed at length at the 
Rockefeller conference, there were a limited number of possible outlets for 
theoretical work on international studies. International Organization (also 
founded in 1948) offered primarily overviews of the activities of international 
organizations, which left political science journals (like the American Political 
Science Review, Journal of Politics, and the Review of Politics) as the main rec-
ognized outlets. World Politics was thus a crucial venue legitimizing theoretical 
work in the nascent field of IR, as noted by Thompson at the Rockefeller 
conference.245 The editorial and advisory board of World Politics thus identifies 
many of the main actors in the field.246 The managing editor was William T. 
R. Fox, with Bernard Brodie, Frederick Dunn, and Percy Corbett. The board 
consisted of, among others, scholars Edward Mead Earle, Grayson Kirk, Klaus 
Knorr, Harold Lasswell, Wolfers, Derwent Whittlesey, and Quincy Wright. 
Perhaps more interestingly, it also included governmental insiders Viner and 
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Leo Pasvolsky, a state department economist active in postwar planning and 
in the design of the United Nations, who was head of international studies at 
Brookings between 1946 and 1952.247
In addition to the invited study group members, a number of staff members 
of the CFR for 1953– 54 joined in the discussions. While many attended infre-
quently, Gerhart Niemeyer, Grant S. McClellan, and Charles M. Lichenstein 
attended often and made numerous interventions in the debate, while John 
Blumgart was assigned the important role of rapporteur.
Gerhart Niemeyer (1907– 1997)
Of the CFR staff who attended the meetings while not being formally members 
of the study group, the most influential at the meetings was Gerhart Niemeyer, 
whose biography is an illuminating snapshot into the context of the study 
group. Born in Essen, Germany, Niemeyer studied at Cambridge, Munich, and 
Kiel, where he received his doctorate in jurisprudence in 1932 under the su-
pervision of the legal theorist Hermann Heller.248 Heller was the author of the 
book Staatslehre and was engaged in a set of debates with Carl Schmitt and 
Hans Kelsen (who was also Hans Morgenthau’s advisor) over the causes of the 
weakness of Weimar democracy. Niemeyer followed Heller to Madrid as he 
fled the Nazis before Niemeyer emigrated to America in 1937. Niemeyer held 
positions at Princeton and Oglethorpe University in Atlanta before spending 
three years at the State Department Office of United Nations Affairs. At the 
time of the CFR study group, Niemeyer was working as a research analyst at 
the CFR (1953– 55). Niemeyer spent most of his subsequent career as a con-
servative political theorist at the University of Notre Dame (1955– 76) before 
leaving to become a priest in the Episcopal Church.249
In his career before the CFR study group, Niemeyer wrote principally on 
international organization,250 politics, and law. In “World Order and the Great 
Powers” (1944), he extolled the responsibilities of the great powers after the 
war, by which he meant Britain, Russia, and the United States.251 Striking a 
notably realist tone, he argued, “It is the absence of an adequate moral ba-
sis for international ‘order’ founded in superior power that gives aggression a 
plausible cause”252 and is thus deemed legitimate to its bearer. Not intending 
to minimize the guilt of those who initiated war, it was nonetheless important 
to recognize that the war, “like past aggressions, has sprung from conceptions 
of international politics to which all nations, through their own practices, 
have at one time or another made a contribution.”253 The only way to end 
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aggression then is to end power politics, which is unlikely since “it is com-
monly assumed that power politics is the very essence of international rela-
tions.”254 Like Morgenthau, Niemeyer saw prudent statesmanship on the part 
of the leaders of the great powers, not international organization, as the basis 
of peace: “The prevention of war, like the prevention of revolution within the 
state, does not depend on legal procedures, but on the art of adjustment.”255
Niemeyer’s most substantive contribution prior to 1953– 54, however, was 
his 1941 book Law without Force, where he elaborated on his skepticism of law 
and organization as the basis of international peace.256 Niemeyer dedicated the 
book to Heller, who had insisted that political theory must be understood as 
a cultural science grounded in reality, which relies therefore not on “abstract 
concepts but individual characteristics of political standards and forms.”257 
Following this line of thought, Niemeyer repudiated the natural law tradi-
tion of Hugo Grotius, which was prominent in international legal theory and 
practice and which grounded international law in person, property, injury, and 
contract. Niemeyer saw this metaphysic as an unsuitable basis for opposing the 
forces against peace and security in the mid- twentieth century, and he sought 
a more realistic basis for international law based on the empirical analysis of 
political practice.258
Via Heller, then, Niemeyer was led to the thesis that “political reality 
has become unlawful, because the existing system of international law has 
become unreal.”259 Adopting a historical perspective, he argued that the de-
cline of international law was not caused by its frequent violation in modern 
times, but because it was no longer backed by either a common moral code 
underpinned by a shared religion, as originally, or an independent bourgeois 
political society. Rather, international law is meant to rein in states at the 
same time the state is viewed as the ultimate power over human association. 
International law for Niemeyer, by contrast, is not a property of states but an 
artifact of relations between them. Accepting this allows him to see that in-
ternational reality, as a cultural thing, has inherent law- like features, of which 
the pre- eminent role he later gave to the great powers in the postwar world is 
a good example. As a practical and not merely descriptive theory, Niemeyer’s 
approach sought to show that that making international life more peaceful 
does not require making more formal law through additional institutions (as 
this will only exacerbate the problems), but by making international relations, 
whether conducted through international institutions or not, more functional, 
i.e., to correspond better to how to how international reality actually works.
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John D. Blumgart, Grant S. McClellan, Charles M. Lichenstein,  
and Paul Zinner
Council staff members Blumgart, McClellan, Lichenstein, and Zinner were 
each frequent attendees. McClellan and Lichenstein in particular were not 
overawed by the higher status afforded the permanent members of the group 
and offered numerous interjections into the debates. But each is less easily 
traced through prosopographic research, despite going on to prominent ca-
reers. Piecing together what information has been available thus indicates the 
types of people brought together by the clarion call of theory in 1953.
McClellan appears to have been working as a research analyst at the CFR 
at the time of the study group.260 In 1955 he contributed to the CFR vol-
ume, lead authored by Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 
1953.261 His whereabouts after leaving the CFR in the mid- to- late 1950s can 
only be traced through the short biographical statements at the beginning of a 
number of books (on topics ranging from “The Two Germanies” to civil rights 
and road safety) he wrote for the series the “Reference Shelf,” published by 
H. W. Wilson.262 From these we can discern that McClellan went on first to a 
position as a staff member with the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) before 
moving by 1964 an associate editorship of Current Magazine.263
McClellan’s move to the Foreign Policy Association is interesting in that 
it highlights the interconnections in the interstitial field of international rela-
tions, here between two hybrid organizations, the FPA and the CFR, and also 
between them and the media field. Like the Council on Foreign Relations it-
self, the Foreign Policy Association was born of the First World War, founded 
in New York 1918 as the League of Free Nations Association, before changing 
its name in 1923. Its focus was, and remains, on stimulating discussion of in-
ternational affairs among elites and the public, through public lectures and 
locally chaptered meetings. Not to be confused with Foreign Policy magazine 
(founded in 1970), the FPA publishes Great Decisions to this end, which also 
appears on public television in the United States.
Charles Lichenstein’s (1926– 2002) biography highlights a different trajec-
tory one could take after a position at the CFR early in one’s career.264 Born 
in Albany in 1926, Lichenstein studied at Yale. After the CFR, he worked 
for Richard Nixon’s 1960 presidential campaign and four years later for Barry 
Goldwater before a short stint at the Republican National Committee. Enter-
ing government, he served in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations. 
Lichenstein later went on to work at the conservative Heritage Foundation.
Lichenstein is most well- known for an incident on 19 September 1983 
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while serving as America’s second- highest- ranking envoy to the United Na-
tions, in which he told a UN committee the United States would wave a “fond 
farewell” if the members decided to move the UN elsewhere. The context was 
a New York and New Jersey ban on Soviet aircraft landings, which followed 
the Russian downing of a Korean airliner on 1 September 1983 that killed 
269 people. Lichenstein’s ire was directed at a UN committee set up to assess 
relations between the UN and United States, to which he said, “The members 
of the U.S. mission to the UN will be down at dockside waving you a fond 
farewell as you sail off into the sunset.” Lichenstein was publicly backed by 
Reagan himself when controversy arose.265
John Blumgart was charged with recording the study group’s proceedings. 
His early years are obscure, but he was educated at Oberlin College and Co-
lumbia. Blumgart spent the bulk of his career working for the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided the ratio-
nale for an oral history interview conducted in 1995 containing information 
about his pre- and post- CFR trajectory.266
At Columbia Blumgart worked on international relations at the School 
of International Affairs, then headed by Grayson Kirk. Kirk was linked to 
the CFR as the author of a CFR- sponsored survey of teaching and research in 
international relations in US colleges and universities.267 Indeed, as CFR staff 
member William Diebold noted in his letter inviting MacIver to chair the 
1953– 54 study group, the group was expressly meant as a follow- up to Kirk’s 
evaluation of the state of the field.268 Kirk may well then have been influential 
in gaining Blumgart access to the CFR.
But Blumgart was also linked to other Council members through his job at 
the American Committee on United Europe, the organization set up in 1948 
to support European integration, which included funding European grassroots 
federalist movements (leading the British Telegraph recently to label the Eu-
ropean Union as “always a CIA project.”269) Founded by former OSS director 
William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan (1883– 1959),270 the ACUE’s board also fea-
tured Allen Dulles, Lucius Clay, Robert Patterson, Walter Bedell Smith, and 
one George S. Franklin Jr., also of the CFR and later of the Trilateral Com-
mission. Franklin attended the first study group meeting on E. H. Carr but did 
not attend any of the subsequent meetings.271
The final member of the study group deserving of biographical analysis 
is Paul Zinner. Zinner spent most of his subsequent career at the University 
of California– Davis as an expert in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.272 
Born in then- Czechoslovakia, Zinner moved to New York in 1940 before join-
ing the US Army, being posted to the Office of Strategic Studies. He then 
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spent six years as an analyst with the State Department. In California, Zinner 
was a frequent consultant to government and a media commentator, working 
particularly on issues of nuclear power and the relationship between the Uni-
versity of California and the government concerning the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory.
Plan of the Book
The remainder of the volume faithfully reproduces the group’s records. Each 
chapter details one of the group’s meetings, beginning with Lipsky’s discussion 
of the approach under scrutiny during that session and followed by the digest 
of the meeting. The study group covered the following subjects: (1) the theory 
of E. H. Carr as an exemplar of what Lipsky termed the “historical approach” 
to international relations; (2) the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau and the issue 
of the national interest; (3) the theory of Harold D. Lasswell; (4) Marxist 
theories of imperialism; (5) political geography and geopolitics; (6) Wilsonian 
idealism; and finally (7) a general discussion of the nature of theory in the 
study of international relations.
I have adopted a light touch in editing the documents, standardizing 
formatting slightly for aesthetic reasons, and correcting the occasional typo-
graphical error. I have provided a small amount of extra information to make 
reading the discussions more straightforward where helpful, and I am sure it is 





George A. Lipsky (1912– 1972), former Berkeley po-
litical scientist, was the main figure at the study group. 
Lipsky’s commitment to philosophical nominalism 
significantly shaped the discussions, preventing any 
one approach from monopolizing the subject matter 
of “international relations.”
Robert M. MacIver
Robert Morrison MacIver (1882– 1970), Columbia 
sociologist, chaired the CFR study group. Now large-
ly forgotten, even within sociology, in the 1940s and 
1950s MacIver was one of the foremost social scien-
tists and public intellectuals in the United States, 
promoting a humanist approach in the method wars 
of the period.
Dorothy Fosdick
Dorothy Fosdick (1913– 1997). Former member of 
the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, Fos-
dick’s membership of the group was so sought after the 




Hajo Holborn (1902– 1969) was a prominent schol-
ar of international history and professor at Yale Uni-
versity. Holborn spent the interwar years in Berlin at 
the Carnegie- funded Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 
with fellow group- member Arnold Wolfers, and later 
consulted for the US government on policy toward 
occupied Germany.
William Kaufmann
William Kaufmann (1918– 2008) was another Yale 
affiliate. A scholar of international relations at the 
Yale Institute for International Studies, Kaufmann 
specialized in military strategy, following the institute 
to Princeton in 1951 before later joining the RAND 
Corporation as a nuclear strategist.
Robert Strausz­ Hupé
Robert Strausz- Hupé (1903– 2002). A professor of 
political science at the Wharton School of Business, 
University of Pennsylvania, Robert Strausz- Hupé was 
a prominent proponent of geopolitics to the problem 
of American strategy, offering a stark warning of Ger-
many’s plans for the United States in Axis America: 
Hitler Plans Our Future (1941).
Kenneth W. Thompson
Kenneth W. Thompson (1921– 2013) was an ac-
complished theorist, administrator, and institution- 
builder. Thompson played a key role alongside Hans 
Morgenthau in the development of realist theory, uti-
lizing to good effect his administrative position in the 




Arnold Wolfers (1892– 1968) of Yale University is to-
day the most recognizable theorist who attended the 
CFR study group meetings.
Gerhart Niemeyer
Gerhart Niemeyer (1907– 1997) was in 1953– 54 a 
staff member at the Council on Foreign Relations. 
Niemeyer later went on to a long and distinguished 
career as a political theorist at the University of Notre 
Dame.
Paul Zinner
Paul Zinner (1922– 2012) was a staff member at the 
CFR during 1953– 54, and would spend most of his 
subsequent career at the University of California– 
Davis, a noted expert in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe.
Charles Lichenstein
Charles Lichenstein (1926– 2002) was a staff member 
at the CFR during 1953– 54 and graduate of Yale Uni-
versity. Lichenstein later served in the presidential 





First Meeting: E. H. Carr and the 
Historical Approach, December 3, 1953
The first meeting of the Study Group on the theory of international relations 
was held at 5:45 PM on Thursday, December 3, 1953, at the Harold Pratt 
House. The subject was the theory of E. H. Carr. Present were: Robert M. 
MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, 
secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; Byron Dexter; William Diebold Jr.; 
George S, Franklin Jr.; William Henderson; Hajo Holborn; William W. 
Kaufmann; Grant S. McClellan; Isidor I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; Robert 
Strausz- Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; R. Gordon Wasson; Arnold Wolfers.
*****
Working Paper No. 1
Prepared by George Lipsky
Among the most important writers contributing to the theory of international 
relations today is the Englishman E. H. Carr. One measure of his importance 
is a recent comment by C. Hartley Grattan in Harper’s to the effect that Carr 
is the most pernicious writer in England today. Presumably that means in his 
field. I do not deny my own impression that Carr’s conclusions are often de-
structive, and, if taken seriously, work toward an end contrary to my values. 
His theory of theories and his evaluations imply a philosophical system that 
I in considerable measure reject. On the other hand, much credit must be 
given to him for the sights he has set upon important objectives in the field of 
international relations. Whether or not he has been successful in achieving 
his goal, he has stated forcefully the importance of hard, ruthless analysis, dis-
passionate and moved to a minimum degree by desire. His own works do not 
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carry this project through to a conclusion. His main concern, I judge, is with 
fitting into the dynamic world of politics. This political ambition is often, if 
not always, incompatible with the achievement of a theoretical system, con-
sistent and complete.
This paper is a précis of a much longer essay evaluating Carr. The latter 
is thoroughly documented and makes reference to the relevant literature, es-
pecially the writings of Carr. Such works as The Twenty Years’ Crisis, The So­
viet Impact on the Western World, Conditions of Peace, etc., are more important 
among Carr’s works for our purposes than his The Bolshevik Revolution. The 
emphasis has been upon those works in which the theoretical development is 
most explicit.
Carr, his professions to the contrary notwithstanding, I would assess as a 
“radical” realist. The term “radical” is appropriate here to describe a realist for 
whom the real world is producing a change and a future quite different from 
what has been known before. Carr is a prophet of the revolution of our times. 
At the very least, he calls for conformity with these revolutionary trends. At 
the most, he calls, particularly among the young, for a participation in the 
revolution to take full advantage of its results. It is important to emphasize the 
“radical” quality of Carr’s realism since in his own analysis the realist position 
is conservative, even sterile. The realist is the cynical determinist, willing and 
able to look at history without flinching, accepting its evils and its good with 
the same emotion. But I believe there is another kind of realist for whom the 
unfolding of history is producing a better world, institutions that are more in 
keeping with the pattern of historical trends. This kind of realist is much more 
ambitious than the realist bureaucrat, to whom Carr refers at length, who will 
employ exclusively the empirical method, reacting to each situation in an 
ad hoc manner and fitting it into the stream of events in an almost intuitive 
fashion. All these facets of the realist position may be so accounted because, as 
a matter of degree, they profess and, in some measure, realize a determination 
to view history as it is, especially assigning importance to power relationships, 
emphasizing practice as the source of theory and politics as the source of eth-
ics. Whether they succeed in terms of theory of knowledge or practical politics 
is another matter. At this point their professions and intentions are the test 
of their position.
Theory of Knowledge
One product of such speculation and analysis as Carr holds important must, 
naturally, be a theory of theories. That is, a theory or explanation of how 
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the data of international relations should be viewed. In intellectual history 
he asserts that in the initial phases of a science the speculation is moved 
mainly by desire. The general principles are established and facts and events 
are presumed to be in conformity with them. As time passes the impulse 
grows stronger to view the world of reality first, to understand it and to de-
rive from it conclusions concerning the correct actions that should be taken 
with respect to the situations history is producing. Carr accepts that this 
progression is normal and good. Those who look at reality and correctly see 
its development, the realists, place proper emphasis on the data, the facts 
of life. The concept of determinism appears; purpose comes to play a lesser 
role, except as one of the predetermined factors. The realist abandons the 
doctrine of free will.
There may be a type of realist who recognizes or emphasizes the limita-
tions on human capacity to know. Carr may do so, but there is no place in his 
writings where he deals with this problem. He consistently refers to reality as 
if it may be known simply through observation, as if it may be known merely 
through the process of perception. Much that is occurring in history is self- 
evident to Carr, the realist. He does not doubt that there is a revolution of our 
times, which the young at least, should recognize. He does not doubt that we 
are moving into an era of planning on a statewide, if not global, scale. He does 
not doubt that history is inevitably modifying the application of the principle 
of national self- determination. Change is the one constant condition. What 
it is producing can be seen and one’s conclusions about the results do not have 
to be sifted through the sands of an informing theory. The theory is produced 
after the event to explain it in terms of one’s interest. The interest exists apart 
from the fact, but involves the application of a value to a situation that one 
finds good or relatively good.
Any theory of a harmony of interest is, for Carr, especially in this revolu-
tionary age, the disguise for the desire of those who profit from a status quo to 
preserve it. Carr’s variety of radical realist, living today, will attack the defend-
ers of the idea of harmony or “artificial” means for realizing collective security. 
Such realists, being proclaimers of a new day, are most at pains to suggest 
the means of achieving change. And, I submit, they are inclined to sympa-
thize with those states that are the most vigorous agents of change. The states 
that have most profited from the conditions that are being overturned are 
the satiated states or the states least dynamic in their thinking, least capable 
of devising new tactics, new strategy, or even new means of applying power. 
Success is told in terms of capacity to achieve power, and to maintain it. Carr 
has, to the disadvantage of his reputation as a prophet, if not as an analyst, 
been an apologist for success. The state which at any given time seems to be 
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the most effective agent of the revolution is provided with, if not his approval 
in explicit terms, at least apologies.
Thus, I take it, Carr believes it is possible to see and know reality, apart 
from an informing theory. This reality may be known so explicitly that, if 
one accounts oneself a realist, long- range prophecy is possible. In any event 
Carr does not eschew long- range prophecy. I judge him to be a historicist as 
described by K. R. Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies. He assumes that 
he can know so clearly what is happening and what will happen that it is im-
possible to escape the conclusion that he wishes it to happen. Since he clearly 
cannot really know so explicitly the nature of the pattern of historical trends, 
he is, without acknowledging it, imposing his values upon history. This is the 
approach of the dangerous fanatic. Carr draws back, at least rhetorically, from 
the full implication of his thought, as we shall see, but I think there are times 
when he can reject or attack with all the passion of the fanatic. It is not only 
the utopian who can be dangerous, but also the thinker who exaggerates the 
realistic approach. He also can employ the weapons of destruction.
Finding it difficult, perhaps for reasons of his background, to accept the 
full implication of a realistic determinism, Carr insists upon employing some 
of the tools and techniques of utopian thinking. To escape the cold and sterile 
determinism that he at least asserts— although he really imposes his purposes 
upon reality— he says that, particularly in the social sciences, one should not 
abandon utopian thinking altogether. Without it, conservativism will pervade 
one’s thinking. There will not be sufficient inspiration to action. It is notable, 
however, that all the utopian projects to which Carr refers, particularly in 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, are recorded in the annals of failure. They have been 
either the heady projects of vague, romantic radicals, or the theory of those 
who have wished to rationalize a policy of preserving a status quo no longer 
preservable.
Despite the fact, then, that Carr’s realist or Carr, the realist, assumes that 
it is possible to know all that is essential to know and despite the fact that 
the utopian aspires to that which it is unrealistic to aspire to, Carr calls for 
the establishment of an equilibrium between realist and utopian thinking. I 
submit that, in terms of his own definitions, he seeks an equilibrium between 
contradictions. Why should failure be imported into the record of success? In 
the manner of John Locke, Carr has failed to inspect his first principles. Locke 
never saw, or did not plainly see, the conflict between his psychology and his 
metaphysics. Carr does not see that his theory of knowledge is incompatible 
with his ethical system. Contending that that realistic observer may know the 
course of history in explicit terms, he excludes the opportunity for purposes to 
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function in the historical process. And even more remarkable, he does not see 
that, in viewing the world about him, he has imposed his values even before 
he has consciously employed utopian purpose and value. The main difficulty, 
I think, is the lack of a formula. Carr, the politician publicist, wishes to know 
and to act and he has rested content with imprecise generalizations concern-
ing how one may rightfully and correctly view the world and act with purpose 
with respect to it.
A way out of this problem exists, although perhaps not for one working 
from the premises Carr employs. There is in his thought much of a universalist 
character which identifies thinking with being. If his premise were nominalist 
and by virtue of this position he concluded that there is an unbridgeable gap 
between human knowledge, on the one hand, and final reality, on the other, 
he could not make such ambitious assertions concerning reality. In fact, con-
cerning ultimate reality he would say or write little at all; his concentration 
or emphasis would be upon the limitations upon his own capacity to know. In 
such a view, all knowledge is a structure of data understood and organized in 
terms of an informing theory and/or philosophy. Every theory or explanation 
is an incomplete theory or explanation. In order for the significance of data 
to be judged, or for relevant data to be selected out of the mess that exists, 
human value preferences (giving direction to purpose) come into play. Every 
theory, then, is compounded of knowledge— as knowledge is given to the fi-
nite mind— and interstices or areas of ignorance. Within these areas of igno-
rance there is the greatest opportunity for values to function and to influence 
the selection and evaluation of data, the substance of situations. Wherein 
and to the degree reality becomes known in some forms and aspects it may 
and perhaps will happen that the values and purposes of the observer are in 
accord with that observed reality. If Carr’s theory of knowledge denied to him 
the capacity to know reality so truly, there would not necessarily exist the 
contradiction between his view of knowledge and his conception of value and 
purpose. Moreover, he would not be so dogmatic concerning what is a utopian 
and what is a realistic project.
Power Politics
As I have suggested, Carr places a stress upon power as the central factor in 
politics. He writes, “Politics are, then, in one sense always power politics.” 
He does not go so far in this emphasis as Hans J. Morgenthau, who leaves 
little room for the transformation of politics into administration of situations 
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in which conflicts are resolved. Carr refer to power as the essential element 
of politics, but would not define politics exclusively in such terms. His stress 
upon power is sufficiently strong, however, for it to be made a gauge of his re-
alism. He is always at pains to discover, if not the more obvious manipulations 
of power, at least the “subtler forms of compulsion successfully concealed from 
the unsophisticated [as the] silent workings of political power.” Since power is 
the central factor in all systems, it becomes immaterial to emphasize institu-
tional differences between them. Systems differ largely in terms of the means 
they employ for the exercise of compulsion. In any era, conflicts between sys-
tems are not to be judged as conflicts between those that invite obedience by 
the power of their basic ideas and those that compel obedience. The essence 
of government everywhere is compulsion. It is naïve, in this view, to stress in 
the comparison between Western democracy and Sovietism the variations in 
the method employed to achieve obedience.
The importance of political ideas in the conflicts of international politics 
is illustrated, however, by Carr’s own expositions of the problem of interna-
tional politics. He certainly takes the study of international politics beyond 
the evaluation of power. I would judge Cobben to be wrong in his placing of 
Carr among those theorists who stress power exclusively and whose works, for 
this reason, illustrate the decline of political theory. His writings are impreg-
nated with his purposes. They may not be explicitly stated, but they are easily 
understood and they are there: Anglo- American democracy is a product of a 
particular economic order, an order understandable and visible in the nine-
teenth century but anachronistic in the twentieth. This democracy is hyper- 
individualistic and atomistic and reflects an era in which it was reasonable to 
think that each person in serving his own interest was serving the general in-
terest. One person’s vote used reasonably would represent his interest, and the 
mandate produced by vote- or head- counting would be a close approximation 
of a natural harmony of interests; this view on the level of domestic politics 
had its manifestations in the level of international politics. Each nation in 
seeking its own interest would be serving a general world interest. In Carr’s 
view, these arguments were attempts, mainly unconscious, to disguise conflicts 
of interest within and among nations. Politics are conflicts resolved eventually 
by compulsion. Carr would replace the utopian theory underlying Western 
democracy with a new one. The present era, he submits, is an era when in the 
conflict between giant power complexes a new political system more suited to 
the inevitable trends of history is being realized. Carr would call it a synthesis 
of the old and the new, just as he calls for an equilibrium between utopianism 
and realism. But I do not think he really subscribes to a new form. What 
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he finally produces, in terms of arguments most familiar, is a system stressing 
equality exclusively. Carr, the radical realist, comes to the point of supporting 
the New Democracy in much the same terms Vyshinksy would use. This fact 
is not in itself a refutation of Carr’s argument, but there is reason for criticizing 
the argument on other grounds.
Revolution and National Self­ Determination
Every new order, for Carr, has its origin in revolution, or perhaps more than 
one revolution. The revolutionary process is almost certainly violent, but we 
can take hope in the fact that the destructive phases come to an end and the 
period of constructiveness begins. This was true of the French Revolution and 
Carr counsels that it is true of the Russian Revolution. He does not provide 
any tests of constructiveness, but I judge that the revolutionary process may 
be termed constructive when it begins to produce an economic and social 
order of which Carr approves. The New Democracy, brought to full devel-
opment in the Russian Revolution, had its origins in the French Revolution. 
The idea given expression is that each person should be allowed to participate 
in the benefits of the community, in the product of the community, and to 
have “maximum social and economic opportunity.” Equality of economic op-
portunity or capacity so to participate is the fundamental condition. Unless 
this condition is met the principle of one head one vote is meaningless. The 
tensions of international politics today may be described largely as the clash 
between the old, anachronistic democracy and the new, real democracy. The 
latter represents an attempt to create a harmony of interests, or should we say 
unity of interests, and is not merely utopian wishful thinking that a harmony 
exists. There is no doubt in Carr’s mind where the victory will lie. It will surely 
be with the New Democracy, the new economic order, and, very likely, the 
biggest battalions.
One product of the French Revolution that cannot survive in the pres-
ent era is the idea and principle of national self- determination. The French 
Revolutionary spirit mainly affected those people whose national spirit could 
appropriately and efficiently be identified with the state. Democracy, na-
tion, and state could easily be associated together both in fact and in theo-
ry, a convenient partnership between reality and thinking about reality. But 
the significant political orders have become more numerous since the early 
nineteenth century. The peoples of the great globe itself are immersed in the 
revolution, and they cannot be organized in terms of the principle of nation-
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al self- determination. Their interests will not necessarily be served by iden-
tifying nation and state in organization. Modern technology has destroyed 
the viability, from a defense or power standpoint, of the nation- state. Even 
more, peoples cannot be fully permitted the luxury, even if they desire it, of 
independent, national, sovereign existence. What must be achieved is an effi-
cient organization of human affairs, so that there is a large product in human 
satisfactions in which people may share. I surely have no quarrel with the idea 
that the principle of national self- determination may be applied destructively 
from the standpoint of my values, but I think it is going to another extreme 
to provide all the rationale that is required by the new Soviet Empire. To be 
sure, the argument serves what might be called by some American interests as 
well. But Carr oversimplifies in classifying the means of compulsion employed 
by the United States with the means of compulsion employed by the USSR. 
Compulsion within states is for Carr the central factor and he does not make 
distinctions in degree or type. The compulsion applied by one people upon 
another, he concludes, is much the same as the compulsion by any people over 
others. Carr selects key ideas; but he is not as determined to draw distinctions 
as he is to make comparisons. Whether these failures derive from his desire to 
place the Soviet Union in a better light in the current struggle is not clear, but 
it is obvious that for those who take his argument seriously this would be the 
result. He is not an ardent defender of the old imperialism but he has provided 
the arguments in support of a new imperialism. As he writes, “Every modern 
revolutionary movement of any importance, whether its original ideology was 
national or international, is sooner or later impelled to turn away from nation-
alism as a self- sufficient principle of political action.”
One means of achieving change, as we have indicated, is revolution. The 
intense type of conflict known to domestic politics would be revolutionary 
conflict. In it, of course, the struggle for power is uppermost in importance. 
Although Carr admits that the goals sought in revolutionary struggle are not 
frequently the goals achieved, he would not eschew revolutionary struggle for 
that reason. The historical trend or drift in which he believes so much em-
ploys the revolution to achieve ends for which theoretical explanations can 
and will be produced after the fact. It is perhaps given to a few to chart the de-
velopment of ideas as well as events. Carr would not be unique as the observer 
who assumes that he has a singular capacity for detachment and therefore for 
seeing what is happening and what explanations are and will be needed. In 
this detached view, the Soviet system presents a challenge to man “to com-
plete the unfinished revolution.” I can only conclude that this detachment is 
not detachment from values, for the revolution can only be unfinished in the 
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sense of not yet having achieved certain ends or situations which Carr holds 
good. Yet the course to those ends may not be one of progress, even in the 
light of Carr’s values. The revolution may take us along the paths of “retrogres-
sion” (note the value- full worlds employed) to “new and unfamiliar forms” of 
institutions. He even, on occasion, decries the idea that revolution may be “a 
shortcut to utopia.” But the lasting impression is of a theory that sees history 
and men making use of revolution to produce defined and definable results. 
And it is stern, violent revolution the he envisages: “Revolutionary dictator-
ship was the instrument used to bring bourgeois democracy to birth— a striking 
historical precedent for the theories of Marx and Lenin.”
War
Another means of achieving change, if men do not realistically work for it 
in the context of peace, is war. Carr’s devotion to this brand of change is 
so determined that he envisages war as a source of change with remarkable 
composure. He once in a lecture termed himself a quasi- pacifist, but I cannot 
believe that this was more than a sop to the students he was addressing. Before 
1939 he also called for British neutrality to prevent the hardening of the two 
sides, but I judge this to have been a counsel of tactics. If he is a protagonist 
of the “unfinished revolution,” it is significant that he has written “I cannot 
believe in the international revolutionary, whether of the right or of the left, 
as a good pacifist.” “Nations, in this view, determined to play an active role 
in preserving a condition they prefer or in achieving a condition they desire, 
must be prepared, in the last resort, to apply the supreme penalty of war.” One 
must be prepared for the use of power in war to preserve a system of collective 
security or an imperial order. Not only have revolutions and economic col-
lapse been necessary to show the impotency of individualism but two world 
wars have had this result of convincing observers of the inadequacy of the 
individualist tradition. I do not that think that Carr’s main theses permit him 
to reject Bagehot’s contention that “The characters which do win in war are 
the characters which we should wish to win in war.” He has contempt for 
the Anglo- Saxon view “That any nation which desires to disturb the peace 
is . . . both irrational and immoral.” Some states, quite naturally pursuing their 
interest, do not have the same interests as other states in peace. “The fact of 
divergent interests is disguised and falsified by the platitude of a general desire 
to avoid conflict.” To be sure, he did not believe it possible under modern con-
ditions to fight wars of limited objectives but, at least before the atom bomb, I 
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do not believe he entirely rejected even the idea of catastrophic, major wars. 
There are occasions in which nations and peoples are compelled to fight for 
their survival, at the very least, and even in the pursuit of their interests. An 
insight into his thinking is revealed in his acceptance of and insistence upon 
the point that all modern wars are at the same time wars and revolutions. As 
such they are catalysts in that process of change the products of which Carr 
is awaiting with such anticipation. At the very least, war provides the motive 
force of the economic system. The pacifist is an escapologist who would wash 
his hands of current political problems and abandon a major means of resolv-
ing them.
Carr, again, emphasizes the element of conflict in politics and the factor of 
power as the major means of resolving such conflict. The victory goes to the 
strong. Among nations the strong, those who, therefore, have an advantage 
in a status quo, seek to preserve that status quo. Within nations, the strong in 
terms of wealth and proximity to the seat or locus of power seek to preserve the 
conditions that give them these advantages. Strong nations and strong classes 
and individuals produce myths of a natural or contrived harmony of interests. 
In Carr’s view, it must be the impulse of the weak or the underprivileged to dis-
pute the myth of a harmony of interests; they must seek to produce a condition 
to their advantage. Every increment of their power will increase the possibility 
that they may alter the situation to their advantage. The picture that emerges 
is one of tension kept within bounds by power, the weak attempting to become 
strong, and the strong imposing myths of harmony and holding the capacity 
for compulsion always in readiness. In this evaluation, Carr appears always to 
favor the protagonists of change, that is, change in accord with his values or 
with the pattern of history, which is to say the same thing.
The defect that I see in this is that Carr underestimates the power of ideas. 
The weak may accept their physically inferior position. They may in fact see 
a long- range advantage in the maintenance of peace. Just as, say in Britain, 
certain classes may accept their position of inferiority because their condi-
tioning makes it congenial, so among nations there may be those who recog-
nize the advantage of not having to share in the responsibility for leadership 
and making great decisions. Moreover, a person or nation in an inferior social 
or power position may rationally weight the possibilities and decide that the 
struggle will cost more than it produces. Carr is at great pains to say that a 
nation may not have an interest in the status quo or in peace. Interest is not 
a tangible that exists externally; it is related to a theory and value system. It 
is the academic theorists or the political leaders who lead in giving reality to 
interests by defining them, by producing theories outlining them. Germany 
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in the interwar years is described by Carr as not having an interest in the 
preservation of peace. Germany did not have an interest in the preservation of 
peace as Germans under the leadership of Hitler and Co. evaluated the situa-
tion of the German nation. Under a different leadership the German nation 
might have desired peace first of all. I think there is a failure on Carr’s part to 
establish a consistent philosophical basis for consideration of the problems of 
international politics. Second, he underestimates the power of ideas to work 
as significantly in the direction of accommodation as toward conflict. Third, 
he overestimates the dynamics of change and exaggerates his own capacity to 
see its quality and direction.
I think that Carr is basically a man of violence who, driven by his desire 
for the fulfillment of a revolution, defined in his own terms, has not taken the 
time to be philosophically precise. At the same time he has gone far to provide 
the theoretical arguments justifying a major onslaught on liberal democracy, 
a relatively free market economy, and a system of collective security. At one 
time, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, he stated his belief in an international com-
munity. Today he does not believe such an international community exists. 
Evidently the facts thoroughly belie the talk about such a community, but the 
facts surely must be established by other tests when talking or acting. In fact, 
if such a discussion is maintained on a level of vague generalizations, it will be 
almost certain that the observer is expressing his values rather than the result 
of his own empirical investigations. Carr almost surely would reject an inter-
national community based mainly upon the ideas and principles of Western 
democracy. He finds no real compatibility between Sovietism and Western 
democracy and cannot hope very strongly for a synthesis between the two as a 
foundation for such a community. And it would be temerity indeed for him at 
this stage to posit Sovietism as the basis history will employ.
International Law
In view of his premises, it is not surprising to note Carr’s conception of inter-
national law. Among the available alternatives he has chosen to depreciate 
international law as law. The most he has been willing to contend for— and 
this when he accepted the idea that there was an international community— 
is that international law is “the law of an undeveloped and not fully integrated 
community.” Custom is its only source. “A treaty, whatever its scope and con-
tent, lacks the essential quality of law.” Multilateral treaties cannot become 
the course or repositories of even customary international law. Since he no 
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longer believes in an international community, his test for the existence of 
such law no longer exists, for international law can have no existence except 
insofar as there is an international community which, on the basis of “a mini-
mum common view,” recognizes it as binding. The conditions of international 
life do hot have that quality of fixity and regularity that law can and does give 
to a situation. Nations today are in the midst of a great tension: they are in 
danger of oppression and even annihilation. In such a condition, as Hitler 
contended, “the question of legality plays a subordinate role.” There is no 
international political order making possible the “legal definition of interna-
tional public policy or of what is internationally immoral.” Since he once 
would have contended for the existence of an international society, the rule 
pacta sunt servanda he held to be more than a moral principle but rather a 
rule of international law. That society does not exist today, inter- law does 
not exist, the rule pacta sunt servanda is a moral principle honored only as the 
power political necessities of nations engaged in a titanic struggle for survival 
and not maintaining a basic consensus make possible. The forces generated 
by the contemporary revolution are too great to be contained by any existing 
framework for society. A radical realist must in fact become a disturber of the 
peace and an enemy of the law. Only when a political order implying a basic 
consensus has been re- created will law effectively operate among peoples, or 
in fact exist as law. “The condition of international legislation is the world 
super- state.” If they both are the criteria of the existence of international law 
in Carr’s mind, international law under these terms cannot exist.
Conclusion
I think, then, that we now may summarize at least the evaluation of Carr given 
in this paper: He is a publicist of great power who has made an important con-
tribution to theory of international relations. Although he calls for a combi-
nation of realistic appraisal and utopian aspiration, in terms of the definitions 
he offers he is properly accounted a radical realist for whom historical trends 
are producing one of the major revolutions of human history. He escapes what 
he properly calls the sterile conservatism of the realistic approach by assuming 
that he can see the major historical trends of our times. He thus imposes his 
own radical values upon history, and in the fashion of Plato, Hegel, Lenin, et 
al., he concludes that what is the product of reality ought to be the product of 
reality. Although he occasionally writes in eclectic terms and speaks of men 
making choices on a short- term basis and building by a slow process of ad-
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justment, he generally calls for seeing the revolution whole and pressing on 
to its obvious fulfillment. He is ambivalent, often coming up with his logical 
conclusions and then pulling away from their full implications. He states no-
bly the creed for hard ruthless analysis and then, himself, fails to inspect his 
own first principles. He has been in the main an apologist for success, after the 
fashion of a realist, although he is in no doubt a dissatisfied man, for the future 
promises the goals which the present usually denies. For him the revolutionary 
and unstable ages are the productive and creative ages, but he fails to set up 
tests by virtue of which the product may be judged or creativity determined. 
He handles vast masses of data with consummate skill in description, but his 
stylistic accomplishments permit him often to disguise the embryonic quality 
of his philosophical analysis. He is a worthy antagonist who illustrates as all 
men must that they can aspire to be no more than part of a process in intel-
lectual history. His stimulus to students of international politics cannot be 
denied, nor can the danger that he will earn more respect than he deserves. 
He states his resentment that the defenders of the status quo can overlook 
inequities, but he looks with singular composure toward a future that may pro-
vide a prison for the human mind. His quasi- detachment is at least sufficiently 
real to allow him to survey the stringencies of dictatorship without particular 
concern. And last, but not least, he is neither systematic enough nor direct 
enough to reveal whether Carr is speaking for himself or for others. This latter 
creates the risk that what one asserts about him will be subject to denial either 
by Carr or other analysts. But that risk must be taken, for otherwise a theorist 
of significance would be neglected.
*****
Digest of Discussion
The chairman called the meeting to order and suggested that the group might 
first devote some thought to planning its method of work. One method was 
that of taking up representative authors and publicists in the field and analyz-
ing their predominant theories; another might be to study the basic concepts 
or problems which made a working theory of international relations such as 
the balance of power, the national interest, the limits of power, international 
law and so on.
Professor Holborn wondered about the method of selection of the persons 
listed in the letter of invitation. Mr. Lipsky said that each person mentioned 
in the letter was especially concerned and identified with a theory of interna-
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tional relations having a particular emphasis. Since the group was scheduled 
to hold seven meetings, some selectivity was necessary although he was by no 
means suggesting that the listing in the letter was definitive. In any case, the 
phenomenon of theory will undoubtedly enter as the discussions are studied.
Professor Wolfers felt it would be easier for the group to study concepts 
such as Geo- Politics than authors such as Spykman, although much would 
depend on how either was introduced.
Professor Strausz- Hupé believed that many of the listed authors were sim-
ply elaborators of the previous theories; Carr, for example, as presented in the 
working paper, seems to be a restatement of Hegel.
Professor Rabi wondered whether a better approach might not start from 
the question, what conditions must be a body of ideas satisfy in order to be 
termed a theory? He doubted whether a real answer would emerge from a study 
of the bygone era and that an effective theory must be able to interpret the 
facts of international life as they exist today.
Professor McClellan agreed. Although he thought the first method sug-
gested by the chairman to be a good one, he also felt that a fundamental shift 
had occurred in the political scientist’s approach to a theoretical interpre-
tation of world politics. It might do, he added, to run through the principal 
authors and then proceed to the substantive problems.
Professor Holborn considered that none of the listed persons, with the 
exception of Wilson, were first- rate thinkers; most of them depended on other 
sources for their basic ideas. He felt that it would be better to discuss the es-
sential problems of theory rather than the authors.
The chairman raised the question of the reality behind a particular theory 
and the degree to which theory corresponds to reality as a criterion for the 
theory’s value.
Professor Strausz- Hupé raised the question as to whether International Re-
lations can be considered a science. He personally felt it was at a stage of evo-
lution approximate to that of botany at the time of Linnaeus, concerned more 
with classification than experimentation. To evolve further, International Re-
lations must create criteria for measuring the phenomena of politics. As yet, 
however, no adequate means for testing has been found.
Professor Wolfers felt that the question of whether the theoreticians sug-
gested in the letter were great minds or not was not relevant to study the the-
ory of international relations as it existed today. This particular body of theory 
was still at an early stage of development, and, in this context, the selection 
could be considered a rather good one so far as “giants” exist in the field.
Mr. Diebold noted that the question of approach had been examined in 
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the preparatory work and it was felt that the authors would provide conve-
nient foci for the conduct of the group’s discussions. Naturally, the list was 
not definitive and others could be added if the group wished to do so. But the 
authors merely furnished convenient points of entry into the larger topical 
problems which, it was hoped, would receive the greater emphasis.
Mr. Thompson expressed the hope that the present study would come up 
with observations and suggestions on the material used by academicians in 
teaching international relations.
Professor Strausz- Hupé pointed out the significance of Lenin’s theory of 
imperialism to the general theory of international relations. Several members 
felt that the Marxist contribution did not stop with the Leninist view of im-
perialism but included a complex of theories which were being continuously 
subjected to refinement and development down to as recently as Stalin’s pro-
nouncement of October 1952. Mr. Thompson believed that Marx could not 
be ignored, for example, in evaluating Carr, hence some attention to Marxian 
theories was desirable. Mr. Diebold suggested that the Marxist complex be 
substituted for Schumpeter and that Schumpeter’s views be examined as those 
of one critical toward Marxism.
Professor Holborn observed that the study of international relations was 
still in an experimental stage. It was not important, he felt, where the group 
began its own study, but out of the early discussions should emerge an idea 
of what international relations theory has failed to do. Thus the group can 
proceed to the complexes of problems inherent in such theory and attempt 
to make a constructive contribution to thinking about these problems. He 
would not agree, however, that Toynbee represents the historical approach to 
the study of international relations nor could he find a representative of that 
approach among those listed.
Mr. Lipsky and Professor Wolfers wondered about the distinction made 
between “giant” and “midget” minds in the field of political theory. Professor 
Wolfers noted that in a recent re- examination of the great English- speaking 
theoreticians such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Burke, he had found that 
while they were strong on theories of government, they were quite weak on 
theories of relations among governments. Professor Holborn felt that great-
ness consisted in large part of originality of concept. The thinkers mentioned 
in the letter were mostly of originality of concept. The thinkers mentioned in 
the letter were mostly “plumbers” of the idea of others. Mr. Lipsky believed 
that interpretive application and creative synthetization of ideas was as im-
portant as their original conception. Professor Holborn agreed to the extent 
that the persons listed in the letter were mostly concerned with harmonizing 
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the idea of others and putting them to work in a new field. Mr. Thompson 
noted that the “plumbers” nevertheless had a monopoly on the theory of in-
ternational relations, which may be indicative of the poverty of thought ex-
isting in that field.
In response to the chairman’s query as to which authors the group felt it 
would be most useful to consider, Miss Fosdick expressed the opinion that 
consideration of the substantive theoretical problems would be more valuable 
than an analytical survey of particular points of view on these problems. The 
author should merely be a device for initiating discussion on a problem. The 
chairman felt this constituted a sound approach. Mr. Diebold agreed but re-
minded the group that theories are methods of looking at phenomena.
Professor Holborn felt the group was theorizing too much on how to go 
about discussing theory; once it began discussing Carr it would rapidly move 
into more abstract theoretical problems.
Professor Strausz- Hupé suggested that the group compile a list of theo-
ries of international relations which could be used as a check to determine 
whether the authors mentioned in the letter sufficiently covered the field. 
Miss Fosdick thought that some of the theories on such a list would not be 
relevant to contemporary problems of international politics and felt that a 
topical list by subject headings would be more useful. Professor Wolfers be-
lieved that the group could discuss formulated propositions more readily than 
abstract problems gleaned from a survey of publicists and thinkers. Professor 
Strausz- Hupé noted that theories, once considered remote or antiquated, have 
a disconcerting habit of springing back to life and again becoming applicable 
to international affairs.
The chairman, summarizing the discussion to that point, felt that the 
consensus of the group leaned toward using representative authors as starting 
points or introduction for studying a particular complex of problems. He asked 
Mr. Lipsky whether the subsequent working papers could be elaborated in that 
manner— taking, for example, Morgenthau as an introduction to a study of 
the problem of the national interest— and containing formulated problems for 
discussion. Mr. Lipsky felt that the papers could be drawn up in that manner 
but pointed out that Morgenthau’s theory of national interest was bound up 
with the totality of his theory. The chairman agreed that the procedure would 
be artificial to that extent. Nevertheless, Morgenthau’s theory of the national 
interest should be able to stand by itself if it has validity.
Mr. Diebold wondered whether the procedure should be one of relating 
the theory to its proponent or whether attention to the applications of the 
theory to the world of politics would be more profitable. He hoped that the 
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group would take into account the conclusions for policy which are apt to 
flow from a particular theory and whether other policy conclusions could also 
be drawn. Speaking for the Council, he hoped that this group’s work would 
furnish guidance to that of other groups concerned with more concrete prob-
lems of international relations. In response to a question from the chairman 
about the Council’s attitude toward the present group, Mr. Diebold said that 
this was the first time the Council had sponsored an effort devoted solely to 
the theory of international relations. Because the group was something of an 
experiment, the Council was interested in the conclusions the present study 
would lead to. With the help of a Carnegie Research Fellowship, Mr. Lipsky 
was doing the spadework for such a study. The Council hoped that the group’s 
discussion would be helpful to Mr. Lipsky’s own work and that both projects 
would enlighten and enrich the Council’s research and study program, which 
was so largely devoted to more specific problems in the international field.
Professor Holborn, reading from the letter of invitation, noted that while 
the second sentence indicated that the group will undertake an analytical ex-
amination of foreign policy assumptions, the third sentence proceeds to make 
such an assumption about US foreign policy.
Professor Strausz- Hupé observed that some of the most eminent practi-
tioners of the art of diplomacy, such as Bismarck, had elaborated political the-
ories to guide their conduct of statecraft. Professor Holborn wondered wheth-
er such theories were simply ex post facto rationalizations. He also wondered 
about the general nature of the relationship between theory and practice in 
international affairs. Was the value of a study of theory to be derived from the 
influence such theory is presumed to exercise upon the practitioner?
Mr. Lipsky felt that statesmen and diplomats are usually influenced in their 
choice of alternatives by their belief in a given informing theory, hence the 
practical value of theory evaluation. Professor Holborn expressed some doubt 
as to whether most practitioners were greatly influenced by an explicit the-
ory of international relations. He felt that weight must also be given to the 
more nebulous social mores and customs prevailing upon the practitioner at 
the time. Mr. Thompson thought a strong causal relationship existed between 
theory and the policies of statesmen. Theory had certainly exercised an im-
portant influence on the policies of Wilson, and both Wilsonian theory and 
practice had more recently become a focal point of debate and critique among 
scholars and practitioners. The position that theory has no or little relation-
ship to the statements or actions of political leaders has been used by the 
Marxists to attack democratic liberalism. The extent to which practitioners 
such as George Kennan and others have been influenced by theory is quite 
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significant. This is not to say, of course, that every step the practitioner takes 
is based upon an informing theory, he concluded.
Professor Holborn replied that he was confining his argument to concepts 
of action dominated by theory. The Soviet Union, for example, makes a great 
point of the alleged theoretical foundations for Soviet foreign policy, but it is 
also obvious that political exigencies often force the Soviets to turn to expe-
diency. Therefore there is the problem of analyzing the two influences. The 
trend nowadays, he felt, was toward giving theory greater weight as an influ-
ence on practice.
Professor Wolfers, referring to a study he had made of the writings and 
speeches of a numbers of leading statement such as Hull, the late Senator Taft, 
and Churchill, noted that in each case certain postulates and generalizations 
kept reappearing and seemed to be the premises for their beliefs and actions. 
For example, a recurrent assumption of the late Senator Taft was that a nation 
does not go to war unless its territory is attacked, hence his conclusion that 
there was no risk from Russia should the US proceed to implement MacAr-
thur’s proposals for military measures against China. Hull, and even Churchill, 
likewise operated on fairly clear- cut and consistent premises or theories which 
could be deduced from their utterances. It was quite probable, Professor Wolf-
ers said, that these theories were not explicit but unconscious.
Professor Strausz- Hupé pointed out that foreign offices themselves have 
theories of policy which tend to exercise a heavy influence on whatever for-
eign secretary happens to be in office at the time. These theories involve a par-
ticularized doctrine of foreign policy which is part and parcel of the traditions 
and lore of the foreign office in question. Thus the policies of the Quai d’Or-
say continue to be permeated by the theories of the Count de Clauzel, who 
analyzed the problem of French foreign policy shortly after 1870. Similarly, 
the British Foreign Office and the American State Department possess their 
indigenous doctrines which exercise a kind of momentum in the formulation 
of policy. When a foreign secretary attempts to break out of the confines of 
prevailing tradition it is usually an indication that the nation is facing a crisis 
for which the tradition is found to be inadequate.
Miss Fosdick thought her experience on the Policy Planning Staff tended 
to confirm Professor Strausz- Hupé’s remarks insofar as the State Department 
was concerned. The past three or four years had, in her opinion, been a period 
of considerable ferment in the Department during which new ideas and out-
looks challenged older, more customary ones. She had been surprised at the 
extent to which the new administration had relapsed into the more traditional 
doctrines of foreign policy.
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Professor Wolfers posed the question as to whether the group’s main objec-
tive was that of analyzing certain fundamental problems in international rela-
tions theory— such as, for example, whether the concept of the national interest 
was an adequate guide for the conduct of foreign policy— or whether the discus-
sion should be slanted to determining how a theoretician, such as Morgenthau, 
reached his particular definition of the national interest. Using Carr as another 
example, is the group interested in analyzing Carr’s theories or is it interested in 
the truth or non- truth of certain propositions propounded by Carr?
Mr. Lipsky felt that both objectives were valid and useful. He was inter-
ested, for the purpose of assisting his own evaluation, in having the benefit of 
the group’s thinking on the theories of a number of prominent publicists. The 
second basic purpose was that of attempting to elaborate a sounder informing 
theory for the conduct of foreign policy, hence the need for topical analysis. 
The working papers were merely points of departure for discussion along both 
of these lines.
The chairman remarked that the question seemed to be one of choosing 
a focal point for the discussion. For example, the group might choose Carr’s 
particular theory of international behavior or the subject problems which the 
man has enunciated. Mr. Roberts felt the most fruitful procedure was one of 
discussing the ideas which emerge out of the man rather than the man per se.
Professor Holborn suggested that the group devote the remainder of its first 
meeting to Carr, take up Morgenthau and the theory of the national interest 
at its second session, turn its attention to the Spykman and the geopoliti-
cal strategic theories during the third meeting, and devote the fourth session 
to the Marxist complex and Schumpeter theories of imperialism. He further 
proposed that the group consider the remaining subject it wished to discuss 
in the light of its progress by that time. This is not to suggest, he concluded, 
that Toynbee or Lasswell be eliminated. Miss Fosdick felt that if Toynbee was 
discussed, Butterfield’s theories should be considered at that time.
Mr. Diebold agreed with Professor Holborn’s proposal. In this way the 
group could utilize a given theorist for the purpose of analyzing his ideological 
contribution and then proceed to a critique of his particular methodology.
Professor Wolfers suggested that Lasswell be substituted for Spykman. Pro-
fessor Holborn felt that Lasswell was the least rewarding theoretician of those 
proposed to the group. Professor Wolfers believed that Lasswell was the most 
influential of the contemporary theoreticians and deserved serious attention. 
Professor Holborn expressed doubt as to the influence of Lasswell’s theories 
but agreed that perhaps the group, and even he, might learn something from 
such a discussion.
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It was agreed that topic for discussion would be scheduled at least two meet-
ings in advance— the minimum necessary for the preparation of working papers.
Professor Strausz- Hupé felt that some attention should be given to the 
theories of such influential practitioners and advocates as Clarence Strait and 
Aristide Briand. The chairman suggested that these people had a political 
mission but not a theory. Professor Strausz- Hupé maintained that a coherent 
conceptual theory lay behind the mission of each, and that the influence ex-
ercised by these theories was a valid claim for attention.
Professor Holborn said that the Wilsonian- utopian school merited consid-
eration on both counts. Mr. Diebold noted that Mr. Byron Dexter’s excellent 
papers on Wilson and Herbert Croly would undoubtedly be of great help in 
considering the utopian school. Professor Wolfers pointed out that both Carr 
and Morgenthau began by a scathing critique of the liberal- utopian school; 
the group would render a substantial service if it could put Wilsonian theory 
in its proper perspective.
Professor Strausz- Hupé suggested that some consideration be given to 
George Catlin.
Summary
Summarizing the discussion to that point, the chairman noted the group’s 
consensus that the next three to four meetings be devoted to Lasswell, Carr, 
Morgenthau, Marx- Schumpeter, that the theories offered by each author be 
used to initiate discussion of a major topic or theoretical problem, and that af-
ter two or three sessions the group would reconsider this method of procedure 
and plan its future program.
Mr. Thompson added that he thought it might be helpful if Mr. Lipsky 
included a concise statement of the main gist of each author’s thought in the 
working papers.
At this point, the chairman recessed the meeting.
The Theory of E. H. Carr
Upon reconvening, the chairman asked Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion of 
Carr’s theory of international relations.
Mr. Lipsky said that if he seemed somewhat negative about Carr’s con-
clusions, it was due to the serious deficiencies which he felt existed in Carr’s 
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theory of international relations, despite the fact that Carr’s proclaimed inten-
tion is to conduct a hard, ruthless analysis of that subject. The analysis, Mr. 
Lipsky continued, begins with the dichotomy of the realist and the utopian 
approaches to the phenomena of politics. The realist, assuming that the rele-
vant data may be inspected and known, draws conclusions from the world of 
reality concerning the correct policy which should be taken. For the utopian, 
wish precedes the assessment of data and policy strives to bring reality into 
conformity with ideology.
Carr then concludes, Mr. Lipsky observed, that neither approach alone is 
adequate and that a combination of the two is required for sound policy. Ac-
tually, Mr. Lipsky noted, this is similar to trying to combine water and oil since 
the two approaches, as postulated by Carr, are antithetical. It is more than 
coincidental that Carr’s examples of realistic policies are those which have 
achieved success while the utopian policies cited by Carr are associated with 
failure. One cannot escape the conclusion that the synthesis of realistic and 
utopian policies which Carr advocates is an impossibility because Carr has not 
inspected the first principles of his system. One such principle, for example, 
is the dubious assumption, implicit in his realistic position, that knowledge of 
reality can be attained simply though observation and perception.
In response to questions by Professor Rabi and the chairman, Mr. Lipsky 
observed that Carr viewed the nineteenth century as a political oasis between 
the monarchical despotism of the eighteenth century and the dictatorial total-
itarianism of the twentieth. The world is moving into a new era marked by the 
breakup of such fundamental liberal tenets of the supremacy of the individual 
and the organization of political life in terms of the nation- state. The new era 
is one demanding greater satisfaction of the needs of the masses, hence the 
necessity for economic and social planning. Carr assumes that planning and 
individual freedom are incompatible and that the latter must be sacrificed to 
the demands of the former.
While it is often contended that Carr is a Marxist, Mr. Lipsky could not 
agree to that conclusion. Carr does, however, assume that the Soviet Union is 
leading the world toward fulfilling the historical revolution into the twentieth 
century, just as he assumed that the Nazis were performing this mission in the 
1930s. To the extent that the political democracies recognize and adjust to 
the revolutionary conditions of the new era, no fundamental difference be-
tween democratic and totalitarian states exists. The essence of government is 
compulsion, by one means or another. The antithesis of democracy, according 
to Carr, is not dictatorship but aristocratic government, that is, government 
which does not serve the demands of the masses and opposes public planning.
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Mr. Thompson wondered whether Carr’s major contribution to interna-
tional relations theory was his critique of the assumptions and conclusions of 
the Wilsonian- utopian school, and equally, his questioning the assumption of 
the existence of a harmony of interest between the policies of the “status quo” 
nations and conditions for a secure, peaceful and prosperous world order. Mr. 
Lipsky felt that Carr’s critique on these points, while influential, were simply 
points of departure into his general theory.
Interpretation of History
In response to a question from Professor Rabi on Carr’s basic, cardinal ideas, 
Mr. Lipsky mentioned that among Carr’s premises was the idea of the inevi-
tably of change, that the historical change was necessarily often accompanied 
by violence and that the direction of change could be interpreted by the in-
telligent, reasonable statesman. Moreover, the promise of the future is a world 
organized in terms of the individual’s contribution to society rather than in 
terms of individual liberty.
Professor Holborn agreed that Carr viewed history as being in constant, 
dynamic change and that a static society is a doomed society. He seems to con-
strue our present era, Professor Holborn continued, as analogous to that of the 
French Revolution. The communist challenge is a disturbing element to older 
societies but, as was the French- Republican challenge, contains the seeds of a 
new era. The role of the statesmen is to recognize the necessity of change and 
adjust to it positively by distilling the good elements of the revolution from 
the bed. In present- day terms, the Western statesman must be able to take 
the Bolshevik revolution seriously, to analyze it dispassionately, determine its 
good, constructive elements and thus have the insight to predict the trend of 
historical development. Such a statesman will also appreciate the fact that 
the Bolshevik challenge is a direct result of the failure of the liberal system to 
provide a viable international order.
Professor Strausz- Hupé felt that Carr was also impressed by the growing 
complexity of modern industrial civilization and the inability of man to cope 
with its problems within the framework of democratic liberalism. Hence Carr 
has a strong Marxian orientation and seems to believe that Marxism enables 
man to understand his environment and furnishes a means by which man can 
master technology.
Professor Holborn interpreted Carr as believing that there is much in his-
tory which is terrible and ruthless and he views men as often being a slave to 
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historical destiny, hence Carr’s proximity to the Hegelian position. Carr also 
believes, Professor Holborn continued, that the function of the intelligent 
statesman is to try to interpret the trend of history and fall in step with that 
trend. In other words, policy is the process of marking intelligent concessions 
to the wave of history. Mr. Lipsky agreed with these observations and pointed 
out that Carr maintains that the most productive ages of history are also the 
most unstable.
Professor Rabi wondered what the relevance all this had for international 
relations.
Professor Wolfers observed that Carr began writing towards the end of the 
interwar period when the Nazis were in the ascendancy in Europe, challenging 
the Western Wilsonian system based on the Versailles Treaty and the League. 
Carr criticized such principles as collective security and sanctions as the hypo-
critical moralizing by which the “status quo” powers justified their preferential 
position in world affairs; he considered himself a “realist” in seeing through 
this hypocrisy. Carr viewed the challenge of the revisionist powers as the chal-
lenge of newer, more vital historical forces destined to mold the future. Basic, 
underlying technological changes had rendered the nation- state and individ-
ual liberty passé; the compulsions of the new technology must be served. With 
the military- political defeat of the Nazis, Carr looks to the Bolsheviks as the 
agents to usher in a new era, and the violent challenge of communism to the 
Western world is simply the birth pangs of a new social age.
Mr. Lipsky remarked that Carr could therefore be termed a historicist. It 
was impossible to escape the conclusion that Carr’s “inevitabilities” are devel-
opments which he himself wishes to see fulfilled.
The chairman posed the question as to the basic causal forces, according 
to Carr, for the inevitable historical development. What are the forces which 
could mold the future?
Mr. Lipsky felt that they were somewhat difficult to define with precision. 
Professor Rabi believed the advance of industrial technology to be the causal 
force which was rendering the nation- state obsolete. Mr. McClellan detected 
a strong element of economic determinism in Carr, hence his proximity to the 
Hegelian- Marxism school of historical determinism.
Professor Holborn did not consider Carr to be a historical materialist since 
he seemed to subordinate economic technology to the needs of society. His 
message was apparently that economic policy must be harnessed to the needs 
of men. Hence his repudiation of economic liberalism and his advocacy of 
economic planning. Professor Holborn concluded that Carr might be de-
scribed as a “radical liberalist.”
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Professor Rabi stated that he was still hoping for a definition of Carr’s basic 
system of thought.
Professor Strausz- Hupé pointed to Carr’s analysis of a historical trend to-
ward larger systems of production and exchange and the need for comparable 
political adjustments. Hence the view, also held by the Marxists, that qualita-
tive change merges from quantitative change.
Implications for Policy
Professor Kaufmann felt Carr’s theory of change to be rather meaningless. Pro-
fessor Holborn agreed to the extent that it offers no criteria for good policy 
advice. Carr, Professor Holborn noted, must ultimately fall back on simple 
common sense, that is upon certain basic values. For example, he argues that 
economic liberties should be stressed in the new Bolshevik- inspired era, but 
there is nothing in his theory which leads to that conclusion; it is simply a 
common- sense judgment. Mr. Lipsky agreed that Carr’s theory did little to 
furnish statesmen with the basis for making “realistic” decisions.
Professor Wolfers felt that Carr’s policy advice was fairly consistent. Now, 
as before the war, he addresses himself to the Western powers. Before the war 
his advice took the form of anti- League recommendations; today he is sympa-
thetic to the claims of the new revisionist force, the Soviet Union. He consis-
tently sees the West as the status quo force, justifying its preferential position 
with hypocritical moralizing.
The chairman wondered whether Carr could be thought of as consistently 
anti- capitalist; was the capitalist order at stake at the time of Munich? Mr. 
Thompson held that, in Carr’s view, capitalism had been at stake, thus leading 
Carr to sympathize with the challenge posed by the revisionist powers. Mr. 
Thompson expressed the opinion that Carr carried a large quantity of Marxist 
baggage around with him. For example, Carr fully endorses the Marxian view 
that democratic ideology is simply a mask for ulterior ambitions. Similarly, he 
points out the impossibility of separating the basic interests from the morality 
of nations. Thus interest and morality furnish keys for understanding the real-
ities of power politics. Carr then proceeds to attempt to transcend this juxta-
position by looking for higher moral grounds for policy. In The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis he apologizes for appeasement, in The Conditions for Peace he advocates 
social and economic planning, in the Nationalism and After he argues that the 
nation- state is no longer large enough to be politically viable, and in the Soviet 
Impact on the Western World he is again a Marxist— somewhat in the sense that 
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many Westerners were “Marxist” during the war. Carr’s theories are suscepti-
ble to an economic critique as well as a political critique but both relate to his 
attempt to escape from the dilemma of power.
Professor Strausz- Hupé noted that Carr’s analysis constantly seem to deal 
with elements in juxtaposition, having no organic unity. Carr never explains 
how he arrived at this picture of the world. Nor does his analysis of recurrently 
opposing forces gel into a unified political theory.
Professor Wolfers felt that in postulating political forces in inherent antag-
onism, Carr was defining world politics as he saw them. Carr assumes that the 
problem of peace can only be solved by granting concessions to the dynamic 
force which is willing to resort to violence to achieve its objectives. The chair-
man agreed and thought that Carr sympathized with the dynamic side because 
he believed it was in step with the march of history.
Mr. Thompson remarked that Carr points out that nations are sometimes 
viewed as masses of individuals while at other times are regarded as collec-
tive organisms. He resolves this dilemma by suggesting that nations have both 
qualities. He further seems to believe that, whatever the causal forces, nations 
are faced with inherent conflicts in their relations with one another. Being a 
political scientist, Carr is interested in the behavior of nations as they react to 
those dynamic forces, Mr. Thompson said.
Mr. Lipsky asked whether Mr. Thompson felt that Carr wished to rise 
above the confines of a pure power analysis. Mr. Thompson thought that Carr 
had explored one means after another in his attempt to transcend power. Pro-
fessor Holborn observed that Carr did not seem to foresee a historical trend 
toward utopia, but viewed history as a constant, unending struggle between 
dynamic and static forces.
Professor Wolfers remarked that Carr’s advice was in the nature of urging 
constructive adjustments to the inevitable forces of history. Professor Hol-
born agreed; Carr seemed to believe that “the beast of history can be slightly 
domesticated but never tamed.” Thus the “realistic” policy for the Western 
statement is one of making sensible concessions to his opponents. Mr. Diebold 
observed that Carr’s advice of “give a little, keep a little” was precisely that 
adopted by feudal Britain toward the rising bourgeoisie. Professor Holborn 
agreed and felt that in the present world situation, Carr’s advice to the West-
ern diplomat would be to oppose the terror of the Bolshevik revolution and 
attempt to make it more humane, but at the same time, to accept it and come 
to terms with it.
Miss Fosdick wondered why the United States, rather than the Soviet 
Union, was not the revisionist historical force that figured in Carr’s theory. 
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Professor Wolfers felt that this was simply an a priori value judgment on Carr’s 
part. The chairman remarked that Bolshevism was progressive or reactionary 
depending upon which side of the Soviet system was emphasized. Professor 
Holborn noted that Carr’s interpretation of America’s role in history was lim-
ited to American foreign policy and especially Wilsonianism. He never ana-
lyzes the American system as a domestic organization. And for Carr, Wilsoni-
anism is a kind of political backwash from the French Revolution, Professor 
Holborn stated.
Basic Assumptions
The chairman posed the question as to Carr’s basic assumptions. Is one such 
assumption that the great historical changes must take place through vio-
lence? If Carr assumes the irreconcilability of historical forces, much of his 
theory becomes more intelligible, the chairman pointed out. Mr. Lipsky felt 
that Carr was not very optimistic concerning the ability of the status quo 
nations to recognize the need for adjustments and concessions, hence his an-
ticipation of violence. It would almost appear, Mr. Lipsky thought, that Carr 
approves the use of violence to break the grip of the status quo nations on the 
necessary course of history.
Professor Rabi observed that if Carr’s writings furnished conclusions for 
policy with respect to the kind of concessions Western statesmen should 
make, then it might be accurate to designate those writings as the expression 
of a theory. This is plainly not the case, Professor Rabi said. Mr. Lipsky felt 
that a theory may exist even though incomplete. Professor Rabi expressed the 
opinion that for an assortment of ideas to be a theory it must contain certain 
basic elements, among them being a number of fairly clear assumptions, the 
ability to apply these assumptions, and the capacity to draw certain general, if 
not precise, conclusions. While Carr’s ideas contained bits of wisdom, they did 
not constitute a theory, according to Professor Rabi.
Mr. Wasson noted the observation on page one of the working paper to the 
effect that Carr’s ambition to fit into the world of politics made it impossible 
to elaborate a consistent and complete theoretical system. Mr. Lipsky felt that 
Carr’s political ambitions made his theoretical problem more difficult but not 
impossible.
Professor Wolfers believed that certain general conclusions could be de-
rived from Carr’s theories. For example, Carr concludes that political life is 
of necessity being organized in ever larger units or orbits, that the content of 
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world politics is evolving into the political relationships among these large 
orbits, and that clashes between orbits are to be expected unless the status quo 
orbits make the necessary concessions.
Mr. Thompson felt that Carr’s theory did not offer any precise criteria 
concerning the kind of concessions Western nations can and should make.
The chairman thought that Carr’s theory was fairly inchoate. The chair-
man was further inclined to believe that the basis of the theory was economic 
and that Carr viewed economic and technological developments as the gener-
ating forces for inevitable international political struggles.
Mr. Thompson expressed the opinion that in his early writings, Carr’s 
theoretical basis was political and that he shifted to a theory of economic 
causation in his later writings.
Mr. Franklin wondered whether Carr, like Anne Morrow Lindbergh in 
The Wave of the Future, wrote uncritically about a totalitarian system because 
of an inner dislike for it. Mr. Lipsky and the chairman did not feel this was the 
case with Carr.
Mr. Thompson noted that Carr has no notion of the existence of a world 
community. Carr’s passage on the world community in The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
is perhaps the weakest part of the book, Mr. Thompson felt.
Miss Fosdick thought that another weakness of Carr, like that of Niebuhr, 
was an inadequate conception of human interest and motivation. According 
to Carr, people are either selfish or altruistic; this oversimplification prevents 
Carr from making an adequate analysis of world politics.
The chairman expressed the opinion that the subject of Carr had been 
pretty well thrashed out. After consulting with members of the group it was 





Second Meeting: Hans J. Morgenthau and 
the National Interest, January 14, 1954
The Study Group on Theory of International Relations held its second 
meeting on Thursday, January 14, 1954, at 5:30, at the Harold Pratt House. 
The subject was the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau. Present were: Robert 
M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, 
secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; Edgar M. Church; William Diebold Jr.; 
Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; 
Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz- Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; R. Gordon 
Wasson; Arnold Wolfers.
*****
Working Paper No. 2
Prepared by George Lipsky
Professor Morgenthau of the University of Chicago asserts the existence of 
a great debate for our times, going far beyond academic limits, between two 
main theoretical interpretations of the phenomena of international politics. 
On the one hand, there is the school of realistic theory, which manifests cen-
tral preoccupation with political objective fact and self- consciously asserts 
its unwillingness to be guided by large- scale moral abstractions in arriving 
at political decisions or in making political appraisals. On the other, there 
is the school that is frankly moved by moral aspiration in description as well 
as prescription. This school emphasizes the international political world as 
it ought to be and not as it is, even though protagonists of this school will, 
on occasion, use such terms as “the reality of idealism.” Morgenthau is, of 
course, the leading academic contender for what some would call a realistic, 
cold, neo- Machiavellian theory of international politics. His literary product 
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is already large and is growing rapidly. Its scope presents difficulties to anyone 
proposing to encompass it, but at the same time provides opportunities for see-
ing the growth of his thought. His theory is an evolving description of interna-
tional politics. It is embodied in a felicitous, almost poetic, English prose style, 
the more remarkable by reason of the fact that English is not Morgenthau’s 
mother tongue. Occasionally style may interfere with analytical structure and 
logic, although there may be other reasons that will be referred to later for 
deficiencies of this type, if they exist.
The main concern of this paper is suggested by the title of what is perhaps 
Morgenthau’s best known publication, In Defense of the National Interest. In 
addition to presenting and later appraising Morgenthau’s changing concep-
tion of the national interest, this paper provides some view of its intellectual 
and philosophical context, which explains in some measure the particular as-
pects of that conception. I have had the good fortune to see the revision in 
galley proof of Chapter I of Morgenthau’s larger book, Politics Among Nations. 
This chapter in its revised form is entitled “A Realistic Theory of Internation-
al Politics,” a change from the original “Political Power.” This title suggests 
Morgenthau’s growing concentration upon the task of building a solid base of 
theoretical constructs, but the chapter itself has the additional advantage of 
presenting a capsule survey of the main aspects of his theoretical approach.
In addition to the works already referred to above, other titles of main 
importance to understanding Morgenthau are Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
(especially important in suggesting his general philosophical approach) and 
the articles appearing in the American Political Science Review, “Mainsprings of 
American Foreign Policy,” 44 (Dec. 1950), 833– 854, and “Another Great De-
bate: The National Interest of the United States,” 46 (Dec. 1953), 961– 988. 
Other titles used in the preparation of this paper are listed below.
Morgenthau’s Philosophy
Professor Percy E. Corbett of Yale University, an antagonist of Morgenthau 
on the issues to which Morgenthau directs his main attention, complains 
that “American foreign policy has recently become a favorite target area 
for attacks upon an alleged moralizing and legalistic habit which ignored 
or condemns national interest.”1 The existence of the attack is a certainty. 
When we have finished with the analysis, we shall have some basis for de-
termining whether the case against American foreign policy as made out by 
Morgenthau is effective.
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Fundamental to this case is Morgenthau’s view that “Since the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars there has been an ever increasing tendency in the Western 
world to shift attention away from the substance of international politics to-
ward simple formulas and formal arrangements, which either would do away 
with international politics altogether or at least would guide it into peaceful 
channels.”2 This tendency is particularly apparent, he asserts, in the United 
States because of the philosophy of international relations which dominated 
American thinking during the “better part of the nineteenth century” and 
because of the “particular political and intellectual circumstances” of Unit-
ed States foreign relations.3 This is, in Morgenthau’s view, a tendency that 
forever invokes “justice against expediency” and, forever “blind to the tragic 
complexities of human existence  .  .  .  ,” “contents itself with an unreal and 
hypocritical solution of the problem of political ethics.”4 For pragmatic rea-
sons the realist position would eschew such a stand and is indeed its antithesis. 
The realist position in Morgenthau’s view helps avoid policies and popular 
attitudes reflecting “uneasy confusion,” “cynical despair,” and the risk of being 
overwhelmed “by the enemies from within and without.”5 Morgenthau would 
at all costs avoid being so wedded to a metaphysic as to accept static concepts 
as descriptive of society, losing sight of the fact that all life is flux. Only by rec-
ognizing that he can but partially solve problems can man avoid that dogmatic 
and escapist perfectionism which has led him so often to the edge of catastro-
phe. Understanding is as much an attempt to comprehend the limitations of 
the mind as it is to acquire the substance of knowledge.
Under the impact of a realistic resolve, says Morgenthau, modern man 
may begin, indeed has begun, “to examine the fundamental and persistent 
forces of world politics.” “Thus the political scientist is moving into the inter-
national field at last . . . ,” not with the view of praising or condemning, but to 
aid in the search for survival through knowledge of basic drives. In this view, 
international politics is not a simple study seen through a body of abstractions, 
but a vast, shifting panorama of events, those of the present being correlated 
with those of the distant past in terms of a theory that does not profess too 
much or too little. Such a theory denies that international politics can be 
reduced to legal rules and institutions just as a realistic theory of politics in 
the United States will refuse to identify “American politics on the national 
level . . . with the American Constitution, the federal laws, and the agencies 
of the federal government.”6
Although Morgenthau’s general philosophy is dynamic and growing, Sci­
entific Man vs. Power Politics still represents his philosophical position, which 
he thinks gives better answers than those given by the traditional custodians 
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of Western thought. Fearing that modern man will look even further afield for 
his philosophical convictions, Morgenthau has entered passionately into the 
combat to forestall that contingency. Morgenthau’s concern with the great 
debate is not fortuitous. He thinks the outcome, if it favors the lessons of 
realism, will conduce to democratic survival. He is particularly opposed to 
modern philosophy’s habit of elevating its “truths into suppositions of absolute 
validity, based on the authority of reason and claiming the objectivity of what 
the modern age calls science.”7 He contends for a more- than- scientific man 
who with an insight and wisdom beyond science can resolutely elevate his 
expressions into the universal laws of human nature.8 In this perspective, the 
“nothing- but- scientific man appears as the true dogmatist who universalizes 
cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them to realms not acces-
sible to them.” When the latter appears in the field of international politics, 
he is the fashioner of formulas, the protagonist of single causes, the utopian 
champion of final solutions, who, when events turn out contrary to his theory, 
blames the events rather than the theory. The orthodox theorist in interna-
tional politics has not gone beyond the assumptions of scientific thought in 
the nineteenth century, whereas scientific theory today recognizes limitations 
of theory, the tentativeness of conclusions, the reality of probability.9 Morgen-
thau is led to a paradoxical conclusion. This theorist, placing false hope in the 
unreal security present in the view of nature as always congruent with truth, 
cannot find that security which can be found in “the knowing insecurity of the 
wisdom of man.”10 Put another way, scientific knowledge does not provide all 
the knowledge that is necessary for survival. There is a degree of security for 
man in awareness of his limitations.
Man, then, possesses a freedom that he denies in giving himself entirely 
to the weapon of science. In the exercise of his freedom, he may err, but he 
may also as a hero achieve a victory in a struggle that the searcher for scien-
tific truth might never have undertaken, particularly were he in a cynical, 
pessimistic phase occasioned by defeat in terms of the scientific formulas he 
espouses.11 The hero will recognize that struggle is never ending and will not 
be abashed thereby. He will know that one episode is concluded, only for 
another to appear, on a continuum leading into the perhaps tragic future. By 
reference to this continuum, the grandeur of man and his fitness for his free-
dom may be measured, as it cannot be measured in terms of the inadequate 
constructs of science.
This is not to say that Morgenthau will not assert truths in large gener-
alizations, suggesting even the formulas for his opponents. He can write that 
“democracy is superior to Bolshevism in the truth which it contains and in the 
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good of which it carries the promise and in part the fulfillment.”12 This appears 
to be nothing more than an affirmation of Morgenthau’s preference for democ-
racy, based upon the more- than- science basis. But it is enough to warrant the 
conclusion that the survival he seeks to promote may be described in terms of 
democratic process, although his system recognizes the concurrent historical 
validity of the national interests of non- democratic states.
Morgenthau contends that a real distinction must be made between phi-
losophy and politics. Philosophy is concerned with discovering the absolute 
good which is everywhere the same. A realistic politics is concerned with 
discovering the relative good “that is good only under particular circumstanc-
es.”13 Philosophy has mainly a contemplative function. Politics must not only 
understand the relative good but must make use of it in the struggle for surviv-
al. All men participate in a “community of psychological traits and elementary 
aspirations,” but, in Morgenthau’s world, I believe these do not significantly 
weigh against “the absence of shared experiences, universal moral convictions 
and common political aspirations.”14 The philosopher is consigned to reflec-
tion upon a future, far- off, divine event, toward which he can but hope the 
whole of creation moves. The student and practitioner of politics may attempt 
to fashion means for survival out of a material that is both defective and suf-
ficient, if his sights are properly set upon that to which a realist may aspire.
The Nature of Idealism
Against this background, we may come closer to grips with the national inter-
est, assumed to be realistic, with which Morgenthau is especially concerned. 
In doing so, it is important to present his view of the nature of contemporary 
idealism or utopianism against which he has arrayed his forces. This idealism 
or utopianism has been modified in the course of its history. As depicted by 
Morgenthau, the history of utopianism is the history of rationalist thought 
and practice, manifesting all the effects of “scientism” upon it, especially since 
the eighteenth century. Utopianism is part of a tradition which, “From the 
Church Fathers to the anti- Machiavellian writers of the eighteenth century, 
international politics was made the object of moral condemnation.”15 The 
modern version goes even further and, although it may not deny the existence 
of power politics, denies that it has any “inevitable connection with the life 
of man in society.”16 In this process the political and legal principles that had 
been formulated to protect the freedom of individuals were applied to nations, 
with the anticipation that they would serve to defend nations as surely as they 
defended individuals within organized domestic societies.17
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In the early modern and optimistic period, this type of theory, with some 
warping of principle, could justify wars to bring the blessings of liberal idealism 
“to people not yet enjoying them or to protect them against despotic aggres-
sion.”18 It was not a long step, in fact it was an entirely consistent one, to Wil-
son’s plea for participation in a final war “‘making the world safe for democra-
cy’ . . . and ‘the culminating final war for human liberty.’”19 This was a closing 
development in the early period of liberal virility; when the promise was not 
fulfilled, a period of liberal decadence set in, in which the only alternative 
available was non- action or drift. In Morgenthau’s view, these alternatives 
illustrated the inevitability of inconsistent application of the abstractionist 
and formulas which were the main stock- in- trade of idealist- utopian thought 
and action.20 In the process, the ideological war of the liberal was proved to 
be a “self- defeating absurdity,” but this was a lesson the liberal never learned. 
He continued to believe that the formulas contained the truth; the resistant 
reality, part of which was the perversity of man and nations, was blamed.21 It 
would be an oversimplification to place all liberals in the same class in their 
reaction to changing events. His attachment to old slogans weakened, the 
disappointed liberal might refuse to fight for beleaguered nations under attack 
by aggressors. The “good” liberal, harassed but untroubled by doubts concern-
ing his truths, would still continue to fight. But neither variety came to grips 
with the fact that the real issue was “the influence upon the national interests, 
expressed in terms of power politics, of violent change” in the configuration 
of power relationships.22 Neither type would fight any cause for other than 
liberal ends.
The interwar period, particularly in its early phases before disillusionment 
and skepticism had set in, saw the inception of “the age of the scientific ap-
proach to international affairs.”23 Conferences, congresses, treaties, research, 
and publication proliferated. The goal was the scientific, simple solution to in-
ternational problems, especially that of war. The pessimistic period of the thir-
ties was survived and the end is not yet. Following World War II, for example, 
the Western concern for democracy in the Balkans revealed the perseverance 
of utopian attachment “for abstract slogans rather than political interests.”24 
This perseverance was natural and inevitable, for by their very abstractness 
slogans and formulas are bound “to be kept alive after they have outlived their 
political usefulness.” The fact that the realities of international politics are 
“concrete, specific, and dependent upon time and place” is not clearly seen or 
not seen at all.
Morgenthau’s realist can see that the problem of the “abolition of war 
is . . . the fundamental problem confronting international thought.”25 But the 
non- rationalist mind recognizes the difficulty of the solution of this problem 
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because of “the variety of causes which have their roots in the innermost as-
pirations of the human soul.” The rational- utopian- liberal would reduce this 
variety to a single cause. He is often a person with a “social and political con-
science,” but he is singularly capable of relying upon “a relatively innocuous 
outlet for his longing for reform.” His reformism may be sincere, but it accepts 
an unheroic outlet, neglectful of the total and complex reality. International 
society was not organized, therefore international organization would be pro-
vided on the basis of a scientific formula. Or, if this were not the emphasis, 
the accent might be on simple, material remedies. In any case, the utopian 
advocates a short cut that in Morgenthau’s view is doomed to fail, especially in 
achieving final solutions to the problems presented by power politics.
The idealist will not see that there must, of necessity, remain a permanent 
gap between his formulas and political reality. The formulas assert that the 
problem may be met with technical, scientific responses. Since technical, sci-
entific, or legalistic responses have final answers to problems in other fields, it 
is expected that they can and will do so in the field of international politics. 
The liberal- idealist will not accept the fact that the problems are political, 
always to be solved temporarily on the basis of the prevailing distribution of 
power among contending nations. Morgenthau assesses this failure to meet 
the challenges as taking refuge in illusion, as a catastrophic unwillingness to 
confess political failure. Let the formulation appeal in its logical consistency 
to reason, and perfection in reality would derive therefrom. Thus, let the rule 
of law be finely drawn by technicians of competence, and “insecurity and dis-
order [would be transformed] into the calculability of a well- ordered society.”26 
Failures and the perseverance of conflict do not distract nor deter the utopi-
ans. The survival value of this type of thought is testimony not only to the 
ruggedness of its protagonists in the face of failure, but also to the simplicity 
and logical appeal of the panaceas offered. An easy road to perfectionism is os-
tensibly opened. “There are many . . . perfectionist devices by which Western 
civilization has tried during the past one hundred and fifty years to escape the 
facts of political life.”27 Of them all, it was “the political philosophy of Wood-
row Wilson which provides the classical example of this kind of perfectionist 
escapism.”28
Power and the National Interest
To this, Morgenthau would oppose a frank awareness and formulation of the 
predominant role of power and the outstanding fact of power politics. In his 
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system, “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or 
to demonstrate power.”29 “Political power is a psychological relation between 
those who exercise it and those over whom it is exerted.”30 This is a relation-
ship that has a configuration that is worked out as men, born in chains, either 
are forced to accept their chains, or, responding to the universal desire for 
power and hegemony, succeed in becoming masters. This reversal of Rous-
seau’s formula places Morgenthau without qualification outside the utopian 
camp (using his terms). The fact of power (and therefore of power politics) 
cannot be removed by wishing, nor may men legislate it out of existence 
through any institution, or by evoking a formula as a vehicle for doing so. 
Morgenthau starts from the “assumption that power politics, rooted in the 
lust for power which is common to all men, is for this reason inseparable from 
social life itself.” Contempt for power politics cannot provide a master for 
politics by attempts to make it a science. Man cannot control political reality 
by assuming that that reality is less complex than it is. The establishment of 
dichotomies between the good and the true, on the one hand, and the bad 
and the perversion of truth, on the other (substitute society vs. state, law vs. 
politics, men vs. institutions, reason vs. tradition, order vs. violence) cannot 
obviate the fundamentally tragic facts of political existence. Seeking survival 
man must make the best use he can of these facts; he cannot make perfect use 
of them.
The simple dichotomies are especially dangerous since they provide a po-
lar position of rectitude, intellectual and ethical, in which the utopian liberal 
will take refuge, even when his politics have been unsuccessful. Our survival 
is not served by taking refuge in abstractions, says Morgenthau; it may be 
served by recognizing that international politics are and will remain an un-
ending struggle for power. Only by facing the truth can man avoid the full 
consequences of the tragedy of his existence. Organized violence has been 
the rule rather than the exception in human affairs. In this age when man has 
developed the capacity for prodigious destruction, it is especially important to 
avoid the path to easy virtue that has signally failed to prevent the outbreak of 
organized violence in the past. Man should not bury his head even further in 
the sands of confusion of a vast, simple, intellectual desert. With time growing 
short, he must finally stand erect, look about himself, face the awful world, and 
really make a change in the methods of controlling reality, since he cannot 
change the reality himself.
This reality will be more easily or certainly controlled if the national 
interest of each state is so defined as to be accommodated within a pattern 
of national interests among all states. Morgenthau states in the revision of 
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chapter I in Politics Among Nations that the national interest must be defined 
in terms of power. In further elaboration he would presumably say that the 
natural interest is an interest in the production or maintenance of certain 
events or situations in the historical continuum. These events or situations are 
a structure of power relationships which can only be produced or maintained 
by the maintenance, enforcement, or demonstration of power by each nation 
in realistic congruence with the national power interests of other nations. 
Some have contended that Morgenthau is an unqualified champion of the 
interests of the nation without regard to the interests of other nations. This, I 
think, is a misreading of his case. First, he assumes that the realistic approach 
gives full attention to power limitation as well as power potential. Second, his 
theory recognizes historical continuity and change and discountenances ego-
centric belief in the special mission of particular states to remake the world in 
a special and final form. The realist perspective is a perspective in breadth and 
depth; it strives to see the realities of the situation immediately and in histor-
ical perspective. And, in fact, a higher morality is implicit in this perspective 
than in the perspective of the utopian- moralist.
It is apparent that the national interest must be given substance through 
definition. Some source must be found for an authoritative statement of the 
situations or events that each nation may or should seek to produce or main-
tain. In Morgenthau’s scheme the statement will be one that is realistically 
limited to permit an accommodation of all other national interests similarly 
defined and realistically limited. With statesmen generally working on the 
basis of realistic assumptions, there would be less likelihood of conflict over 
interests. For example, such an approach would provide the best circumstanc-
es under which Hungary and Rumania could work out a settlement of their 
conflict over Transylvania. Desire for the same piece of territory on the part of 
two nations would, of course, persist, but the realistic approach would stimu-
late the statesmen involved to assess the power factors more objectively. And 
the approach would likewise influence those statesmen to apply a principle of 
limitations eschewing total accomplishment of national aspiration. But we are 
still safe in assuming that the problem of defining the national interest in each 
such case remains, even though it is more consciously faced by the realist. 
Each situation presents unique value factors. And the realist will be influenced 
in his own values as well as by what may be community values in defining the 
national interest in each case. Morgenthau’s thesis assumes that the realist ap-
proach will result in definitions thereof that will be the source of less conflict 
than would be the case when men are moved are moved by moralistic- utopian 
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formulas. This is assumption is, of course, open to evaluation. The complex 
pattern of national interests envisaged here assumes the less- than- perfect op-
eration of a balance of power always in process of achievement, but incapable 
of perfect achievement. To wish for the latter would be to wish for the removal 
of the one constant factor in history: change.
Given the problem of definition and the necessity for giving concrete ap-
plication of the national interest in time and place, it is natural that Morgen-
thau’s reference to the national interest should show a change in emphasis. 
Perhaps these changes reflect the difficulty of finding the particular applica-
tion and therefore substance of the concept in the abstraction “national inter-
est.” In Defense of the National Interest, having particular reference to the na-
tional interest of the United States, conveys the impression of clear, obvious 
national interest, discernible, no doubt, by more- than- scientific wisdom. This 
national interest is that which will be sought by the realists opposed to the 
goals of the utopian, which will be moralistic or legalistic. If the latter goals 
are nonetheless in the national interest, that fact will be fortuitous rather than 
a product of an awareness of the nature of reality. In the goals of Alexander 
Hamilton, on the other hand, there is a reflection of the ineluctable demands 
of the national interest, in his case the interest of preserving the balance of 
power in Europe.
In the article “Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the Unit-
ed States,” Morgenthau appears to change pace or emphasis. This is reflected 
in the following statement: “It has been frequently argued against the real-
ist conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the national interest, 
does not provide an acceptable standard for political action. This argument 
is in the main based upon two grounds: the elusiveness of the concept and 
its susceptibility to interpretations, such as limitless imperialism and narrow 
nationalism, which are not in keeping with the American tradition in foreign 
policy. The argument has substance as far as it goes. But is does not invalidate 
the usefulness of the concept.”31 Here we have a reference to the concept as 
not being capable of precise definition and unquestionable substance. It is 
analogous to the modification made by Engels in the concept of economic 
determinism when he declared that it was a tool for the understanding of the 
historical process rather than a single cause of explanation of every aspect of 
that process. And in the revision of chapter I of Politics Among Nations the em-
phasis falls on the larger problem of political realism, and the national interest 
defined in terms of power becomes the “main signpost that helps political 
realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics.” The 
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national interest is no longer a luminescent fact or goal which wise men and 
the statesmen of genius will see clearly without fear of being wrong. It is an 
emphasis or rhetorical tool the employment of which will safeguard men and 
nations from dangerously aspiring for the millennium or for the final victory 
of good over evil. The view of the national interest as rhetorical tool may be 
opposed by some interpreters of Morgenthau; it may be justified in the fol-
lowing manner. As Morgenthau points out, very often the utopian- moralist 
will support or adopt policies that are basically in the national interest. But 
he is not influenced by his theory to apply a principal of limitations. He thus 
seeks a complete victory over the enemy. The realist, on the other hand, with 
his theory constantly in mind will know that complete victory will always be 
denied to him. His problem is to find the pattern of accommodation, which is 
the best that the situation can produce. Men with this theoretical emphasis in 
mind will seek viable solutions in the historical continuum; they seek conti-
nuity and growth, rather than a disjunctive state of excellence or good beyond 
their reach, in the course of reaching for which they may achieve chaos, the 
product of their basically catastrophic assumptions.
Now Morgenthau’s accents are upon the larger problem of developing a 
realistic theory of international politics coming as close as possible to the “is” 
without asserting more than can be asserted by the finite mind. This theory 
asserts “that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws 
that have their roots in human nature.” It emphasizes, as noted above, the 
importance as a tool of the concept of the natural interest. It emphasizes that 
the term down not have a meaning that is fixed once and for all. A realistic 
theory to Morgenthau now assumes a tension between moral command and 
political action, whereas formerly he would refer to a political action as suc-
cessful because it was taken without moral consideration, but rather in terms 
of the national interest. It will refuse, as always, to identify the moral aspira-
tions of one nation “with the moral laws that govern the universe.” These last 
sentences state in highly condensed form the main aspects of Morgenthau’s 
realistic theory as presented in the new chapter I of Politics Among Nations. 
They indicate, I think, that he is moving away from the idea of a hard- and- 
fast dichotomy between national interest and morality. The national interest 
is conceived as a conceptual tool, a device, an abstraction that Morgenthau 
prefers to other abstractions, such as collective security, the rule of law, and 
the like. In this theory morality and moral command make a contribution to 
a realistic appraisal of a situation rather than confuse such an appraisal. And 
society presents a subject matter concerning which significant abstractions in 
the form of descriptive laws may be stated in the name of science.
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Evaluation
It is possible to criticize Morgenthau’s theory in its old as well as its new form. 
There can be no doubt of the corrective value of Morgenthau’s political “re-
alism,” not least of all the value of the theory in what I presume to be its old 
form. It was, in that form, perhaps even more challenging than it is today, 
and, as he writes his present theory, “there is no gainsaying its distinctive in-
tellectual and moral attitude to matters political.” Morgenthau has stimulated 
a great debate. He has also been executing a small, if not great, retreat from 
the rather extreme position that originally stimulated that debate. He is to 
be lauded for his part in accenting these issues; we are much in his debt for 
his untiring attempt to put consideration of international politics on a basis 
of realistic appraisal. And the retreat is testimony to the indefatigable energy 
that he brings to the cause and is further testimony to a candor that is, if not 
explicit, at least present by implication.
The retreat has been on two fronts. First, he now writes of politics in terms 
of objective laws derived from human nature. These laws are ones that man 
may observe in a scientific fashion. And having to do with politics, they are 
laws discernible to and important in the social sciences. In Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics Morgenthau’s thesis is that the social sciences are different in 
method from the natural sciences because of the position of the observer in 
the situation observed, making it necessary to go beyond science in arriving 
at wisdom and knowledge in this area. This stand was, I suggest, like saying, 
on the one hand, the deity is inscrutable, on the other he commands thus 
and so. The subject is very large, but it is possible to sketch objections to this 
position. Scientism may have involved a foolish assumption that man could 
“create a gigantic social mechanism [which could be placed] at the command 
of the scientific master.” But pessimism concerning man’s capacity to do this 
does not require rejection of the thesis that understanding the laws of nature 
involves the employment of the same methods as understanding the facts of 
society. That the results in the social sciences are less precise and conclusive 
does not support Morgenthau’s former thesis. Nor does the fact that man is at 
once observer and observed, for techniques are available for producing some 
objectivity in the observation of the observer. The social sciences do not deal 
with situations that are clearly typical but rather with situations of which the 
uniqueness is a dominant feature. But the natural sciences cannot produce un-
qualified constancy of conditions in experiments, nor could the social sciences 
produce any significant generalizations if the situations with which they deal 
are entirely unique. Each situation has a basic novelty or uniqueness. It has 
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not occurred before in exactly the given form. But there are aspects of similar-
ity with preceding situations warranting the suggestion of causal relationships 
with assurance, if not with the definiteness found in the natural sciences. The 
differences between the two areas are difference of degree and not of kind. 
Morgenthau found the method of science inadequate and he counseled going 
beyond science in the social sciences toward a knowledge based upon a kind of 
spiritual insight or intuition. I submit that to go beyond the data made avail-
able by science is to go into an area of irreducible abstraction, a result that 
Morgenthau cannot but abhor. Abstraction in the name of science entails the 
obligation of continuously testing the abstraction, but abstraction like Mor-
genthau’s, in the name of something very like intuition, is not verifiable. On 
admittedly inadequate evidence, it appears to me that Morgenthau has now 
modified this position. He is claiming more for science and less for processes of 
cognition beyond science. This does not significantly weaken his attack upon 
the excesses of naïve rationalism (influenced by scientism), for it remains pos-
sible to point out the dangers in assuming that an abstraction is capable of easy 
scientific demonstration satisfactory for all time. Modern scientific method 
is based upon an awareness of the irreducible gap that will remain between 
scientific law as description and a reality that is always approached but never 
fully described. At the same time, a determinism may be reappearing in sci-
entific assumptions (for instance, on the basis of Einstein’s unified field the-
ory) that will militate against reserving an area in the social sciences within 
which understanding will not be sought primarily in terms of the principle of 
causality. Morgenthau’s retreat is in keeping with this trend. Moreover, he is 
getting away from the paradoxical conclusion that more- than- scientific man 
is realistic and nothing- but- scientific man is utopian. By the same process 
he gets away from the apparent contradiction of asserting the validity of the 
more- than- scientific approach to political problems while at the same time 
counseling a kind of superscientific calculation of power relationships in, for 
example, a balance of power situation.
The second front of retreat has been with respect to the conception of the 
national interest. In his initial use of the term, he was not sufficiently aware of 
the fact that the term “national interest” is an abstraction that will be given 
differing content depending upon the value preferences of the observer. Even 
though national security or national survival will be the abstract goal posit-
ed, the statement of the best ways of achieving this goal— i.e., the national 
interest in certain circumstances— will vary depending upon the individual 
observer. The national interest, even as defined by Morgenthau, cannot be 
given content without the intrusion of values or personal moral views. Thus, 
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although there may be a higher morality involved in pursuing the national in-
terest as calculated in realistic terms, there is also the manifestation of moral-
ity in the very act of definition. Morgenthau’s own conception of the national 
interest has no special claim to validity. There certainly are Americans who 
do not define the national interest as requiring the preservation of the balance 
of power in Europe or Asia, or as requiring the hegemony of the United States 
in the Western hemisphere. Given our particular conception of the role of 
this nation, we may not regard them as good Americans. They may picture 
survival in a warped and negative way. But there is no scientific method, even 
in Morgenthau’s own system, by which their preferences may be demonstrated 
to be inferior or his to be superior. He may assert that he, defining national 
interest in terms of power, seeks survival of this nation in realistic, and there-
fore viable, terms. But others who do not define the national interest in terms 
of power may just as cogently proclaim the validity of their preferences, even 
though this validity is not determined by scientific test.
There are other criticisms of Morgenthau’s theory. He is correct in point-
ing out the danger in relying upon abstractions as a safeguard of peace. We 
would be well- advised, however, to note that Realpolitik has also been inade-
quate to achieve a permanent peace in a world of nation- states. Realpolitik is 
probably a stronger safeguard of peace than utopianism, but a third alternative 
exists. With a full realization of the difficulties in the way man must, in my 
opinion, seek to build an international world community. Until recently Mor-
genthau had not made a contribution to the maintenance of peace or helped 
us to see the difficulties to be encountered. In the revision of chapter I of Pol­
itics Among Nations he agrees that we must grasp every opportunity to achieve 
this end, but this is a new, albeit welcome, development. Until recently then, 
Morgenthau has not offered anything new as a means of understanding reality 
and controlling events. Since we are in a situation that is sui generis, absolutely 
demanding, in the interest of survival, resolution of conflict before general war 
begins, more than conceptual means are required. If they are not available, 
then indeed we may say that the condition of man is tragic.
A high degree of faith is required for the acceptance of Morgenthau’s con-
clusion that the superscientific calculations of a realist will correctly reveal the 
relative strengths of nations in a balance of power situation. Given Morgen-
thau’s own earlier assumptions concerning the limitations of science, it is dif-
ficult to see how his realist could assess the significance of the military factor 
in a power equation. In fact, the preoccupations of the realist may be so thor-
oughly with naked power that he may be obsessed with its accretion or with 
preventing its acquisition by others and thus precipitate the very catastrophe 
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he seeks to avoid. The trouble is that all realists are not on the same level of 
wisdom or efficiency. And a utopian may be less dangerous than an inefficient 
realist. It may be countered that an inefficient realist is a contradiction, but 
I can only retort that tests of efficiency in this area are likely to be the very 
results his policy is supposed to avoid. An iron law may demand having regard 
for the national interest in fashioning foreign policy, but it is an odd iron law 
that is honored as often in the breach as in the performance. Utopians may 
more frequently neglect the national interest than do realists (as realists define 
the national interest), but the difficulty of calculating being what it is in inter-
national politics, the realist may conceivably fail where the utopian succeeds. 
And the tragedy would be that one would not know until the results were in. 
In fact, one may develop a suspicion that he will be accounted a realist by the 
test of success or failure. This may be a bona fide test, but it is often too late in 
the game, if one wishes to take preventive action.
On his altered ground, however, Professor Morgenthau seems to me no 
better prepared to go forward in the more effective service of national sur-
vival. Whereas, while once in attacking abstractions, he employed one of his 
own, the “national interest”; whereas, once, in attaching over- reliance upon 
science as incompatible with necessary scientific humility, he went beyond 
science to make statements about what he implied was inscrutable; now, he 
employs the “national interest” as a tool and asserts both more for science and 
less about our capacity to know the world beyond science.
I know not that Professor Morgenthau would agree with all that precedes. 
I know only that it is what he seems to be saying when he attempts concretely 
to communicate his views. Concerning the changing emphasis on the na-
tional interest there is little doubt. Concerning his attitude toward science, 
the question is not so clear. I have, therefore, included in this paper the main 
body of the thesis with regard to science that he sets forth in Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics, while at the same time suggesting that he may be modifying it. 
Until he does so explicitly, it remains an important part of his attack upon the 
rationalist- utopian- idealist- liberal.
*****
Digest of Discussion
The chairman called the meeting to order and proposed that the group first 
take up Morgenthau’s contribution to international relations theory and then 
proceed to the more general theoretical problems relevant to Morgenthau’s 
approach. The chairman called upon Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.
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The Theory of Hans J. Morgenthau
Mr. Lipsky remarked that, in line with the procedure agreed upon at the pre-
vious meeting, the working paper before the group attempted to present a 
brief exposition of Morgenthau’s theory and then proceeded to a critique of 
that theory. Morgenthau’s claim to the group’s attention was, in part, due to 
the positive, provocative point of view he has presented and the great debate 
which he has stimulated among academicians.
In defining the basis of Morgenthau’s theory, Mr. Lipsky continued, one 
should return to his earlier work Scientific Man vs. Power Politics rather than 
the more recent In Defense of the National Interest. Morgenthau asserts that 
his theory comprises an organic unity and in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
one finds the basis for Morgenthau’s critique of the utopian school. It is there 
that Morgenthau develops the conception that “scientism,” as he defines it, 
leads, in the field of international politics, to utopianism and moral dogma-
tism. Morgenthau finds such “scientism” inadequate for producing answers to 
questions of foreign policy. Rather, Morgenthau asserts the existence of a re-
ality beyond the application of the scientific method to politics. In Scientific 
Man vs. Power Politics the “realist” (as opposed to the “scientific utopian”) 
possesses an insight and wisdom based upon intuitive values and preferences. 
The more- than- scientific man offers policy advice designed to protect or fur-
ther these values.
With regard to the national interest, which is a basic concept in the “re-
alist’s” position, Morgenthau seems to be shifting his position, Mr. Lipsky 
observed. Originally he believed the notion had tangible and clear content. 
But in the galley proofs of chapter I of the forthcoming revised edition of 
Politics Among Nations, he regards the concept as a tool for understanding the 
phenomena of international affairs. Moreover he places this concept in the 
context of the larger problem of developing a realistic theory of international 
politics.
Thus Morgenthau has modified his views. As originally stated, the nation-
al interest is self- defining and self- evident to the “realistic” political scientist. 
Fundamentally, this version of the national interest was concerned with the 
protection of the territory, population, and welfare of the state. Hence, “na-
tional interest” meant the security of the nation. But it is apparent that the 
national interest, so stated, is a subjective abstraction that will receive differ-
ing content depending on the outlook of the individual employing it.
In conclusion, Mr. Lipsky said, Morgenthau has performed a useful ser-
vice by steering academic thinking toward a more realistic appraisal of the 
nature of world politics and by focusing attention on the very basic problem 
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of national aspiration. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Morgenthau’s more- 
than- scientific man operates on the basis of value preferences and that the 
dichotomy of scientific- utopianism vs. realism is not a clear one. In this sense, 
Morgenthau is subject to the same criticism that can be levelled at Carr.
The chairman thanked Mr. Lipsky for his introductory remarks. He asked 
whether Mr. Thompson cared to add anything to Mr. Lipsky’s appraisal.
Mr. Thompson observed that the problems raised by Morgenthau’s analy-
sis had doubtless disturbed all of those present, as well as Morgenthau, because 
they were decisive problems. It would appear fair to say, Mr. Thompson con-
tinued, that Morgenthau regards the problem of the national interest in two 
distinct ways and it would be misleading to conclude that Morgenthau has 
shifted ground if by that is meant the abandonment of either notion.
The first notion is the assertion that the concept of the national interest 
possesses a certain, recognizable, objective content. Professor W. T. R. Fox, 
in his study of international relations research in the US between the wars, 
points out that it was considered to be almost a mark of infamy for a politi-
cal scientist to be concerned with problems of national security. Virtually all 
academicians were devoting their attention to transnational subjects and pre-
ferred to study, for example, collective security rather than national security. 
The content of world politics was divided into “good” international subjects 
and “bad” national subjects. In this context, Morgenthau has served a useful 
purpose by emphasizing the elementary urge of the nation- state to seek sur-
vival. Morgenthau has insisted that this is a valid subject for national inquiry.
Morgenthau bases his contention that the national interest concept pos-
sesses objective content upon historical experiences with reference, for exam-
ple, to British and American foreign policy. Mr. Thompson recalled a recent 
remark by Mr. Dean Rusk to the effect that every action of the Eisenhower 
administration to date has been a continuation of the policies of the Truman 
administration, the current desire to reduce global troop commitments being a 
case in point. Thus domestic political passions and alleged partisan approach-
es to the conduct of foreign policy fade away when the party in opposition 
assumes responsibility. The continuity of British foreign policy through Con-
servative and Socialist regimes is another case in point. Historical experience 
therefore points to the existence and persistence of an objective national in-
terest which is recognizable and capable of being pursued.
The national interest, Mr. Thompson said, is therefore more than an in-
tellectual tool. It has objective, rational content. Great Britain best illustrates 
the nation that pursues its national interest; Germany, in twice ignoring the 
hazards of a two- front war, illustrates the nation which has violated its nation-
al interest.
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Secondly, Mr. Thompson noted, Morgenthau does not focus attention on 
the national interest as such, but rather argues that it is a persistent continuing 
factor in international politics. Just as domestic policy revolves about group or 
regional interests, the national interest is a concrete example of the political 
process at the international level.
The chairman thanked Mr. Thompson. He remarked that, in his opinion, 
a few problems relating to Morgenthau’s theory remained to be clarified. One 
was Morgenthau’s concept of realism as it applied to theory. A second was 
Morgenthau’s concept of the national interest in terms of its pre- suppositions, 
rather than in terms of attacking or defending the concept.
Professor Strausz- Hupé did not think that an inherent contradiction exist-
ed between science and intuition as postulated by Morgenthau. Morgenthau’s 
need to transcend science is, in fact, a resumption of the scientific method he 
had just attacked. Professor Holborn expressed disagreement with the state-
ment in the working paper to the effect that the scientist cannot repeat some 
of the characteristics of the German philosophical tradition with its distinc-
tion between the natural and cultural sciences. Probably Morgenthau would 
be more at ease if he could express himself in German terminology.
Scientism and Realism
Professor Wolfers remarked that when Morgenthau came to America the uto-
pian school dominated American academic thinking. Morgenthau evidently 
felt that the school based its orientation on a theory grounded in the scientific 
method. He rebelled against this, pointing out that political decisions cannot 
be reached by simply applying abstract generalizations to problems of foreign 
policy. In this, Morgenthau is correct, although he designated the utopian 
orientation as “scientism” because he is addressing his critique to people who 
he thinks regard themselves as being scientific.
Mr. Thompson felt that Morgenthau’s juxtaposition of science and politics 
could be clarified by redesignating it as a juxtaposition of metaphysics. Mr. 
Thompson illustrated the point by a quotation form Burke which Morgenthau 
was fond of referring to. Mr. Thompson believed that an ultimate reliance 
upon prudence, common sense, and mature wisdom was central and intrinsic 
to Morgenthau’s thought. General precepts and aspirations will only be of mi-
nor help when it comes to choosing specific alternatives. Wise judgment must 
play a role, although there is a tendency to write this off in ex post facto studies 
of decision making. But in examining history one finds that the political as-
sumptions made by the solitary statesman really partake of a special kind of de-
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cision making. Mr. Henry L. Stimson has remarked, Mr. Thompson recalled, 
that it was his experience that the State Department conducted lengthy delib-
erations on unimportant matters and decided major issues in periods of abrupt 
crisis. While it is always useful to perfect knowledge and methodology, sound 
decision making must contain an indispensable measure of prudence in the 
last analysis.
Mr. Niemeyer remarked that Morgenthau’s theory seemed to lead to reli-
ance upon the political judgment of the great man. There can only be recourse 
to the great man because, according to Morgenthau, his prescriptions for pol-
icy are the national interest.
The National Interest
Moreover, Mr. Niemeyer continued, Morgenthau never defines the national 
interest in terms having clear implication for policy. He never states why, for 
example, the neutralization of Germany is more in the national interest than 
some other policy toward Germany.
Mr. Niemeyer also doubted whether the historical experience previously 
cited provided adequate criteria for determining when a nation was pursuing 
its national interest. If Britain is the prime example of single- minded devotion 
to the national interest, was it pursuing that interest at the time of Munich? Is 
Britain strong and wealthy now because of her success in serving its national 
interests? How can one choose policy as being in the national interest?
Professor Strausz- Hupé ventured that it was easier to define the concept 
negatively. One can assert, for example, that it is not in the interest of a nation 
to commit suicide. But when one tries to define the concept in positive terms 
one runs into conditioning factors which make a clear- cut description most 
difficult. As for defining the national interest by allusion to British diplomat-
ic history, this does not satisfy the question as to whether Britain pursued a 
certain policy because it was in its national interest or for some other reason.
With reference to the observation that Great Britain furnished an exam-
ple of the successful pursuit of the national interest while Germany illustrated 
the opposite, the chairman wondered whether Hitler did not believe he was 
serving Germany’s interest when he attacked Russia. Could it not be argued 
that, with Britain isolated and driven from the continent, with his armies 
flush from successive victories, the moment had come to eliminate his last 
European rival? The chairman therefore wondered if judgments as to whether 
a decision was or was not in the national interest were not ex post facto evalu-
ations depending upon the consequences of the decision.
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Mr. Thompson, addressing himself to Mr. Niemeyer’s remark on the neu-
tralization of Germany, stated that Morgenthau did not hold that such a policy 
defined America’s interest with regard to Germany. Rather, Morgenthau felt 
that it was in the American interest to create and maintain a balance of power 
in Europe vis- à- vis the Soviet Union. The question thus reduces itself to a 
rational discussion of the best of several alternatives for implementing this 
objective. Statesmen will, of course, differ on that point but such differences 
will have a common point of reference— the national interest in preserving a 
balance of power.
With regard to the continuity of Great Britain’s pursuit of its national in-
terest, Mr. Thompson observed, this can be examined by reviewing the many 
common elements in the speeches of successive British statesmen from Pitt to 
Churchill, by the fact that modern Britain has never been invaded, nor with 
the exception of the past two wars, seriously threatened. These facts indicate 
something about the wisdom of British policy over the long run. The citation 
of a few obvious exceptions does not invalidate a general proposition.
Political Motivation
Professor Wolfers believed that two general points could be made about Mor-
genthau’s analysis. First, Morgenthau sees the political process as the conflict 
and resolution of interest, whether on the domestic or at the international lev-
el. People are motivated by interests and seek to promote their interests. The 
central government, in turn, is the agency for promoting the national interest 
through its foreign policy. Diplomacy is therefore the process of defining and 
pursuing the national interest and not, as Morgenthau interprets the utopians, 
of serving “good” or defeating “bad” moral aspirations.
The second point, Professor Wolfers went on, is how can one determine 
what these interests are. It is possible, perhaps, to define certain irreducible 
interests— the interest to survive, for example, or the interest of holding 
onto what one has. But these interests do not exhaust the possibilities. Some 
nations are willing to withdraw and make concessions while others pursue 
acquisitive policies. Thus while Morgenthau was correct in his criticism of 
American academic utopianism, it is also questionable how far one can go in 
analyzing the behavior of nations in terms of interests. Beyond the quest for 
survival, the concept is elusive and open to a variety of alternatives.
Professor Strausz- Hupé agreed and pointed out that while a certain irre-
ducible national interest exists for each nation, great difficulty arises in at-
tempting to apply the national interest concept to concrete decision making. 
100 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
Most foreign policy decisions are ad hoc estimates based on ad hoc circum-
stances and not on any abstract notion of the national interest.
Professor Wolfers felt that, for practical purposes, the national interest 
concept had an immediate if not inclusive validity. Policy makers in Wash-
ington are clearly concerned with the problem of not being defeated in a war. 
If someone should propose to solve the German problem by handing Western 
Germany over to the Soviet Union, their immediate reaction would be “we 
simply cannot afford it.” This is an interest evaluation. Thus, within certain 
limits, the issues are fairly clear and policy conclusions fairly recognizable.
Mr. Niemeyer observed that the desire of the US to survive vis- à- vis the 
Soviet Union might, in the context of the present discussion, be implemented 
in two ways. The utopian school would view the Soviet threat as an ideologi-
cal one and would propose countermeasures aimed at undermining communist 
ideology. The national interest school, on the other hand, would view the 
Soviet Union as an imperialist power which was using ideology as one of a 
number of weapons in pursuit of an expansionist policy. At issue are two inter-
pretations of the world political situation. By what process does Morgenthau 
claim the latter view to be the correct one?
Mr. Thompson said that the question involved an evaluation as to wheth-
er ideology per se had political substance or whether it became politically rel-
evant only when it was embodied in a nation- state. Mr. Thompson felt that 
Morgenthau failed to appreciate that ideology is more than just a weapon. 
Rather ideological- moral factors can become vital components of a national 
power complex.
Mr. Lipsky held that the group’s discussion had been progressing on an 
alarming number of levels. He raised the question as to whether Morgenthau’s 
views met the test of being a complete theoretical system. Any exposition, 
regardless of its form, must be submitted to the test of philosophical adequacy, 
primarily some test based on a theory of knowledge. Any discussion of such 
an exposition, e.g., that of Morgenthau, should be primarily concerned with 
applying such a test.
Mr. Thompson expressed the view that such an approach would not con-
tribute significantly to an understanding of Morgenthau. Morgenthau himself 
maintains that he is not a philosopher and hence not engaged in building 
a theoretical system. Morgenthau operates below the level of true political 
philosophy.
Professor Wolfers felt that even if one conceded Morgenthau’s analysis of 
political motivation there remained the problem of interpreting the national 
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interest. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, believes that individual freedom 
is the basic issue of world politics while Morgenthau insists that survival is the 
important criteria. With the growth of an international community, Profes-
sor Wolfers remarked, Morgenthau may become obsolete. As the nation loses 
importance as the custodian of human interests, transnational interests will 
become controlling.
Mr. Wasson pointed out that the “nation” part of the phrase “national 
interest” should be clearly defined. History has shown, as in the separation 
of Belgium and Holland, that the survival of the nation is not necessarily the 
expression of the minimum popular desire and that dissolution may be in the 
interest of each part. Mr. Wasson imagined that similar sentiments could be 
found in the Ukraine, for example. Thus there should be a clearer understand-
ing of the “nation” as well as the “interest” in evaluating Morgenthau.
Transnational Interests
Miss Fosdick questioned Morgenthau’s assumption that national interests in-
evitably bring nations into opposition to one another. This, she felt, resulted 
in a false realism. Morgenthau overlooks the factors which bring nations to-
gether in pursuit of their separate interests. He does not recognize the fact that 
nations can share interests or the existence of common interests. The commu-
nity of interest which the US shares with Western Europe is a case in point. 
Morgenthau’s theory seemed to be inadequate for sound policy planning.
Mr. Thompson noted that since the interests of even the closest allies 
do not run parallel, the job of statesmanship is that of bringing them togeth-
er. Morgenthau, however, devotes so much emphasis to the study of the US 
interest that he does not sufficiently consider the interests of other nations. 
Moreover, he did not treat the subject of collective security adequately. In Mr. 
Thompson’s opinion, such action was more than mere transient accommoda-
tion to an ad hoc situation. The community of interest which has been built 
up between this nation and Western Europe has more substance.
The chairman wondered whether Morgenthau viewed a nation’s share of a 
common interest as that nation’s national interest. Professor Wolfers observed 
that Morgenthau dealt with a billiard- ball world in which the nation is a self- 
contained unity and in which morality is limited to the nation. Miss Fosdick 
felt that in protesting against the utopian presupposition of a universal moral-
ity, Morgenthau had gone too far to the other direction.
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Professor Strausz- Hupé expressed the opinion that Morgenthau’s “national 
interest” might be more meaningfully expressed by the phrase “raison d’état” 
or the reasons given by a ruling group for its continued existence. Professor 
Wolfers agreed but felt that the state should be substituted for ruling group. 
Morgenthau, in this sense, is a theoretical descendent of Machiavelli’s theory 
of the Prince which subsequently, at the hands of Hegel, became the State.
Mr. Thompson pointed out that with the emergence of democratic states 
the factor of popular consent appears. The chairman wondered whether the 
interest of the people was included in the national interest and whether a dis-
tinction existed between the national interest and the interest of the govern-
ment. Professor Wolfers observed that Morgenthau was insufficiently versed in 
Lasswell. If one says that a nation “wants” something the expression is clearly 
metaphysical. Furthermore, people are not, as Morgenthau assumes, wholly 
preoccupied with the preservation of their nation’s sovereignty, nor with a 
craving for power. While it may be true for certain nations at certain times it is 
not the psychology of people everywhere at every time. Mr. Wasson noted that 
a power motivation theory certainly seemed to correctly explain phenomena 
like Napoleon or Hitler.
Mr. Niemeyer referred to Morgenthau’s assumption that nations wish 
to survive and therefore attempt, through foreign policy, to produce condi-
tions conducive to survival rather than to further any particular ideals. In Mr. 
Niemeyer’s opinion this juxtaposition of realism vs. idealism was false since 
in defining a particular national interest one is always presented with a moral 
problem involving moral choice.
Mr. Thompson remarked that many seemed to assume that because Mor-
genthau discussed power he must like it. This attitude often implied that pow-
er is evil. The liberal position, according to Mr. Thompson, is that the moral 
content of power depends on the ends for which it is used. Anyone who has 
raised a child knows the dangers of abusing power. Morgenthau’s viewpoint 
that human existence includes a struggle for power among individuals seems 
to be correct, and is just as apparent on the university campus as elsewhere. 
On the international level some nations simply wish to survive while others 
are striving to expand. Diplomacy is the craft of recognizing and finding ways 
of accommodating these conflicts.
In response to a question concerning whether Britain was seeking to maxi-
mize its power at Munich, Professor Holborn stated that Chamberlain certain-
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ly believed that he was advancing Britain’s national interest and conserving 
British power. This remark prompted the query, “What, then, is power?”
Criteria for Theory
Upon reconvening, the chairman proposed that the group consider issues 
behind Morgenthau’s approach, especially with reference to the problem of 
constructing an informing theory of international relations. He called upon 
Professor Kaufmann.
Professor Kaufmann estimated that Morgenthau was about as useful as 
Carr for the purpose of analyzing the international relations process. Morgen-
thau confuses, Professor Kaufmann felt, his position as an observer with that 
of a would- be policy maker. Some of the questions which a theory of interna-
tional relations should attempt to handle include the nature of the political 
process, the forces which influence its development, the indeterminate which 
must be recognized, the latitude which remains for the exercise of choice, and 
the values to be served in weighing alternatives.
The chairman called upon Mr. Church, who suggested that the construc-
tion of a realistic theory of the forces which determine the national interest 
might begin with an examination of the decisions and the steps that were tak-
en to promote this country’s interest over a period of its history, say from 1800 
to 1820. A study of this sort would give the theorist a series of facts which 
would be susceptible to analysis and development in terms of a theory. The 
national interest could be surmised from the decisions which were taken and 
the end results that were sought.
In response to a question from the chairman, Mr. Church expressed the 
view that a realistic theory first had to begin with the facts and proceed to con-
cepts and conclusions. Mr. Diebold thought that the question as to how the 
national interest was conceived during a given period was essentially a histor-
ical problem. The national interest at one period would not necessarily hold 
true for another. Mr. Church and Mr. Diebold agreed that study of that kind 
ought to proceed on the bases of the facts as then known to the policy makers.
The chairman observed that John Dewey had once used the same method 
and had devoted the first chapter of a book to a study of the facts. However, 
the theory he developed in the subsequent chapters bore no relation to the 
opening chapter.
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Conflicts of Interest
Professor Wolfers, referring to a study of interest groups and the Saint Law-
rence seaway project, noted that every group had justified its positions as being 
in the national interest. In fact, several groups had reversed themselves yet in 
both instances had maintained that their position served the national interest. 
The late Professor Beard had thus concluded that the national interest is a 
metaphysical expression and that only group interests have validity. But still, 
toward the end of his book, Beard implies that a national interest does exist 
but is extremely resistant to definition.
In theory, Professor Wolfers continued, the president is responsible for 
the nation as a whole and makes decisions in the common interest. But by 
what process does he reach decisions; how does he weigh conflicting pressures? 
Moreover, Americans expect him to advance the interest of the nation, yet 
are not transnational interests also involved?
Mr. Niemeyer said that while the people support group interests, the pres-
ident is in the unique position of being responsible to the people as a whole 
and is therefore capable of acting in the common interest. The chairman won-
dered whether the president was also interested in seeing his party returned 
to office. Mr. Diebold felt that while the president may rise above partisan 
considerations in reaching a decision, the decision may be to the advantage 
of particular groups as well. Mr. Thompson believed that the president makes 
decisions in a political context composed of two elements: first, the partisan 
one which any negotiator faces; and second, the abstract one of serving the 
commonwealth.
Mr. Roberts remarked that in his own thinking about the problem, he had 
found the following model to be helpful: a father is seated with his family in a 
crowded theater when smoke is smelled and the suspicion of fire grows among 
the increasingly restless audience. The problem confronts the father of wheth-
er to seek to quiet the growing panic and encourage the orderly withdrawal 
of the audience, including his family, or whether to insure the safety of his 
family at the expense of everyone else, creating a panic in the process wherein 
many perish. Statesmen often face such situations and their first obligation is 
toward the nation. Yet in carrying out this obligation they may cause the total 
situation to deteriorate. . . . In international affairs one always seems to be in 
the theater and there is always smoke in the air. In the last analysis the deci-
sion seems to depend upon the use of judgment because no particular general 
observation seems to provide a solution to the dilemma.
Professor Wolfers observed that political scientists would like to be able 
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to perform two functions: the capacity for fairly accurate prediction and the 
capacity to make constructive political choice. In the present example, how-
ever, the government has no choice; it must always act egocentrically. He 
also pointed out that Mr. Roberts’ illustration contained a third alternative in 
which the father created a panic and, in so doing, sacrificed his family as well.
Professor Wolfers asked whether the king of Belgium had been justified in 
surrendering to the Germans, thus relieving his country but jeopardizing the 
Allied cause. Here was a conflict of national and transnational interests. Mr. 
Niemeyer felt that the issue could also be argued solely in nationalistic terms 
since Belgium’s national honor was also involved. Mr. Niemeyer raised the 
question as to the extent to which a government is responsible to the values 
of the people. He felt a dichotomy existed between the physical powers of the 
nation on the one hand and its moral values on the other.
It was observed that Hitler, perhaps the most nationalistic ruler of this era, 
insisted on continued German resistance and sacrifice long beyond the point 
where it served German welfare. Professor Wolfers suggested that Hitler prob-
ably felt that survival was worse than defeat. The chairman noted that Hitler, 
in the early edition of Mein Kampf, scorned the German people and applauded 
the race. He conceived his role as that of leading the people back to their ra-
cial destiny. Thus Hitler viewed the military defeat as Germany’s punishment 
for radical failure. In general, the chairman observed, fanatical leaders and 
philosophers care more for abstract ideals than human beings.
Conclusions
Professor Kaufmann posed the question, apart from Morgenthau’s approach to 
the problem of national interest, as to what constitutes the specifications of a 
basic theory of international relations. The chairman felt that the group was 
approaching an answer through a critique of existing theories and the prob-
lems which they raised. Professor Kaufmann thought that the existing theories 
provided the group with such convenient targets that a danger existed of not 
moving ahead constructively. The chairman wondered whether a theory of 
the national interest would not necessarily be one of the pillars of any inform-
ing theory of international relations.
Professor Holborn expressed the view that there had been little direction 
to the group’s discussion that evening. While it is common to assume, as Mor-
genthau does, that the formulation of a theory of foreign policy involves an 
assessment of the interests of the nation- state, the phenomenon of the nation- 
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state is limited to about two hundred years of man’s historical experience. This 
suggests the need for a broader interpretation of political behavior. Earlier 
political concepts are relevant to modern political theory. One such concept 
is the ethical sanction, which forms the basis of government. The concept im-
plies that political obedience is not enforced by threat or actual violence but 
by persuasion in a religious and ethical sense. In the Middle Ages politics did 
not concern the majority of the community. Government was sanctioned by 
religion. Thereafter policy had to be justified by reference to an ethical ideal.
The utopian academicians, referred to by Morgenthau, are dealing with the 
ideals and nostalgia of their age when they assert a relationship between ethics 
and politics, Professor Holborn continued. Moreover, to distinguish between 
ethics and politics is completely artificial. The problem of ethical ends and 
the realistic conditions for the realization of ideals is a continuous one. Mor-
genthau’s theory is weak because, in the rationalist tradition, he attempts to 
separate the two. No government could possibly convert its people to imperial-
istic or altruistic policies were it not able to arouse the loyalties and ideological 
commitments of the people involved. Hence a theory of international relations 
must deal with operative ideal factors. The chairman agreed. Government must 
be able to evoke at the least values, if not ideals. Mussolini, for example, did 
not call upon the Italians to sacrifice themselves to him but for Italy.
Mr. Thompson asserted that Professor Holborn’s remarks had reached the 
root of the problem and pointed up a defect in Morgenthau’s theory. General 
moral principles affect the pursuit of the national interest in three ways, he 
believed. (1) They place limits upon the range of choice open to a state; hence 
the most expedient policy may not be a morally feasible one. The impossibility 
of America precipitating a preventive war can be cited as an example. (2) 
Moral principles fortify the policies of nation- states. President Grayson Kirk 
is correct in stating that they have indigenous power. The Atlantic alliance, 
for example, has an ethical core which increases its substantive strength. (3) 
Moral principles tend to filter into the policies of nation- states, giving them 
direction and moral content. While it is easy to exaggerate the influence of 
morality on policy, it does make a difference when Churchill can affirm that 
the West fought for a principle in the war.
With reference to Professor Kaufmann’s doubts as to whether Morgen-
thau’s analysis constituted a theory, Professor Wolfers felt that Morgenthau’s 
investigation into the nature of the national interest had the elements of 
a theory. A theory need not be complete. Professor Holborn and Wolfers 
discussed the differences between history and theory. They agreed that one 
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was primarily concerned with empirical investigation and the other meta-
physical.
Mr. Thompson, referring to the relatively short historical era of the 
nation- state mentioned by Professor Holborn, noted that Toynbee had found 
that the ancient city- states had behaved in many ways similar to their modern 
counterparts.
With regard to the doubts expressed by some members that the discus-
sion was not progressing in a sufficiently cohesive and purposeful manner, Mr. 
Thompson felt that the group should not attempt to be too self- conscious 
about its objectives. Moreover, most of the theoreticians under review were 
not methodologists. Professor Kaufmann felt that the group was devoting too 
much attention to analysis of theories of lesser importance. He did not think 
that the discussion of the national interest concept had advanced matters very 
far in terms of elaborating a better theory.
The chairman believed that the present discussion had been useful if only 
that it enables one to avoid easy conceptual traps such as “realism.” It is neces-
sary, in a task of this kind, to clear the ground a little and to clarify one’s terms 
and know their ambiguities. He remembered reading a passage in a book by 
Professor W. T. R. Fox in which the author had treated international politics 
as analogous to that of a forest populated by elephants and squirrels. But in 
what sense, the chairman wondered, was a nation an “elephant” or another a 
“squirrel”? This only held true for power relationships but what did it mean in 
terms of national interests and objectives?
Mr. Niemeyer expressed the view that economic theory might provide an 
indication of the task which confronted political theory. Modern economic 
theory has evolved from its moral- philosophical origins of two hundred years 
ago into a system of considerable success, especially in terms of capacity for 
reasonably accurate prediction. If one starts with the presupposition that eco-
nomic theory is the theory of allocating scarce resources to economic ends 
then political is the theory of allocating scarce resources to moral ends, or in, 
other words, the relation of proposed actions to proposed values. This is the 
tentative task of political theory.
At this point, the chairman brought the discussion to a close. After con-
sulting with the group, it was agreed that the next meeting would be held on 
February 4 and take up Lasswell. The group would next meet on March 4 to 
discuss Marxism and Schumpeter.
John Blumgart
Rapporteur
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Third Meeting: The Theory of  
Harold D. Lasswell, February 4, 1954
The third meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Rela-
tions was held at the Harold Pratt House, Thursday, February 4, 1954, at 
5:30 p.m. The topic was the theory of Harold D. Lasswell. At the end of the 
discussion, the group also considered next steps, and had a short discussion 
about the general nature of the theory of international relations. Present 
were: Hajo Holborn, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy 
Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; William W. Kaufmann; Grant 
McClellan; Charles Marshall; Isidor I. Rabi; Robert Strausz- Hupé; Arnold 
Wolfers.
*****
Working Paper No. 3
Prepared by George Lipsky
The critic is almost disposed to refer to the writings of Harold D. Lasswell as 
Sir Desmond McCarthy referred to those of James Joyce when he contended 
that Joyce had devised a special vocabulary and syntax for communicating 
only with himself and a limited group of cognoscenti. There is no doubt that 
Lasswell’s purpose has been to increase his capacity to be meaningful to the 
audience to which he addresses himself by many refinements of language and 
definition presumed to be working toward economy and logic of connotation. 
Despite an impression that he sometimes creates of having embodied simple 
truisms in needlessly technical language, Lasswell on the whole is engaged in 
a process of refinement of language valuable to himself and to those whose 
rapport with him perhaps derives from similar sources, not least of which is 
interest in the psychic basis of human relations.
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Lasswell’s basic emphasis is upon the tools (symbols) men employ in the 
process of thinking and upon how those tools may be manipulated for the 
better achievement of the goals (values) Lasswell deems to be good. In this 
context symbols are words and values and are, quite conventionally, situations 
(Lasswell calls them events) upon which assessments of goodness or badness 
may be made. In his earlier career, Lasswell as a scholar hesitated to state what 
the goals of the scientist should be, but he has now developed a methodology 
which makes it not only appropriate but essential to state values that it is 
the scientist’s aim to create or to realize. The reasons for this conclusion are 
manifold. Surely one is that Lasswell has a personal preference for the social 
situations he wishes to create and maintain. Second, whatever those goals 
might be, it is important to state and work for them in the development of a 
social consensus and attendant security. These are themselves values, since 
they enhance survival. He seeks a scientific validation of values, although he 
remains positivistic in his basic philosophical position.1
Through the social sciences Lasswell proposes to tell society what poli-
cies ought to be pursued. He also says that “the political scientist [can] offer 
reliable advice concerning the means that ought to be used to achieve” the 
goals that a society posits for itself. The advice that the social scientist can 
give on both these matters possesses a “higher degree of truth probability than 
the uncommon common sense of the statesman.”2 Lasswell is, therefore, at a 
pole apart from Morgenthau, for he makes the most extreme claim that can be 
made on behalf of science. Whereas his earlier phase was a conventional one 
in which he concentrated upon the study and description of power, now he 
appears to “convert political science to a policy science . . . , in terms of new 
referential principles.” Even more, “there appears in embryo the further claim 
that even the goals upon which social policy must be based can be established 
with procedures of a fully developed science of man.”3 This position has a ped-
igree of at least three centuries; it perhaps runs the risk of becoming a closed 
system that excludes relevant factors, but its challenge can hardly be denied.
In the current global struggle, Lasswell would have the social scientist ma-
nipulate political society with a full awareness of the available techniques at 
his disposal. The achievement of world organization, representing a real world 
community, is absolutely essential for human survival, although he does not 
prophesy the exact form that must appear. He states merely the contingent 
possibilities. At all times the social manipulator must be aware of the factor of 
timing. If he presses too vigorously for world organization and, therefore, “out-
runs the growth of strong sustaining elements in world society, collapse will 
merely follow.”4 The social manipulator should also foresee that before this 
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collapse of world organization comes, “the political elite, fearful of secession 
and revolution [will almost certainly create] a state which is not only a world 
garrison state, dominated by the military, but a world prison state dominated 
by the police.”5 On the other hand, if men are slow in working toward the 
goal of world organization, that is if they lag behind the condition that can be 
achieved by political skill “at any particular time, humanity will remain under 
the shadow of atomic disaster.” Several emphases must be pointed out here: 
One is, of course, the belief that an international organization of an effective 
type can and must be achieved. Second is the view that the achievement 
thereof must be in accord with certain underlying configurations in society. 
Third is the assumption that decision making can take the necessary con-
ditions into account and achieve the desired results. Lasswell appears to be 
moved by apprehension concerning the threat of the police or prison state 
and a high degree of optimism concerning the capacity of wise men to meet 
this threat.
In the Lasswellian system politics becomes enlarged. Its scope is suggested 
by the definition that “politics is the science and art of management.”6 The 
political scientist or the policy scientist must direct his attention and apply 
his science to all those processes that involve the management of human af-
fairs. This undertaking appears gigantic and at first glance would assume that 
Lasswell is looking for or presuming to be a universal, omniscient philosopher- 
king. After inspection, that impression may remain. But Lasswell provides the 
philosopher- king with a key to understanding man’s nature, his past, present, 
and future. Politics is all- inclusive, but it can direct its attention to employ 
means “related to the three levels of personality structure.”7 The policy sci-
entist must recognize the extent to which the impulses (id) of man must be 
given scope and how they may be controlled, the nature and employability of 
conscience (super ego), and the significance and power of the rational facul-
ties (ego). It is true that “no institutional pattern falls into any pigeon- hole 
with any more than an approximate fit”;8 nothing is pure id, ego, or super ego. 
One cannot but feel in reading Lasswell that he really believes that men are 
equipped to “see more clearly how to meet the incessant and perplexing issues 
of private and public policy with a confidence capable of contributing to the 
best because it has foreseen the worst.”9
Lasswell writes, therefore, in terms of foreseeing the future. He states this 
future by means of a series of what he calls “developmental constructs.”10 
Some of these constructs suggest the worst that could happen, tested by Lass-
well’s values. Others are neutral and quite congruent with the developmental 
pattern through which freedom may be preserved and extended in the future. 
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One such construct (which seems to be belaboring a truism) is “that human 
beings will continue to be affected, and affected to an increasing extent, by 
one another.”11 This is “the trend toward interdetermination throughout the world 
community.”12 The trend is based upon both external factors of technology and 
psychological factors working to fulfill the trend itself and also to counteract 
it. I shall not attempt here to employ Lasswellian language at its knottiest, 
but such a sentence as the following states the point: “increased exposure to 
individuals with whom one is not already identified brings about more intense 
preoccupation with those with whom one is previously identified (including 
the primary ego).”13
A second developmental construct is “bipolarization.” At first glance one 
would assume that this would be even in Lasswell’s system related primarily 
to factors only incidentally psychological. But every problem in this system 
must fundamentally be stated in psychological terms. Therefore, “Bipolarity is 
a function of a continuing high level of expected war.” A basic characteristic 
of world culture today is the expectation of violence. Institutions, therefore, 
assume a pattern in great measure conditioned by this expectation. The ex-
pectation favors the perpetuation of war and those institutional arrangements 
designed to forestall it or win it once it begins. Though Lasswell considers 
world organization essential, he believes that the best condition we can hope 
for some time to come is a continuing condition of bipolarization. He writes, 
“the prospects of continued peace depend upon maintaining the expectation 
among the elites of both camps that they have more to gain by continued 
peace than by any alternative policy, and eventually that they will gain more 
by extending the area of peaceful co- operation on a global scale than by war 
preparation.”14 Lasswell seems optimistic that this process can be worked out 
if sufficient skill is manifested on both sides.
Closely related to the foregoing is the developmental construct, “mili-
tarization.” He states that war may be the outcome of this trend, but he con-
tends also that peace has as often been its product. He, again thinking in psy-
chological terms, suggests that the militarization that results in weapon parity 
between the two sides in a bipolar world may enhance the prospects of peace.15 
That is to say, weapon parity may convince the elites that accommodation 
rather than war is the appropriate alternative. On the other hand, militariza-
tion (the garrison state, etc.) does not lead to those political conditions that 
Lasswell supports as good values.
Finally, he sees as a trend the increasing subordination of society to gov-
ernment. To the extent that “centralization is a function of perceived common 
threat,”16 this is likely to be the trend in all countries in greater or less degree 
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depending upon the nature of the political tradition. Elites have acquired the 
knowledge of how to remove or abolish human privacy including the privacy 
of the unconscious. An insecure elite in a time of great crisis is impelled to 
search out secrets “in order to perceive common threats in time for defensive 
action.” In such a situation the one hope for the defense of freedom may be 
the tendency of tyrants to fall out among themselves.
Up to this point, no Lasswellian theory of international relations has been 
depicted in precise terms. Lasswell, in fact, does not present a theory of what 
the present is producing as a future, except in terms of alternatives. The pros-
pect that he does offer is of a world that can be peaceful, free, and democratic, 
if men but use the knowledge and the techniques that are available. It will 
remain a world in which power is a central factor and condition. Lasswell 
denies that power is inevitably evil in its portent or substance.17 He asserts no 
ideal of perfection by reference to which the accomplishments of power must 
be judged and found evil. “Some of the men of power are among the culture 
heroes of mankind, the ‘great men’ of history, the ‘lawyers,’ ‘liberators’ and 
‘nation founders’; in a word, the statesmen. In this perspective, government 
and personality . . . [can be] favorably judged.”18
Lasswell has a “socio- political objective:” to learn and to state how knowl-
edge concerning the interrelation between power and personality can serve 
human dignity. The social scientist need not remain merely contemplative: 
he may and should pass to a manipulative phase wherein he devises “ways 
and means of putting power in the service of a democratic society, a society 
in which power and respect are shared, and in which other values are made 
more abundant and accessible to all.”19 His special problem is, therefore, the 
study of democratic leadership, the democratic elite. He hopes that that lead-
ership will acquire the techniques necessary to serve democratic survival and, 
indeed, expansion. His desire is to “make recommendations with more con-
fidence regarding the development of an elite appropriate to the needs of a 
society that aspires toward freedom.”20
Morgenthau asserts that all men desire power. Lasswell denies this and 
is at pains to develop a rationale justifying a power drive among those who 
aspire to leadership in a democratic society. Morgenthau proceeds easily 
from his exclusive emphasis upon power to a derived emphasis upon power 
politics. Lasswell’s analysis of human relations is more complex and justifies 
the use of other, secondary terms in place of the term “power.” This analysis 
makes plausible the search for an early supernational democratic common-
wealth, in which the wielders of power will not possess the characteristics 
of Genghis Khan, Alexander, Cyrus, or the ruthless restorers of order after a 
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time of troubles. The task for the manipulative social scientist is to cultivate 
or create those institutions that will create democratic forms of advocacy. 
The power holder in a democratic society may have sought power to com-
pensate for his own feelings of inadequacy, but that fact does not prevent his 
seeking conditions essential to the maintenance of a democratic order. In 
international politics such a democratic leadership will think more often of 
shared values than of domination. Within the democratic community there 
must be a sharing of power and a subordination of it to the dignity of human 
personality. “The principal expectation contained in democratic ideology is 
that it is possible to attain universal democracy by bringing into existence 
on a global scale the equilibrium that has repeatedly been achieved in more 
parochial communities.”21
On this score again, Lasswell differs from Morgenthau and Carr. He be-
lieves there is a fundamental psychic good health in a situation of democratic 
equilibrium. It is the duty and task of democratic leadership to enlarge the 
equilibrium until it becomes global in extent. Such an equilibrium would be 
freer of destructiveness and therefore of many of the scourges of mankind. In 
this doctrine there is a plea for a social psychiatry. “It becomes one of, if not 
coterminous with, the developing sciences of democracy, the sciences that 
are slowly being evolved in the interest of democratic policy.”22 To recognize 
that this social psychiatry has its terminus a quo in value judgments does not 
undermine the authority of the physician. He will not be merely matching bi-
ases with those who may differ with him. In fact, Lasswell’s fundamental tenet 
is that a society maintaining democratic preferences represents a psychically 
healthier society and, therefore, group of individuals. In a world where those 
preferences are more and more threatened, a strategy must be developed for 
using our “limited intellectual resources for the defense and extension of our 
[democratic] values.”23 “The pressing need, however, is for the mobilizing of 
motive and skill for the purpose of elaborating the missing links in the chain 
of analysis and observation which bears most directly upon the maintenance 
of the social equilibrium of democracy.”24
Lasswell is therefore a social (policy) scientist who wishes to instruct dem-
ocratic and potential democratic elites on how they may “sustain more opti-
mistic expectation of value fulfillment than non- democracies.” These elites 
must learn how to bring the entire community “to the level of equilibrium 
that sustains democracy.”25 “They must construct myths working and crystal-
lizing moral sentiment in favor of democracy as against another form of gov-
ernment and society.”26 The democratic personality is the good personality in 
which low estimates of the self have not been permitted to develop. Demo-
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cratic personalities esteem themselves enough to esteem others.27 Democratic 
man is free because he is free of social anxiety.28
The policy scientist must learn how to reduce social anxiety. The per-
haps basic essential is the reduction of fitful bolts and starts in social trends, 
producing insecurity in terms of safety, income, and deference (status). For 
example, “Scientific study of the dynamics of business cycles can discover the 
strategic points where controls can be applied for the purpose of reducing the 
excessive swings of business and of sustaining high levels of productive em-
ployment.”29 Thus security or, as Lasswell puts it, high value expectancy can 
be assured on that level and many related levels. This intermediate goal is of 
course paramount in those countries where the democratic way is already par-
amount. In the arena of international politics where the struggle will persist 
until the victory of one side or the other is achieved, the task is doubly im-
portant and much more difficult. But Lasswell has a prescription of sorts in two 
parts: “Physical Defense, Psychological Offense.” Of the two, I assume that 
his main concern is with the latter. We must vigorously construct or improve 
an appealing myth structure that can defeat Marxism, “which for a century 
has won its way not merely by the force of its propaganda but also because it 
seemed to be vindicated by so many facts.”30 The question is how to widen the 
“socialization of retaliation” (rule of law) in a world of mutual provocation, 
especially where the prescription used calls for the psychological offensive. 
The strategy of the democratic policy scientist and statesman “is to arouse 
and maintain expectations of effectively shared values.”31 This is especially 
difficult where the application of the strategy is subject to such interference as 
the authoritarian opposition can produce.
Lasswell does not see the issue as one between capitalism and socialism, as 
if these words were interchangeable respectively, with democracy and tyranny. 
This issue is capitalism and socialism against either annihilation or serfdom “in 
a world of the garrison- prison state.”32 The fulfillment that Lasswell desires or 
that the achievement of democracy requires is the progressive democratization 
of the world community.”33 This progressive democratization “depends upon 
finding the ways of dealing with children which do, in fact, aid in the forma-
tion of democratic character, transmit democratic perspectives and foster the 
acquisition of democratic skills.”34
Lasswell has been particularly interested, as his bipolarization construct 
indicates, in the relations between the United States and Russia.35 Earlier he 
dealt with the “interrelation of world politics and economics in his book World 
Politics Faces Economics.36 In that book he states three major economic goals: 
(a) high levels of productive employment; (b) a rising standard of well- being; 
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(c) the attainment of these goals by means compatible with freedom and secu-
rity.37 The achievement of these goals will in great measure depend upon the 
world environment. This environment the United States must be prepared 
to manipulate, even by war if necessary, although when “we engage in war, 
we do so, not from joy in destruction, but from the overwhelming pressure of 
conditions that we are determined to abolish.”38 At the same time, if Amer-
ican economic goals (essential to democracy) are to be achieved, there must 
be no next war.39 (This appears to be a contradiction.) Once upon a time, in 
the time of cheap wars and even large, although nontotal wars, the expansion 
of industry and commerce was stimulated by armed conflict.40 This is no lon-
ger true today. But this fact does not obviate the likelihood of war. In fact, in 
the presence of too high an expectation of war, war is made more certain. In 
the face of too low an expectation, aggression is invited. The expectation of 
violence becomes one of the variables affecting the employment of violence. 
There is a middle ground, which a policy scientist in control would seek (al-
though Lasswell recognizes it would be difficult to maintain), and that is a 
firm, composed, and disciplined attitude.41 The policy scientist can practice 
a kind of preventative politics, which suggests a rare comprehension and ca-
pacity to see the simple psychological key in the complex situation. To be 
sure, Lasswell does not accent exclusively the psychological factor, but to the 
degree that he emphasizes psychological security as the key, all other factors 
become important in relation to that central one.
He speaks conventionally, also, of such conditions as the balance of power 
and differentiates between the process of balancing and the doctrine of the 
balance. This distinction is natural and to be anticipated, for in referring to 
the process, Lasswell can emphasize psychological expectations. “The process 
of balancing occurs whenever the expectation of violence is important.”42 The 
“doctrine” is the operational theory of those who seek a balance of power. 
Lasswell writes of the other problems faced by statesmen in a rather conven-
tional and surely not definitive manner. What is important is the extraction 
from his writings of certain fundamental conclusions that set him apart from 
important schools of thought in the theory of international relations. For ex-
ample, he anticipates that a league can be established that “can pass gradually 
into a legal order in which the expectation and practice of violence occupy a 
minor position. There can be a frame of security based on consent and sanc-
tioned by force that it is seldom necessary to apply in practice.”43 However, for 
the near future, he recognizes that America and Russia dominate a global bal-
ancing of power.44 “They will tend to face one another throughout this globe 
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on practically every issue.” “America and Russia are the ‘fixed points,’ the ‘po-
lar opposites,’ in the world balancing of power.”45 On the whole, starting from 
his psychological point of orientation, Lasswell achieves considerable success 
in short- range prophecy and in the description of events. It is not necessary 
or possible in this paper to indicate the details of such prophecies or descrip-
tions. What is more important is to indicate the manipulative techniques that 
Lasswell believes may be employed in achieving peace and democratic victory.
A key or a beginning may be indicated by his statement that the “future 
course of world politics will be affected by feelings of self- respect.”46 Self- 
respect is in considerable degree a function of security. Security can be present 
only when the impact of factors working upon the world environment does 
not produce an erratic result. Relating this proposition to economics, Lasswell 
writes that “unbalanced (predatory, exploitative) industrialization may build 
up war industry and thus directly exert a deleterious effect on world security.”47 
On the other hand, balanced industrialization tends to close gaps between 
government and people. “Social unrest stays at a manageable minimum.”48 If 
we in the United States are able to keep social unrest at a minimum there will 
be less fear of conspiracies, particularly Russian. The Russians will feel more 
secure, and, if they feel less menaced, democratic tendencies will be strength-
ened inside that country.”49 In short, we win against the Russians not only 
through a psychological offensive, but through reducing the Russian sense of 
insecurity so that the pluralizing forces inherent in any large- scale society can 
make themselves felt.50
All of the above, the process of healthy democratization and consequent 
improvement in the psychic health of individuals and the nation, will “improve 
the efficiency of private choice as an instrument of the common good.”51 Throughout 
these analyses there is Lasswell’s stress upon planning to improve the psychic 
health of individuals so that they may participate in constructive, democratic 
decision making on the basis of a sound equilibrium among the three factors, 
id, super ego, and ego. This equilibrium expresses itself politically and has its 
foundation also in the economic system: “The system of competitive private 
enterprise, when actually in operation, provides a decentralized economic ba-
sis for freedom.”52 Democratic leaders suffer the disadvantage of not being able 
to manipulate effectively over the entire globe, but they can make beginnings. 
They may operate directly upon their own societies. There are intermediate 
areas where much can be done. And there are indirect ways, referred to above, 
of influencing conditions in the citadel of the enemy himself.
Lasswell’s goals, in the final analysis, are global in extent: “In the long run 
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a secure, hence a free, America depends upon a secure world, which implies a 
free world commonwealth.”
“We do well not to conceal from ourselves the drastic nature of the condi-
tions that must be fulfilled if security for free institutions is to be realized on a 
world scale. Any social process can be conveniently described in terms of man 
pursuing values through institutions or resources. The all- embracing objective 
of a free society is a commonwealth in which the dignity of man is realized 
in theory and fact. Values (or categories of preferred events) are the human 
relationships which are sought and protected. A representative, though not 
necessarily definitive, list of values includes power, respect, rectitude, and af-
fection; enlightenment, well- being, skill, wealth.53
Democratic societies do not survive without great energies being directed 
toward planning for their survival both internally and with relation to other, 
competing systems. But they are inherently the systems in which the healthi-
est sharing of values may be accomplished.
Evaluation
As a system, at least as one may judge by the multiplicity of ideas, Lasswell’s 
has too many facets to comprehend in a short paper. His major purpose is to 
contend for the psychological factor as the underlying one. He regards the so-
cial sciences as sciences in the traditional sense, and believes they quite prop-
erly can establish goal values as a basic datum in terms of which the means 
they devise may be judged. These goal values, for example democracy, may be 
stated as preferences, but his system provides arguments on behalf of certain 
preferences. Democracy, for Lasswell, is a large term describing a condition of 
challenge as well as of opportunity to produce other values important to the 
development of the healthy human personality. Democracy is essentially an 
equilibrium of sharing on the basis of which destructiveness is reduced to a 
minimum and human life is preserved under the best circumstances.
I shall not further labor the point, so often made, that Lasswell’s style is 
needlessly pedantic and recondite. It certainly does provide a barrier to un-
derstanding and the implementation of his ideas. But a fundamental proposi-
tion in his system is clear enough to bear inspection. That is the proposition 
that the democratic system, as defined by Lasswell, is more compatible than 
any other with the fully and soundly developed human psyche. Lasswell and 
Fromm have striven to found ethical systems on a psychological or psychiatric 
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basis. The approach is essentially Aristotelian in nature; that act or condition 
is judged good that works for the sound or healthy development of the human 
personality. However, in my opinion there is no way of determining by empiri-
cal verification what is rational, impulsive, or inhibitive in human action. The 
terms id, ego, and super ego are convenient abstractions suggesting division 
in human personality that should not be made too precise. In short, there 
is no test sufficiently precise for determining when the human personality is 
soundly developed. There probably is a personality that may be described as 
democratic. I agree with Lasswell that it must love itself enough to love others 
and therefore desires to serve human dignity. But an authoritarian philosophy 
could provide reasons why individual men need not hold themselves or others 
in high esteem, and surely the positivist, Lasswell or any other, must be first 
to agree that the preferences held by authoritarian personalities are on the 
same level of validity as those held by the democrat. Destructiveness may be 
reduced in democratic society. However, the positing of nondestructiveness 
as an absolute good is not warranted in any fundamental sense, unless some 
metaphysical grounds are found for asserting absolutely that life is good and 
the opposite thereof of evil.
Finally, there is suggested in the Lasswellian system a degree and type of 
symbol and, therefore, of human manipulation that may have democracy as its 
goal but that may itself be incompatible with democracy as the process of ma-
nipulation is pursued. Imagine a group of policy scientists, academic and gov-
ernmental, self- consciously manipulating conditions, presumed to conduce to 
democratic values, as well as the minds of men. Such policy scientists, al-
though striving for universal comprehension, remain human. Can we be sure 
that their brand of democratic brainwashing can remain democratic? With the 
best will in the world, they may find the material they are using intractable. 
In their moments of frustration, the manipulative element will become pre-
dominant. This will be authoritarian in implication. I should, therefore, like 
to see Lasswell concentrate now more simply and directly upon the problem 
of how decision making among the policy scientists can be made compatible 
with large- scale decision making in the pluralized society.
Despite the above criticism, Lasswell’s contribution is or could be enor-
mous. At least here is a forthright attempt to embody a discipline in the social 
sciences within the framework of science in the conventional sense.
*****
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Digest of Discussion
The Theory of Harold D. Lasswell
Mr. Lipsky noted that the first impression gained from reading Lasswell— his 
use of an unnecessarily abstruse and recondite language— was not substantially 
modified by more intensive readings. Nevertheless, Lasswell has been attempt-
ing to devise a vocabulary having an internal consistency and based on psychi-
atric terminology. Lasswell’s closet ideological kinsman is Erich Fromm, who 
has also tried to find a psychological basis for ethics. This search is, of course, 
not a new project despite its contemporary prominence and importance. Ar-
istotle first raised the problem when he postulated that acts may be judged 
good if they contribute to a healthy personality development. Nevertheless, 
the problem is reflected in a new form in the writings of these two thinkers.
A fundamental proposition with Lasswell, Mr. Lipsky continued, is that a 
democratic society is more conducive to the development of the complete and 
well- rounded personality than other forms of society. The democratic com-
munity emphasizes a sharing of values essential to the furtherance of human 
dignity. Among such values are power, respect, rectitude, affection, enlighten-
ment, well- being, skill, and wealth. Democratic leadership seeks to promote 
these values and does so through the exercise of power. Hence Lasswell dis-
agreed with Morgenthau’s assumption that power, per se, is evil or that the 
motives of power seekers are necessarily evil. Lasswell therefore appears as a 
strange kind of positivist. He emphasizes relations rather than substance. He 
begins with the assumption that men choose life over death and in so choos-
ing must seek psychological fulfillment.
Mr. Lipsky wondered, parenthetically, whether psychiatry could be con-
sidered an empirical science by assuming that the results of its application 
are verifiable. In other words, can a hypothesis be empirically verified by the 
consequences it produces or must it also be susceptible to direct investigation? 
Lasswell assumes the former, and he makes skillful use of psychiatric studies to 
underline his points.
Mr. Lipsky noted that one critic had asserted that Lasswell makes the most 
extreme possible claim for the validity of the scientific method, namely, that 
the political scientist can offer reliable advice as to the ends and means of 
social policy. In the early part of his career, Lasswell was primarily descriptive 
and felt it was up to the student to draw his own conclusions. Lasswell has 
not abandoned this method in favor of the formulation of a policy science for 
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assuring democratic results in national and international affairs. In this sense, 
and contrary to Carr and Morgenthau, Lasswell offers a complete, informing 
theory of international relations.
Professor Holborn thanked Mr. Lipsky. He felt in concordance with agreed 
practice, that the remainder of the first session should be devoted to an anal-
ysis of Lasswell’s psychiatric approach to the theory of international relations.
Individual and Group Behavior
With regard to Lasswell, Professor Holborn continued, the question has been 
raised as to whether psychiatry is really a science. He felt that the question, for 
the purpose of the present discussion, might rather be posed as two questions: 
(1) is there a science of psychiatry which is relevant for dealing with the indi-
vidual personality; (2) is psychiatric theory applicable to the social process in 
general and to international relations in particular? Lasswell’s theory assumes 
that the answer to both questions is affirmative. Mr. Lipsky agreed with this 
reformulation of the problem and noted that Lasswell claims scientific validity 
for both concepts.
Professor Strausz- Hupé thought that empirical verification exists for psy-
chiatry as applied to individuals but not as applied to nations.
Professor Holborn felt that since there were no psychiatrists or psycholo-
gists present, the group could not answer the first question, which was, more-
over, outside its scope of interest. However, the applicability of psychiatric 
theory to national behavior is a relevant question for the group. He noted that 
at the time of the Nuremberg trials, a number of psychiatrists, such as Gilbert, 
had made studies of some of the defendants and had tried to define a “totali-
tarian mind” which, as a concept, could be projected into international affairs 
as an explanation of certain types of political behavior.
Professor Wolfers felt that to apply a theory of individual behavior to na-
tional behavior is a non sequitur. What Lasswell attempts to do, on the other 
hand, is to break down and analyze the international political process from 
abstract concepts of national behavior to the behavior of multitudes which 
make up the nation. He is concerned with group and individual behavior on 
the plausible assumption that it presents political data which is more readily 
observed and analyzed and has greater validity and relevance to understanding 
national actions than a deductive method which attempts to generalize from 
historical descriptions of national behavior. This type of analysis is especially 
valuable and appropriate in the field of communications where groups are 
122 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
constantly using symbols to communicate with one another. By employing a 
psychological approach to the political process, Lasswell seeks to throw light 
on that part of international behavior which can be explained with reference 
to individual or group activity.
Professor Strausz- Hupé doubted the utility of attempts to define a “total-
itarian mind.” An analysis of Hitler’s personality would, he felt, give little 
information susceptible to generalization as, for example, the elaboration of a 
“German totalitarian mind.” Lasswell, however, seems to make the leap from 
the individual to the mass.
Professor Wolfers, noting Professor Strausz- Hupé’s use of the concept of 
“the natural aggressor,” felt that for such a personality to exist it must have 
validity in terms of psychiatric concepts and if the concepts are valid they 
will have an impact on political behavior. Professor Wolfers believed that 
Lasswell’s attempt to analyze human drives and project these drives into the 
international arena was of more than marginal significance.
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered whether it is possible to arrive at collec-
tive concepts through the study of individuals.
The acting chairman remarked that the psychiatric approach, involving an 
attempt to break down the human personality into its component elements, 
had often in the past been used as a method for analyzing human behavior. But 
at the level of social action, is not the psychological influence merely another 
“drop in the bucket” among a multitude of social factors which guide human 
behavior? When human behavior is studied at the level of national society 
and, further, at the level of international society, is not the influence of indi-
vidual psychology even more remote?
Mr. Lipsky pointed out that Lasswell continually emphasizes expectations 
as a “core factor” in human behavior. He felt that it is correct to assume that 
Lasswell believes psychological influences are the most fundamental factors in 
influencing the political process.
Professor Wolfers believed that this constitutes “pinning down” Lasswell 
too much. Lasswell is fully aware of multiple determination in human be-
havior. With regard to expectations, Lasswell has made a real discovery and 
contribution to behavior analysis. He has also tried to develop the technical 
means of ascertaining public attitudes. Sampling methods for obtaining gen-
eralizations on public viewpoints are now being carried out with considerable 
success. In these ways Lasswell is moving from the convenient but metaphysi-
cal “people” to the more complex but realistic “peoples.”
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Analyzing Group Behavior: Elites
Professor Kaufmann added that Lasswell had also made an effort to analyze 
the decision- making process. By focusing attention on the elites of a pluralized 
society, he helps to limit the groups which need be subjected to analysis.
Professor Strausz- Hupé felt that there are still serious limitations to polling 
techniques despite the fact that some progress has been made. He questioned 
the reliability of attempts to quantify the political process. Second, while it 
may be convenient for Lasswell to relate a theory of individual behavior to 
the political process by speaking of elites, at the international level elite in-
terrelationships are far more complex and operating influences are far more 
numerous. Hence resultant action is far more variable and difficult to predict.
Professor Wolfers pointed out that a number of worthwhile discoveries 
are being brought out by a group at MIT which is studying elite communica-
tion. For example, preliminary results of a study of the basis upon which busi-
ness groups react to tariff reduction proposals has yielded serious information 
which is at variance with traditional concepts. Many responses indicate that 
these groups do not behave in accordance with accepted, rational, interest- 
motivation concept, but rather on the basis of misconceptions, myths and 
prejudices. It would appear, therefore, that elite groups often do not know 
what their best interests are. What strikes a person like Lasswell about this 
kind of information is the lesser or greater degree of invalidity of accepted 
categorical postulates about group behavior. We assume that “the French want 
X,” but is it true? Lasswell is trying to penetrate such abstract explanations and 
find out how and why groups really behave.
Professor Strausz- Hupé noted that many attempts to assess public opinion 
have long preceded those of Lasswell. Napoleon III ordered his provincial of-
ficials to make surveys of public sentiment on national issues and discovered 
that the results did not always coincide with what his advisors believed was 
on the public mind.
Professor Holborn felt that the MIT study bore out what history had also 
shown to be true, namely, that businessmen do not always act in accordance 
with their economic interests. The English business class, for example, clearly 
acted against its interest in not attempting to prevent British participation in 
the First World War. Norman Angell was right when he said that war with 
Germany would be a disaster for British capitalism. Similarly, in the interwar 
period, although acting differently, it still was not being guided entirely by 
rational economic considerations. But having said this, where does a theory of 
individual psychology help in obtaining a more accurate explanation of such a 
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behavior pattern? Psychological considerations may have had some influence 
but probably not a decisive one. One would have to examine, among other 
things, the social development of British capitalism and the political organi-
zation of British management before one could answer these questions. There-
fore, while Lasswell’s approach is not to be rejected, the weight which Lasswell 
assigns to the psychological aspect of the group behavior may be questionable.
Professor Wolfers observed that psychology is basic to all human behavior 
in that all action must originate in the psyche. One speaks of geography as a 
basic determining factor in foreign policy formulation, yet, this presupposes an 
evaluation process in the mind of the policy maker as he looks at his country’s 
position on the map. Lasswell sees human behavior as the result of interplay 
between “objective” factors and the subjective interpretation which they re-
ceive in passing through the psyche.
Mr. Lipsky felt that Lasswell’s writings indicate the priority of importance 
to be accorded to these determinants. In the final analysis Lasswell always 
assigns priority to the psychological factors. He is thus able to conceive the 
policy scientist as capable of manipulating the political process in accordance 
with a psychologically oriented theory of human behavior.
Implications for Policy
In response to a request from Professor Rabi for an example of Lasswellian 
advice as a policy scientist, Mr. Lipsky noted that Lasswell would caution the 
US political elite to play down the threat of the Soviet conspiracy to the US. 
This would tend to reduce expectation of violence and would yield a greater 
sense of security on the part of both countries. It would also have a tendency 
conducive to the development of democracy in the Soviet Union, for as that 
country feels less menaced, the pluralizing forces inherent in any large- scale 
society will make themselves felt. Mr. Lipsky felt that a basic, if not funda-
mental, aspect of Lasswell’s theory is the function of the policy scientist to 
influence, through self- conscious manipulation, the political process toward 
democratic values in a more cohesive and organized manner than has hereto-
fore been thought possible or desirable.
Professor Strausz- Hupé thought that Lasswell’s prescription for spreading 
democracy to the USSR constitutes manipulation twice removed. He ap-
proved the prescription with regard to the administration in Washington but 
doubted its validity with regard to Russia. The Soviet Union’s sense of security 
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is determined by US capabilities as well as its own attitudes, hence extra- 
psychological factors are also operating at the international level.
Mr. Lipsky observed that a basic assumption of Lasswell’s seems to be that 
all men react similarly to certain stimuli, hence the theoretical capacity of the 
policy scientist to extend his scope of operations to the international scene, as 
in the example previously cited.
Professor Rabi wondered whether this idea approximates reality in inter-
national relations. Mr. Lipsky recalled a recent speech by General George C. 
Marshall in which the general referred to an inalienable ideological conflict 
between the two countries. Lasswell, on the other hand, believes that tensions 
can be reduced by influencing popular attitudes.
Mr. Marshall noted that attitude is not the only factor susceptible to ma-
nipulation; geography can be manipulated as well. When the US acquired the 
Louisiana Territory or the Panama Canal or bases in North Africa it was ma-
nipulating the geographical component of its relationship with foreign nations.
With regard to the psychiatric orientation of Lasswell’s theory, Mr. Mar-
shall continued, he has found that every professional group tends to analyze 
the political process in terms of its own training and approach. The military 
man views the situation in terms of capabilities and will insist that the estab-
lishment of a certain base is essential to American security; the economist will 
see the Cold War as one in which investment and technological assistance to 
exposed, underdeveloped areas will be the determinant of victory. Lasswell 
evidently sees psychological relationships as meriting first priority. The con-
clusion would seem to be that there are many mainsprings operating, all of 
which must be watched.
Psychological Aspects of Human Behavior
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered whether Lasswell views the human psyche 
as a kind of sieve through which pour the phenomena of actuality. Professor 
Wolfers felt a more appropriate simile to be that of a sensitized photo plate 
which accepts some phenomena, but ignores others. With reference to Mr. 
Marshall’s comment, Professor Wolfers pointed out that even geographical 
manipulation has its psychological implications.
Mr. Marshall said that Lasswell’s theory of psychological determinism re-
minded him of accounts of insurrections in Cuba. At first it was considered 
necessary to subdue the Havana garrison in order to force the regime in power 
126 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
to capitulate. Succeeding revolutionary leaders learned that it was just as ef-
fective to seize the telegraph and radio networks and “manipulate” the gov-
ernment to leaving office. This worked for a while until later regimes stopped 
taking revolutionary radio messages at face value.
Professor Wolfers agreed that the psychological element is often of deci-
sive importance. For example, if those connected with the plot to assassinate 
Hitler had been able to seize the Berlin radio at the time they struck against 
the dictator, they would probably have been able to seize power even though 
they failed to kill him. The fact that Hitler had been able to communicate his 
survival to the nation and give orders for taking countermeasures had been 
instrumental in crushing the coup. Professor Holborn agreed. Actually Hitler 
had been right when he stated in 1940 that Britain was defeated; British tem-
perament and spirit simply refused to acknowledge the fact.
Professor Wolfers noted also that the psychological aspect could be carried 
too far. The present administration seems to have believed originally that the 
manipulation of symbols can accomplish most anything in foreign policy. He 
was glad to see that the board of experts appointed to study the problem had 
come up with a much more moderate view, namely, that psychological warfare 
is a means of communicating policy rather than a substitute for it.
Professor Holborn wondered about Lasswell’s theory of communication. 
The role of elite communication is a crucial one in Lasswell’s theory of policy 
making. On the other hand, Lasswell’s theory of elites is not psychological but 
social and hence his description of the process of elite communication is not 
in harmony with his psychological theory of human behavior.
Mr. McClellan felt that a sound critique of Lasswell requires some under-
standing of the principles of Freudian psychology. He disagreed with the char-
acterization of the psyche as a static recipient of phenomena such as a sieve or 
photo plate. The psyche is a dynamic process composed of id, super ego, and 
ego. By employing psychiatric concepts, Lasswell seeks to call attention to the 
profound emotional element in human behavior. The jump from a theory of 
individual behavior to that of the group has often been badly executed by so-
cial psychologists but some, such as Gorer in Britain, have been able to predict 
group behavior patterns.
Professor Strausz- Hupé expressed reservation concerning Lasswell’s teleo-
logical approach to the question of morality. Lasswell evidently equates psy-
chological health with good and psychological maladjustment with evil. Such 
an equation does not hold true for many aspects of human behavior, art being 
a case in point. Lasswell then goes further and proceeds to equate psychologi-
cal health with democratic values.
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The Task of the Policy Scientist
Professor Wolfers observed that Lasswell’s thinking on the psychological- 
manipulative aspect of human behavior originated with his analyses of the 
processes by which dictatorships are capable of manipulating public opinion. 
This has led him to inquire as to whether democratic values might not also be 
served through conscious manipulation and communication by the elites of 
a democratic society. Professor Wolfers remarked that acceptance of psycho-
logical methods have even spread to the curriculum of the Yale Law School, 
where stress is placed on the conscious use of symbols in litigation proceedings.
Several group members questioned whether totalitarian techniques are ap-
plicable to a democratic society or the furtherance of democratic values. The 
problem of control over the manipulative activities of the policy scientist was 
also raised.
Mr. McClellan said that Lasswell has made a fundamental contribution by 
insisting that the irrational psychological forces in human behavior be taken 
into account. Lasswell also poses the problem as to the implication of these 
forces for the political process. Mr. Lipsky suggested that Lasswell’s answer 
to the problem is that by furthering economic, political, and social democ-
racy one furthers the development of sounder, healthier individuals. Professor 
Wolfers agreed and felt that Lasswell was attempting to base his beliefs on 
scientific certainty. Lasswell claims that the policy scientist can and should 
manipulate attitudes and behavior toward democratic views.
Professor Rabi doubted whether people would continue to respond to the 
manipulations of the policy scientist once they understand the cause- effect 
relationship involved. Miss Fosdick agreed. She expressed skepticism with 
regard to a theory of an elite, within a democratic society, possessing such 
powerful influences over the psyche of the individual citizen. It is doubtful, for 
example, whether the present political elite in Washington has the capacity 
to manipulate along the lines Lasswell seems to suggest.
The citizen is usually a member of many groups— social, economic, 
political— and has overlapping loyalties. Thus he is bound to resist the ex-
ertions of a single elite. In general, Lasswell’s theory does not seem to fit the 
realities of pluralistic, complex society; his concepts of elite and fellowship are 
oversimplified.
Professor Wolfers said that some aspects of Lasswell’s theory are being 
greatly exaggerated. Lasswell certainly does not conceive the policy scientist 
as capable of manipulating human behavior toward a world democracy, for 
example. But Lasswell does believe that certain things could be done which 
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would contribute toward a democratic order and certain things antithetical to 
democracy could be avoided.
Mr. Lipsky had the impression, after going through Lasswell’s works in 
some detail, that the concept of self- conscious manipulation on the part of the 
policy scientist is a fairly emphatic and basic one in Lasswell’s theory.
Mr. Marshall noted that many members of the “new team” in Washington 
refer to Lasswell as an authority for their views on how policy should be artic-
ulated and communicated.
Professor Kaufmann felt that the group should not stress the Freudian as-
pect of Lasswell to the neglect of the sociological. He further felt that it would 
be a mistake to conceive Lasswell as preoccupied with a theory of elites and 
followers. This is simply a focus within a larger context.
Mr. Lipsky thought that, while Lasswell does not deny the existence of 
the context, he believes that the context can be abstracted and the remainder 
manipulated.
Professor Kaufmann expressed the opinion that it would be more profit-
able for the group to concern itself with the systemic aspect of Lasswell and 
less with the manipulative.
Professor Strausz- Hupé drew a comparison between Lasswell’s idea of 
social elites and the eliteless society of Riesman. Miss Fosdick felt that any 
democratic society is made up of competitive elites, each attempting to ma-
nipulate its public. Professor Kaufmann noted that Lasswell recognizes this 
fact and stresses the existence of multiple elites— political, economic, commu-
nications, and so on. Mr. Lipsky suggested that the end result of such a theory 
might be an amalgamated elite. Such an elite is not necessarily compatible 
with the growth of world democracy which Lasswell favors so strongly.
Miss Fosdick observed that there seems to be something very unreal about 
Lasswell’s theory and this unreality appears to spring from an erroneous view 
of human psychology. His implication that people are so easily manipulable 
would seem to be a faulty interpretation of stimulus- response relationships. 
For example, it is hard to imagine a group of children in Bronxville being 
strongly influenced by manipulators in Washington. In this connection, Pro-
fessor Holborn noted that the educational system of a democracy exercises the 
most powerful influence toward strengthening or weakening the democratic 
content of that nation’s society. Miss Fosdick acknowledged this observation 
but felt it could be ascertained by better means than Lasswellian theory. Mr. 
Lipsky quoted a passage from Lasswell in which he emphasizes the need for 
inculcating children with democratic values.
Professor Kaufmann expressed the view that the group had not sufficiently 
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observed two points in its discussion of Lasswell: first, it had confused Lasswell 
as a thinker with Lasswell as a manipulator and, second, it had overstressed 
the lack of novelty in Lasswell’s work. Professor Kaufmann felt that original-
ity is not relevant to the problem since the group is necessarily confined to 
talking about international relations theory with reference to existing the-
orists. If a thinker is able to use non- original ideas and apply them in a way 
that offers a better understanding of the international political process, that is 
more relevant than the source of his ideas.
At this point the acting chairman recessed the meeting.
Procedures and Future Meetings
Upon reconvening, the acting chairman felt that the group should devote a 
few minutes to examining its methods to date and determining its agenda for 
the future. He noted that the group had resolved the question as to whether to 
emphasize personalities or problems in the field of international relations the-
ory by deciding to discuss the theories of leading publicists before dinner, thus 
clearing the ground for later discussion of more general problems suggested by 
the theorist in question.
Mr. Lipsky pointed out that the group had previously decided to devote the 
next meeting to Marxian interpretation of imperialism including references to 
Schumpeter’s critique. Mr. Lipsky noted that in drawing a work paper on this 
subject he was not concerned, as in previous papers, with a single individual 
but with a host of theorists. It is an important subject because, for some, the 
phenomenon of imperialism is the central problem of international relations. 
Certainly any worthwhile theory must be able to offer some interpretation of 
it. Mr. Lipsky felt that he was, in one respect, at a disadvantage with regard to 
Marxian theories of imperialism in that he was without extensive training in 
economic analysis and some of the theories were based on economic concepts.
The following session, Mr. Lipsky continued, had been allocated, accord-
ing to a previous decision, to geopolitical theories with Spykman as a point 
of departure.
Professor Holborn noted that the evening of March 4 (changed since 
March 17), then would be devoted to imperialism and that of April 1 to geo-
politics. He asked for suggestions with regard to the remaining sessions. Mr. 
Lipsky wondered about Toynbee. Professor Holborn expressed the opinion 
that Toynbee should be tentatively passed over, although this question should 
be brought to the chairman’s attention at the next meeting. The acting chair-
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man felt that the group had adequately covered the historical approach to 
international relations theory in its discussions of Carr.
It was generally agreed that the group would continue to devote the open-
ing session of each meeting to the approach of a particular theorist and the 
closing session to the problems raised by this approach and their application 
to the starting points for a theory of international relations.
Mr. Lipsky asked whether Wilsonian theory would be dealt with. Professor 
Holborn thought that the relation of ethics to international relations is an 
extremely important one. If the group felt that the field was not sufficiently 
covered with the number of meetings originally scheduled, it might be worth-
while to raise the question of having its life extended.
Mr. Marshall observed that Wilson’s theory did not seem to have much 
application to the international relations until Wilson became president and 
then the theory was elaborated to meet the circumstance of policy. Professor 
Wolfers agreed but felt that there were certain basic concepts and assumptions 
to Wilsonian theory which remained consistent throughout.
The group agreed with Professor Holborn’s suggestion that the final meet-
ing should be let open for the purpose of drawing together some of the basic 
ideas which had been expressed during the previous discussions and with a 
view to reaching some conclusions.
A Theory of International Relations
The acting chairman then opened the meeting for discussion on the general 
problem of developing a theory of international relations.
Professor Rabi expressed the view that one problem is the need to devote 
some time to cases and empirical materials. He would like to hear more dis-
cussion on how “this animal” works and know more about the actual condi-
tions under which nations communicate with one another, including both 
the physical conditions and the psychological circumstances. Moreover, he 
was also interested in getting an idea of the size of the field encompassed by 
the title “international relations.” Does it not include international commerce 
and investment? Finally, he would like to have a sharper idea of the kind of 
theory the group was aiming at. Is it primarily a descriptive theory? Is it a the-
ory which attempted to define what was good and bad in a global sense? Or is 
it a theory which would be suitable for guiding a policy maker?
The acting chairman called upon Professor Kaufmann, who felt that before 
too much could be said about how “the animal” behaves it would be necessary 
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to agree about what “the animal” is. The first step, therefore, is to attempt to 
define what constitutes the field of international relations. In doing this it 
might be profitable to begin with the idea that one is dealing with a system or 
society. Within this system one finds all the activities which one is accustomed 
to associate with a decentralized national society. Allowance must of course 
be made for the new elements which are introduced at the international level, 
but it is important to begin with the concept of a system and then to proceed 
to analyze the relationships which take place within the system, always allow-
ing for developmental aspects.
Mr. Lipsky asked whether attention should not also be paid to the phil-
osophical roots of a theory in attempting to explain that theory’s content. 
Professor Kaufmann said he was primarily interested in a theory’s content. 
Professor Kaufmann said he was primarily interested in a theory which at-
tempted to explain and define the processes which actually operate. Such a 
theory should be able to isolate the variables and should be useful as a basis for 
prediction. Moreover, the question of manipulation should only be considered 
if it is thought to be useful in attaining desired ends.
Professor Rabi observed that the subject matter of international relations 
encompasses an area containing some sixty- odd nations, hence one character-
istic of the problem is the relatively small number of units in the field under 
study. Would it not be sound first to examine the content of the field before 
attempting to theorize on how it behaves? The units in the field differ widely 
from one another, but do they not have elements in common from which 
principles can be drawn?
Professor Wolfers felt that it is misleading to base a theory of international 
relations on a conception of nations as a peculiar species of individuals. One 
is rather, dealing with thousands of acts in a field in which thousands of forces 
are interacting and realigning. If, indeed, one conceived of a sixty- unit field, 
then one must be recognize that each and every unit is unique.
Professor Rabi wondered whether each nation acts differently from the 
rest. Do they not merge into constellations? One must first describe how they 
act and then attempt to deduce the theory.
Professor Holborn felt that two problems exist: first, the construction of a 
theory of international relations is not just a problem of drawing conclusion 
from the actions and reactions of sixty- odd nations; second, such a theory is 
concerned with the study of one form of action and reaction.
Professor Rabi thought it necessary to establish a number of intellectual 
constructs if a field of such complexity is to be brought into some of kind of 
order.
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Mr. McClellan expressed the opinion that the concept of a system or field 
is a useful beginning for a theory of international relations. The first problem 
is to describe this field. It is not just a static system of some sixty units. These 
units are in contact with one another, cooperate, and come into conflict with 
another. This gives one a conception of the complexity of the system and leads 
one to draw a first intellectual construct, namely, that the field is characterized 
by relationships. While noting certain similarities with the domestic political 
process, the analogy cannot be carried too far since there is no sovereign pow-
er over the units in the field. The absence of a sovereign arbiter might be a 
second intellectual construct. A third might be recognition that three or four 
centers of power do exist in the field. If one then refined the relationships be-
tween these centers of power by applying Lasswell’s analysis, one might have 
the rudiments of a theory of international relations.
Professor Holborn noted that a theory of international relations has to rec-
ognize another set of problems as well. For example, US defense and foreign 
policy is presently being heavily influenced by the desire of the Republican 
Party to cut governmental expenditures. Hence, the conduct of international 
relations is not simply that of intergovernmental relations; domestic forces and 
ideologies play a vital role in determining one nation’s relations with the rest. 
Professor Rabi thought that intergovernmental relations can be conceived as 
synonymous with international relations if one interprets relationships be-
tween governments as being the resultants of the various forces— domestic or 
otherwise— that are working upon each government.
Professor Wolfers observed that the problem can also be handled by study 
of the decision- making process with relation to the thought that different types 
of value patterns will affect the choices of alternatives. Professor Rabi won-
dered if the decision- making process did not vary with each nation. Professor 
Wolfers felt that this is true to a point but that there are features common to 
all nations. Professor Rabi thought this offered some hope for elaborating a 
theory of international relations.
Criteria for the Adequacy of Theory
The acting chairman noted that at the group’s first meeting Professor Rabi had 
expressed doubt as to whether Carr’s analysis constituted a theory. He won-
dered whether Professor Rabi would give the group the benefit of his definition 
of theory.
Professor Rabi said that, from his own point of view, a theory starts with a 
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number of concepts elaborated to simplify the material with which the theory 
is concerned. Relations between these concepts are also an inherent part of a 
theory. The concepts are then tested with reference to their predictive value 
for the future or their predictive value in the past.
Mr. Lipsky wondered whether a theory can exist apart from the record 
of the material. Professor Rabi felt that the function of theory is to order or 
organize the record in meaningful terms. Mr. Lipsky asked whether this meant 
that Professor Rabi considered theory to be synonymous with explanation. 
Professor Rabi said that theory is rather an organization of knowledge and the 
creation of a pattern from which further knowledge can be learned. Mr. Lipsky 
inquired about the interstices within the scope of knowledge provided by the-
ory; do they not explain the function value has for theory? Professor Rabi 
believed the question of value to be an aesthetic one rather than one related 
to the problem of knowledge. Mr. Lipsky believed that the function of value 
is related to the incompleteness of knowledge. If the theory is complete, if it 
explains all phenomena, then value is irrelevant since absolute predictability 
exists and one would not value or desire that which one knows is impossible. 
Hence value can be equated with ignorance.
Miss Fosdick thought that the material of international relations is of a 
nature which does not lend itself to a high degree of predictability. Professor 
Rabi pointed out that predictability is highly overrated in the physical sci-
ences. Most so- called prediction is merely extrapolation on the basis of previ-
ous experience.
Professor Holborn asked Professor Rabi to clarify this observation. He 
noted that he had been under the impression that the physical sciences had 
discovered fundamental laws which provided a basis for precise predictability.
Professor Rabi stated that physicists are able to note the existence of cer-
tain patterns which give rise to the probability that, under certain similar con-
ditions, these patterns will recur. One “predicts,” for example, that the sun 
will rise tomorrow morning, but this is merely a statement of high probability 
based on previous observation. One cannot really make a prediction because 
man does not know enough about the forces which govern the phenomena. 
Actually, the theory of physics is not in good shape at present because physi-
cists are constantly finding evidence which tends to refute previously accept-
ed principles. This has given rise to a search for new concepts. Therefore, 
predictability may be an overly ambitious test for the adequacy of a theory of 
international relations.
Professor Kaufmann thought a sounder criterion is that of operational util-
ity; that is, a theory which would furnish the observer with a greater capacity 
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for understanding the political process and hence the ability to “predict” in a 
more limited sense.
Mr. Lipsky said that he is concerned with the theory of knowledge which 
each author offers in the field of international relations. Marxism’s claim to 
absolute predictability rests on its epistemology. If the gaps of ignorance in a 
given field can be closed, then one can predict with certainty and value would 
be relegated to a minimal role.
Professor Rabi doubted whether this would be a feasible approach. In phys-
ics, for example, a  theory explaining the characteristics and behavior of plu-
tonium molecules had been elaborated. It regarded the molecule as a particle 
with a certain mass traveling at a given velocity. This theory was thought to 
offer a basis for prediction until it was discovered that the particle did not ex-
ist. The concept of the particle had been an extrapolation from the properties 
and behavior of known data. Hence, it may not be possible, in the field of in-
ternational relations, to know enough about the material to afford prediction 
with certainty. It might therefore be better to seek more modest objectives, 
one being an attempt to arrive at concepts which clarify and create some order 
out of the material at hand.
Mr. McClellan thought that it is also necessary to avoid oversimplification 
and to appreciate the very complexity of the field. In this connection, an ap-
proach which postulates nations as units does not appear to be a fruitful one. 
Professor Rabi acknowledged that there might be a better approach.
Evaluation of Lasswell
Professor Wolfers noted, returning to the theory of Lasswell, that concepts 
are often the product of schools of thought rather than of individuals. Usually 
these schools merely reformulate old ideas in new contexts. The eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries saw the ascendancy of nationalism while the twen-
tieth century has witnessed the rediscovery of the irrational facet of man’s 
behavior and his attachment to myths and symbols. This truth has been viv-
idly exemplified and exploited by the anti- democratic forces of the twentieth 
century but there are those who realize that no inherent relationship exists 
between myth and fascism. Authors like Arnold and Lasswell have pioneered 
in pointing up the myths held by democracy and capitalism and have created 
a theory based on the proposition that those forces can serve democratic ends. 
On the other hand, history has shown that in the wrong hands, the techniques 
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advocated by Lasswell can be used to serve anti- democratic purposes as well. 
Mr. Lipsky felt that it is fortunate for this country that Lasswell is the chief 
spokesman for this school of thought.
The phenomenon of elite and followship is most striking, Professor Wolf-
ers continued, even within a strongly democratic society such as ours. It is 
noteworthy how, on the university campus, for example, leadership seems to 
assert itself, taboos are created and accepted with surprising passivity by the 
fellowship. This process is not overt; there is no demonstrable compulsion. 
Professor Holborn agreed and thought the difference between press cover-
ages in the UK and the US offered a good illustration. One finds a range of 
opinions and viewpoints expressed in the Manchester Guardian for example, 
which are entirely overlooked or dismissed by, say, the New York Times. Pro-
fessor Wolfers thought he noticed a sharp trend toward uniformity among the 
younger generation. Miss Fosdick thought it was especially evident among the 
teenage group.
Professor Holborn said that Lasswell contributed a great deal with regard 
to the problem of social communication. Trends toward greater uniformity 
may be symptomatic of the fact of greater homogeneity in the elite that con-
trols US organs of communication. But with regard to developing a theory 
for explaining events in international politics, Marx seems to offer more than 
Lasswell.
Mr. McClellan held that much of Lasswell’s work is based on Freudian 
concepts of the nature of the human personality. The basic emotional forces 
which shape human behavior have political relevance in that they help to 
explain patterns of national behavior. The psyche’s quest for self- fulfillment 
offers much material for judging motivation in the political process.
Professor Holborn alluded to Germany in 1938 and 1939. A large body of 
the German people were unsympathetic to the policies of the dictatorship but 
had no means whatever for expressing their disapproval. Hence there are certain 
situations in which the political process, as expressed by Lasswell, becomes to-
tally inoperative because other factors have been called into operation.
Miss Fosdick wondered to what extent Lasswell considers that he is de-
scribing the realities of politics and to what extent he is describing the politi-
cal world he desires. Mr. Lipsky thought that Lasswell considers himself to be 
a realist.
Professor Wolfers pointed out that Lasswell had been among the first to 
foresee that a bipolar international situation would create a tendency toward 
garrison- state conditions within the US.
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Professor Holborn expressed concern with the fact that in most societies 
a large majority of the people seem completely indifferent to politics. In Ger-
many in 1933 some 20 percent of the people seemed to be actively pro- Nazi, 
of which about half were fanatics; on the other extreme about 5 percent were 
ardent anti- Nazis and another 5 percent held strong anti- Nazi opinions. The 
great majority, in the middle, were largely indifferent.
Professor Kaufmann, in conclusion, stated that it would be misleading to 
consider that Lasswell excludes the other obvious variables which affect the 
political process, such as economics. Second, he felt that Lasswell regards elite 
communication and manipulation for democratic ends as a separate problem 
and that his more general theoretical approach stands on its own feet.
Professor Holborn remarked, in bringing the meeting to a close, that the 
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Fourth Meeting: Marxist Theory of 
Imperialism, March 17, 1954
The fourth meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Rela-
tions was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, March 17, 1954, 
at 5:30 p.m. The subject was Marxist theories of imperialism. Present were: 
Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy 
Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur, John P. Armstrong; William 
Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Charles Lichenstein; 
Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Isidor I. Rabi; 
Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz- Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Arnold 
Wolfers; Paul Zinner.
*****
Working Paper No. 4
Prepared by George Lipsky
The use of the Marxist theory of imperialism as a point of departure in the 
consideration of the whole phenomenon of imperialism is warranted by the 
appearance of success that the Marxists, old and new, have attained in putting 
the facts of world development and history into their schema. Superficially, 
the Marxist theory seems to be capable of absorbing easily all particular cases 
and using them to establish its own further support. It has become a social 
force stinging millions into action. Yet its theoretical support is weak and in-
adequate. The general Marxist view of imperialism as mainly a product of 
export surplus, monopoly, parasitic moribund capitalism is either an oversim-
plification, a meaningless tautology, or both. It is an oversimplification if, by 
definition, it excludes imperialist phenomena of other periods than the pres-
ent. It is tautological if, in finding imperialism to be the equivalent of expiring 
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capitalism, it states that the present is that age of imperialism because those 
conditions are to be presumed (as they can only be presumed) to exist. But it 
is a tautology that works in the war of ideas, as do so many, because it offers 
such a large opportunity to draw contrasts with other systems and conditions, 
which the Marxist theory holds superior and with respect to which, therefore, 
it may wish to avoid the disadvantage of identification as imperialist.
A major premise of this paper is that imperialism is one of the very few 
points of departure from which all the phenomena of international politics, 
and in fact of human relations, can be considered. Marxist theory of imperi-
alism is, by and large, Marxist theory of contemporary international relations. 
And a rejoinder thereto may be even more thoroughly a theory of internation-
al relations, especially if it avoids the oversimplification of the Marxist theory.
Theories of imperialism may take many forms but from the historical stand-
point, they are of three types: (1) those which hold that imperialism is only 
now being experienced or is to be experienced in the future; (2) those which 
look upon imperialism as atavistic and, therefore, almost certain to wither 
away, very much as the state withers away as the Marxist millennium is ap-
proached; and, (3) those which hold that it is a perennial phenomenon. The 
orthodox Marxist theory is of the first type; it quite naturally emphasizes the 
economic factor, and in analyzing the inexorable evolution of economic insti-
tutions (particularly relations of production) it applies the term “imperialism” 
to particular conditions of those institutions. There have been many theories 
of atavistic imperialism, held not least by those who idealistically believe that 
we are inevitably moving into a millennium of the perfect commonwealth, 
perhaps on a global scale. However, the main theory, which I shall outline and 
use as illustration here, is that of Joseph A. Schumpeter. His theory is mainly 
to be found in his essay on “The Sociology of Imperialism” in Imperialism and 
Social Classes.1 The third type of theory is equally varied, but I shall be content 
here to set forth my own concept of imperialism as a perennial phenomenon, 
without indicating where it overlaps other, similar theories of the type.
As Paul Sweezy has indicated, Schumpeter was subject to criticism by 
“Economists who conceive of their science in traditional and rather narrowly 
restricted terms” for his essays on imperialism and social classes. They could 
be considered “brilliant forays into other fields perhaps, but essentially unre-
lated to his main work on business cycles and the theory of economic devel-
opment.”2 The scope of the problem is such that any one concerning himself 
with it in brief compass must resort to large generalizations and a high degree 
of selection of materials. Schumpeter’s essay on imperialism can be considered 
suggestive rather than definitive. It goes without saying that this paper can 
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only be an attempt to sketch the problem. Some points, however, can be made 
with great assurance. In keeping with the various definitions referred to at 
length in this paper, war and military power must be considered as factors con-
comitant or coeval with imperialism,3 since by those definitions imperialism 
is essentially an act of aggression meeting the resistance or finding opposition 
among those upon whom the imperial power is applied. This is not an un-
conventional view, contrasting with the definition of Hans J. Morgenthau in 
which imperialism involves a policy of altering the status quo. Morgenthau’s 
definition appears to me essentially inadequate for a variety of reasons. It refers 
largely to national motivations rather than conditions of fact. It cannot take 
into account the cases of satiated imperial powers who may be applying a prin-
ciple of limitation because they are aware of the strain that further territorial 
acquisition would place upon them.4 In this light, Lenin’s definition appears 
more appropriate than that of Morgenthau.
Marxist Theory of Imperialism
In dealing with Marxist theory of imperialism, it is necessary to decide what 
particular Marxist theory will be considered representative. Marx himself 
did not develop a complete and conscious theory of imperialism. Despite his 
stress upon economic determinism, there exists some ground for asserting that 
imperialism was to him a product of policy decisions reflecting the desire to 
exercise brute strength. The neo- Marxists found in Marx most of the foun-
dation in economic theory they needed for their own highly developed the-
ory of imperialism, although Marx did not stress monopoly and the resulting 
development of protectionism.5 The stress upon the economic factor among 
Marxists assured the existence of a potent source of doctrinal conflict.6 This 
was a conflict already made certain by the dogmatic nature of the Marxist 
approach. And the opportunity for conflict was no doubt a great advantage 
to those who sought to achieve leadership of the movement. We must make 
a selection among many: Rosa Luxemburg, Otto Bauer, Rudolph Hilferding, 
Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, and V. I. Lenin. In the light of the latter’s 
success as the leader of a successful revolution, the position he established can 
with reason be called orthodox. Moreover, the view is plausible that Lenin is 
more consistent with Marxist premises than were the others whom he labeled, 
in his cavalier use of epithets, opportunists or social chauvinists. Among them 
he found some reason to bestow praise upon Hilferding, but he reserves his 
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greatest praise for a non- Marxist, the English economist J. A. Hobson, whose 
study of imperialism he praised highly and referred to at length.7
This is not an appropriate point at which to outline in detail the con-
troversy on economic points involved in this building of a triumphant neo- 
Marxist theory of imperialism. The main point at issue was whether on this 
score capitalism was subject to reform or inevitably subject to such contradic-
tions that it must produce its imperialist form as a prelude to its demise and the 
advent of the socialist revolution. Despite Lenin’s attacks upon the imperialist 
war, it is quite certain that he did not abhor war as such, for it was to him part 
of the historical process by which the new order would be established. And the 
so- called “social chauvinists” or “opportunists,” although charged by Lenin 
with being in favor of the prosecution of the First World War by their own na-
tions, may very well have become reformist because of their rejection of war, 
particularly the inevitable war(s) promised by Lenin’s theory of imperialism.
The heroic time of colonial expansion would appear to the average observ-
er to have antedated the twentieth century, but to Lenin the latter part of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries saw the inception 
of the imperialist era. This was a period witnessing “the enormous growth of 
industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in 
ever- larger enterprises.”8 This development involved the “transformation of 
competition into monopoly.”9 Free competition, in fact, leads naturally and 
inevitably to the concentration of production and, eventually, monopoly.10 By 
the turn of the century giant combines and cartels of various types have de-
veloped in a wide zone. Even more, “Cartels became one of the foundations of 
the whole of economic life. Capital has been transformed into imperialism.”11
The major significance of this process is that it involves “immense prog-
ress in the socialization of production,” particularly in technical invention and 
improvement. Therefore, in this period capitalism is preparing inevitably in 
this positive way for its own destruction. Other activities are developed which 
foreshadow large- scale planning. Raw material sources are estimated, even on 
a global scale. These sources are captured by large- scale monopoly alliances. 
Market estimates are made, and the trusts and cartels divide the markets among 
themselves. The monopolies destroy those who do not submit to their yoke.
Another major fact in the epoch and in the development is that the basis 
of economic life has ceased to be “commodity production.” The real power has 
gone “to the ‘genius’ of financial manipulation.” Socialized production is the 
product of his activities, but the benefit goes entirely to the speculators. Only 
petty bourgeois, social- chauvinist opportunists “would dream of taking a step 
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backward,” for Lenin it would be backward. And, as Lenin contends, compe-
tition, to which they wish to return, is itself the source of the abuses of which 
these dreamers wish to rid us.
Gigantic problems arise as this development proceeds. There is an over-
flowing of capital and a corresponding increase in technical progress which 
gives way “more and more to disturbances in the co- ordination between the 
various spheres of industry, to anarchy and crisis.”12 These in turn reinforce the 
tendency toward concentration and monopoly. In this process the part played 
by the banks must be accented. They cease to be modest intermediaries. Bank-
ing power, controlling most if not all capital, becomes concentrated in a small 
number of large- scale monopolistic establishments. “The transformation of 
numerous intermediaries into a handful of monopolists represents one of the 
fundamental processes in the transformation of capitalism into capitalist im-
perialism.”13 A handful of banking monopolists know the exact position of 
the various capitalists and come to control them and determine completely 
their fate. There is a fusion of banking and industrial capital; banking institu-
tions acquire a truly universal character. The domination of capital in general 
makes way for the domination of finance capital.
Under the new arrangements, it is possible for comparatively small capi-
tal to dominate “immense spheres of production,” says Lenin. Particularly in 
those countries of the, say, “one pound share” it is possible to bring about this 
separation of ownership from control.”14 The rentier becomes separated from 
the entrepreneur and the former becomes the new ruler. A financial oligar-
chy has appeared working through the power of a small crystallized nucleus 
of financially powerful states. Whereas formerly the typical economic feature 
was the export of goods, under finance capitalism the typical feature is the 
export of capital.15 This is a product of an enormous superfluity of capital in 
the advanced countries. The export of capital is made possible “by the entry 
of numerous backward countries into international capitalist intercourse.”16 
The elementary conditions for their industrial development are created. Fi-
nance capital spreads its net over all countries. Spheres of influence among 
the monopolist combines are created. International agreements among them 
tend naturally toward the formation of international cartels. Political allianc-
es between states are created parallel to these economic alignments, working 
toward a territorial division of the world. A struggle for colonies comes, or, 
put more significantly, a “struggle for ‘economic territory.’”17 By the beginning 
of the twentieth century this fact had to be connected with the fact that the 
world had become completely shared out. New partitions were possible, in fact 
inevitable, but territories must now pass from one “owner” to another. The 
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evolution from capitalism, to monopoly capitalism, and to finance capitalism 
“is connected with the struggle for the partition of the world.”18
Naturally the struggle for territories in this period becomes especially bit-
ter. This is a period of imperialism par excellence, in Lenin’s view. The imperi-
alism and the colonial policy of capitalism in previous stages and the imperial-
ism of precapitalist periods are essentially different from the imperialism and 
colonial policy of finance capital.19 There is a necessity about the latter that 
did not exist with the same intensity before. As capitalism passes through its 
various stages, the need for raw materials becomes more intense, competition 
more bitter, the hunt for raw materials more feverish, and the struggle for 
colonies more desperate. The giant machine must be fed more and more; it 
outruns its supply and finally begins to feed upon itself. “Imperialism [emerges] 
as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental attributes of 
capitalism in general.”20 Lenin writes flatly that “imperialism is the monopoly 
stage of capitalism.”21 It embraces all the conditions that have been referred to 
in the preceding paragraphs.
As the stage is passed through, “the struggle of world imperialism becomes 
more aggravated.”22 Parasitism and decay, however, are also characteristic of 
this period of great expenditures of energy. The rentiers clip their coupons and 
live without making any contribution; the monopolies tend to stifle technical 
progress, a condition that has produced them. Here we can see a structure of 
contradictions. With great energy the system is preparing for the future, yet 
it produces a class of enervated parasites. Technical progress is at the core of 
the new development, yet it is slowed down by the system it produced! These 
and other contradictions are working for the new day.23 Embryonic imperial-
ism has become full- fledged imperialism and is the stage immediately prior to 
proletarian revolution.
While the contradictions should not be depreciated in picturing the capi-
talist swindle, they are inevitable and should be made use of in the struggle for 
a better world, according to Lenin. Only the lackeys of the imperialists, the 
social chauvinists, will tone down their references to these facts. Only such 
individuals will fail, on the one hand, to oppose imperialist war from its incep-
tion, to expose it for what it is, to work for the defeat of their own government 
in such a war, and thus to take advantage of the opportunity such a war pro-
vides.24 Such a war is reactionary, but it gives an opportunity to foment revo-
lution and to coordinate in terms of mutual aid “the revolutionary movement 
in all belligerent countries.”25 It was especially important for the Russian party 
to agitate against its own government during the war, because Russia was the 
most backward of the major participating powers and an immediate socialist 
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revolution was possible there. The prospect was real that this could be the be-
ginning of the process of transforming the imperialist war into an internation-
al civil war.26 Blows against government from their own oppressed classes must 
accompany “a series of military reverses and defeats” in order to produce this 
result.27 High treason must be the order of the day for the proletarian deter-
mined to produce the “disintegration of ‘his’ imperialist ‘Great’ Power.”28 The 
revolution must be general, a revolution in the West; the revolution in Russia 
must be merely the inception of that larger development. Revolution must not 
be undertaken in those places only where the purpose of defeating a particular 
enemy, labelled the aggressor, may be fulfilled. All the imperialist powers were 
on the same level of guilt. A “proletarian international revolutionary” could 
not discriminate among them.”29
A major goal of this revolution would be the establishment of the prin-
ciple of national self- determination and the right of free, political secession 
from the oppressing nation. But “the more clearly the democratic system of 
state approximates [through revolutionary change] to complete freedom of se-
cession, the rarer and weaker will the striving for secession be in practice.”30 
There was the great advantage economically in large states for economic prog-
ress. Lenin was not in 1916 a protagonist of the principle of federation. He 
surely did not believe in its practice, although he might support it as preferable 
to national inequality and “as the only path towards complete democratic 
centralism.”31 Classes can be abolished only through dictatorship of the pro-
letariat; mankind can become a unified whole only through passing through a 
period of complete liberation for oppressed nations, their freedom to secede. 
The subsequent unity would not be imperialism, for the bulk of the peoples 
would be united in common interest free from oppression by class and state. 
By the Leninist definition, imperialism could not exist under those conditions, 
for imperialism is finance capitalism with all its oppression and aggressions. 
Utopian proclamations of desire to see these conditions accomplished under 
a “peaceful” capitalism, a reformed imperialism, were philistine and opportu-
nistic. Imperialism, when it exists, implies an “inevitable division between op-
pressing nations and oppressed nations.”32 There is only one road to freedom 
from such oppression: a successful international civil war under the leadership 
of the proletarian internationalist revolutionaries.
Schumpeter’s Critique of the Marxist Theory
Joseph A. Schumpeter was probably not the ardent defender of capitalism in-
dicated by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter.33 He was willing to accept partially 
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the picture of the evils of monopoly, protectionism, etc., described by Lenin. 
Capitalism was not, however, dying of its own inherent defects. Its decline, if 
it occurred, would be the product of an irresistible myth- drift ranged against 
it, i.e., the pressure of ideology and propaganda. In connection with imperi-
alism, Schumpeter made many favorable comments on capitalism. The wars 
of this epoch, held by Lenin to be the natural accompaniment of imperial-
ism, or finance capitalism, were not clearly the product of capitalism as such. 
For war was, just as imperialism, a product of institutions and techniques 
antedating capitalism: “modern pacificism, in its political foundation if not 
is derivation, is unquestionably a phenomenon of the capitalist world.”34 
“Wherever capitalism penetrated, peace parties of such strength arose that 
virtually every35 war meant a political struggle on the domestic scene.”36 
The imperial worker created by capitalism is everywhere anti- imperialist. 
The capitalist age has been especially vigorous in devising or attempting 
“methods for preventing war, for the peaceful settlement of disputed among 
states.”37 Among all the states the one least burdened with precapitalist sur-
vivals and elements, the United States, is the one least likely to exhibit 
an imperialist trend.38 In fact, capitalism is “by nature anti- imperialist.”39 
“Rather, imperialist and nationalist literature is always complaining vocifer-
ously about the debility, the undignified will to peace, the petty commercial 
spirit, and so on, of the capitalist world.”40 Where free trade exists “no class 
has an interest in forcible expansion as such.”41 Even protective tariffs “do 
not basically change this situation as it effects interests,” although they may 
move the nations economically farther apart, making it possible for imperi-
alist tendencies to become dominant.42
Where an aggressive economic policy on the part of a country exists in 
terms of a unified tariff, with war preparation in the background, the econ-
omy is only apparently and not really served. The economy becomes rather 
a weapon, “a means for unifying the nation, for severing it from the fabric of 
international interests, for placing it [sic] at the disposal of the state power.”43 
“Where protective tariffs appear without monopoly, agreement is possible; 
where monopoly appears, agreement is very difficult to reach . . . for it would 
require self- negation on the part of the new rulers,” and economic conflict 
can easily turn into armed conflict. But these are dangers not necessities. The 
capitalist system does not produce them from necessity, nor does it make “its 
continued existence impossible by its own growth and development.”44 But 
it may produce the results Marx and Lenin described as inevitable: economic 
aggression, military aggression and struggle for the securing of markets. Capi-
tal may be organized to achieve these results and realize the interest that may 
appear in rising wartime consumption. At the least, diversionary tactics (war) 
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may be employed to confuse those who are in opposition to special capitalist 
interests that are making use of the state for selfish purposes.
These possibilities should not be overestimated. Deep down the real com-
munity of interest among nations never completely disappears, “The normal 
sense of business and trade naturally prevails. Even cartels cannot do without 
the custom of their foreign economic kin.”45 Essentially a believer in men’s 
capacity to reason, Schumpeter stressed that men will know that the “hope of 
a future of dominion, to follow the struggles of the present, is but poor solace 
for the losses in that struggle.”46 What is more, “Export monopolism does not 
grow from the inherent laws of capitalist development.”47 The automatism 
of the competitive system can never explain the rise of trusts and cartels.48 
Neither does it explain the growth of protective tariffs. These excesses “are 
the fruit of political action,” not reflecting the objective interest of all con-
cerned, but really impossible when those whose consent is required recognize 
their true interest. The excesses which Lenin describes as imperialism do not 
stem from capitalism as such. They are the product of precapitalist factors that 
capitalism failed to sweep away. The bourgeoisie did not completely conquer 
the citadel, and, therefore, it has remained in part the servant of state and the 
state interests rather than its own.
Schumpeter’s Theory of Imperialism
Imperialism in Schumpeter’s theory is a product of the autocratic state, “the 
outcome of precapitalist forces which the autocratic state has reorganized in 
part by the methods of early capitalism.”49 It would not have been evolved by 
an inner logic of capitalism itself. Precapitalist elements in our society may 
have great vitality and may be revived from time to time to greater energy in 
producing imperialism, “but in the end the climate of the modern world must 
destroy them.” Capitalism itself will certainly, Schumpeter contends, survive 
much longer than essentially untenable export monopolism, admittedly a 
concomitant of modern imperialism. But other factors that are even more im-
portant as components of imperialism, such as warlike instincts and structural 
elements and organizational forms oriented toward war, “will be politically 
overcome in time, no matter what they do to maintain among the people a 
sense of constant danger of war, with the war machine forever primed for ac-
tion. And with them, imperialism will wither and die.”50 Unfortunately there 
is truth in the statement “that the dead always rule the living.”51
These are the highlights of Schumpeter’s thesis that imperialism is atavis-
tic. As to the content of imperialism, he says that imperialism has been histor-
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ically the product of “objectless” tendencies toward forcible expansion, with-
out definite, utilitarian limits. Irrational, instinctual inclinations toward war 
and conquest have played a large historical role. Most wars have been waged 
without adequate justification from the standpoint of reasoned and reason-
able interest.52 There has been a will to war, a product of situations that have 
“molded peoples and classes into warriors.”53 Such “psychological dispositions 
and social structures acquired in the dim past in such situations, once firmly 
established, tend to maintain themselves and to continue in effect long after 
they have lost their meaning and their life- preserving function.”54 Imperialism 
“is an atavism in the social structure, in individual, psychological habits of 
emotional reaction.” The vital needs that created it have passed away, and it 
too must pass away although every “warlike involvement . . . tends to revive 
it.”55 Imperialism and its source are absolute autocracy; with the disappearance 
of the latter, the present imperialism can pass away.
Evaluation
It appears to me that imperialism is misrepresented in considerable measure in 
both the Marxist- Leninist and Schumpeterian systems. In both cases, an as-
sumption is made that there can be a time when men’s aggressions will not be 
expressed in terms of the domination of one people over another against the 
will of the latter and involving a clash of interests. In the one case, the Marxist 
position holds, by virtue of a special definition, that precapitalist imperialism 
or imperialism in the early stages of capitalism is embryonic, but that an inev-
itable historical process produces imperialism as the product of capitalism in 
its final stage. This historicist position selects facts to fit the theory with great 
plausibility, but it insists on an inevitability that it cannot be given to man 
really to know. Moreover, if non- economic factors are brought in, as they must 
be, then imperialism cannot be related simply to a given stage of capitalist 
development. In the other case, Schumpeter assumes too easily that “Social 
imperialism” (fascism) does not and cannot exist, and relates imperialism to 
the condition worked by the absolute state, particularly when it was clearly 
dominated by a few, especially a small class of warriors. This theory suggests 
that a high degree of rationality in decision making will supplant the previous 
pointless and instinctual decision making, expressing love of conflict, and per-
haps mere desire to expend energy.
On the contrary, I think men will be more thoroughly safeguarded against 
danger if they will realize that there is and will be always a tendency among 
them to attempt to foist upon other men their values. Even those who ac-
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knowledge that their values are mere preferences, especially the Machiavel-
lians, will not permanently restrain themselves from imposing their values. 
The best defense against abuse is the permanent recognition of its imminence. 
Imperialism is, in this view, a perennial problem. It should not be thought of 
as offering no opportunity to be transformed into another, a higher, form. The 
so- called Roman Empire appears to have been really a commonwealth in most 
respects during the major part of the period of the Caesars. The test was, as 
it should be, the degree of acquiescence with which the non- Roman peoples 
accepted the myth, values, and institutions of Rome and came to identify 
themselves with her. The test was not whether or not Rome remained expan-
sionist, as Professor Morgenthau would have it.
Today many people, ordinarily perhaps rather empirical in their approach, 
are doctrinaire on the question of imperialism. They would identify some con-
temporary complexes of political relationships including many and disparate 
peoples and cultures and insist that those systems have to be broken up. They 
do not inspect closely enough the possibility that these systems may be trans-
formed into commonwealths, that through sound policy, emphasizing equality 
of capacity to share in the distribution of human satisfactions, resistance may 
be transformed into cooperation and acquiescence. Instead, too often, they, 
pursuing their doctrinaire course, strive to create new political vacua that can 
only give opportunities to the really imperial order today, one that is all the 
more objectionable because it rationalizes itself though a fantastic feat of rhe-
torical legerdemain. In the clashes of cultures and values that will persist as 
long as men inhabit this planet, orders will arise that will be basically imperi-
alistic. Such strife is inevitable. But certain values, in achieving victory, may 
form the foundation of a new and more widespread peace. We could do worse 
than to maintain our confidence that Anglo- American values could form the 
foundations of a more widespread peace. At the very least, a strong Anglo- 
American community is the antithesis of that political vacuum upon which 
contemporary, candid authoritarianism feuds. Man’s success story will be told 




The chairman called the meeting to order and suggested that a later date 
be fixed for the next meeting in view of the unavoidable delay which had 
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occurred in holding the present meeting. After a brief discussion, Thursday, 
April 8, was agreed upon.
The chairman went on to note that the topic for the present meeting was 
a “double- barreled” one in the sense that the two approaches to an important 
subject would be under consideration. He thought that an analysis of these 
approaches offered a great deal for developing the group’s own thinking with 
regard to international relations theory. The chairman called on Mr. Lipsky to 
open the discussion.
Marxist­ Leninist Imperialism
Mr. Lipsky said that while he had found the subject of imperialism one of the 
most interesting aspects of international relations theory, he felt less satisfied 
with the present working paper than with previous ones. Be that as it may, Mr. 
Lipsky continued, he has always objected to the naïve and doctrinaire ten-
dency, often found in this country, to dismiss imperialism as evil per se and to 
advocate the elimination of “imperial” systems regardless of political vacuums 
thereby created. Such vacuums will always constitute a strong temptation to 
the real imperialist power of this era.
These considerations prompted him, Mr. Lipsky continued, to include 
a final section to the working paper setting forth a few generalized personal 
concepts on the nature of imperialism. This view assumes power as the basic 
factor. In the course of history, a more powerful people will inevitably tend 
to impose their values and culture upon less powerful people. Imperialism is 
therefore a perennial phenomenon and a phenomenon open at both ends. For 
just as there is a tendency to impose, so also is there a tendency for the subject 
people to acquiesce and accept the new cultural pattern and, in so doing, to 
form the basis of a cooperative international commonwealth.
With regard to Marxism and Schumpeter’s theory, Mr. Lipsky felt that 
it is a grave mistake to assume that imperialism is either an atavistic relic 
from the past or an economic “necessity” of the present. The latter theory 
effectively serves propaganda purposes and is a convenient vehicle for making 
accusations against the Western powers. On the other hand, it is somewhat 
surprising to note Schumpeter’s view that imperialism is essentially behavioral 
residue from the precapitalistic, authoritarian era, thus excluding a whole host 
of factors which any comprehensive theory of imperialism must account for. 
It is also disappointing to note the extent to which Schumpeter agreed with 
Marx. For example, Schumpeter believed that Marx was methodologically sci-
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entific. There is also a certain parallelism between the two theories which is 
illustrated by the broad generalizations each was willing to make. Schumpeter, 
for example, predicted a steady decline and termination of imperialism.
The chairman suggested that the group first turn its attention to clarify-
ing the significance of certain features of Marxist theory of imperialism. The 
group could then proceed to the application of those problems as they relate 
to developing a theory of international relations which encompasses a world, 
large areas of which are under communist domination. Schumpeter’s theory, 
he thought, should only be treated in passing and might best be used as a foil 
for analyzing Marxian theory.
The chairman remarked that, strictly speaking, there is no Marxist theory 
of imperialism but only subsequent interpretations of Marx as applied to that 
phenomenon, the leading interpreters being, of course Lenin and Luxembourg. 
Lenin’s interpretations pose significant problems. For example, Lenin based 
his theory of imperialism on the development of industrial concentration in 
the capitalist states and the glutting of home markets, leading to a search for 
new markets overseas. Rivalry between these states for third markets would 
lead, in turn, to imperialistic wars and, finally, to “civil wars” between capital-
ist and proletariat classes within the advanced industrial countries. However, 
the problem is, why should concentration of industry, in Marxist logic, lead 
inevitably to the breakdown of the capitalist system?
Professor Holborn thought the answer is not to be found in Marxist theory 
but outside that “camp,” that is, in Hobson’s theory of imperialism. Of course, 
postulating the development of monopoly capitalism from competitive capi-
talism is good classical Marxism. Concomitant with the growth of monopoly is 
the growth of surplus capital and the increased exploitation of labor. Hobson 
added the notion that, in seeking a higher rate of return than that found on 
the domestic market, capital is exported to overseas areas. This was very useful 
to Lenin, who needed an explanation for the failure of capitalism to collapse 
along the lines predicted by Marx. Lenin used Hobson’s theory to build a “new 
floor to the house of Marx” through which capitalism must ascend before its 
final plunge.
Professor Wolfers added that, according to Lenin, even this expedient is 
doomed to failure because of the ever- decreasing opportunities for profit in the 
overseas market as these markets become glutted and as rival capitalist states 
expand into similar markets. Thus the capital- exporting states are each faced 
with an ever- increasing surplus of capital which cannot be profitably invested. 
Hence they are under increasing pressure to force their way into markets al-
ready pre- empted by their rivals.
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Professor Rabi felt that this line of reasoning still did not make intracapi-
talist war inevitable. If monopoly concentration is possible within the nation, 
why can it not develop across national boundaries as well?
The chairman pointed out that by “imperialism” Lenin did not mean the 
acquisition of territory but simply the penetration of markets for the export 
of capital and goods. Mr. Niemeyer wondered whether political control is not 
necessary to assure economic control. The chairman thought the political as-
pect is a corollary but not a precondition of the economic aspect. Professor 
Holborn felt that imperialism, from the Marxist standpoint, means protec-
tionism at home and colonialism abroad. In other words, it means the ex-
clusion of rival capitalist states from the home and overseas markets of the 
imperial state.
The Relevance of Economic Theory
Professor Strausz- Hupé believed that Lenin had borrowed much from Hilford 
as well as Hobson in developing his theory of imperialism. In any case, an 
understanding of Lenin’s theory pivots, he thought, on a comprehension of 
Marx’s surplus value theory. Given the assumptions of the value theory and 
the desire to maximize profits, the competitive process is confined to a lower-
ing of wages and, hence, to an ever- increasing exploitation and subjugation of 
the proletariat. This process also explains capitalism’s need to win new mar-
kets overseas.
Mr. Niemeyer wondered whether the economic aspect of Leninist theory 
was really a relevant matter for discussion. The relationship of Lenin’s analysis 
of imperialism to international relations theory appeared, he believed, to offer 
quite different problems. One such problem is whether or not imperialism, as 
Lenin assumed, defines the entire content of international relations and offers 
an explanation for the international political process as a whole. A second 
problem is whether or not imperialism, as Lenin assumed, contributes to an 
understanding of the phenomenon of war; does it explain why wars arise or 
why they are more apt to start at one particular time rather than another? 
These questions can be discussed without resource to the economic structure 
of Marxism, just as Marx’s and Lenin’s theories of government can be analyzed 
without references to the surplus value theory.
Professor Strausz- Hupé noted that Lenin’s theory of imperialism consti-
tutes the operational theory of Soviet foreign policy. To understand the mind 
of a Soviet diplomat such as Vishinsky one must be aware of his doctrinal ori-
154 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
entation. This applied with equal force to evaluating the probable course the 
Soviet government will take in a given situation. One must have a grasp of the 
whole theory in order to understand its application to policy.
Mr. Niemeyer wondered whether the Soviet leaders really believed their 
own theories. Professor Strausz- Hupé acknowledged that there is some uncer-
tainty on that point. The chairman felt that Soviet leaders must be aware that 
capitalism per se does not breed intracapitalist wars since such an assumption 
implies a Soviet policy of waiting for capitalism to destroy itself. That is obvi-
ously not true of Soviet policy today. Professor Holborn noted that historical 
examples exist in which Soviet foreign policy operated on the basis of Marx-
ian doctrine. In the 1920s, for example, the Communist line was hostile to the 
Social Democrats in anticipation of a major economic crisis in the capitalist 
world as predicted by Varga. During that period there was a marked parallelism 
between Soviet foreign policy and certain economic assumptions. Unfortu-
nately, those assumptions proved to be correct.
Professor Strausz- Hupé felt that Marxism had made a significant contribu-
tion to economic theory in general. Keynesian theory, for example, borrowed 
heavily from Rosa Luxembourg’s teachings. Thus Marxism has had practical 
as well as ideological consequences. On the whole, Marx offered a superbly 
intelligent theory. Given the limitation inherent in generalizing on the basis 
of an ideal model, Marx’s predictions could be described as brilliant.
Mr. Niemeyer disagreed. He held that Marxism, on the whole, had failed 
to predict major economic and political developments in the West. The chair-
man noted that every major prediction made by Marx had failed to material-
ize: namely the shrinking of the middle class, the lowering of wages, the in-
creased exploitation and subjugation of the workers. Something, he thought, 
must be wrong with a theory having a record of so many erroneous predictions.
Mr. Zinner expressed the view that it might be profitable, from the group’s 
standpoint, to distinguish between the economic and political elements in 
Marxist theory and to analyze them independently. He doubted whether one 
could be as categorical in dismissing Marx’s political prediction as one could 
with regard to Marx’s economic forecasting. Italy and France today, from a po-
litical and social standpoint, appear to have a close resemblance to the Marx-
ist concept of a capitalist state.
The chairman felt that the surplus value dogma could be dispensed with 
for present purposes. The fact that those countries now ruled by communist 
governments have never gone through a capitalist phase of development 
seems to indicate the theory’s irrelevance. Mr. Zinner agreed. Actually Lenin 
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was mostly concerned with the political aspect of Marxism and its applicabil-
ity to the revolutionary situation in Russia. In that sense, Lenin could be said 
to have turned Marx upside down.
Value of Marxist Theory
Professor Holborn said that while he was, of course, by no means a Marxist he 
had the feeling that Marxism has been, in some respects, underrated. As a the-
ory of history, or perhaps of political sociology, it had created certain insights 
which were an advance over previous concepts. One of these was the concept 
of social classes. Liberal theoreticians had viewed classes as an agglomeration 
of individuals while Marx showed that they possessed a certain organic unity 
and particular interests and patterns of behavior. Although Marx’s theory of 
class warfare is now antiquated, it opened the door to a more effective inter-
pretation of society.
Marxism also has contemporary relevance, Professor Holborn contin-
ued, when one notices the extent to which US foreign policy appears to be 
based on perverted Marxist notions. This country’s economic and technical 
assistance programs seem to be largely predicated on a theory of economic 
determinism, yet US policies fail to recognize the power of ideas and the in-
terrelationship between ideas and material welfare in attempting to influence 
behavior abroad.
Mr. Niemeyer emphatically agreed with professor Holborn’s observation 
on US foreign policy. The Marxist assumption of economic motivation in 
human behavior appears to have become an operational theory of foreign 
policy in the US and nowhere else. He also agreed that the Marxian anal-
ysis of society has produced greater insight into the workings of the political 
process which are beneficial to both Soviet and non- Soviet rulers. However, 
it is doubtful whether imperialism constitutes a complete explanation of the 
international relations process.
Mr. Thompson noted that most modern political theorists have passed 
through a phase of development in which they are intrigued by Marxism. But 
this enchantment contains the seeds of its own destruction. Usually the phase 
originates with a rejection of the oversimplified concepts of nineteenth cen-
tury liberalism. One such idea, for example, is the postulate that social groups 
pursue universal interests while pursuing group interests. More particularly, 
there is the notion that the middle class was working for the liberation of all 
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classes when it challenged the rule of monarchy and aristocracy. Marx pointed 
out that universal interests are not necessarily served by the pursuit of partic-
ular interests and this was a step forward.
However, Mr. Thompson continued, the notion of the supremacy of partic-
ularized class interests is often carried to perilous lengths. It has reached a point 
where a Western statesman can hardly make a policy statement without its 
being construed in terms of special group or class motivations. Although class 
conflict is a real aspect of the political process, it is undoubtedly exaggerated 
and too rigidly defined by some theoreticians influenced by Marx. This had led 
to their failure to understand a program like that of the New Deal with its idea 
of a collective good as a clue to a nation’s economic and political growth.
Moreover, Mr. Thompson pointed out, those theoreticians who have been 
influenced by Marx are inclined to view political power as merely a corollary 
of economic power and not as a problem in its own right. With the growth of 
state functions and powers under the New Deal and the war, there has been an 
increasing awareness of the problems which centralized political power poses 
for democratic government.
Professor Strausz- Hupé expressed the opinion that Lenin derived the caus-
al factor for his theory of imperialism from Marx: namely from the concept of 
oversaving. He thought the group would have to come to grips with that basic 
notion if it were to be able to evaluate the theory as a whole. The chairman 
held that oversaving had not been a causal factor for Lenin in State Revolution. 
Certainly oversaving was not a causal factor for imperialism in the Keynesian 
sense of the term. Rather Lenin had postulated a general accumulation of 
capital and a falling rate of profit on the home market.
An important feature of Marxism, the chairman continued, is its 
dynamics— its appeal as a spur to action. It is pretty well established, at least 
in the field of political theory, that there is no necessary relationship between 
the importance of an idea and its truth. The essential concept of Marxism is 
the notion of class antagonism, which is, to say the least, a remarkable simpli-
fication of human behavior.
Professor Wolfers thought that the only fact about Lenin’s description of 
imperial motivation is that it happens not to be true. On the other hand, 
Marxist theory of imperialism is also an explanation or justification for pin-
ning guilt on the capitalist countries for international exploitation and war. 
It is, in addition, interesting to note the parallelism between Schumpeter and 
Marx in that both were trying to fasten the guilt for imperialism on a particu-
lar class, be it capitalist or precapitalist. Neither theorist viewed the phenom-
enon as being inherent in the state.
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Professor Wolfers thought that Mr. Lipsky had “played down” imperialism 
somewhat when, in his working paper, he described it as an age- old phenome-
non in which the strong extended their values over the weak. Professor Wolf-
ers held that imperial conquerors are more concerned with exploiting people 
for economic gain than with spreading values.
Professor Wolfers noted that history has seen the rise and fall of many em-
pires. Were these simply cases of international gangsterism? Would it simply 
continue under new forms? Are its origins to be found in a particular class 
pattern or did it spring perhaps from the political organization of man into 
nation- states?
Mr. Thompson suggested that three major theories have, over the years, 
been formulated to answer Professor Wolfers’ questions. None of them is 
wholly adequate. First, there is the economic theory of imperialism which 
can be traced back to the laissez- faire theorists who held that imperialism 
and war was an inevitable result of the absence of free trade. The munition 
makers’ theory is also a branch of that school. A third is, of course, the Marx-
ian approach to imperialism with its many subsequent reinterpretations and 
ramifications. All of these schools see a particular economic configuration as 
the root cause. A second school of thought holds that imperialism springs 
from the existence of particular political systems. Thus Bentham maintained 
that control over colonies inevitably leads to war. Others have maintained 
that autocracy is inherently imperialistic and war- bent. Today the ideologi-
cal theory of imperialism has become popular. Thus one hears that nations 
holding communist or fascist ideologies will inevitably attempt to conquer 
other nations. None of these schools asks, Mr. Thompson observed, whether 
there is something inherent in man’s nature which is the root cause. None has 
speculated as to whether war and imperialism are simply mass manifestations 
of behavior found in subnational life.
The chairman thought that while it is certainly true that human beings 
seek power they also seek other things as well. The problem is, he thought, 
whether certain conditions tend to bring out the power urge in preference to 
other values and, if so, what those conditions are.
Mr. Zinner wondered whether the group had not shifted the discussion 
away from Leninism to a generalized theory of imperialism in which one or-
ganized society has dominance over another. He suggested that it might be 
valuable first to examine fully the content of Leninist theory of imperialism, 
as well as the validity of that content, before taking up the more generalized 
subject. In this connection, he thought three questions came to mind: (1) To 
what extent is imperialism motivated by economic causes? (2) To what extent 
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do Soviet leaders believe Lenin’s theory of imperialism? (3) To what extent 
has that theory been invalidated by advent of the USSR and the behavior of 
the USSR during the interwar period and after?
With regard to the content of Leninism, Mr. Zinner continued, the basic 
and essential concept offered by the theory of imperialism is that of conflict. 
Lenin postulated imperialism as a historic era characterized by conflict at three 
levels. First, between the proletariat and capitalist classes in the advanced in-
dustrial states; second, among the capitalist states in their rivalry for markets; 
and third, between the colonial peoples and their capitalist exploiters. Thus 
Lenin saw the existence of international and interclass struggle. Lenin’s theory 
of imperialism was therefore not only relevant for rationalizing the necessity 
for a proletarian revolution in Russia but as a guide for exploiting tensions 
and conflicts created by imperialism, once the Soviet Union came into being.
The chairman noted that Lenin held that imperialism is the last stage of 
capitalism, yet offered no inherent reason for the absence of further stages. Mr. 
Zinner agreed that Lenin’s interests as a revolutionary politician often inter-
fered with building a consistent theory. Lenin could not see how capitalism 
could develop further after the imperialist stage nor did he desire that it do so 
since that would have postponed his own political ambitions.
With regard to an observation made by the chairman concerning the ref-
utation of Lenin’s theory of imperialism, Mr. Zinner expressed the view that 
the theory has also been refuted by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a 
proletarian state and its subsequent dominance over other nations. He felt 
that these developments have introduced new elements into the subject of 
Marxian interpretation of imperialism.
Professor Holborn questioned this conclusion. He referred to Malenkov’s 
speech before the last Party Congress in which Malenkov stated that this dis-
appearance of large areas of the world from the capitalistic orbit would make 
capitalism’s economic contradictions even more acute. Mr. Zinner remem-
bered that both Malenkov and Stalin had reiterated their faith in Marxism on 
that occasion but at no time has the USSR taken for granted that intracapital-
istic wars make a capitalistic war against Russia an improbability. Mr. Niemey-
er thought that Stalin had made it clear that he regarded an intracapitalistic 
war as probable within the foreseeable future.
Professor Strausz- Hupé noted that a refutation of Lenin’s theory of impe-
rialism lay in statistical studies of the imperialistic process. For example, the 
flow of capital to underdeveloped countries actually moves much slower than 
Lenin thought and earns a return much less than Lenin indicated. A French 
study shows, as a case in point, that the rate of return on French colonial 
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investments averages 1.2 percent while the rate of return on domestic invest-
ments averages much higher. Professor Strausz- Hupé said that statistical anal-
ysis of that type are the best means of indicating the validity or non- validity 
of Leninistic concepts.
Marxist Theory: Gospel or Tactical Weapon?
Professor Wolfers doubted whether Leninism is considered “the gospel truth” 
even in the Kremlin. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the Soviet 
leaders really believe that the policies of the Axis powers represented an out-
burst of capitalism in those countries. Although Stalin might say that the 
coming years will witness a renewal of intracapitalistic wars, one can write the 
pronouncement off as a calculated move to weaken the Western coalition. 
How better could he have attempted to sow suspicion than to predict such a 
war? Many Soviet statements appear to be no more than conscious attempts 
to manipulate attitudes and behavior in foreign nations, especially in uncom-
mitted nations like India.
Professor Strausz- Hupé suggested that the US sometimes gives the USSR 
aid and comfort by lending a little substance to communist propaganda. This 
country’s foreign assistance policies, in certain instances, lent credence to the 
Soviet doctrine of economic saturation in capitalist states. With regard to 
whether or not the Soviet leaders believe Marxist theory, Professor Strausz- 
Hupé felt that the Nazi experience was fairly conclusive on that point. The 
records show that Hitler really believed his fantastic ideology. In fact, one 
might say there is a tendency for dictatorships to become victims of their own 
propaganda.
Mr. Lipsky thought a distinction could be made between fanatics such 
as Hitler who sincerely believed in Nazism and cold- blooded leaders such as 
Goebbels, who manipulated the ideology without taking it very seriously in 
terms of personal belief. Several group members felt that Goebbels was a poor 
example of the latter type of leader.
Mr. Thompson pointed out that a number of specialists on Russian affairs 
have addressed themselves to the significance of successive purges which have 
largely eliminated the old Bolsheviks and the more cosmopolitan diplomats 
from the Soviet diplomatic corps. These representatives possessed broader back-
grounds, traveled more widely, and could “speak the same language” as their 
Western counterparts. The influx of Soviet- trained diplomats, such as Gro-
myko, is reflected in behavior which adheres more rigidly to Marxist dogma.
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Professor Rabi made the point that even if a theory is known to be wrong 
or imperfect it is used and improvised upon until a better theory can be elab-
orated. The tendency is not to discard it but to patch it up and correct it on 
the basis of empirical observation and to continue to regard it as a theory. 
Thus the classical theory of physics was known to be wrong for a considerable 
period of time, yet it continued to be used and taught until a basic advance was 
made. Therefore, Professor Rabi observed, the Soviet leaders probably believe 
Marxist theory but only as they use it, not as it is laid out in their writings.
Mr. Thompson felt it would be erroneous to consider Soviet foreign policy 
as relying entirely on theory. There has always been a dichotomy in Sovi-
et policy as between its Russian and its Marxist aspects— reliance on theory 
alone would tend to lead the Soviet down blind alleys. The USSR’s current 
overtures to France have little theoretical justification, especially when one 
remembers the Marxian stricture that the future of the world revolution lies 
in the colonial areas, yet such overtures are quite intelligible when viewed in 
terms of traditional Russian national policies.
Mr. McClellan said he was finding it difficult to follow the trend of the 
discussion. Returning to the phenomenon of imperialism, he thought those 
present would agree that the phenomenon is expressive of a will to power as 
Lenin and his followers had argued. It is noteworthy, however, that with the 
coming of age of the USSR, the Soviet leaders have not turned their own 
ideological discipline upon themselves in terms of a theory of revolution but 
not in terms of a theory of imperialism. Mr. McClellan stated that he was 
thinking especially of Soviet relations with other communist countries and 
in terms of the Tito problem and the problem of relations with China. The 
USSR is now coming up against relationships for which their theory can fur-
nish little guidance. Mr. Lipsky noted that the Marxist held their theory to be 
complete. This might be an indication that it was incomplete.
Miss Fosdick expressed the opinion that US foreign policy is more lack-
ing in the understanding of realities than Marxist. Marxian orientation 
stresses active support of insurgent forces in foreign countries. This tends to 
give the USSR the advantage in competing with the US for popular support 
abroad. This country, on the other hand, seems to place emphasis on struc-
ture and form.
Professor Wolfers felt it would be useful for the group to leave aside the 
theory of surplus value in discussing Marxist theory of imperialism and exam-
ine more fully why the USSR has been able to use the theory so effectively 
within the context of current social forces and dynamics.
Mr. Niemeyer thought that the essence of the theory is the concept of 
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conflict. However, the theory tends to encourage or produce the very conflicts 
it postulates, hence the theory tends to become self- confirming.
Professor Strausz- Hupé held that the Soviet leaders “play it by ear” rather 
than relying on theory in making decision. Miss Fosdick thought that the US 
also seems to operate on the basis of theoretical assumptions which tend to 
block off large areas of reality.
Historical Causes of Leninist Theory
Mr. Roberts expressed the opinion that one of the reasons why a theory of 
imperialism was developed was to explain why a series of events took place in 
the period after 1870. Hence one criterion for a theory might be its usefulness 
in explaining history. In that sense, Leninism seems to be more relevant than 
a theory which ascribes imperialism to atavistic tendencies in the human psy-
che. In determining whether or not a theory has usefulness in explaining his-
tory, one must also determine whether the phenomenon is a suitable object for 
theorizing or whether it is too particular for that purpose. In general, Lenin’s 
theory seems to offer a sounder explanation for why the phenomenon began 
at that time rather than before or after 1870.
Mr. Lipsky thought that the era of imperialism with which Lenin was con-
cerned antedated 1870. Mr. Roberts thought that it was generally acknowl-
edged that the sudden and rapid rise in extra- European expansion began 
around 1870. Mr. Lipsky felt that nineteenth- century imperialism was but an-
other assertion of a perennial phenomenon in human behavior. In response to 
a question by Mr. Roberts as to the cause of imperialism, Mr. Lipsky held it to 
be the tendency of men to foist their values upon other men. In answer to Mr. 
Roberts query as to why nineteenth- century imperialism began around 1870, 
Mr. Lipsky thought that the Leninist theory of surplus capital accumulation 
appeared to have validity in explaining that point.
Mr. Zinner felt that Leninist theory was a poor explanation for Ger-
man imperialism. Professor Holborn thought that much could be said for the 
Marxist theory of history but little for its theory of imperialism. In general, 
he found the word “imperialism” too ambiguous and too subjective to be 
of any value as a descriptive term. The chairman suggested that if Profes-
sor Holborn refused to use the term he would have to find another equally 
suitable for describing, say the British conquest of South Africa. The point 
is, the chairman thought, whether such conquests are motivated by those 
interests which Lenin postulated.
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Professor Strausz- Hupé observed that the expansionist plans of some states 
have largely been reactions to expansionism of others.
Professor Holborn felt that it could be said, in general, that human be-
ings have the capacity for great lust for power and enrichment. The rise of 
nineteenth- century capitalism gave certain groups an obvious opportunity to 
express such desires. The chairman wondered whether that was an adequate 
explanation for the desire for colonial acquisitions at that particular time.
Mr. Zinner thought that differing motivations impel different nations. 
The reverse is also true: namely, that the same nation is motivated by dif-
ferent interests during various periods. One motivation is that of preclusive 
occupation— to deny the territory in question to other powers. Prestige mo-
tivations are also of great importance. Professor Strausz- Hupé suggested that 
much of British colonial expansion was prompted by the desire to acquire 
naval and other bases.
Professor Holborn, citing the example of German colonialism, noted that 
no more than two- thirds of one percent of Germany’s balance of trade had 
been with her colonial possessions. On the other hand, the bulk of German 
trade had been conducted with the US and Great Britain. Moreover, German 
plans for the Near East, as embodied in the Berlin- Baghdad railroad project, 
were largely political in motivation. Actually, German financial interests had 
wanted to share the burden of financing the railroad with foreign bankers but 
had been prevented from doing so by the government. Hence the German 
imperialist experience was completely at variance with the Leninist model.
Mr. Thompson wondered whether there might not be more plausible theo-
ries than the Marxian for explaining imperialism. He thought that a politically 
oriented theory might be relevant. By 1870 any further territorial changes in 
Europe could only have been carried out with great difficulty and only at the 
risk of a general war. The focus of European rivalries had therefore gradually 
shifted to the “empty spaces” of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where 
expansion could proceed without as great a risk of general war. Overseas ex-
pansion therefore worked as a kind of safety valve but did not fundamentally 
alter the balance of power which had been created in Europe.
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered whether such a theory sufficiently em-
phasized conflicts which developed out of colonial rivalries, as illustrated by 
the Fashoda Crisis. Such conflicts are, he thought, the essence of imperialism. 
Professor Holborn believed, on the other hand, that the importance of those 
conflicts has been exaggerated. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck indicated 
to the French that Germany would support French ambitions in Tunisia. 
France’s subsequent advance touched off a race for territories in Africa. While 
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there is no doubt that rivalry for colonies tended to increase tension among 
the European powers and that colonial disputes served as testing grounds for 
European foreign policies, there is little evidence to support the claim that the 
First World War resulted from imperialist rivalries.
Mr. Diebold suggested that the Leninist theory of imperialism could be 
criticized on the theoretical as well as the historical level. Lenin’s theory was, 
presumably, based on economic “necessity,” yet intracapitalist conflict does 
not appear to be inevitable even under his assumptions. There seems to be no 
reason why the capitalist ruling groups of imperialist countries cannot come 
to an agreement to parcel out the markets of the world for joint exploitation. 
Mr. Zinner agreed. He ventured that Lenin would not have admitted the pos-
sibility of a resolution of imperialist rivalry through international cartels. Such 
an admission would have cut the roots from under the “inevitable” proletarian 
revolution, and Lenin was loath to concede that this revolution was anything 
but imminent.
Professor Strausz- Hupé observed that Leninism ignored the infinity of caus-
es which propel any massive historical phenomenon. He expressed the opinion 
that the English novel of that period furnishes excellent evidence of the causes 
for British empire building. Some Englishmen left home to escape their wives, 
others were searching for adventure in such pursuits as lion hunting.
Professor Wolfers expressed some skepticism as to the lions. He felt that 
imperialism usually occurs at periods of history in which ruling groups see great 
opportunities for personal enrichment and advancement through colonial ex-
pansion. Once the process begins other factors tend to enter the picture— 
such as security, prestige, and so on. But the original impetus, he believed, is 
economic and has been so from the time the nomads left the mountains and 
descended into fertile valleys. Professor Strausz- Hupé held that Genghis Khan 
did not create his empire for personal enrichment or for the enrichment of his 
people. Conquered towns were destroyed, not looted. Mr. Zinner suggested 
that Genghis Khan somewhat predated the period of imperialism about which 
Lenin had theorized.
Toward a Definition of Imperialism
The question as to the precise meaning of the term imperialism was raised. 
Professor Holborn felt it has a special, distinctive meaning: namely, the Marx-
ian description for a specific phase in the development of capitalism. The term 
makes certain assumptions and predicts certain consequences. Historically, 
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the term outdated Lenin and had quite a different meaning in the context of 
the French Second Empire.
The chairman wondered whether the term could not be further defined 
as the theory which Lenin developed to explain why Marx’s theory had not 
been borne out.
Mr. Thompson thought that the principal weakness of Leninist theory was 
equally applicable to most theories of imperialism save, perhaps, the so- called 
“diplomatic” theory. Most theories ascribe a certain moral opprobrium to im-
perialism, be it the national character of the offending nation or its social 
or economic structure. It would appear to be more plausible, he thought, to 
analyze it on the basis of historical facts. The Truman Doctrine furnishes an 
example. In that instance the US was attempting to prevent Soviet expansion 
into vital areas. Such expansionist aims, if successful, would have caused a 
fundamental alteration in the balance of power as a result of basic territorial 
changes. The USSR thus can be termed imperialist when it follows policies 
having those characteristics.
Professor Holborn disagreed with that interpretation on the ground that 
it is broad enough to designate the US as imperialist. He asserted that the 
term only has meaning if one accepts the Marxian interpretation of capitalist 
exploitation.
Mr. Thompson felt that it is fairly clear that groups or nations tend to 
rationalize their own interests as promoting more general values. Professor 
Holborn agreed. Marx had shown mankind the sin that resulted when class 
interests and social philosophies were confused. Perhaps Marx had made men 
better Christians as a result.
US “Imperialism”
In response to a question as to why American foreign policy might not, at 
times, assume imperialist characteristics, Professor Holborn said that US for-
eign policy is basically oriented toward protecting American security. Imperi-
alism at least implies an aggressive policy of domination.
Mr. Thompson felt, on the other hand, that in opposing the USSR, the US 
runs the risk of adopting imperialist methods and objectives. In attempting to 
stop communism there is a tendency for this country to become authoritarian 
in its relationships with others. Professor Holborn disagreed. He thought one 
might lose all faith in US foreign policy if such conclusions appeared to be val-
id. He felt convinced that US policy is devoted to protecting those interests 
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necessary for the nation to survive. It could be acknowledged, indeed, that this 
country lies under a grave temptation to sacrifice the interests of its allies in its 
own behalf; one must always try to avoid running roughshod over one’s allies 
in providing for the nation’s security. Yet he could scarcely believe that the US 
was not continually seeking to harmonize its own interests with those of the 
free world especially those of Europe and the Commonwealth.
Mr. Thompson recalled that the writers of the Federalist had understood 
the threat of imperialism, in the sense that groups or institutions tend to ag-
grandize themselves at the expense of others, and had created the system of 
checks and balances to neutralize that tendency. Professor Holborn agreed 
that power is always a great temptation to a group or nation but he saw little 
value in attaching to it a label borrowed from a discredited philosophy.
Professor Wolfers felt that this country could not be characterized as impe-
rialist since it does not seek to dominate other countries. Mr. Lipsky thought 
that the US might and probably should seek to dominate a country, such as 
Guatemala, if that country fell under communist rule. If domination occurred, 
he saw no reason why this country’s relationship with Guatemala should not 
be characterized as imperialist. Professor Wolfers thought the US and the UK 
seek to carry out their policies short of domination. Mr. Lipsky felt that if a sit-
uation necessitated imperialist methods in order to protect American survival, 
this country would use them. He cited the possibility of American military 
intervention in Italy in 1948, had that country elected a communist majority.
Mr. Armstrong suggested that there might be a difference between domi-
nation and control. This country might dominate another country in the sense 
that it would deny them the choice of establishing a communist government but 
the US would not seek to control a country in the sense of deliberate exploita-
tion. Mr. Lipsky agreed. He thought there were a variety of situations which the 
US would not allow to deteriorate beyond a certain point. Beyond that point 
the US would probably intervene in the interest of its own survival and would 
be forced to use techniques which could aptly be described as imperialist.
Mr. Lichenstein questioned the theoretic value of so broadening the 
meaning of a term as to cover an infinite variety of relationships. He preferred 
Professor Wolfers’ definition of imperialism: namely, domination for the pur-
pose of exploitation.
Mr. Thompson observed that if imperialism is defined as an alteration of 
the status quo, then direct action in countries like Italy or Guatemala could be 
termed imperialist providing such action involved a change in the previously 
existing distribution of power. Miss Fosdick questioned whether US interven-
tion for the purpose of liberating a nation which had succumbed to commu-
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nism could be termed imperialist. Mr. Thompson felt that the employment of 
US troops for such purposes would tend to alter the distribution of power and 
hence could be termed imperialist.
Mr. Zinner said he was appalled at the ease with which the group had 
drifted into a discussion of US- Soviet relations. As for the meaning of im-
perialism, he thought that Lenin described it explicitly enough: namely, the 
monopoly phase of capitalism with its attendant assumptions and predictions. 
With regard to Leninist theory, he felt that the central notion of class and in-
ternational conflict was most useful for purposes of analyzing the international 
relations process.
Professor Holborn noted that one aspect of Leninist theory which had not 
received much attention was Marx’s and Lenin’s challenge to the idea that the 
area of international affairs is that part of the field of political science which 
is concerned with relations among nation- states. Marxism assumed a decisive 
underlying reality of an international community in terms of economic class-
es. This concept raises important considerations of the study of internation-
al affairs. For example, if no one assumes a static nation- state system, then 
international treaties would not be broken. But one has only to recall the 
meaningless reciprocal pledges embodied in the interwar Franco- Soviet pact 
to understand that treaties which do not reflect dominant class interests of 
the contracting nations are worthless. US foreign policy in particular is only 
intelligible in terms of group, class and institutional interests. In general, the 
Marxist stress upon class influence is a decided contribution to the theory of 
international relations.
The chairman asked what further conclusions Marxist theory might have 
for international politics. He suggested that one such conclusion involves 
Marxism’s confident anticipation that capitalism is inherently contradictory 
and that the capitalist world is doomed to conflict and destruction. If the 
capitalist countries can maintain themselves and cooperate with one another 
over a respectable period of time, it would inflict a damaging blow to Soviet 
ideology.
Mr. Zinner believed that in examining the matrix which holds the West-
ern community together, an effective refutation of Marxism might emerge. 
Mr. Thompson felt that such a refutation would include recognition that there 
is some political wisdom to the Western tradition. Such qualities as moder-
ation, prudence, and accommodation are essential aspects of coalition and 
consensus.
Mr. McClellan recalled Mr. Truman’s final message to Congress in which 
the former president argued that Marxism was a pre- atomic philosophy. That 
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viewpoint seems to be influencing even Soviet policy at the moment. The 
chairman agreed that the atomic age tends to make Marxism obsolete. Marx-
ism and Leninism assumed that wars are inevitable because of the inherent 
make- up of capitalism, but the destructive power of atomic weapons has 
placed a premium on avoidance of a general war. Mr. Zinner thought that 
Malenkov’s recent speech on the topic seemed to indicate a growing aware-
ness of the possibility of mutual destruction.
John D. Blumgart
Rapporteur
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Fifth Meeting: Political Geography  
vs. Geopolitics, April 8, 1954
The fifth meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Relations 
was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, April 8, 1954, at 5:30 
p.m. The subject was political geography vs. geopolitics. Present were: 
Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy 
Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur, John P. Armstrong; William 
Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Charles Lichenstein; 
Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Isidor I. Rabi; 
Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz- Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Arnold 
Wolfers; Paul Zinner.
*****
Working Paper No. 5
Prepared by George A. Lipsky
Introduction
The considerations of main importance in dealing with the contrasts between 
political geography and geopolitics are considerations of methodology. The 
major issues of methodology in any discipline or in any analysis may be drawn 
out as questions of epistemology. That is to say, the data of any investigation 
will be defined and will be employed according to the investigator’s view of 
what one knows or can know concerning the nature of reality. Therefore, it 
seems suitable to preface this discussion of geopolitics with a brief statement of 
the author’s view of these epistemological matters. This view has been part of 
the underlying argument of previous working papers and is especially relevant 
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to the discussion of the nature of a theory of international relations planned 
for the final meeting.
A major premise of this position is that all metaphysical assertions in-
volving an assumption that thinking can be identical with being are beyond 
science and, therefore, are not subject to scientific evaluation except as the 
assertions are themselves data. A metaphysical position is certainly a repre-
sentation of a particular type of epistemology.1 But it may be contended that a 
position that holds epistemology to be the core philosophical area from which 
one should begin will incline to eschew metaphysics and refer to apparent 
relationships rather than the so- called substance of things.
It may reasonably be asserted with Bertrand Russell that philosophy “in . . . 
[the] historically usual sense, has resulted from the attempt to produce a syn-
thesis of science and religion, or, perhaps more exactly, to combine a doctrine 
as to the nature of the universe and man’s place in it with a practical ethic 
inculcating what was considered the best way of life.”2 Put more strongly, and 
yet I think fairly, most philosophers have been at pains to enshrine their value 
preferences as absolutes in a structure of thought expressed with culture and 
logic, complex and complete enough to confuse or entreat their audience, es-
pecially those whose similar value preferences require support. An essentially 
nominalist position, on the other hand, demands a strict separation between 
knowledge and virtue (a quality attributed to situations, and persons as parts 
of them, deemed good). It has been mainly the success of some modern philos-
ophy to achieve this separation, although the emphasis is under severe assault 
in this century from quarters that no doubt wish to maintain the conventional 
philosophical support of authority.
More and more, however, it becomes difficult to establish a single ortho-
doxy giving security even for a limited period. The most that a universalist, 
intuitive, or dialectical position can do is produce, in a world that will be 
growingly secular and therefore questioning, an orthodoxy among warring or-
thodoxies. To proceed from a principle established a priori by authority is today 
to choose the road to conflict. Besides being scientifically and philosophically 
correct, the nominalist approach is, I submit, the only one that can in the long 
run reduce national and international tensions and make change possible in 
the context of peace.
The position taken in these pages bespeaks a fundamental humility, im-
plying toleration of varieties of points of view. The question is customarily 
asked whether, in the interest of consistence and attachment to principle, this 
toleration has to be total or complete, whether the nominalist has to accept 
any and/or all results of the contest of ideas in the marketplace or the opera-
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tion of political institutions working in terms of majority rule. The answer is 
clear that, before the contests are over in the marketplace or in politics, the 
nominalist, if he values the intellectual freedom that should be his most im-
portant means, and almost certainly his highest value, must struggle with great 
vigor and energy against his opponents. After the results are in in the political 
and social contest, there are no compelling logical, philosophical, or practical 
reasons why the nominalist’s toleration should be extended to give aid and 
comfort to those proceeding from non- nominalist positions. The victory of au-
thoritarians, whether universalist, intuitive, or dialectical, must be the signal 
in this last extremity for civil war, national or international. Otherwise those 
whose philosophical premises reject the conception of an authority in nature, 
having its spokesmen among men, prescribing virtue and the proper way of 
life, must accept this authority for a dreadfully long time, particularly in this 
century wherein technology has made the barricades almost obsolete. In the 
final assessment, then, toleration need be extended by the nominalist only 
to those multitudes of conceptions of the nature of reality and value that are 
compatible with his position. A nominalist may with consistency choose not 
to fight, but if he values the intellectual processes he asserts, modern condi-
tions make struggle against the abridgement of those processes a real, if not an 
absolute, imperative. And the interval between the formal and the real victory 
of the authoritarians may be so short that the action of their opponents must 
be decisive and quick. That our contemporary experience does not give much 
cause for hope that such action will be decisive and quick is part of our present 
tragedy.
The position asserted in the paragraph immediately above calls for the 
running of real risks and dangers, but this fact cannot be an effective appeal to 
inaction, for every human action or decision involves risks and dangers. The 
nominalist may find through experience that he moved against the authori-
tarians before a clear and present danger had appeared. He can only hope that 
time will educate him to be more sensitive to his needs. The call to national 
or international civil war may temporarily enthrone naked power as the ex-
clusive arbiter of human affairs, and power historically inclines toward an ex-
clusive intolerance even on the part of those who wield it in a supposed good 
cause. The attempt must be made to see that institutions are preserved that 
prevent power from becoming its own reason for being. Nominalists should 
not be constrained to inaction for these reasons; partial success is all that can 
attend the affairs of men; sin is always with us.
It may be asked what in the nominalist position is so compelling as to war-
rant the counseling of such a vigorous defense, a defense some will call contra-
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dictory. To the last charge some answer has been given above. Briefly, until a 
nominalist can be shown an authority in nature, upon whom all can agree, by 
whose fiat an end or value or situation can be known to be unqualifiedly good, 
he must reject the conception of an obvious or self- evident identity between 
thinking and being (external nature). In this view, all statements of ends are 
attempts to freeze a status quo, a situation, on the time continuum. This is an 
impossible task at best, and there is no scientific basis for asserting the good-
ness of such an illusion. At most, every situation is a means or an inadequately 
described complex of events on the time continuum, about which science may 
only venture a description of causal nexus.
In this light, single or multiple causes, long- range explanations, or predic-
tions of what will occur are highly questionable ventures, especially in history 
and the social sciences. To the extent that long- range predictions are under-
taken in these areas, they tend to admit value preferences under the guise 
of science.3 What man predicts in history, beyond his scientific capacity to 
know, is what he wishes to happen. And like the orthodox philosopher he 
is palming off his conception of goodness and virtue under false and pseudo- 
respectable colors. The twentieth century especially tends to be victimized 
by such attempts. Admittedly attempts at distinguishing between long- range 
and short- range predictions cannot be sure and certain. Prediction of a sort 
is necessary and inevitable. Pure description serves no adequate purpose if it 
is unaccompanied by some attempt to forecast at least possibilities. A sound 
methodology can propose to do no more than provide a dynamic guide to 
assist the analyst in distinguishing between the suggestion of possibilities and 
the prophecy of the course of history.
As we have previously suggested, a theory (or explanation) must be a com-
bination of description (classification) rather clearly representing or reflecting 
the observable, physical world and description [word missing] assumption. 
Every theory is incomplete, since it has interstices correlative in scope with 
ignorance. Within the interstices values function and assist in suggesting hy-
potheses (theories in their most incomplete condition) and in guiding the 
selection of data by which hypotheses appear to be transformed into theses. 
There is no process by which the cognitive subject can be made certain that 
its classifications unquestionably represent real classifications in the cognitive 
object. For this reason, as well as because the history of culture and science 
indicates analogically that all theories are incomplete, total theories, presum-
ing to forecast the course of history, are presumptuous and usually the products 
of fanatics and those who are not disposed to inspect closely their own first 
principles and the possible contradictions among them.
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Not the least important step is to insist upon the precision of definition 
and classification in accordance with the soundest observation of phenomena. 
Few would deny that mankind lives in an age of transition or hurried change. 
Theorists and philosophers, as part of this process of acceleration, seek simple 
explanations of or causes for change. In most cases their intellectual product 
becomes a part of the process and we have at least the illusion of ideas func-
tioning independently and without predetermination to alter and condition 
history. It is not necessarily a conservative position to suggest that men should 
meet the need for social change (demanded by their accumulated preferences) 
without recourse to the ex cathedra pronouncements of those who find it easy 
to see an authority in the empyrean or in history to support their wishes and 
desires. By trial- and- error adjustment it may be possible to preserve a modi-
cum of social consensus, the context of a people’s political education. And 
we may thus not become victimized by those who presume to know more 
than they can know about what is good for and virtuous in their fellow men. 
Theories of class conflict, parochial theories of imperialism, and theories of 
geographical determinism, the writer submits, are part of the revolutionary 
pressure and acceleration whereby men seek to rationalize their demands for 
change.4 The task is one of worsting the fanatics, many of them perhaps given 
their opportunity by a democratic environment that has cultivated the idea of 
popular wisdom and that by its basic tenets cannot insist that generalizations 
be submitted to a sound process of scientific verification.
Intellectual activity would be arid indeed if men were not encouraged 
to attempt broad adventuresome generalizations suggesting historical cycles, 
movements, pulsations, trends, parallels. To the degree, however, that we 
know that these generalizations are difficult to verify, it is important to avoid 
acting upon them as if they were unquestionably true. It is possible that, true 
or not as they are used to suggest the past, they may move men to action that 
is successful in fulfilling their ambitions. I believe, however, that democracy 
is more certain to be preserved by sounder, even though less ambitious, eval-
uations of reality.
Definitions and Classifications
Applying these views to the subject of this paper, I should say that political 
geography represents sound description and allowable short- range prophecy 
while geopolitics— in its usage and associations— represents scientifically un-
warranted, grandiose historical generalizations and long- range prophecy, em-
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bodying, in the main, the wish fulfillments of either fanatics, or those who 
accept the fiat of an external authority speaking through a church or a polit-
ical regime, or an external authority implicit in a historic automatism (e.g., a 
concept of economic man based upon a Philistine rationalism).
A reading of the literature reveals an unfortunate confusion in the use of 
the two terms. In this paper “political geography” is used strictly to refer to the 
genuine descriptive science, which avoids gigantic generalizations embodying 
long- range prophecies cloaking a kind of religious aspiration. “Geopolitics” on 
the other hand, is used to designate the pseudo- science of geography applied 
in the single- cause explanation of human affairs. Some writers make this dis-
tinction with great care.5 Others use the term “geopolitics” as a more conve-
nient term than political geography and keep within proper methodological 
bounds for the most part.6 Still others make use of the term “geopolitical” 
in preference to “political geographical” and yet rather carefully eschew the 
excesses of the former and speak of its misuse by some theorists.7 At the same 
time they may, as in the case of Hans W. Weigert, counsel a geopolitics that is 
freed from abuse and yet not a political geography.8 Finally, some do not face 
the problem at all.9
Weigert’s assertions do not appear orderly and some seem, in fact, eccen-
tric. In the final evaluation it is not possible to be certain concerning his 
views, probably because he is not systematic in his analysis (in the philosoph-
ical sense). The title of his work discussed here is Generals and Geographers: 
The Twilight of Geopolitics. It is not clear from the text whether he is suggesting 
a fact by the title or indicating a wish that geopolitics should go into eclipse. 
He deplores the fact that we, particularly in the West, are overlooking “the 
bearing of space- configurations on history and politics.” This language is am-
biguous; it might be that either of a political geographer or a geopolitician. He 
refers to Sir Halford Mackinder as a political geographer, although the correct 
classification of his work is not so certain.10 Weigert’s stand on this latter point 
reveals that he is enlarging the area of what is properly called “geopolitics.” He 
seems to bestow even an accolade upon the German variety when he points 
out that Germany under Hitler did not enjoy the exclusive advantage of a 
well- ordered and developed geopolitics and quotes Haushofer approvingly in 
placing English and American geopolitics ahead of continental geopolitics.11
His confusion is worse confounded in the following extract:
If we compare “political geography” and “geopolitics,” it becomes obvious 
that political geography is a child of geography, while geopolitics belongs to 
the realm of political science. The geographer who ponders over the space- 
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relationships of states becomes a political geographer; the political scientist— 
and, we might add, the statesman— who learns to use geographical factors for a 
better understanding of politics, becomes a geopolitician. Theoretically, polit-
ical geographer and geopolitician should meet. The fact is that they do not.12
First, it is difficult if not impossible to see the distinction between evaluat-
ing the space relationships of states and considering the relationship between 
geographical factors and politics. Second, it is impossible to see why the po-
litical scientist and the statesman should be placed in the same category as 
having the same purpose in considering geographical factors. The suspicion 
that the political scientist is indirectly being charged with using his data to ac-
complish political purposes is confirmed by later contentions of Weigert that 
geopolitics is concerned with “conflict and change, evolution and revolution, 
attack and defense,” that geopolitics “aims to furnish the weapons for political 
action,”13 and that geopolitics “by linking all historical development with the 
conditions of space and soil, and by regarding history itself as determined by 
these external forces, . . . attempts to predict the future.”14 Is Weigert condemn-
ing geopolitics for its attempts at prognosis, and, in so doing, is he condemning 
political science for its involvement with this rather “juvenile” science?15 His 
view of the purposes and methodology of geopolitics is probably unexception-
able; his reaction to the propriety of this methodology is ambiguous at best and 
in error at worst. The devoting of these paragraphs to Weigert is warranted 
because a reading of the literature of the field reveals great paucity of system 
and inadequacy of method, both among those who would describe the fields 
and those who would be practitioners therein. If more system and sounder 
methods had been employed, the excesses of geopolitics would probably not 
be so widespread, but, on the other hand, this particular type of philosopher 
would not have had such an opportunity to purvey his wares (values). That 
would be an advantage difficult to give up. Weigert is typical of the inadequate 
expositors of these fields.
The stringency of the criticisms here requires an attempt to set out sound-
er definitions. Political geography is that descriptive and largely observational 
science that proposes to see the state and other political orders in relation 
to geographical factors as they are classified in terms of an informing theory 
combining as always both a high degree of certainty of knowledge and areas of 
ignorance (primary spheres of values). The designation of political geography 
will make description his starting point. He will establish criteria, some con-
ventional and others personal, through the use of which natural geographic 
regions, both real and hypothetical, may be determined. He will recognize, 
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however, that his own values will be instrumental in bringing him to a defini-
tion of such regions. Since he is particularly interested in the relationship of 
states to geographical environment, he will be influenced to delineate regions 
in terms of the purposes and needs of states. For example, in terms of some 
imaginable purposes a region might be declared to be a mountain range com-
bined with its slopes to their outer limits. For the purposes of the state, how-
ever, this kind of region might not make for survival (defense, unity), either 
physical or cultural. The political geographer will be particularly conscious of 
the functioning of the “ought” in his theory, and he will be safeguarded against 
allowing it so to dominate description that the “is” becomes inextricably con-
fused with it. These two areas of theory, ends (“ought” or values) and means 
(“is) will be inevitably related, but they must not be confused. Their nature 
and relationship will be essentially a matter of statement, but systematic state-
ment and careful handling will safeguard the political geographer against es-
tablishing his ends as the appropriate ends for all men without question. So 
safeguarded, he may remain a scientist and avoid becoming a medicine man.
Not only will the political geographer be most careful to observe the func-
tioning of informing theory in his classification of states, he will also employ 
historical analogy, biological analogies, and cyclical conceptions in a gingerly 
fashion. An Arthur Koestler, influenced by geopolitical conceptions and look-
ing for the locus of world anticommunist leadership, may visit the United 
States to try to discover whether we are a young or old nation, therefore 
whether we are capable of vigorous or only decadent leadership. If he wishes 
hard enough and does not face up to his great methodological problems, he 
may easily discover that the United States is young and, therefore, the hope 
of the future. A political geographer, on the other hand, might conclude that 
it is worthwhile to use such analogies as guides to analysis, but with great 
care. The United States might then be viewed as vigorous (young- like) in 
some spheres, enervated (old- like) in others, reviving (no direct biological 
analogy, if we omit the use of monkey glands) in still others. In this view, the 
ecumene* of the United States is not an internal, pulsating organ, the size of 
which contributes only to strength and not to weakness. To the political geog-
rapher, the ecumene will be simply the basic inhabited and exploited area in 
the United States in terms of population size and skills (manufacturing power 
and strength of market) and complexity of communication facilities. Avoiding 
biological analogy, there will be less tendency in the political geographer to ar-
*The primary exploited and inhabited region of a country; a complex based on resources and 
communication.
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rive at oversimple conclusions, such as, for example, confusing size of ecumene 
with strength or survival value. Looking for complex answers or hypotheses as 
well as simple ones, he may more easily tally the elements of weakness as well 
as those of strength.
Similarly, the political geographer will be most chary of seeing the state’s 
frontier as a kind of peripheral organ (analogous to the human skin), if the 
tortuous employment of such an analogy is largely the rationalization of some 
philosophy (religion) of expansion. These cautions are safeguards against asser-
tions of mystical or occult attractions or repulsions implied within statements 
perhaps superficially descriptive of geographical phenomena. Such statements as 
that the Rhine is part of the natural peripheral organ of France without which 
France is crippled would be viewed with great care and skepticism.
Geopolitics, as it is viewed in these pages, may be compared to Marxism. 
They both look for single causes, in the one case, the geographical factor (as-
serting a determinism in, for example, the possession of the “heartland”), in 
the other the economic factor (asserting a determinism in, for example, the 
working out of the class struggle). They both suggest a teleology, if not of a 
controlling deity, at least of nature itself, with goals (millennia) promised by 
that nature which, although they may not be eternal (even in the Marxist 
view), cannot have dimension put upon them.16 Conceptions range from one 
hundred to one thousand or even five thousand years.17 The geopolitical or 
Marxian theorist, attuned to this unfolding purpose because he sees clearly 
the operation of the single cause, may predict for today, tomorrow, and for 
the long- range future. Since he asserts more than he can know, he is project-
ing his values and forcing them upon history. They become the major part of 
his prophecy. History may seemingly or actually appear to bear him out, but 
the largest possibility is that history’s underwriting of the theory is fortuitous, 
even though the ideas themselves may have contributed to the result which 
appears. The primary consideration here is that the theorist has asserted more 
than he can know. The coincidence that may appear between his creed and 
practice has sources far more complex than any explanation his theory may 
present. There is a religious drive, if not a religiosity, underlying both types 
of theory. It comprehends a willingness or drive to know the nature of reality 
without preserving the corrective of establishing the limits of knowledge. The 
assurance of rectitude may be so great that men may be liquidated, or even 
nations, if they do not fit the formula or perspective of the creed.18
Both geopolitics and Marxism present theories for a time of revolution 
wherein men are particularly disposed to seek the clear way to a better fu-
ture as they define that future for themselves or their community. There is 
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a definite sense of satisfaction that can come to those who feel they have 
found the magic words, the way. It is as though they have been admitted to 
the Arcanum, after which the doors can be thrown open to permit the light 
therefrom to chase away the last remnant of shadow and doubt. Historical par-
allels become more than parallels; they become deeply suggestive. Historical 
parallels working upon and with geographical parallels become a confirmation 
of revealed mystery. The way men react historically to the obstacle of the 
African promontory being so much like the way, at least superficially, they 
reacted to the obstacle of the Hellenic promontory, a law of history may be 
derived therefrom, although it may be stated at first with diffidence. Since so 
frequently the nomads have moved in upon the sedentary sowers— moved for 
the geopoliticians by the pulsations and ebb and flow of climatic change, for 
the Marxists by the vicissitudes of economic development— on the basis of 
these particulars a law of historical evolution can be stated. The geopolitician 
will see the historic importance of a vaguely defined “heartland” as a base of 
conquest and depredation. The Marxist will see a confirmation of a thesis of 
class conflict, with rule and political power being established by the violence 
of one invading class or group exercised upon another. While many theorists, 
moved by non- nominalist patterns of thought, will be only vaguely a part 
of a revolutionary ferment, they are all potentially the “doers” or organizers 
who wish a formula of easy rationalization to justify the course they counsel. 
Even the revisionist socialists, giving sincere loyalty to democratic process, 
take a delight in doctrinairely scrambling the eggs and constantly throw off 
from their insecure fringes more “doers” who have had enough of restraint. 
And some academic but certain geopoliticians would rip apart their political 
maps and remake them, in keeping with their favorite theory and single- cause 
explanations.
I take this stand against them for methodological reasons, because my val-
ues reject the violence they portend, and because I think they cannot recreate 
soon the context of evolutionary change within which we may preserve the 
valuable test of a conditioned historical experience.
Illustration and Example
As we have proceeded in our definitions from political geography to geopoli-
tics, so we might follow that course with our illustrations and examples. Both 
Gyorgy and Strausz- Hupé in their descriptive and analytical references to 
geopolitics show that they perceive the nature of the distinction,19 although 
Revised Pages
Fifth Meeting—Political Geography vs. Geopolitics 179
Gyorgy in lumping many authorities together in the tradition of those who 
stressed the geographical factor indicates a possible confusion on the method-
ological question.20 He likewise refers to Ratzel’s “serious Anthropogeographie, 
[as] a dignified branch of political geography,” as some would not do. But his 
reference to geopolitics in Germany as “the science [sic] of a new, totalitarian, 
state, seeking eventually to achieve a geographic and political domination 
of the world” indicates insight into the problem, if we apply the rule inclusio 
unius, exclusio alterius. We are left in some confusion by such a statement as 
“It [geopolitics] is human geography adapted to modern totalitarian politics.”21 
However, in all fairness, it must be admitted that as environmentalists even 
the German geopoliticians did a great deal of constructive work and provided 
insights. I suggest that in this respect they are not geopoliticians but rather 
mainly descriptive political geographers. On this ground, Gyorgy is weak in 
asserting that we must begin in looking for geopolitical thinking among the 
Greeks by noting Aristotle’s stress on the influence of climate, soil, and to-
pography upon the Greek polis. It is difficult to count Aristotle as more than a 
political geographer on these grounds. That Aristotle is capable of historicist 
thinking is clear, as Popper points out,22 but in this connection he is not a 
historicist.
It appears to the writer that Strausz- Hupé is close to the truth in referring 
to geopolitics as a political strategy, proposing to answer the question of what 
to conquer (therefore comprehending values in a dominant position).23 It has 
not been defined as a science, he writes (and I presume he means it cannot 
be), and “it cannot be put down as political geography or political science in 
the conventional sense.”24
Isaiah Bowman shows in the use he makes of geographical knowledge that 
he can safely avoid a presumptuous theory. The burden of his point of view is 
that by “viewing our geographic position narrowly,” we may succumb to the 
influence of geography.25 We can succumb to the effects of our manipulating 
geography by such “geographical surgery” as the Panama or Suez canals.26 The 
importance of geography is stressed, as well as the central role of power, dy-
namic and changing in configuration, requiring balance to be even temporar-
ily subdued. But the realities having been recognized in order that they may 
be dealt with, there is some prospect of transferring the power clash into the 
council chambers.
Nicholas J. Spykman took a kind of cathartic and grim delight in stressing 
the omnipresence of the power political struggle. This is suggested in the line, 
“One of the charms of power politics is that it offers no opportunity to grow 
weary of one’s friends.”27 He may be compared with the geopoliticians with 
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their ostensibly non- moralistic stress upon power, although the latter create a 
new, historically relativistic morality of their own. However, Spykman wrote 
America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942) to point 
out that we can wisely manipulate our power and our geographical position to 
our own strategic advantage and to serve our survival value. Power can be put 
in relative equilibrium and some factors, generally considered geographical, 
may be changed in their meaning either by being consciously and directly 
manipulated by men or under the impact of other forces (developing tech-
nology, changes and shifts in population balances, etc.). His references to the 
geographical factors are generally restrained and cautious: “Because territory 
is an inherent part of the state, self- preservation means defending its control 
over territory.” Or, he will be content with a generalization that the power of a 
state depends upon, among other things, size of territory or the nature of fron-
tiers, or a statement that a “hegemony that has access to the sea can become a 
menace to far distant shores,” or that “A small state is a vacuum in a political 
high pressure area.”28
Frederick S. Dunn in the introduction to Spykman’s The Geography of the 
Peace, refers with great praise to Mackinder’s article “The Geographical Pivot 
of History,” published in 1904, and he expresses regret that it remained for 
the German school of geopolitics to take over the geographical approach and 
distort it “into a pseudo- scientific justification for a policy of territorial expan-
sion.”29 Spykman would almost certainly have accepted this view. It remains 
for us to consider, however, how much such praise of Mackinder may involve 
one in a geopolitical position. Professor Dunn contends that Spykman be-
lieved as a derivation from Mackinder that the “most important single fact in 
the American security situation is the question of who controls the rimlands 
of Europe and Asia.”30 The important consideration is not here that the rim-
lands emerge as equally significant as, if not more significant than, the heart-
land, but whether the same pattern of thought is employed in both Spykman 
and Mackinder. Were they political geographers, or geopoliticians, or both? 
The writer’s conclusion is that, quantitatively, Spykman does not manifest a 
geopolitical type of thinking to the same degree as Mackinder. A quantitative 
measurement, however, is not so important as a qualitative measurement in 
this case.
Spykman did not deny himself the use of the term geopolitics, although 
the definition is quite different from that employed in this paper: “It should 
be possible, then, to consider the security problems of a country in geographic 
terms in such a way that the conclusions can be of direct and immediate use 
to the statesmen whose duty it is to formulate foreign policy. Just such an 
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analysis is implied by the term geopolitics.”31 Geopolitics in this sense is not 
incompatible with political geography; there is no reason why the political ge-
ographer cannot advise the statesman concerning the best means of achieving 
security. But Spykman describes political geography as “merely a branch of the 
general science of geography describing the structure of individuals states, and 
the world in terms of its political subdivisions.”32 Geopolitics, he writes, may 
be used as a synonym for political geography. This is true, but it is the thesis 
of this paper that it should not be. Moreover, there is no methodological rea-
son why political geography should be limited to consideration of individual 
states or should emphasize political subdivisions. The political geographer is 
within proper bounds when he suggests alternative means or the means that 
should be employed to achieve security. He can and should assist in planning 
the security policy of a country, and he does not become a geopolitician when 
he does so, if he limits himself to short- range prophecy. It is when prophecies 
become long- range and all- encompassing and begin to take on the aspect of 
“a whole philosophy of history” that he becomes a geopolitician and becomes 
suspect from the standpoint of method.
Spykman notes the various approaches satisfactorily, but he should have 
attributed more significance to political geography and supported a narrower 
definition of geopolitics. His objection to geopolitics as a philosophy of his-
tory is not, so far as the writer can determine, based upon methodological 
grounds, but rather on the grounds that that philosophy contains a “doctrine 
supporting the need and desirability of territorial expansion.”33 In fact, even 
a political geographer, once his ends have been set up for him, can properly 
advise as to the best means of achieving territorial expansion, which may in 
the particular case be considered an essential of security. It is only when he 
goes beyond and insists that security and the full life of the state can only be 
realized through expansion and prophesies that such expansion will certainly 
be achieved that he exceeds proper bounds. A close inspection of his works 
does not indicate that Spykman employed a geopolitical cast of thought, even 
though he runs the risk of appearing to do so by his rather indiscriminate use 
of the term geopolitics.
Spykman was aware of the multiplicity of factors that condition the pol-
icy of a state; “they are permanent and temporary, obvious and hidden; they 
include, apart from the geographic factor, population density, the economic 
structure of the country, the ethnic composition of the people, the form of gov-
ernment, and the complexes and pet prejudices of foreign ministers.”34 This 
was no single- cause philosophy of history, with all other factors immersed in 
the geographical and given meaning through geography, the unfolding mean-
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ing of which could be foreseen for the far distant future. Spykman’s use of such 
geopolitical conceptions as “heartland” and “rimland” must be seen against 
the background of his eclectic approach. When they are so evaluated, they 
cease to be geopolitical in the sense in which that word is used in this essay.
Mackinder has been referred to in the paragraphs above. His importance 
can scarcely be overestimated, particularly since his influence has been so great 
in terms of particular items of doctrine, upon other contemporary and suc-
ceeding theorists. Determinism was not so apparent in his thinking as among 
the Germans. He represented rather a possibilism similar to that emphasized 
in some French writing. A major aspect of his thesis was that something could 
be done to forestall the movement of the historical glacier. Is Mackinder to 
be rescued from the epithet “geopolitics” because there is to be found only a 
modified determinism in his writings? Certainly he is geopolitical in his as-
sertion of the central and core importance of geographical configuration as 
controlling the pattern of history. Moreover, he cannot be completely rescued 
because he implies the existence of alternative possibilities rather than a cer-
tainly determined future. Admittedly Mackinder’s position is more ambiguous 
than that of the German school, less certainly geopolitical. No clear- cut an-
swer can be given, but, all things considered, Mackinder should be denoted 
basically a geopolitician.
Those who have followed him have assumed that he has uncovered a “cold 
and terrifying logic” in the geography of the world island, at least in this his-
torical epoch, which makes the possession of the “heartland” or core of that 
world island the terminus a quo of an inevitable march to total global pow-
er.35 No doubt Mackinder wrote with some hope that the heartland could be 
prevented from falling into the hands of a single power or a combination of 
powers able to collaborate to gain a single end. He was not optimistic, howev-
er, if we may judge by his persuasive use of historical analogies controlled by 
geography. Once the heartland becomes so dominated, he was persuaded, the 
relentless process of developing world domination would get under way. This 
is geopolitical historicism. A whole host of reasons and factors may work to 
disprove Mackinder’s Cassandra voice intoning:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World- Island;
Who rules the World- Island commands the world.36
A technological revolution may emanate from another hemisphere. Internal 
political troubles may come to the heartland powers. The rimlands, assuming 
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the soundness of such concepts, may prove stronger for many reasons than 
the heartland. The disadvantages of heartland geography may outweigh the 
advantages. In a generation it may be seen clearly that Mackinder’s views 
are as much limited by the conditions of his time as those of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan.
Mackinder writes, “Unless I wholly misread the facts of geography, I would 
go further, and say that the groupings of lands and seas, and of fertility and 
natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the 
end of a single world empire.”37 True, these factors only “lend” themselves, 
but Mackinder almost certainly means to imply that they make empire prac-
tically inevitable, even though in the next sentence he counsels taking steps 
to “counter their influence.” Aside from the question of prophecy, the broad 
sweep of his generalizations referring to a single cause suggests geopolitical 
reasoning and a historicist pattern of thought. He counsels “marrying our new 
idealism to reality,”38 but there is no sense of conviction that it will be done. 
Indeed, the question may be asked here, as in the case of Carr: Why should 
reality be diluted by something beyond or less than reality? In this view, the 
great organizer or doer is the real fashioner of history, the real realist, whose 
imagination deals with “‘ways and means’ and not elusive ends.” He succeeds, 
not by resisting history, but by accommodating himself to it and assisting it. 
He may be a bad supreme master, but he has better survival value than other 
masters, because he perfects the art of using men rather than frittering away 
his energies on considerations of rights and ethics. Mackinder’s charge that 
we resist the organizer and his “ways and means” mind seems to cancel out 
the claim that he is a historicist,39 but the whole context suggest little prom-
ise of success. Maps may be the preoccupation of a “ways and means” Kultur, 
but the greatest stimulus to a consultation of maps has come from Mackinder 
himself. The whole Mackinder thesis is based upon the depicting of grandiose 
parallels and historical analogies, burgeoning in size as the central action and 
drama move, say, from the locale of Hellas until they encompass the globe in 
the continuing struggle of the landsmen against the men of the sea. The his-
tory of man can be told in terms of the alternating hegemonies of one or the 
other. Such broad general sweeps cannot be verified. They are useful as keys 
to understanding. They are dangerous if they are the source of imprisoning 
stereotypes suggesting to men an inexorable fate which they cannot have even 
the illusion of altering. Mackinder should be used for the advantages that his 
insights may offer, but guardedly so that the destiny he feared does not become 
the destiny we are assured. There is a kind of mesmerism in such conceptions; 
men become entranced by what appears to be the inevitable unfolding of the 
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promise of such simple theorems. What is promised may come to pass, but all 
the more certainly if we accept the promise as already verified.
Mackinder must in all fairness be distinguished from the German school of 
geopolitics. It is not appropriate here to describe the intricacies of developing 
doctrine from Ratzel and before, through Kjollen, to the Haushofers and the 
working group associated with the Institut fur Geopolitik. We can assume that 
these people were predominantly geopolitical historicists, confusing the “is” 
with the “ought,” identifying thinking with being, the conscious instruments 
of an aggressive statecraft. As Dunn points out, they discovered much but their 
discoveries became unwarrantedly and unscientifically the verification of a pre-
sumptuous philosophy of history. Captivated by the promise of the “heartland” 
theory, they could offer no conclusive reasons why its advantages could be en-
joyed more in collaboration with than by conquering the Russians. For all their 
complexity, the data of the German geopoliticians became the foundations of a 
single- cause theory which was no clear guide to action. Wishes produce theories 
promising millennia; the tragedy of man is that history always falls short of what 
it appears to offer. And the pain is probably greater because we have been led 
along the way by men whose patterns of thought promised so much that when 
disappointment comes the necessary readjustment is the more difficult.
*****
This paper has been written to provide a statement of a thesis. There has 
been no intention of surveying geopolitical thought or the conclusions of po-
litical geography. Space and location are important for both. Various doctrines 
with regard to these factors, giving them content, are available for survey. The 
bibliography that follows contains several citations that will provide the read-
er with a quick view of these doctrines.
*****
Digest of Discussion
Upon calling the meeting to order, the chairman suggested that to avoid the 
danger of becoming involved in a “metaphysical bog” it might be best to take 
up the subject of geopolitics first before proceeding to the more generalized 
considerations presented in the opening pages of the working paper. He asked 
Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.
Mr. Lipsky agreed that the metaphysical questions, which are relevant to 
geopolitics as well as to other theories of international relations, might best 
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be deferred until later on. By way of background, Mr. Lipsky noted that his 
first serious contact with the geographic approach to international relations 
theory had taken place as a student at City College through the teaching of 
Professor Renner. There, geography had been presented as the basic causal 
factor which molded historical development, and as the indispensable key for 
understanding world politics. The idea was not only intriguing, Mr. Lipsky 
said, but he had been impressed by the appeal it had made to the emotions. 
It was more revelatory than analytical, attempting to define the pivot upon 
which the future hinged.
His exposure to this particular rendition of history and his subsequent crit-
icism of it had led him to conclude that, within the body of theorists who 
concern themselves primarily with the geographic aspect of international re-
lations, some recognize the geographic factor as one relevant condition to be 
considered among many elements; other theorists assign a determining role to 
geography. The first group might best be termed “political geographers” while 
the latter school deserves the term “geopolitician.” Political geographers can 
be considered as within the tradition of Western social science, emphasizing 
the role of geography as an influence on history. Their methodology is pri-
marily descriptive, although they do not deny themselves the opportunity of 
making predictions, primarily of a short- run nature.
Mr. Lipsky acknowledged, parenthetically, that he knew of no precise 
means of distinguishing between “long- run” and “short- run” prediction. It is 
mostly a distinction in emphasis and a matter of assigning influence to one or 
more factors in a given situation. K. R. Popper in The Open Society and Its Ene­
mies also fails to make a precise distinction between long and short- run proph-
ecy. But to the degree that a theorist tends to be dogmatic he is also inclined 
to make long- run predictions. Haushofer once stated that the geographic in-
fluences accounts for some 25 percent of the effective forces operating upon 
the international political process, yet it is fairly obvious from the context of 
Haushofer’s writings that he attributed a predominant role to geography.
Many authors, Mr. Lipsky continued, use the terms geopolitics and polit-
ical geography loosely, yet a burden of the present working paper is that they 
should be used with care and with precision. Some authors, such as Walsh, 
don’t examine the underlying methodological problem at all. On the other 
hand, the extreme geopoliticians, such as those of the German school, postu-
late that the Louisiana Purchase and the Monroe Doctrine were acts resulting 
from keen geopolitical insight. In other words, the extremists are apt to inter-
pret any political move which relates to space and/or location as within the 
field of politics and to be judged accordingly.
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The present working paper does not attempt to survey the geopolitical 
approach to international relations. But if one were called upon to draw a 
few principal conclusions concerning that approach, one might note that the 
political geographers have a great deal to say about space as a factor— and as a 
central factor— in a given power complex. Location has a secondary emphasis 
as compared with space. In addition, some geopoliticians stress organic theo-
ries of the state, point to national “life cycles,” and classify states as “young” 
and “old.” Such theorists ignore the possibility that a declining nation might 
revive.
It is apparent, Mr. Lipsky concluded, that geopolitical concepts are lit-
tle more than crutches which are conveniently used as substitutes for hard- 
headed factual research and description. Although the German school has 
industriously gathered data, the results had merely been fitted into a simple 
monistic theory of international behavior. That school also illustrates the ef-
fect of a rigid, unpliable theory upon statecraft. By reducing the complexities 
of international life to a few static stereotypes, German geopolitik offered a 
rationale for a policy which has led a people to disaster.
The chairman thanked Mr. Lipsky. He noted that the group was fortunate 
in having with it a scholar who has given much attention to the relationship 
of geography to politics. The chairman asked Professor Strausz- Hupé to say a 
few words on that problem.
Geopolitik: The Haushofer School and Mackinder
Professor Strausz- Hupé also thought it would be fitting to mention how he had 
happened to become concerned with political geography. He recalled that he 
had begun his career as a geographer and as a surveyor when he had first be-
come acquainted with the Haushofer school of geopolitik— around the fringes 
of which, he had noticed, Spengler was “floating”— and had considered it to 
be primarily concerned with military geography. This military emphasis, he 
thought, formed much of the substance of geopolitik as enunciated in Germany 
and elsewhere. It was essentially based on the notion that geography is the 
least variable factor influencing world affairs. The geopoliticians had clutched 
at this fact and built a theory in which geography become the key to under-
standing international relations.
Professor Strausz- Hupé recalled that he had forgotten about the Haushofer 
school until several years later, when geopolitics was “imported” into the US 
and became something of a fad. To set the record straight, he had written a 
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paper on the subject. At that time international relations was treated peda-
gogically as an aspect of international law or of international economics or of 
diplomatic history. The introduction of geopolitical thinking into American 
academic circles had a healthy by- product in that it had helped to bring the 
teaching of international relations “down to earth.”
It was useful, Professor Strausz- Hupé ventured, to distinguish between 
those who regarded the subject primarily as a branch of geography and those 
who strove to build it into a distinct school of thought. Mackinder might be 
regarded as the greatest exponent and founder of the former group. Mackinder 
was not only a learned geographer but equipped with a profoundly intuitive 
mind possessing an incisive understanding of the “texture of history,” which 
expressed itself in a dynamic florid style. It was noteworthy that Mackind-
er attracted considerable attention, but largely outside of Great Britain, the 
country to which he was addressing himself. Certainly his theory had made 
a valuable contribution to the interpretation of history and of international 
relations. For example, if US statesmen had been more fully aware of the geo-
graphic factor many of the mistakes made in the postwar settlements might 
have been avoided. This was especially true with regard to China and Korea. 
Mackinder’s observation regarding the movement of the Russian people from 
west to east and from south to north has also proved to have been basically 
correct. Indeed, the perspectives on history which he was able to perceive 
were the work of genius; the man had a poetic grasp of history and of its rela-
tionship to statecraft.
Now the question arises as to whether this body of thought can be elabo-
rated into a discipline of the social sciences. Professor Strausz- Hupé doubted 
it. If it were divested of its intuitive perception it would become little more 
than a series of rather trite platitudes, such as the observation that the con-
struction of the Suez and Panama canals had a decisive effect on the history of 
Japan by enabling the Western maritime powers to challenge Japanese naval 
power, which is the backbone of Japanese imperialism.
Therefore, Professor Strausz- Hupé concluded he does not believe that geo-
politics has much to offer from a metaphysical point of view. Actually the 
great contributions have been made by people who were entirely unaware of 
the metaphysical aspect of geopolitics. Weber’s studies of the significance of 
location is a case in point. Secondly, geopoliticians have made a contribution 
to international relations theory by forcing theorists to study the obvious as 
well as the esoteric aspects of world politics as, for example, recognition that 
small size makes for small power. This has had a healthy affect and one for 
which academicians concerned with international relations could be grateful.
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The chairman thought that Mackinder had offered little that was new 
but had brought a new perspective to bear on old problems. Professor Strausz- 
Hupé agreed. For example, Mackinder was the first to recognize that the mar-
itime age was ending and that the basis of British sea power had changed. 
This was an event of importance to world history comparable to the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453.
Parenthetically, Professor Strausz- Hupé remarked that no historian had 
ever drawn full attention to the impact of the fall of Constantinople on the 
development of the West. Turkish occupation of the Levant and the overland 
trading routes to the East had forced the Portuguese to search for new means of 
access. That search had resulted in the discovery of the Western hemisphere.
An event of similar importance occurred with the growth of the railroads 
on the Eurasian land mass, Professor Strausz- Hupé continued. This made 
it impossible for Britain to enforce the balance of power on the continent 
through the exercise of naval power. Thus a historical era had come to an end 
with the development of effective and rapid inner lines of communication 
on the part of the major continental powers. Indeed, this is the root of the 
strategic problem facing the West today. Thus, to some extent, Mackinder’s 
heartland- rimland prophecy has been borne out: the first and decisive element 
of Russian power today is the possession of inner lines of land communication. 
Mackinder was the first to understand the significance of these developments, 
yet his understanding was not so much derived from a knowledge of geography 
as from a certain intuitive feeling for the sweep of history.
Mr. Lipsky expressed a certain reservation concerning the numerous refer-
ences being made to unverifiable propositions. How could such postulates, as 
postulates, be verified? Referring to chapter 5 of Professor Strausz- Hupé’s The 
Zone of Indifference, Mr. Lipsky wondered whether the references to historic 
parallels were not of the same order of unverifiability. It was his feeling that 
grand generalization must be always employed with great care.
Professor Holborn felt that Professor Strausz- Hupé had expressed himself 
fairly clearly on that point. The heartland areas have produced the major civ-
ilizations of mankind: Greek, Roman, Arabic, Turkish, and Christian. But to 
postulate that this is bound to happen is geographically unverifiable, and for 
many reasons unconnected with geography. The same applies to the industri-
alization of Russia which, he thought, is a more accurate descriptive phrase 
for expressing the transformation than simply alluding to the development of 
Russian railroads. If he understood Professor Strausz- Hupé’s position correctly, 
the professor had noted that the power of the Soviet Union depends in large 
part on the relationship between its level of technology and its geographic 
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position. He certainly agreed with that viewpoint and felt that German histo-
ry offered another example of the same proposition. Between 1815 and 1855 
Prussia was relegated to a secondary role in European affairs, one of the reasons 
being her unfavorable geographic position in relation to British sea power and 
the prevalent level of technology. The development of railroads and industry 
turned an interior position on the continent from a liability to an asset and 
it could be predicted after 1855 that Prussia was likely to be a major power 
until the areas to the east also underwent industrialization. Professor Holborn 
remarked that while there was a large amount of intuition in Mackinder’s 
prophecies, there was also an element of geographical soundness to them.
The Applicability of Geopolitical Insights
Professor Strausz- Hupé ventured that the geographic factor is of major impor-
tance in making recommendations for policy. It argues for example, against a 
policy designed to provide for a neutralized Germany. An agreement to with-
draw forces from Germany would move the Russian army back to the Vistula 
and the American army back to Staten Island. The significance of space and 
location to policy is often vital. Again, for example, if the Western powers 
withdraw from Western Germany it is questionable whether there would be 
sufficient space remaining to provide for the defense of Western Europe.
Professor Holborn remarked that Mackinder’s theory seemed to have a 
high applicability to present- day military geography. The strategic planning of 
the Air Force is largely in terms of Mackinder’s theory. This country’s effort to 
build a crescent of bases around the Soviet Union, as further indicated by the 
pact with Pakistan, is another indication. Professor Holborn observed that at 
the previous day’s press conference, the president, in outlining the country’s 
stake in Indo- China and Southeast Asia, had noted the area’s abundance of 
raw materials, its population of 100 million, but had placed special emphasis 
on its strategic location, pointing out that communist domination of the area 
would place Australia in grave jeopardy.
The chairman thought that the practical applications drawn from geo-
graphic notions are primarily of value in the field of military strategy. Professor 
Strausz- Hupé agreed. Both the Germans and the French had seized upon the 
insight which Mackinder’s theories provided in devising their military strategy.
Professor Holborn wondered whether political geography is not also useful 
in defining the boundaries of national security. Thus, does it point up those 
areas— such as the Panama Canal Zone— which are of such importance to na-
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tional security as to be defended at any cost? Professor Strausz- Hupé felt that 
even such generalizations must be examined with care. For example, a major 
geopolitical maxim of British foreign policy has been that no major power 
should control the channel ports of the Low Countries; yet the best channel 
ports in terms of given access to Britain are those located in France.
Professor Holborn felt that political geography could not be considered a 
theory of international relations in itself. It is simply a facet of the truism that 
man is conditioned by nature and that his survival depends upon his capacity 
shrewdly to explicit geographical configurations to his advantage. The chair-
man thought that the significance of political geography went a little further, 
namely the effect land configurations have upon man’s political attitudes. Ge-
ography is an ever- present factor in political calculations; although economic 
and technical conditions might alter the political significance of geography, 
the geographic element always remains and has to be reckoned with.
Mr. Thompson thought there was some merit in thinking of the elements 
of international politics as a pyramid with the geographic element constitut-
ing its base. Although the significance of geography is altered by developments 
occurring at the other levels, it would be fallacious to conclude that such de-
velopments completely transform the geographic element. Oceans separating 
American from Eurasia are still important despite jet transportation; Western 
Europe still largely ends at the Pyrenees; and it is of continuing importance 
that the mountains of northern Italy permit entrance into Italy more readily 
than they allow penetration from Italy into Central Europe.
Spykman viewed geography, Mr. Thompson continued, as a conditioning 
factor in foreign policy rather than as a determining factor. Failure to take 
account of this conditioning factor would be, of course, harmful to sound pol-
icy planning. On the other hand, it is not difficult to use the relatively static 
geographic factor as a stepping stone for analyzing the dynamics of policy it-
self. Professor Sprout, for example, is at present engaged in a study of the role 
of geography as an influencing factor in foreign policy but within the social 
and cultural context of the nation concerned. It makes a decisive difference 
in a nation’s foreign policy, to cite an example, if the government in question 
is cognizant of the presence of oil deposits within its territory. One could set 
up a whole range of hypothetical situations showing the interrelationships 
between material assets, the cultural context, and policy. In general, the geo-
graphic influence is of an importance warranting the closest consideration; 
not just the Germans should be interested in its applicability to foreign policy.
Mr. Roberts drew attention to the critique of the Mackinder quotation 
on page 21 of the working paper. He thought that the qualifications cited 
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therein were of two different orders, the first two being extreme contingen-
cies and extraneous to Mackinder’s thesis unless one assumed that Mackinder 
was attempting an all- embracing prophecy. The latter two qualifications, Mr. 
Roberts felt, were valid in that they strove to question the burden of the thesis 
itself. What interested him as a historian in Mackinder’s thesis was the extent 
to which it offered, barring fortuitous developments, a valuable working hy-
pothesis. Citing the example of the geographically oriented claims of Rouma-
nia and Hungary to Transylvania, Mr. Roberts wondered which, if either, had 
greater validity in terms of political geography. At some point, he thought, 
one must ask whether geographically oriented theses shed additional light and 
meaning for understanding world affairs.
The chairman ventured that if the geographic factor is treated in a re-
strained manner it would often prove useful to understanding international 
relations but that it should never be regarded as a “magic key” which holds 
the secret of the political process. The burden of Mackinder’s approach seems 
to indicate that geography is the controlling factor. On the other hand, Mac-
kinder argued for the use of countermeasures to prevent the realization of his 
predictions. Hence, as the working paper pointed out, there is a basic contra-
diction in Mackinder’s theory.
Geography and Public Policy
Mr. Marshall remarked that the opinion expressed above, to the effect that 
a better understanding of political geography would have helped the US to 
avoid mistakes made in the postwar settlement, reminded him of the story 
told of the harbor pilot who, while bringing a ship into port, was boasting to 
the ship’s captain that he knew every reef in the harbor like the palm of his 
hand. Just then there was a sickening crash, whereupon the pilot exclaimed, 
“see, there’s one of them now!” Continuing, Mr. Marshall said he sensed that 
some held the view that a thorough knowledge of geography would equip 
statesmen with an ability to predict and avoid “mistakes” such as Korea. Ac-
tually, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had viewed Korea as an “unsatisfactory penin-
sula” and had argued against making a commitment there since Japan was so 
much more viable and insufficient resources existed for making commitments 
in both areas. The withdrawal of American troops from Korea had been a 
geopolitical but not a diplomatic decision. Yet when the invasion occurred, 
it was clearly necessary to recommit American troops because of overriding 
non- geopolitical considerations.
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Professor Strausz- Hupé indicated that he had been thinking of decisions 
affecting Korea at the end of the Second World War which seemed to have 
been taken without adequate consideration of geographic factors. Mr. Mar-
shall thought that the best solution might have been to avoid going into Ko-
rea at all. In any event, he did not feel one could decide that a certain mistake 
would have been avoided if a certain fact had been known. The complex 
context in which policy decisions are taken prevents drawing simple cause- 
effect relationships.
Professor Holborn remarked that, from the Russian point of view, Korea 
in the hands of an unfriendly power constitutes a thorn in Russia’s flesh since 
it provides an avenue through which her maritime provinces and Manchuria 
could be threatened. Thus an American force in South Korea is bad enough 
from the Soviet standpoint but the decision to advance to the Yalu brought 
this country, with no territorial aspirations in Asia, even further down what is 
essentially a “blind alley.”
Mr. Thompson noted that the London Economist seems often to follow 
Mackinder’s line of reasoning. For example, the periodical argues that a Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Europe is an essential precondition to a settlement 
in Germany.
Professor Holborn thought that the relationship of geography to technol-
ogy raised many political problems. For example, until the First World War 
it was possible to exercise predominant control over large continental areas 
through sea power. Great Britain, by possession of relatively small outposts 
at Singapore, Hong Kong, and Canton was able to exercise predominant 
influence in China. The rise of the Hanseatic League in the Middle Ages 
was a parallel illustration of the effectiveness of maritime communication 
and power in comparison to that on land. In both instances the time lag in 
civilization as between maritime and continental societies made maritime 
power so predominant that it could keep large land masses under control 
by pinpoint occupation of strategic centers. The industrial and political in-
tegration of the Eurasian land mass has produced an entirely new situation. 
There is no doubt that geography constitutes a basic element in internation-
al relations but one which must be viewed in conjunction with the human 
and technological elements.
Mr. Diebold thought that Mr. Lipsky was not challenging the importance 
of the geographic element. But having said this, Mr. Lipsky was contending 
that there was a range of non- geographic factors which must also be accounted 
for and, further, that by constructing a rigid framework of geographically ori-
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ented postulates, one was bound to elaborate a theory having a strong sense of 
predetermination. Mr. Lipsky added that it “worked both ways:” the very sense 
of destiny imparted by a theory, if widely and closely believed, would tend to 
make that destiny be realized.
Professor Strausz- Hupé suggested that political geography offered certain 
tools by which the political scientist and statesman could sharpen his observa-
tion of the political process. Weber observed, for example, that Europe could 
be logically divided into two parts, densely populated France and Northern 
Europe and sparsely populated peripheral Europe. From this he was able to 
embark on a more subtle analysis and undertook to explain the character of 
peoples as a condition of locational factors. For example, the German policy 
has been severely conditioned by such factors. Germany, being strategically 
located at the hub of Europe, was for a long period of history the battlefield 
of Europe. The repeated mixing of the local population with those of foreign 
countries gave rise to a populace without a distinct racial origin, hence subse-
quent German agitation and insistence upon racial purity when Germany be-
came a unified state. The Scandinavians, geographically removed from West 
European conflicts, have retained a certain racial purity but are rather bored 
with it.
Professor Holborn said that while he does not deny that location is a factor 
in shaping a nation’s history, the point could be overstressed. He suggested 
that the facts of nature might throw some light on the basic discrepancy be-
tween the relatively rapid advance of European civilization as compared to 
that of Asia. The fact of nature which appeared to him to be of most con-
sequence was the indentation of the European continent by bodies of water 
such as the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. This permits easy 
communication and facilitates commercial intercourse as compared to Asia. 
Britain is, of course, the best example of this process, no part of this island be-
ing very far removed from coast- bound or river traffic. This creates a stimulus 
to political integration at a more rapid pace than that found on the continent.
With regard to the influence of mountain and rivers, professor Holborn 
continued, the political geographers have offered a valuable contribution. 
They have viewed mountain passes as links between areas rather than as bar-
riers. The same applied to rivers. Therefore, Professor Holborn concluded, the 
main effect of location is the advantage it has conferred upon European civi-
lization by providing relatively easy means of communication. This advantage 
has, of course, decreased with industrial and technological developments and 
much of it no longer applies. But he doubted whether geography had the effect 
on Germany as that just previously suggested.
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Limitations of the Predictive Sciences
Mr. Lipsky said he wished to register a plea for consideration by the group of 
the pattern of thought expressed by geopoliticians. With regard to long- term 
factors operating on the political process, he thought that they could only be 
tentatively defined.
Professor Rabi noted that on the basis of present information concerning 
wind action and soil erosion, it could be confidently predicted that with-
in ten million years the Rocky Mountains would be swept away and the 
US would be under a shallow sea. While this is an absolutely long- range 
prediction, it certainly has no immediate importance nor any relations to 
subjective preferences.
Mr. Lipsky felt that one could toy with the hypotheses which are offered 
by the geopoliticians and that such hypotheses might furnish insight in certain 
situations but that the social scientist should not allow himself to be victim-
ized by tempting generalizations.
Mr. Roberts noted that in the case of the Roumanians it was generally felt 
that their exposed and strategic location has lent itself to numerous foreign 
invasions which, in turn, have affected their national character. Thus one 
of the maxims of folk wisdom in Roumania concerns the survival value of 
“bending with the wind.” These popular attitudes have had an effect on Rou-
manian politics, the partisan movement during the war being a good example. 
It leads one to ask whether there is a correlation between exposed, strategic 
location and policy as expressed in national habits. While it seems to be a 
useful concept with regard to Roumania, it has little validity for a nation like 
Poland which also has been exposed to repeated onslaughts. Similarly, the 
hardy, individualistic qualities of mountain- dwelling people, as typified by the 
Montenegrans, break down when applied to the Slovaks.
Mr. Thompson said that despite the fact that the German school of geo-
politicians has employed geographic concepts for developing a theory in sup-
port of an aggressive policy, it would be mistaken, he thought, to underrate or 
look askance at theories which attempt to emphasize the role of geography in 
international politics. The development of international relations theory has 
been in the direction of closing the gap between the real world of politics and 
academic postulation and projection. There is little doubt that this country 
has suffered from failing properly to appreciate the geographic factor.
In this connection he was reminded of an incident which occurred when, 
during the last presidential campaign, he submitted an article to the Reporter 
magazine containing a passage demonstrating that Eisenhower had made er-
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rors of judgment in his appreciation of problems of postwar policy. The editor 
rejected the criticism on the ground that “the liberals had been equally blind 
to the problem.” It could be said, Mr. Thompson remarked, that Americans 
of all political persuasions had tended to overlook the hard factors of nation-
al power while placing confidence in the assumption that new, international 
institutions would somehow supplant power politics; overoptimistic belief in 
human progress has also contributed to this unrealistic outlook.
Thus, while rejecting the determinism of the geopolitician, one should 
not, Mr. Thompson held, be contemptuous of the statesman who attempts to 
evaluate the geographic factor in formulating policy. Moreover, Mr. Thomp-
son wondered whether the distinction implied in the working paper that 
statesmen and political scientists operate at different levels of awareness is a 
valid one. He also questioned the usefulness of basing a critique of geopolitics 
on a dichotomy of fact vs. value.
Mr. Lipsky did not feel there was any contradiction between most of Mr. 
Thompson’s observations and his own theses. He felt that in the interest of 
sound statesmanship, geographic postulates should be handled in a particular 
way and, in the working paper, had striven to suggest how statesmen might 
make proper use of the conclusions offered by geopolitics.
Professor Strausz- Hupé doubted whether most statesmen would be con-
cerned with theories of geopolitics. For the most part statesmen are of an intel-
lectual caliber which precludes deep understanding of the problems involved, 
besides being far too occupied with day- to- day activities to have the time to 
consider such theories even if they could.
Mr. Lipsky felt that statesmen should not be captivated by theories which, 
by their oversimplification, seem to promise easy answers to problems of poli-
cy. Rather, statesmen should be exposed to the significance of geography along 
the lines of Mr. Thompson’s observations.
The chairman wondered whether political geography simply deals with the 
facts of geography in their political setting or whether it offers a distinct theo-
ry of its own and, if so, how that theory different from geopolitics. Mr. Roberts 
wondered whether there is not a residue of reality which could be gleaned 
from geopolitical assertions. Mr. Lipsky thought that Professor Strausz- Hupé 
had pretty well covered that point when he had remarked that once the in-
tuitive content of geopolitical theory had been removed not much remained 
except a few platitudes, such as the value of inner lines of defense, the role of 
river systems, the function of distance and so on.
Professor Rabi wondered whether every large land area such as Africa or 
North America could not be considered a “heartland” for the purpose which 
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the theorist in question happened to have in mind. Drawing a U- shaped figure 
on a piece of paper to represent a figurative line of battle, Professor Rabi noted 
that it could be considered either a “salient” or a “pocket” depending on how 
it was viewed.
Mr. Lipsky thought that the geopolitical school offered criteria for defining 
the heartland area. A group member commented that the heartland might 
shift from one locale to another as changing technological conditions con-
ferred greater power on one area at the expense of another. Mr. Lichenstein 
observed that this reduced the concept to a tautology, namely, that the heart-
land is where power resides and Mr. Lipsky noted that Spykman’s Geography 
of the Peace contained two diagrams illustrating the comparative strategic rela-
tionship of Eurasia and North America; arrows radiated from Eurasia to show 
how it might threaten North America but no arrows radiated from North 
America in the second diagram.
Mr. Thompson thought that the pocket- salient illustration was a good ex-
ample of the fact that it is impossible to think of political geography in non- 
policy terms. Spykman applied geographic concepts to the problem of formu-
lating a realistic American foreign policy; thus the relevance of theories of 
political geography await their concrete application in terms of the nation. 
Spykman, for example, formulated the concept of the danger of double envel-
opment of North America by a Eurasia under the control of a single power. 
From this he deduced the corollary that a key objective of American policy was 
to maintain the balance of power on the Eurasian land mass. Thus America 
should support friendly powers located on the rimlands if a hostile power arose 
in the heartland. Spykman’s approach was centered on the outlook and needs 
of a given nation and that approach, Mr. Thompson thought, was probably the 
most useful one in terms of contributing to international relations theory.
Mr. Lipsky felt that this was compatible with his thesis that every theory, 
including geopolitical theory, is incomplete and hence can be manipulated 
in the interest of the nation. Some might even assume that North America 
is the heartland from which power radiated. Mr. Marshall said he did not un-
derstand concepts which picture power radiating in one direction or another. 
Power relationships between nations always go both ways. Most power situa-
tions are too complex to be characterized by vector diagrams. The trouble with 
thinking in metaphors, Mr. Marshall remarked, is that in time people tend to 
think more in terms of the metaphor than in terms of the reality which the 
metaphor is supposed to represent— the metaphor “takes over.” Americans 
tend to think of international affairs in terms of sports, especially baseball and 
football, with one side winning for a while and then the other team going to 
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bat. Actually the only illustrative sports are possibly “seizing the initiative” or 
“seizing the offensive.”
Mr. Zinner said that it was only with great reluctance that he ventured to 
offer a few points with regard to the pre- dinner discussion. (1) With regard to 
geography per se, he pointed out that it could not be disregarded in any con-
ceptual approach to international relations— “It’s simply there.” It could, of 
course, be endowed with too much importance and one task of international 
relations theory is to determine just how important it is at a given time. Geog-
raphy is a continuous as well as basic factor in international politics although 
its importance varies in relation to other factors, historical, technological, 
economic, demographic, and so on. Perhaps with the advent of super- weapons 
its importance will diminish. Summarizing his first point, he would say that ge-
ography is basic to the international political process though the importance 
which should be assigned to it will vary from time to time.
(2) Turning to geopolitics as a conceptual framework, Mr. Zinner felt that 
Mr. Lipsky had overstressed the point that geopolitical theory merits serious 
attention only to the extent that it mirrors the reality of the political process. 
Regardless of this consideration, geopolitics has a relationship to human ac-
tion. If it were widely accepted, then regardless of its accuracy, it would tend 
to become self- fulfilling and merit serious attention as a source of political 
behavior.
(3) Finally, Mr. Zinner suggested that there should be further consider-
ation of the question as to the elements which an informing theory should 
contain. This leads to problems of methodology. The working paper before the 
group distinguished between fact and value, yet he questioned this dichotomy, 
especially since it did not meet the problem of a priori value. Actually, is it 
possible to separate fact and value; is not value built into fact; are not so- called 
factual analyses couched in value frameworks?
The Fact­ Value Dichotomy
Mr. Lipsky agreed with Mr. Zinner’s first point. He also agreed with the second 
point and had indicated in the working paper that the geopolitician’s theory in 
itself constitutes part of the data which must be evaluated. Hence geopolitical 
concepts, and the phenomenon of self- fulfilling prophecy, must be taken into 
account in analyzing political behavior. But having said this, there remains the 
fact that the real political scientist must be especially wary of theories whose 
content is so largely value and not the result of data- supported conclusions. 
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The political theorist should be able to define and recognize the function of 
value in the theory he is propounding or examining; that is certainly not the 
case with the geopoliticians. The result is an established tendency to assert 
long- range prophecies and sweeping generalizations. Furthermore, it is hard 
to escape the conclusion that what the geopolitician asserts “must” happen is 
precisely that which he wills to happen. Value is an essential element in any 
theoretical structure, man’s knowledge being finite, yet it is important to be 
able to point to the role of value in shaping a theory’s hypotheses and guiding 
its conclusions.
In response to several questions Mr. Lipsky defined value as “an assertion 
that a given situation is good.” The nominalist theorist is aware of the role of 
value, including his own set of values. Hence the nominalist is highly tenta-
tive in making predictions.
Mr. Diebold questioned Mr. Lipsky’s assertion that values are by definition 
eternal in nature. Could not some values be relative to time and circumstance? 
Mr. Thompson thought it important to consider the existence of proximate 
values— situations in which the good outweighs the bad. The Marshall Plan, 
for example, despite the hypocrisy and selfishness which accompanied it, had 
a proximate objectively good value. The chairman thought that Mr. Thomp-
son’s observation confused value with policy. The Marshall Plan was a policy 
designed to further certain values. Mr. Lipsky considered policy to be a part 
of a given data situation while the chairman felt that policy is expressive of 
value through a given mode of action. Both agreed that values are simply 
preferences.
Mr. Thompson noted that rigid adherence to embedded value systems is 
often a deterrent to accuracy and understanding of historical situations. For 
example, the more doctrinaire American Socialists saw the New Deal pure-
ly as an act of capitalist hypocrisy and were blinded to policies having such 
social values as improving standards of living and reducing inequities in the 
distribution of income. Decisions on such policies could not be made without 
reference to values, but values which arose from the social needs of that his-
torical period.
Mr. Zinner agreed that there is no difference between value and prefer-
ence. With regard to the faultiness of long- range prediction on the basis of 
theoretical analysis, he felt that a distinction should be made between teleolo-
gy and prophecy. If the geopoliticians endow geography with a decisive role in 
directing history toward predetermined goals, then the problem is a teleolog-
ical one. But the problem of prediction is of a different order. True prediction 
in the social sciences rests on non- teleological elements.
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Mr. Lipsky wondered whether the distinction was a valid one since proph-
ecy, and especially long- ranged prophecy, is embedded in the value prefer-
ences of the prophet. This is a well- established fact of human psychology. 
Mr. Lichenstein pointed out that Professor Rabi’s prediction concerning geo-
graphic change in North America after ten million years was a long- range 
prophecy in which preference was an irrelevant factor. Mr. Lipsky wondered 
whether that prediction did not go beyond the limits of knowledge. Professor 
Rabi said it was based on known data of rainfall and other factors; in terms of 
known information it was a fairly precise prediction.
Mr. Lichenstein agreed that, given the conditions set forth in Mr. Lipsky’s 
working paper, total prediction is a theoretical impossibility but this hardly 
exhausts the possibilities of theorizing. Mr. Lipsky agreed and thought that any 
prophesying in the social sciences should be extremely tentative and cautious. 
Marx, for example, claimed to see the unfolding sweep of history as propelled 
by the class struggle; in other words, he claimed to have a total theory furnish-
ing a basis for total prediction.
Professor Rabi remarked that the group’s discussion with regard to the 
problem of prediction seemed to bear a resemblance to that of a group of for-
tune tellers advising some Wall Street bankers on how to play the stock mar-
ket. He felt that little progress has been made toward the question of what 
should constitute the elements of a theory of international relations, particu-
larly as a guide to statecraft.
The chairman thought that much could be salvaged from the discussions 
and that the task of gleaning such material might be reserved for the final 
meeting. Mr. Thompson was also inclined not to take such a bleak view of the 
“Harvest” issuing from the group’s labors. A distillation of concepts and ap-
proaches has taken place. From discussions of Morgenthau, Spykman, Marx, 
and others, one begins to sense that international politics is not an area in 
which absolute values function and that a fairly specific picture of the interna-
tional political process is emerging from the discussion.
The Nature of Value
Mr. Lipsky thought that absolute values could and should function in defense 
of the preservation of democratic society. The justification for such values is 
that only in a democratic society can the war of ideas and values freely take 
place. The chairman felt that the problem of values is an expression of the 
psychology of the person making the value judgment. In the statement “I want 
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democracy to persist” the value judgment is not in the wanting but in the 
thing wanted— the objective.
Mr. Thompson thought that Mr. Lipsky had, in the exposition on meth-
odology presented in the working paper, leaned perhaps too heavily on the 
Lasswellian approach, an approach which is just as incomplete as those of 
the other authors under review. The international marketplace is one in 
which the quest for power is central and fundamental. By heavily stressing 
the value aspect of international politics one runs the dangers of distortion, 
just as one’s view of domestic politics become distorted if power and interest 
motivation are overstressed. In the latter connection, Mr. Thompson was 
reminded of the comments at Chicago University where many, influenced 
by Lasswell, tended to interpret each of Mr. Stevenson’s campaign speeches 
simply as appeals to sectional or social interests.† With the possible excep-
tion of the Taft- Hartley speech, Mr. Stevenson seemed to be expressing his 
personal political values, Mr. Thompson thought. Furthermore, there was a 
risk in Mr. Lipsky’s approach which by emphasizing the impossibility of any 
standards of good and bad, might wind up in something close to a nihilistic 
position.
Mr. Lipsky affirmed that Mr. Thompson had pointed up a dilemma of his 
theoretical position. The only answer is that democracy has an absolute value 
because it constitutes the indispensable condition under which the struggle of 
democratic and anti- democratic forces can proceed.
Mr. Diebold’s main point was that Mr. Lipsky and the majority of the 
group seemed to be in disagreement about a basic issue that was not being 
explicitly discussed. Mr. Lipsky took the view that a given theory of interna-
tional relations is the product of a certain epistemology and that a different 
epistemology leads inevitably to a different theory. Furthermore, Mr. Lipsky 
believed that different theories lead to different policies in international rela-
tions. The majority of the members of the group, on the other hand, appeared 
to take it for granted that the theory of international relations is separable 
from epistemology. His own inclination was to say that people with different 
theories of international relations might often agree on desirable policies and 
that disagreements on policy could occur among those holding the same theo-
ry and sharing a common epistemology. One of the questions about the nature 
of a theory of international relations that ought to be discussed next time is 
whether epistemology, theory, and policy are intimately linked, or whether 
there are (or can be) sharp breaks at the junctures so that one can discuss 
†[DM: Adlai Stevenson, Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1952.]
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the theory of international relations without venturing into epistemology and 
without implying a certain view on policy.
Mr. Thompson, with reference to whether democracy has inherent value 
as a mechanism for serving other values, thought that the Lasswellian school 
sees the moral justification of democracy in its being the institution best suited 
for the development of the sound, balanced personality. Essentially, this is a 
defense of democracy in terms of its efficiency. Yet democracy has often been 
attacked, as in the interwar period and especially during the Depression years, 
on the very ground that it does not compare favorably with totalitarian societ-
ies in being able to provide efficiently for the needs of its citizenry.
Professor Holborn thought that Mr. Lipsky had, in effect, equated a certain 
epistemology position with democratic ideology. While epistemology presup-
poses the existence of corresponding metaphysics, he doubted that a justifica-
tion of democracy could be drawn from epistemology, as Mr. Lipsky had tried 
to do.
Professor Rabi thought that Mr. Lipsky meant that he had been condi-
tioned to certain attitudes which had led him to express certain preferences, 
one of them being a preference for democracy. Mr. Lipsky affirmed this and 
pointed out that since others have similarly been conditioned to prefer certain 
hypotheses, there is no scientific method of demonstrating whose hypotheses 
have the greater validity.
The chairman wondered whether the conditioning process, as asserted by 
Mr. Lipsky, furnished the individual with values as well as preferences. Mr. 
Lipsky thought the question implied a definition of values; for his purpose he 
would define value as “a position beyond which one could not be driven,” re-
gardless of the means by which one had accepted that position. Mr. Thompson 
observed that this is and continues to be a subject of controversy in the social 
sciences.
Mr. Lichenstein wondered whether the group was concerned with phil-
osophical or theoretical problems of international relations. He thought the 
first eight pages of the working paper were excellent but doubted their rela-
tionship to the group’s task. Mr. Diebold thought he understood Mr. Lipsky’s 
position to be that a strong relationship exists between a given theory and its 
underlying philosophical position. The chairman expressed the opinion that 
the group would have a hard time reaching agreement unless it avoided meta-
physical questions. Mr. Lichenstein said that philosophy concerned itself with 
explanations of reality in an all- embracing sense while theory dealt with more 
specific elements of reality having a high relevance to contemporary problems, 
and in terms of limited areas of reality.
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The chairman suggested that the group redirect its attention to the subject 
of geopolitics and ask itself whether the heartland concept contains any sig-
nificance and whether there is any basic validity to the geopolitical approach 
to international relations. He felt that a nominalist position might not be 
essential for answering such questions. Often one could not ask the ultimate 
questions about a particular theory or social problem and, when one could, 
the answers might turn out to be irrelevant. He was reminded of an inter-
denominational conference on education he had attended. The conference 
had bogged down amidst conflicting theological points of view when it had 
attempted to define the goals of education in a free society, but when it moved 
to more concrete problems agreement was readily achieved. Professor Holborn 
agreed. The group had been convened to discuss theory of international rela-
tions, not theory of knowledge.
The Relevance of Geography to International Relations
Mr. Thompson thought that three basic points might be made on the relation 
of political geography to international relations theory. (1) Geography is the 
most static factor of the various elements conditioning international political 
behavior, hence it is convenient to think of it as constituting the base of a 
pyramid of elements. Geography sets certain limits to the choices and actions 
of nations in their relations with one another. However, this conditioning role 
should not be constructed as being all- determining.
(2) Any given foreign policy problem, Mr. Thompson continued, con-
tains a number of more or less strategic- geographic elements which should 
be considered. Thus, if it were possible to hold a few strategic areas in and on 
the periphery of Indo- China, that aspect of the situation should be given due 
account in terms of the free world’s approach to the problem. The strategic sig-
nificance of geographic configurations and channels of communication often 
play a crucial role in international relations.
(3) The concept of the heartland has much validity to it, the increasing 
importance of Asia and Africa notwithstanding. It still makes a tremendous 
difference which power controls the heartland. Spykman has sketched a rough 
picture of the elements which he felt should be considered in arriving at a 
postwar settlement, especially the need for an equilibrium of power in the 
heartland, and warned that a primary task of US policy was to prevent a single 
power from controlling the heartland. This maxim is still not in dispute de-
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spite the technological changes which have occurred since then, Mr. Thomp-
son concluded.
Mr. Lipsky thought, with regard to geopolitics as opposed to political ge-
ography, that Professor Strausz- Hupé had aptly summed up the former’s value 
when he remarked that after geopolitics is stripped of its unverifiable hypoth-
eses little remains except a few trite truisms.
The chairman did not think that Mr. Thompson’s first point was a truism. 
Geography, aside from its intrinsic importance, is by its very static nature a 
useful means of relating other factors in the political process. As such, it might 
be relevant to developing a theory of international relations. Mr. Lipsky noted 
the extraordinary lack of system which prevails in the writings of the geopol-
iticians. The chairman agreed that system is important but felt that a theory’s 
content must also be good to warrant serious consideration.
Mr. Zinner, referring to Mr. Thompson’s first point, noted that while ge-
ography could be viewed as a constant expression or influence on the actions 
of states, the point, if overstressed, could be misleading and confusing in the-
orizing about international relations. For example, it is often said that Soviet 
foreign policy closely parallels the policy followed by imperial Russia because 
the Soviets are seeking to acquire the same lands as those coveted by the Tsars. 
Hence many observers hold that there is no difference in aims between the 
two regimes, a conclusion which Mr. Zinner held is quite mistaken.
Mr. Thompson thought it would be equally misleading to conclude that 
there are no common features to the policies of the two regimes. The Ameri-
can assistance program to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine was, 
in many respects, a reiteration of the West’s historic resistance to Russian pen-
etration into the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, he felt that it would 
also be misleading to regard the communist menace as a discriminate threat 
divorced from the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union. By disregarding 
that relationship, one damages one’s ability to meet the threat.
Mr. Zinner said that he had not meant that there is no common meeting 
ground between Soviet and Tsarist policy. But the Soviet threat cannot be un-
derstood or adequately handheld without reference to its disincarnate aspects. 
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May 18, 1954
The sixth meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Relations 
was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, May 18, 1954, at 5:30 
p.m. The subject was Wilsonian Idealism. Present were: Robert M. MacIver, 
chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; 
John Blumgart, rapporteur, John P. Armstrong; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo 
Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Charles Lichenstein; Charles B. Marshall; 
Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Isidor I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; Robert 
Strausz- Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Arnold Wolfers; Paul Zinner.
*****
Working Paper No. 6
Prepared by George A. Lipsky
The expression “Wilsonian idealism” refers to more than conceptions of for-
eign policy. It refers to a whole body of thought having influence upon domes-
tic politics, society and personal relationships. Moreover, Wilsonian idealism 
may with sound reason be considered larger than Wilson himself, if for ex-
ample we think of all those influenced by and contributing to the New Free-
dom. Wilson’s own ideas were a product of long evolution. Very often they did 
not achieve precise formulation until the need to solve some problem evoked 
them or until a personal experience or encounter elicited self- conscious spec-
ulation. Other men played important parts in the political ferment and in 
the particular tradition whose ideas, with greater or lesser conformity, found a 
focus in Wilson. He became an object of deep veneration for Josephus Daniels, 
Burleson, Houston, Carter Glass, Herbert Croly, Tumulty, House, and others 
from various walks of life and station.1 It would be impossible within the scope 
Revised Pages
Sixth Meeting—Wilsonian Idealism 209
of this paper to evaluate critically this whole movement with its intellectual 
and ideological aspects. It will be worthwhile to consider Wilson primarily, to 
see why he was a response to the needs of the time and to suggest the quality 
and viability of his ideas, particularly as related to foreign policy.
In my view the most significant component of Wilson’s thought was a deep 
religious conviction. This Scotch Covenanter’s religious faith, profound and 
unquestioned, gave a stern quality to moral conviction and, I think, raised 
him to the level of statesmen in domestic as well as international politics. 
Some idea of this faith may be gained from the following sentences written 
by Wilson in 1923, when death was pressing close, but reflecting his lifelong 
faith bred of generations of sternly religious forbears: “By justice the lawyer 
generally means the prompt, fair, and open application of impartial rules; we 
call ours a Christian civilization, and a Christian conception of justice must 
be much higher. It must include sympathy and helpfulness and a willingness 
to forego self- interest in order to promote the welfare, happiness, and content-
ment of others and of the community as a whole. . . . The sum of the whole 
matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be re-
deemed spiritually. It can be saved by only by becoming permeated with the 
spirit of Christ and being made free and happy by the practices which spring 
out of that spirit.”2
Wilson’s life and career reveal his deep commitment to the Christian ideal, 
his high optimism concerning the possibility that men and nations might live 
in accord with a high moral standard founded in the religious faith. Such a 
faith is not so unusual in the politician or statesman, but it is not the em-
phasis we would expect in the academician, the professor of political science. 
It is what made him content with broad generalizations and sweeping moral 
charges with which his audience, desiring to know the concrete unfolding of 
events in which he had participated as their representative, was often dissat-
isfied.3 He found nothing wanting in such generalizations; they were real and 
concrete to him. As I survey them in an inspection of his life and thought, 
they often seem to be little more than a tissue of bromidic clichés. One is 
counseled to avoid sin by the sincere but stern schoolmaster. To politicians 
whose stock in trade is generalization in which an audience cannot find too 
specific commitments, this talent could and did appear to be of a higher order.
Of course, as the successful leader, Wilson had to produce results as 
well as inspire loyalty by his word. As governor of New Jersey he led lib-
eral forces to the legislative enactment of his promised reform program 
in every detail. He did this by the application of a strong and positive 
executive leadership, a product as much of his professional speculation as 
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of his recognition of the political necessity of freeing New Jersey from the 
exploitation of entrenched and corrupt privilege. This initial success in 
the state had been foreshadowed by an early brilliant record as president of 
Princeton University in bringing a more modern light into an institution 
living under the shadow of alumni and faculty orthodoxy. As President 
of the United States his original successes, particularly in fashioning a 
domestic program, were startling and brilliant. In his last role, the glob-
al one, as symbol of the world’s peoples’ aspirations for a life, spiritually, 
physically, and materially secure, he achieved an initial accomplishment 
that had never before been seen. In all the roles he filled, teacher, univer-
sity president, governor, president, and world leader, Wilson was only an 
unqualified success in one, that of teacher. Perhaps it is because students 
can rest largely content with inspiration and are not usually prepared to 
evaluate critically a teacher’s intellectual system.
In every case except this latter the brilliant beginning was doomed to find 
its denouement in bitter frustration, all the more poignant because Wilson 
was not generally and intellectually prepared to make those adjustments to 
events that might have entailed a pragmatic modification of creed. Where he 
did make the attempt by accepting the Versailles treaty with its compromises 
of his previously announced principles in order to get his league, he was be-
labored from all sides, from the doctrinairily liberal New Republic to the reac-
tionary Henry Cabot Lodge. His experiences with both consistency and tacti-
cal inconsistency were grim and bitter. The reasons seem somewhat obvious. 
Wilson had an inordinate capacity to offend those who were of Machiavellian 
temper with his public sense of moral rectitude. After the first inrush of success 
for his program, the old forces of compromise, bargain, and casuistry would re-
assert themselves and Wilson’s position was too clear and prominent to fail to 
be the chief target of the reaction. This result was a product of his dogmatism. 
His was the tragedy of the intellectual faced with politics who appears naïve 
because, particularly in his case, the truth he held to was rather more a rigid 
stricture than a process.
Wilson was the intellectual type referred to by E. H. Carr. As the latter 
writes, “To establish a general principle, and to test the particular in the light 
of that principle, he has been assumed by most intellectuals to be the neces-
sary foundation and starting point of any science.”4 With his ringing phrases 
and rhetoric, the intellectual “has an immense role to fill as the leader of 
public opinion.”5 He may, in fact, be prophetic, particularly to the extent that 
he exhorts men to avoid real dangers. But although he has a great capacity to 
lead public opinion, nature and temperament make it difficult for him to keep 
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in touch with it. He can inspire, but he consistently outstrips and perhaps 
finally bores those whom he once inspired. Wilson could inspire the many 
with his broad program and his vision of the future. “He [even] spoke with 
unchallengeable realism when he said that isolationism had been repealed by 
the forces of history; he spoke with prophetic vision when he said that if we 
did not set up an agency to prevent war, another and more terrible holocaust 
would engulf the next generation.”6 There was realism in his prophetic vision. 
Nevertheless, his rigid sense of rectitude and principle prevented him from 
making those adjustments that would have facilitated the final and continuing 
implementation of his program.
Wilson may be compared in pattern of thought with John Quincy Adams 
more than any other president.7 Both believed that if reason were employed 
with force and logic, truth would stand out with luminescent clarity. It was the 
leader’s function to reveal to the people truth through reason. If only the peo-
ple could be appealed to directly, they in their innocence and goodness would 
see the truth and pursue the right course from which they were constantly 
being turned by disingenuous and evil men. The people so moved, if their 
vision were unwarped by evil influence, might even be unanimous in their 
decision to do right. John Quincy Adams appealed to the people for a second 
term; forces of evil defeated him. Woodrow Wilson appealed to the people 
of the United States on behalf of the treaty and the League, to the people of 
the world in support of principles of high morality in international affairs, to 
the people of Italy over the heads of their political leaders; the principles he 
spoke, deriving ultimately from nature and nature’s god, could not control, for 
men evil by his standards preferred the old and tragic ways. Wilson and Adams 
were doomed to fall short of their ideal in life; for they could not be satisfied 
with much short of perfection.
He set the tone of his administration in his first inaugural address wherein 
he said that the occasion was one of “dedication” rather than “triumph.” The 
words were not mere rhetorical gestures. They meant to him a response to 
what he identified as his duty to express the new stirrings of the American 
peoples against privilege. In this response his function was beyond individ-
uals and parties and meant expressing the conscience and needs of the plain 
people of the nation.8 In foreign policy he conceived of a similar purpose. 
It was his duty to assist the Mexican people to achieve their rights. He thus 
refused recognition to the usurping tyrant, Huerta, and at the same time re-
fused to be pressed into war against Mexico, even under the severest prov-
ocation. The Mexican people should be given an opportunity to put their 
own house in order. They should be taught by this statesmen- schoolmaster to 
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choose sound and honest leaders, but intervention would mean that he was 
acting as an agent of special American and local interests rather than as Pres-
ident of the United States. His entire Latin American policy was designed to 
serve a higher common interest, rather than merely the interest of the United 
States. In fact, the highest interest of the United States could only be served 
by the development and support of a larger, common international interest. 
In his speech at Mobile, on October 27, 1913, addressed largely to the Latin 
American people, Wilson was not disregarding interest, he was attempting to 
inject a conception of higher service into foreign policy. It had immediate and 
practical effect upon our foreign policy, especially our Latin American policy. 
He was attempting to do the twin jobs of reacting soundly and hardheadedly 
to particular political issues and problems, and at the same time to provide an 
ideal of concord. Call it legalistic and moralistic if you will but his rationale 
was not merely a cover- up for a selfish American purpose.
One may illustrate the point with his handling of the Panama tolls ques-
tion. The Taft administration had concluded that the legislative exemption 
of United States coastwise shipping from the tolls was not a violation of the 
Hay- Pauncefote Treaty since the treaty’s guarantee of equal payment of tolls 
by “all nations” did not apply to the United States. This was a possible inter-
pretation of the words, but it did not express the spirit and intent of the trea-
ty. Despite the certain political repercussions and pressure from professional 
British haters and the shipping interests, he pushed for legislation rectifying 
this situation. His domestic political interest demanded or suggested that he 
take no such action, but he was attempting to serve a higher cause, to gain for 
the United states a reputation for honor and stern fulfillment of international 
engagements. This was in the interest of the United States and of the goal of 
building an international structure of law, the only possible framework with-
in which nations might remain free and secure and yet dynamic. To refer to 
Wilson’s words as a hypocritical disguise of national interest or as moralistic 
rhetoric often concealing the real interest in our statecraft, as Carr and Mor-
genthau do, is to neglect the fact that there may be a higher selfishness that 
can accommodate the aspirations of others. Findings of a naivety in Wilson 
should not be allowed to obscure the real, articulated goal he had in mind of a 
sounder international community.
The neutrality policy was spelled out over a long period to clarify the 
rights of the people of the United States under international law. The attempt 
to maintain the policy in the face of German violations was designed to face 
the German government with a clear legal order, the continued violation of 
which would entail final American participation in the war on the side of 
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the Allies. The American people were educated in their rights. The concept 
of an international legal order was maintained. A larger justification of our 
participation in the war was provided than isolated events such as the sinking 
of the Lusitania. And in final consistency with the neutrality policy, we were 
led into war on the side of the Allies not alone for reasons of moral affinity but 
because the president had seen from the beginning the interest we had along 
with Britain and France in preventing the overturn of the balance of power 
in Europe, although he announced his distaste for going to war solely for such 
reasons. He saw the need for a united country on the war issue; it would have 
been difficult to unite the people on a slogan calling for a redressing or main-
taining of the old world balance. He perhaps used words of sincere conviction 
when in his war message he stressed rather the fact that “there . . . [were] no 
other means of defending our rights,” meaning our maritime rights in terms of 
our cherished principle of freedom of the seas.9
Taking this emphasis into account, and, in addition to other direct or im-
plicit evidence, I am of the opinion that this does not suggest the entire con-
ception in Wilson’s mind. Even though he did not propose to enter the war to 
establish anew a European balance of power, he did counsel our entry because 
of the threat to the United States in the destruction of the old balance that 
would have been occasioned by German victory. Even this would not have 
been enough by itself. I submit there was even then in Wilson a higher type of 
realism in a recognition of the meaning to us of a victory of German militarism 
and a potential universal European German monarchy. He had already a de-
termination to alter the European system so as to prevent war through concert 
rather than through the balance of power. The latter was surely better than 
German hegemony, or the situation of conflict of powers with an attendant 
arms race such as had preceded the outbreak of war in 1914 for almost a gener-
ation, but balance itself had proved a delicate mechanism. Wilson recognized 
the changed and revolutionary nature of modern war and the catastrophe that 
impended if it could not be brought under control.
This is the most important issue upon which Wilson’s quality as a realist 
must stand. This question or the answer is not clear- cut. Authorities and writ-
ers on the subject differ. Perhaps no final answer can ever be given that does 
not in some degree depend upon definition of what, for example, one means 
by “realist.” I would contend that Wilson was a real realist, that, put another 
way, he illustrated the realism of idealism, a realism far more penetrating than 
that of a Clemenceau standing before a Chamber of Deputies sarcastically 
referring to Wilson’s noble candeur and calling for the re- establishment of the 
balance of power in the old sense.
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Professor Bailey contends that the United States did not enter the First 
World War “to save the Allies and redress the balance of power.”10 In this 
stress he is at odds with Walter Lippman11 and Spykman.12 He contends that 
this reads the present back in to the past, that it appears so plausible, because 
the theory so clearly fits the situation in 1941. Wilson, he states, abhorred the 
balance of power.13 Moreover, the people of the United States in general did 
not conceive of themselves as entering the war to aid the Allies or redress the 
balance. In support of the latter contention, he points out that the Allies were 
not generally considered to be in jeopardy in February and March of 1917. 
Baghdad was captured on March 11, 1917. The Germans had withdrawn to 
the Hindenburg Line in mid- March, giving up 1,300 square miles of French 
territory, the submarine toll was heavy but not especially alarming. The Al-
lies’ financial situation was not brought to the attention of the United States 
government by Hines’ telegram of March 5, five weeks after the Germans had 
announced their intention of forcing us into the war. In fact, the real danger 
of Allied collapse became apparent only after we entered war. Prior to that, 
many Americans had even thought of carrying on a war of limited liability 
until we had achieved the vindication of our maritime rights, following which 
we might have withdrawn from the war.
The importance, however, of considering Wilson’s views apart from those 
of the American people is clear. Historical development showed that import-
ant segments of the American people were not in step with the president in 
the periods after the tides of idealistic enthusiasm had receded, particularly 
prior to our entry into the war and following the Armistice.14 But after the 
revelation of the Zimmerman note, even the American people, and certainly 
Wilson, saw the nature of the German threat. Wilson’s thinking must be con-
sidered separately from those of the people. He remarked to Tumulty on the 
day of the delivery of the war message,
Tumulty, from the very beginning I saw the end of this horrible thing; but I 
could not move faster than the great mass of our people would permit. . . . In 
the policy of patience and forbearance I pursued, I tried to make every part of 
America and the varied elements of our population understand that we were 
willing to go any length rather than resort to war with Germany. As I told you 
months ago, it would have been foolish for us to have rushed off our feet and to 
have gone to war over an isolated affair like the Lusitania.15
True, he asserted that Germany had to be made to understand that we had 
rights that must be respected. Wilson, however, from the beginning did not 
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see merely that we would have to go to war to protect our maritime and neu-
tral rights, as rights important alone to the American people. He was thinking 
of the force of international law and the stability of the structure of treaties, a 
part of general international law.
Moreover, as Tumulty points out, in late 1916 “the President was convinced 
that we were now approaching a real crisis in our relations with Germany and 
that unless peace could be quickly obtained, the European struggle would soon 
enter upon a phase more terrible than any in the preceding, with consequences 
highly dangerous to the interests of our country.”16 During the first two years of the 
war he frequently made statements to his intimates that showed a concern for 
Britain’s interests and French interests against the threat from Germany to the 
European balance that had given them political, although short- lived security. 
The determination to resist ruthless submarine warfare was a determination 
to resist a threat to the maritime and naval power of the United States and 
Britain, which had been a major means of maintaining the European balance. 
It was a larger view than the perspective of the necessity to protect maritime 
interest which caused him to say in a campaign speech in 1916: “This is the last 
war of its kind of any kind that involves the world that the United States can 
keep out of. I say that because I believe that the business of neutrality is over.”17
Bailey, is, I think, wrong in referring to the whole American people, if he 
meant to include the president and certain important sectors of American 
opinion and certain other individuals in high places, such as Walter Hines 
Page in London. Lippmann and Spykman almost certainly do not sufficiently 
qualify their contentions so as to indicate that Wilson was leading a people 
reluctant and poorly educated to see their interest in the turn of the struggle in 
Europe. If the American people had seen clearly, they would not have deserted 
the president when it came time to construct the peace.
Wilson’s Manchester speech on December 30, 1918, in which he stated, 
replying to Clemenceau, that we were not interested in supporting the old bal-
ance of power is not inconsistent with his recognition that the threat to and 
attack upon the old balance had placed American security in jeopardy. Rather 
than manifesting the “noble simplicity” imputed to him by Clemenceau, he 
exposes the simplicity of the so- called realists who can, even in this critical 
epoch, believe that the best road to the future leads along the stark way of 
realpolitik. The question may be asked today whether the present stress in for-
eign policy upon realistic, ad hoc reaction to day- to- day problems without the 
guidance of a larger ideal than mere political necessity is serving our interests. 
Wilson saw the devices of the past with some, if not sufficient, clarity. He saw 
them as wanting and deficient, and proposed to lead the world into a time of 
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concert and agreement in which balance and politics would not be ended but 
contained within a larger ideal. The tragedy of his failure derives from the fact 
that realists insisted we cannot expect so much and most idealistic followers 
expected too much and found it easy in their disappointment to fall back into 
despair.
I find it easy to see naïveté and noble simplicity in Wilson, on occasion 
perhaps ill- suited to meet his problems. But what more can Professor Morgen-
thau ask for than Wilson’s call for a peace without victory,18 which would have 
left a political foundation upon which to a construct or to continue to build 
an international political consensus? This was no seeing of the struggle as be-
tween good and evil without shadings. Later, to be sure, Wilson demanded an 
overturning of the political institutions of the enemy that made it certain that 
the end could only be total surrender, but his record at the peace conference 
shows that he fought vigorously to temper the peace with consideration for 
the sensibilities of the defeated peoples. He resisted going to see the French 
devastated areas so as to avoid the emotive impact the sight would have upon 
him.
The weaknesses of Woodrow Wilson are clear for all to see. The candor of 
the man did not disguise aspects of character or personality or thought under 
a cloak of mystery. But it is all too easy whilst inspecting the weakness to 
overlook the viability and significance of Wilsonian idealism as containing a 
promise than man can go beyond the present stage. Politics will not end, and 
Wilson did not promise that. He urged the necessity that in the international 
sphere they placed on a higher level of concert and agreement. If that is a 
condition of survival, who then is the realist?
Realism, Idealism, and the Nation­ State
Bertrand Russell lists three alternatives before mankind:19
 “I. The end of human life, perhaps of all life on our planet.
 “II. A reversion to barbarism after a catastrophic diminution of the popula-
tion of the globe.
 “III. A unification of the world under a single government, possessing a mo-
nopoly of all the major weapons of war.”
Finding no way to increase the number of these alternatives, I suggest that 
both the idealism of Wilson and the realism of, for example, Morgenthau be 
Revised Pages
Sixth Meeting—Wilsonian Idealism 217
inspected to discover the means they may suggest in the search for the surviv-
al of human life. Both so- called idealistic and realistic approaches should be 
inspected and means eclectically selected from them, particularly those means 
that may be employed to take men beyond the stage of power political rela-
tions between states. For it is obvious that Russell’s alternatives assign no role 
over the long haul, or long decline, to the national state as we now know it. 
Both approaches should be inspected, therefore, for the purpose of determin-
ing how much they continue to assign a continuing function to the nation- 
state. If Russell is right the degree to which they do so may be a measure of the 
irrelevance of the means they suggest to the present critical epoch.
Professor Morgenthau appears to me to call for a continuation of candid 
power politics among nation- states or loose associations among them. Over 
the long haul, this promises the first two of Russell’s alternatives rather than 
the third, which I take it we all would prefer. Since we have dealt with Profes-
sor Morgenthau at length in another place, it suffices to refer to him here for 
two reasons. First, he presents a persuasive case for his so- called realistic posi-
tion, if we neglect to note what the end product is almost certain to be. Mor-
genthau’s misfortune is that, since his promises make him unable to counsel 
the adventuresome and novel response required to meet a unique situation, he 
cannot advise more than too little, and that almost certainly too late. Second, 
he makes a direct attack upon Wilsonian idealism; this, at least negatively, is 
the core of his argument.
A critical evaluation of Wilsonian idealism is prompted by more than 
Morgenthau’s attack. The tradition of which Wilson’s thought and action are 
a part remains an important one, even though today it must compete against 
even stronger views and conceptions of Realpolitik than those parochial views 
that occasioned its defeat following World War I. In the light of our premises 
here, the evaluation of this idealism should be critical, that is, close, ana-
lytical, and objective. The Wilsonian view does not reduce the emphasis on 
the nation- state and its politics, although a higher morality is presumed to be 
capable of keeping excesses and frictions under control. Indeed, a fragmenta-
tion and multiplication of states as a product of the principle of national self- 
determination occurred to confound the best devices, in particular the League 
of Nations, erected to secure peace under this higher morality. But considering 
the Morgenthau type of realism and Wilsonian idealism together, one may 
contend that the latter looks more definitely beyond today to that condition 
which our statement of alternatives makes essential to survival, that is the 
development of a general supernational and authoritative global government. 
The question arises, who then is the sounder realist, Morgenthau or Wilson?
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The frame of reference for testing the merits of the realist and idealist 
approaches must include more than the condition of survival, i.e., the emer-
gence of a single world government. The means of achieving this condition 
are equally important. Russell contends that only a quick and early war or 
show of force, precipitated by the United States or the Soviet Union, could 
produce this recognition or situation. He prefers that the United States should 
calculate wisely and take this preventive action, and he assumed at the time 
of writing that we had a preponderance of strength so clear for the other side 
to see that they would rationally decide to capitulate before war was actually 
begun. Failing that, our preponderance would be so decisive in war that the 
conflict would be determined or terminated on the constructive side of Ar-
mageddon. The question at present is whether Russell’s margin of safety in 
time has been consumed. If it has, then in terms of his construct we have no 
alternative to a decline to barbarism or total destruction. But constructs have 
a way of proving to be overly rigid under the corrosive impact of time. They 
prove to be not revelations of truth, but guides to action and understanding. 
It may remain true that Russell’s third condition is the condition of survival 
in the long run. The means he counsels for bringing about that condition are 
more problematical. Moreover, the last opportunity to employ them may have 
disappeared, for the essential preponderance of strength on one side probably 
no longer exists. It would nevertheless be too early in the game, for philosoph-
ical and emotional reasons, to accept counsels of despair as controlling. It is 
reasonable for us, therefore, to continue to weigh and evaluate the available 
means on the ground that there is some constructive advantage in doing so.
Morgenthau does not look forward in the discernible future to the estab-
lishment of an authoritative world political order. His system maintains that 
justice is the result of the application of effective power. But he also counsels 
the maintenance of the interaction of political forces in a way that may, given 
self- restraint on the part of statesmen and nations, produce the global con-
sensus necessary to the development of an authoritative world political order. 
Should it appear, it will not be because Morgenthau himself foresaw such a 
development; but he does at least call for the building of the structure from 
the ground up. On the other hand, Wilson’s moralistic charges demanded a 
leap into the future on the assumption that a luminescent moral order would 
sustain a new international system. The analogy is rather that of the build-
er who attempts first to construct the roof rather than the foundation. With 
respect to the means, Morgenthau and Wilson may again be compared. The 
question arises as to who is the sounder realist. On superficial glance at least, 
Morgenthau, although his vision is not so much upon the future, may make 
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the more constructive contribution. That is, if we may today be content with 
conventional devices. If, on the other hand, we require an entirely unique 
course of action, perhaps nothing sort of what Wilson demanded will suffice. 
The fact that the challenge cannot be met is not an effective argument against 
the thesis; it is merely a measure of the tragedy of the situation.
A theorist must claim to be a realist. The conventional idealist is, there-
fore, asserting the realism of idealism. The conventional realist asserts that 
the data his realism regards as describing the truth are sufficient as guides to 
political action, if not to metaphysical speculation. The analyst must inspect 
the assertion of the realism of idealism and not rest content with the sur-
mise or the charge that idealism (or moralistic or legalistic thought) does not 
or cannot face up to the political challenge. It is especially required that we 
face the problem in this way today, since there is no reason to believe that 
conventional, realistic approaches to political issues cannot solve our unique, 
contemporary problems. Possibly at last we must either leap into a new world 
or perish. If that is true, who then is the realist?
The burden that we can place upon the idealist is that he makes every 
attempt to square his idealistic views or goals with sound views of political 
possibility. This does not necessarily mean that he must accept power politics 
as the dominant and exclusive factor forever in the international sphere. He 
may entertain the hope and belief that power politics among nations may be 
controlled eventually as they are domestically to a degree. Power may be so de-
fined as to be the essence of every human relationship, but in my opinion such 
a definition does not take full account of variations in the quality of human 
relations or of the capacity for a mutual understanding of the obligations that 
may be imposed upon all parties by an accepted moral or legal system. Critics 
of Wilson’s idealism often refer disparagingly to his address at Mobile before the 
Southern Commercial Congress.20 We can agree with Morgenthau that “moral 
judgments and political actions show wide divergencies.”21 It is not necessary 
to accept the view that, since there is so there are principles of political action, 
entirely apart from morality, that should be the exclusive guide of statesmen. 
Nor is it necessary or wise to neglect such principles in favor of a high- flown 
morality. Somewhere between there is a position that may be stated in general 
terms. Specific applications must wait for the unfolding of events.
Wilson in the Mobile address asserted that “Human rights, national in-
tegrity, and opportunity as against material interest is the issue which we now 
have to face.”22 The United States had reached the fulfillment of its territorial 
ambitions and would not “seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.” 
He thus could turn to support of a higher interest, that of the Western hemi-
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sphere as a whole, in terms of the interest of the people generally in human 
rights and the integrity of nations. He was not abandoning the concept of 
interest, but he was calling for loyalty to an interest higher than an egocentric, 
national, material power interest. Granted that his language lends itself to 
support of a smug sense of national rectitude and misuse by those who think 
that interest can be abandoned in favor of a vague superior law, the context of 
his thought indicates that he was attempting to go beyond the national inter-
est to a general interest among nations. His rhetoric does not show that he had 
thought the problem through, but his language and his actions together show 
he did not lose sight of the conditions of national survival, on the one hand, 
whilst he rested discontent with a purely parochial national view, on the oth-
er. The national integrity that he posited was not merely that of small nations 
but also that of the United States, a concept that could comprehend the idea 
of national interest. It was his good fortune to be the leader of a nation that 
by the blessings of history could be considered satisfied, if not surfeited. It was 
easier for him therefore, on this ground, as well as by virtue of the special sense 
of mission that America’s geographical and historical detachment helped to 
produce, to proclaim a new day for the international community. Power poli-
tics is a device for working change in history and change is the most constant 
factor in history. Wilson’s plea on behalf of national integrity and settled pro-
cesses under law did not amount to a conservative defense of an unnatural 
status quo. His political career, particularly his advocacy of the League of Na-
tions, demonstrates that he was concerned with producing, on a higher level 
than that of pure power politics, the means of accomplishing peaceful change.
Wilson “disparaged a foreign policy inspired by egotism.”23 By that he 
meant a foreign policy that did not regard for the common good. He perhaps 
naïvely thought that such a policy could be devised that “would no longer be 
moved by calculations of power.”24 The latter conception was not adequate 
but the aspirations he demanded are perhaps the minimum conditions of sur-
vival. As some have pointed out, “the utilization of a national interest concept 
based upon a moral appeal as the firmament of our foreign policy, holds out the 
greatest promise for meeting the challenge of events that lie ahead.”25 Work-
ing from historical analogy, which does not indicate that power politics can 
avoid war, the alternative is an attempt to substitute for war a higher moral 
aspiration with a full awareness of the difficulties. The very existence of Wil-
son is proof that power politics may be diluted by a different motivation on a 
higher level of moral aspiration. This does not mean that statecraft may escape 
egotism, but national egotism can come to serve a general rather than a purely 
parochial interest.
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In preceding papers, I have asserted that no observer or analyst may con-
sider the data of his field except in terms of an informing theory. Such a theory 
will be compounded of knowledge of which one may be highly certain and 
areas of ignorance and doubt in which values will function. Even Morgenthau 
cannot assert that he is the unqualifiedly real realist, for his informing theory 
is certainly highly personal. His value causes him to be the self- proclaimed 
realist, and his realistic theory is a spectrum through which he views the world 
about him. And certainly the same must be said of Wilsonian theory. The 
questions that are relevant with respect to both are as follows: The theory of 
which of them mostly nearly explains or describes the real world as being and 
process? Which theory as a manipulative tool gives higher promise of serving 
man in seeking to survive?
All morality must be in the beginning personal, as Professor Warner Fite 
asserted in his lectures on “Individualism” delivered at the University of Chi-
cago in 1909, “for consciousness of personal aims  .  .  . [is] the beginning of 
morality.”26 Neither Morgenthau nor Wilson could escape, with the beginning 
of such consciousness, the beginning of a personal moral system; and “there 
can be no higher standard of obligation for individuals than that set by per-
sonal ends and ideals.” The viability of a social order will depend upon how 
much those ends and ideals call for a commitment “to the ends of each of the 
others.”27 Woodrow Wilson had a higher degree of confidence that this com-
mitment could be enlarged to apply to relations between nations and states. 
This idealism depreciated the view that states are fundamentally beyond mo-




The chairman called the meeting to order and, after noting the Wilsonian 
position was up for discussion that evening, suggested that a useful approach 
might be that of identifying the major points of contrast between Wilsonian 
idealism and so- called realpolitik. This might lead the group into a discussion 
of the basic points of issue existing between the two approaches, and beyond, 
to the tacit or conscious assumptions which lay behind those points. He was 
thinking of the assumptions which each school made with regard to such 
problems as the nature of human behavior, the nature of power, the national 
interest and its relation to power, and so forth. What he hoped would emerge 
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was a clarification of the real underlying beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations 
which characterize the two schools. Such a procedure might give the group 
some idea of what is essential to a theory of international relations. The chair-
man called upon Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.
Mr. Lipsky noted that there had been a period in his life when he had been 
rather sympathetic to Morgenthau’s approach, especially with reference to his 
critique of Wilsonian idealism. Subsequently his attitude toward Wilson has 
become more ambivalent although he is still impressed with the high content 
of religious conviction which permeated Wilson’s theory and with Wilson’s 
tendency to express himself in “bromidic clichés” and sweeping generalizations.
On the other hand, many critics tend to dip into expressions of Wilson’s 
thought to support their so- called realism. The dichotomy of realism vs. ide-
alism might be a basic issue for international political theory. In any case, it 
seems obvious that both the idealist and the realist must view international 
politics through an informing theory. Thus Morgenthau’s realism cannot be 
divorced from his underlying system of values and, hence, Morgenthau works 
at the same level of operation as did Wilson. The main issue as to which 
is the realist therefore reduces itself to a determination as to which theory 
or theoretical emphasis is most conducive to a man’s survival at this critical 
juncture in world history. In terms of the alternatives posed by Russell, noted 
in the working paper, the realist approach does not provide adequate answers 
for avoiding a holocaust. This conclusion can be confirmed by reference to 
historical analogy. Therefore, there seems to be practical as well as theoretical 
grounds for reinterpreting Wilson in terms of idealism and realism.
The main critique offered by the realists, Mr. Lipsky continued, is that 
Wilsonian theory, in the last analysis, is an attempt to find a substitute for 
politics in the sense that interest motivation is the basic force in the political 
process. Such critique is in error, Mr. Lipsky thought. Wilson was not trying 
to find a means for ending the political process but was rather urging a kind 
of politics in which considerations of interest are placed on a higher, more 
generous level. Wilson was urging the raising of politics to the level of the 
international community in which statesmen would regard the community’s 
interest as a vital factor in their policy calculations. Wilson felt that the idea 
of a community interest must be created to avoid a community catastrophe.
The realist position is, of course, that no such community exists— that it 
is a myth accepted to be a viable guide for human behavior. But to maintain 
that the international community neither exists nor can be created in the 
near future is synonymous with maintaining, in view of the development of 
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atomic weapons, that one of Russell’s first two alternatives is unavoidable. 
Thus the critical question, in terms of realism and idealism, is whether the 
political process can be moved to the higher level of the international com-
munity through international organization. Since Wilson urged this course 
there are good grounds for maintaining that the idealists are realists and the 
so- called realists do not furnish sufficiently realistic answers for avoiding their 
own destructions.
Definitions of Idealism and Realism
Professor Wolfers felt there should be some clarification of the term “realism.” 
He thought there were two ways of defining realism. Mr. Lipsky had defined it 
as a solution guaranteed to assure survival on the ground that it is unrealistic 
to advocate a course leading to catastrophe. But realism is not the elaboration 
of the perfect theoretical solution. Every member of the group would no doubt 
agree that world government is the answer to war, but the realist must ask 
whether the world as he knows it can reach a state of organization sufficiently 
cohesive to support world government in the near future.
In terms of both definitions, Professor Wolfers continued, Wilson seemed 
to be disqualified as a realist. In the first place, his proposals for international 
security fall far short of the theoretically perfect solution to the problem of 
survival since world government was never his ultimate objective. In the sec-
ond place, Wilson’s assumptions about international political behavior do not 
conform to the realities of life.
Professor Holborn suggested that if Wilson was an idealist, he voiced a 
peculiar type of idealism— an ethical type of idealism. The professor doubted 
whether Wilson’s approach could be adequately discussed in terms of idealism 
vs. realism. He felt that Wilson’s real position had not been sufficiently record-
ed in the working paper. It is true that Wilson was Christian, but he believed 
in a special type of Christianity— a Christianity which placed great faith in 
the basic morality of men and the progress of mankind. That faith is certainly 
not true for many variations of Christian belief, including Calvinism. What 
Wilson proposed was the mobilization of the vast latent moral content inher-
ent in man and so to raise history to be a higher, more “Christian” level of 
behavior. To do so meant first to defeat the “Devilish” forces such as autocracy 
and monopoly which led men astray from their truer instincts. Those forces 
must be swept aside and in their place must be rooted democratic institutions 
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through which the real aspirations of mankind could be realized. In that way 
governments would pursue cooperative, rational, and non- acquisitive policies 
and war would no longer be a problem.
Mr. Niemeyer remarked that Wilsonian idealism was very close to Marx-
ism in its analysis of human nature.
Mr. Lipsky said he had Wilson’s views with regard to the mobilization of 
morality and the realization of democracy very much in mind when he wrote 
the working paper. With regard to Professor Wolfers’ comment, he thought 
that political realism might be considered in three different ways: first, as the 
nature of politics as it currently operates; second, as the employment of means 
for achieving certain defined ends; and third, as suggesting what must be done 
to assure man’s survival. On the final point a continuing debate could be de-
veloped between the realists and idealists. Historical analogy is fairly conclu-
sive as to the inadequacy of the means suggested by the so- called realists for 
avoiding atomic war.
The chairman thought it more realistic if the group limited itself to abol-
ishing the use of the terms “realism” and “idealism.” Actually, the idealist 
position could be argued on quite different grounds than those offered here. 
World government could only be constructed on a more durable consensus 
than that existing today— for example, the consensus that might grow if the 
world were invaded by forces from another planet. In any case, he suggested 
that the group move on to a discussion of the basic differences and assump-
tions of the two schools.
Mr. Zinner agreed. He described himself as being both fascinated and per-
plexed by the discussion to that point. He felt that the chairman had started 
matters off on the right track as the focus of the discussion for that evening 
but now wondered whether the group was attempting to analyze Wilsonian 
idealism and its assumptions or whether it was attempting to formulate a solu-
tion to avert an imminent catastrophe and survive the threat posed by Soviet 
Russia or, finally, whether the assumption that world government is a substi-
tute for international politics but rather an objective of international politics. 
In any case, he thought it might be useful to have a “ruling from the chair” on 
which of these questions might be most fruitfully discussed.
The chairman said Mr. Zinner’s remarks touched a sympathetic note in 
him. He thought it would be useful for the group to seek to examine how much 
it could do by way of constructing a theory of international relations. The first 
question which arises, naturally, is what is meant by a theory of international 
relations. The chairman ventured that a theory of international relations is 
one concerned with the conditions and presuppositions of an organization 
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in which nations are related for accomplishing certain purposes. Throughout 
history some order of relations has existed among nations, whether expressed 
in terms of concerts, balances of power, or other systems. A theory of interna-
tional relations must deal with more than such types of relationship; it must 
deal with more important purposes than such things as assuring internation-
al telecommunications and the transit of mail. It should be a theory setting 
forth the condition for reasonable intercourse among nations— a theory under 
which an international order of some endurance could exist.
Mr. Zinner remarked that the dichotomy of atomic war vs. world govern-
ment might be a false one. A world war might itself lay the basis for a world 
order established by the victor. Mr. Lipsky noted that Russell himself had ad-
vocated a preventive war in 1950 but would probably not do so now since the 
margin of safety then assumed by Russell has subsequently disappeared. Profes-
sor Holborn questioned Russell’s position and the value, in terms of discussing 
Wilsonian theory, of referring to Russell at all.
Wilson and World Government
Professor Wolfers questioned whether Wilson had ever suggested or implied 
the need for world government. Rather, he felt, Wilson had suggested that 
with the growth of democracy, nations would operate in harmony; hence there 
would be no need for world government. Mr. Lipsky believed that Wilson 
had hinted at impending catastrophe if the old ways were followed and at the 
need to develop institutions capable of coping with the situation. Professor 
Holborn noted that Wilson had explicitly rejected the French proposals for 
establishing an international police force to maintain the Versailles system as 
simply a façade for French imperialism and an attempt to freeze the status quo. 
The League system of collective security was to be a reasoned, ad hoc response 
by the world community to the threat of an occasional transgressor. Profes-
sor Wolfers agreed. Wilson, he held, believed that if people were given their 
freedom, enjoyed democracy and self- determination, the basic conditions for 
world harmony would be satisfied, except, perhaps, for an occasional irrational 
retrogression— and even these would eventually die out.
Continuing, Professor Wolfers wondered whether the group should assume 
that the only solution to the basic problem of international relations is in the 
establishment of a monopoly of violence in the hands of a world state and that 
solutions of a lower order of magnitude are not worth considering.
Mr. Lipsky pointed out that Secretary of State Lansing had parted ways 
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with Wilson because he, Lansing, considered that Wilson was moving danger-
ously close to the idea of a world state.
Types of International Relations: Theory
Mr. Thompson said it was obvious that Wilson was a person endeavoring to 
match his philosophical commitments with his practical political responsi-
bilities. With regard to the chairman’s remarks on the nature of a theory of 
international relations, Mr. Thompson recalled some suggestions which Wal-
ter Lippmann had made, during a recent discussion,* on types of theories of 
international relations. Mr. Lippmann had suggested three kinds:
First there is what might be termed an operational theory of international 
relations dealing with the assumptions and attitudes of given statesmen and 
the relationship of those to foreign policy. It might be useful, for example, to 
draw up a series of studies on successive secretaries of state along analytical 
lines and discover what, if any, relationship existed between the man and the 
conduct and aims of US foreign policy for that period. Certainly the role and 
responsibility of the statesman is a peculiar one and not the same as that of the 
scholar— the statesman must temporize and accommodate and he is subject to 
diverse pressures. Studies of the way statesmen react and behave might be a 
source of international relations theory.
Second, Mr. Thompson continued, Mr. Lippmann referred to rational 
theories of international relations by which he meant theories which seek to 
provide a rational picture of the international scene. Such theories attempt to 
identify the elements of uniformity and continuity in the international polit-
ical process while at the same time giving proper attention to the variables. 
Interests are a major element of uniformity in international relations and pat-
terns of interaction develop. Pressures of interest result in such configurations 
as a particular balance of power or, more generally, in the development of 
international organization and law. The permanency of a particular config-
uration is dependent upon the endurance of the interests which underlie it. 
US– Canadian solidarity is an example of a relatively long- term configuration.
Finally, there is what Mr. Lippmann described as the normative approach 
to international relations. Wilson might be considered to be within this 
grouping yet with Wilson, norms and practices were often confused. Certainly 
*[DM: Thompson is almost certainly referring here to the Rockefeller Foundation Confer-
ence on International Relations Theory, 7– 8 May 1954. See Guilhot 2011.]
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some of those were a conviction of progress in the affairs of men, a humanitar-
ian, Christian interpretation of human behavior, and a failure sufficiently to 
distinguish between the city of God and the city of men. Similarly, Niebuhr 
has a normative approach to international relations. He relates such norms as 
justice, liberty, and equality to the international environment and determin-
ing the extent to which they are realized or not realized.
With reference to Mr. Thompson’s remarks, the chairman expressed skep-
ticism as to whether Lippmann had really defined three levels of theory. The 
first is simply a methodological approach, the second is simply a descriptive 
picture, and the third is simply a collection of postulates. The chairman sug-
gested rather that a theory of international relations is one which is concerned 
with a structure of international relationships, organized to serve certain pur-
poses. The definition of those purposes is a major problem in constructing 
a theory, but the structure should be strong enough and durable enough to 
assure that any international conflict will be brought before a court of law. 
In concluding, the chairman doubted whether one could advance very far in 
formulating a theory of international relations except in terms of a structure.
In response to an observation by Mr. Thompson, the chairman suggested 
that both Carr and Morgenthau seem to be arguing against a particular struc-
ture. Professor Wolfers thought that Lippmann’s second approach was one de-
signed to move from the data to a conceptual idea of the structure while his 
third approach was to establish the structure first and then proceed to evolve 
a theory from it.
Mr. Niemeyer ventured that a theory of international relations might be 
concerned with two basic questions: first, a description of the international 
political process as it actually operates, and second, an explanation of that 
process, with an economy of thought, in terms of a central concept. The con-
cept need not be related to a particular structure. Mr. Niemeyer feared that if 
one confined one’s terms of a reference to structure, one “stacked the cards” in 
terms of arriving at a theory of world government.
The chairman thought that his use of the word “structure” might have 
been misunderstood. What he meant was a nexus or a system of accommoda-
tion. Professor Holborn suggested “pattern” or “configuration.” The chairman 
agreed and went on to note that the theory must go beyond mere description 
of patterns of relations which have existed among nations in the past. Mr. 
Thompson concurred that descriptions should provide the basis for analysis. 
He thought such analysis would reveal certain irreducible and continuing el-
ements in international politics. The chairman agreed and remarked that Mr. 
Thompson was now “theorizing” rather than simply describing.
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In response to a comment made by Mr. Lichenstein, the chairman thought 
that no useful analogy could be drawn between the theory of physics and so-
cial science theory. Mr. Lichenstein felt an identification of methodology be-
tween the natural and social sciences might be useful. The chairman asserted 
that the inductive method has never worked in either the natural or social 
world; that is, theory is never derived from a background of information. Mr. 
Niemeyer thought that, methodologically, one should begin by forming a hy-
pothesis. However, if one were to begin with structure as one’s hypothesis, the 
hypothesis would be “loaded” in favor of world government. He personally felt 
out of sympathy with such a hypothesis.
Mr. Thompson noted the development of a so- called “realistic” trend in 
American political science. He thought it was related to the development 
of the idea of interest in relation to international political behavior. But it 
was also wise, he felt, to point out the operation of purpose in international 
politics. Different nations have different purposes and these purposes— such 
as the preservation of individual freedom in this country— themselves vary 
though time. Purpose and interest operate and interact in a complex way in 
international politics. He was reminded of the former US diplomat who once 
remarked that he gathered enough information, in the course of private con-
versations with Jacob Malik, to be able to ruin Malik as a Soviet diplomat. Yet 
even if it had been in the US interest to remove Malik from the scene, the 
American could not have revealed that information, for doing so would have 
been inimical to his personal code of ethics. No doubt, Mr. Thompson con-
tinued, a case could have been made five or so years ago for a “preventive war” 
against the USSR, yet such a move was unthinkable in terms of America’s 
national purposes. Thus every nation’s foreign policy is a complex of specific 
interests and moral purposes.
Professor Wolfers noted that Plato and Locke could be characterized as 
normative political theorists. Both speculated on the preconditions of good 
government. Some international relations theorists think the same approach 
can be applied in their field. As applied to international relations, the ques-
tion often takes the form, “what are the minimum conditions necessary to 
prevent international anarchy?” Such notions as world democracy, free trade, 
and world government have been suggested. As distinct from this normative 
approach, Professor Wolfers continued, there is the scientific approach which 
begins with the question, “how does the world of international politics really 
operate?” and proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework or a tentative 
hypothesis for answering that question. Such concepts or hypotheses are, of 
course, discarded if they do not sufficiently conform to the facts of interna-
tional life.
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Mr. Lichenstein wondered whether there was much difference between 
the two approaches. Both are dependent on a full understanding of the in-
ternational political process if they are to avoid becoming sheer abstractions.
Professor Holborn suggested that a lesser, but perhaps more practical objec-
tive of international relations theory than that suggested by Professor Wolfers is 
the counseling of shorter- range improvements in relationships among nations.
The chairman suggested that particular attention be drawn to the fact 
that the field is characterized by relationships; that is, patterns or contexts. 
These patterns can be described as they develop through history. Such a sur-
vey would be a vast job. Moreover the international relations theorists does 
not have the material to work with in the same sense as the physicist has. The 
international relations theorist is obliged to work from sources of relations 
or different schemes which have arisen through history. A given scheme of 
relations is operative today. One might begin by asking how well does that 
scheme relate to changing interests and changing demands of peoples and 
governments. It would seem that the fact of change is primary in the field and 
one might inquire as to how well this existing scheme accommodates change 
and facilitates adjustments.
Professor Wolfers wondered how it is possible to theorize about changing de-
mands when not a great deal is known about the nature of those demands. The 
chairman ventured that it is pretty well known, for example, that mankind fears 
war more than ever before. Mr. Zinner remarked that men also seem to fear des-
potism more than ever before and would usually prefer war to despotism if given 
the choice. Professor Wolfers thought there is also a greater fear of insecurity than 
has previously ever existed, so much so that this nation is, for example, willing to 
contemplate war because of the increased insecurity which would result from the 
loss of Indo- China. Mr. Thompson recalled that during the interwar period many 
publicists in international relations thought that the price of war had risen to such 
an exorbitant level that rational people would never consider it.
The Role of Value in Theory
Mr. Zinner remarked that while he apparently represented the “muddled end 
of the table” a few concepts did appear to be emerging from the discussion. 
In any theory, fact and value are hopelessly intertwined. There is perhaps a 
more or less normative approach and a more or less scientific approach, but it 
is commonly taken for granted that no theory is entirely devoid of value judg-
ment. What is important, however, is that value should be kept to a minimum, 
or at least, be identified.
230 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
With regard to the question “what is theory?,” Mr. Zinner continued, the 
following definition might be considered appropriate: “a theory is a general-
ized explanation pertaining to a set of related phenomena.” The first ques-
tion which therefore arises is: what are the phenomena about which one is 
attempting to theorize and how are they related? Other questions which arise 
concern what the theory explains and how the theory attempts to do so. Fur-
ther, one might ask, what does the theory propose to do; how does it help man 
understand himself and his environment? In asking such questions, two factors 
might be borne in mind: first, what are the limitations of theory— that is, 
how much can be explained by theory; and second, are the phenomena which 
make up the field of international affairs such as to permit a theory at all?
Mr. Lichenstein thought than an objective of international relations theo-
ry might be able to enable nation- states to behave more rationally in their in-
ternational relationships, that is to achieve greater consistency between their 
objectives and their means. This is also, he noted, one sense in which theory 
can be said to be value- free. Mr. Zinner observed that both the US and the 
USSR could be pursuing their respective foreign policies quite rationally and 
yet be diametrically opposed to each other.
In response to a comment by the chairman, Mr. Zinner said that empirical 
verification of an international relations theory is never fully possible. The 
chairman agreed and thought that no theory in the social sciences can ever 
be fully verified. The most one can hope for is a higher probability in one 
direction or another.
With regard to a reference made by Mr. Zinner to the allusion to “inevita-
bilities” found in Leninism, the chairman felt that a distinction should be made 
between theory and dogma. With regard to Wilson, the chairman thought 
there were elements of both, with the dogmatic element relatively high. Pro-
fessor Wolfers believed that Wilson not only had a notion of the world as he 
would have liked it to be but a notion of the world as it was. Wilson’s idealism 
might be termed “reality around the corner.” By introducing the League, he 
hoped to produce in fact what he thought was normatively desirable.
Professor Holborn remarked that Wilson’s belief in the power of the free 
individual was probably more correct in 1913 than in 1918 or 1919. Historic 
forces had been set in motion by the war, especially nationalism, the identi-
fication of man with the nation, and Bolshevism. Wilson himself was eventu-
ally defeated by US nationalism.
Mr. Niemeyer expressed the idea that insofar as theory might be consid-
ered a mental process by means of which nations can act more rationally to-
ward one another, theory should select out those facts and forces operative in 
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the international field which advance the purposes of “the good life.” By this 
he meant not the good life in terms of nations but in terms of individual men.
Mr. Roberts noted that the statement “the balance of power is now forever 
discredited” is a normative statement while “the balance of power is the way 
nations operate” is a descriptive one. But Wilson’s statement can be altered: 
“If the balance of power is played long enough there will be no one left to 
play it.” If this last statement is wrong, that would be duly noted by political 
science; if it is correct then it, together with the second statement, poses an 
immense normative problem.
Professor Wolfers remarked that Wilson would probably have added that 
if his sins were put into effect there would no longer be a need for balance 
of power relationships since all nations would behave as a family. Generally 
speaking, in posing the question “how can I get to my goal,” one might quar-
rel, on the other hand, with the questioner’s goal or, on the other, with the 
procedures he advocates for reaching that goal.
Professor Holborn observed that Wilson rejected the balance of power re-
lationship and wished to substitute for it a community of power. Moreover, 
Wilson saw only a loose community of power as being necessary since, with 
the spread of democracy and world public opinion, an occasional aggressor 
would immediately be confronted by an aroused and outraged world. Actually, 
the UN was merely an attempt to improve upon the Wilsonian idea— hence 
the new international organization was to be exempted from the responsibility 
of peace making and it recognized the necessity of great power unanimity.
Mr. Niemeyer expressed puzzlement over the distinction between predic-
tion and normative judgment. Wilson’s predictions contained postulates or 
normative elements. That is to say, there was an arrangement of facts as moti-
vated by a norm. Wilson’s rebuttal to non- believers, like that of the Christian 
religion, was “you can’t know unless you have tried.” To the extent that one 
makes this the basis of policy making, one converts politics into a religion.
Mr. Thompson commented that nations tend to identify their own nation-
al purposes with common, universal purposes. Thus the US tends to identify 
its own security purposes as serving the common objectives of law and order 
while equating those threatening its security with lawbreakers.
The Substance of International Relations: Moral Purpose
Professor Holborn stated that, in reflecting upon the pre- dinner discussion, he 
was still concerned about the problem of what was made up the field of study 
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known as international relations. The definition that international relations is 
concerned with the relations between nation- states he regarded as inadequate. 
The existence and influence of transnational ideologies and class communities 
certainly make themselves felt in the world of international behavior. They 
also make the picture much more complex.
A second and even more serious problem from the standpoint of historical 
understanding, Professor Holborn continued, is the tendency to discuss pol-
itics in terms of a dichotomy of realistic analysis or idealistic norms. History 
just does not operate that way. People do not act on the basis of realistic inter-
pretation but on the basis of moral ideals and ambitions. Moral ambitions are 
often diluted by other considerations but are, nevertheless, very real elements 
in any given situation. For example, in the case of the Marshall Plan, the 
realists interpreted it simply as a good policy for fighting communism, yet the 
program was made possibly largely because certain moral, Christian motiva-
tions were set in operations. These moral aspirations were very real “realities” 
and he, for one, was glad this was so.
Therefore, Professor Holborn concluded, policy is based on moral feelings 
as well as national interests. Such moral feelings cannot be adequately de-
scribed by the expression “national purposes” but are an intrinsic part of the 
“wholeness of human life” which includes an expression of moral purposes. 
Although men always tend to fall behind their moral aspirations, these aspira-
tions are not imposed upon men but are rather part of human existence.
Mr. Niemeyer agreed. He suggested that it might be possible to study inter-
national relations in terms of patterns of convictions. The following patterns 
come immediately to mind:
First, the pattern of international relations as a whole appears to follow 
historical phases. The present pattern took shape in 1942 and no one can 
study it for as long as it persists. Second, certain patterns appear to have a 
religious basis. The French and Italian situations can largely be explained in 
terms of Catholicism. Third, patterns of conviction emerge in terms of left 
and right. Political parties in the West align themselves in these terms while, 
and at the international level, nations themselves can often be designated as 
left or right in orientation as, for example, India and Spain. Fourth, patterns 
of convictions exist with regard to race relations, the Union of South Africa 
being a good example.
Now, continued Mr. Niemeyer, these patterns of conviction cannot be 
rounded out as concepts for a theory of international relations unless they can 
be expressed in terms of affinities and hostilities among groupings of states. In 
the present era there seem to be three such groupings— the Western nations, 
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the Soviet bloc, and the uncommitted countries. These groupings have to be 
analyzed in terms of the pressures— as expressed in military and economic 
power, for example— which operate within and between groups. These pres-
sures can be conceived as the price nations must pay for maintaining their 
patterns of convictions. Moreover, it should always be kept in mind that such 
patterns go through historical phases, come to an end, and are supplanted by 
new patterns.
Mr. Thompson remarked that Secretary Dulles’ Christian conviction does 
not seem to offer much toward an understanding of his statesmanship. Simi-
larly, not much can be said about the foreign policy of the Labor government 
in Britain in terms of socialist or capitalist criteria. Therefore, would not a the-
ory which began with patterns of convictions become misleading when Chris-
tians did not behave as Christians and socialists did not behave as socialists?
Mr. Marshall thought the group’s discussions regarding the criteria of inter-
national relations theory often wandered from one yardstick to another. Some-
times a theory’s function is held to assist in understanding international politics 
while, at other times, as an aid to the statesman in making decisions. Mr. Mar-
shall referred to the fact that many people study human anatomy— doctors, art-
ists, ballet dancers, coroners, ju- jitsu wrestlers, and athletic coaches, for exam-
ple. The interest of the coach, the wrestler, and the doctor in the human body is 
most akin to that of the policy maker with regard to international relations; the 
artist’s to that of the scholar; and the coroner’s to that of the historian.
Although all of these occupational groups study anatomy, Mr. Marshall 
continued, their approaches are quite different. The artist tends to idealize the 
human body while the doctor recognizes its imperfections and tries to cope 
with them. He himself thinks of international relations as a physician would, 
that is, he asks the question “what can I do to keep the wretched being alive?”
The policy maker is up against limitations in his work which are much 
narrower than that of the scholar. Wilson seemed to have had a foot in both 
camps; he thought of perfectionist solutions in situations which called for lim-
ited expedients.
Mr. Lipsky said that the group ran the risk of thinking in Aristotelian 
rather than Alexandrian terms. Aristotle’s theory was stated largely in terms 
of the existing Greek city- state while Alexander thought in terms of a new 
political basis for mankind. Mr. Lichenstein felt that Aristotle had a continu-
ing usefulness in a variety of circumstances. If a theory is broad enough to be 
able to take in an enormous number of variables, then it will be useful for a 
large number of situations. And, methodologically, there is a further level of 
contemporary relevance.
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Mr. Lipsky thought that Morgenthau’s and Carr’s theories, while hinting 
at the eventual prospect of a more durable world order, see the millennium as 
fairly far removed from the present, and their prescriptions for policy certainly 
do not lend themselves to a rapid advance in that direction. Professor Wolfers 
wondered where Mr. Lipsky could find Wilson advocating a millennium. Mr. 
Lipsky thought it could be inferred, for example, in Wilson’s Mobile speech in 
which Wilson had explicitly championed the sovereign equality of nations but 
implicitly attacked that concept.
Mr. Thompson suggested that world government was little more than a 
goal toward which one could aim by means of international organization and 
law. Indeed, the international organization is currently being re- examined 
with the idea of relating it more closely to the political environment in which 
it operates and re- evaluating its usefulness in terms of its value as a forum for 
negotiation, as a means for making adjustments in the balance of power, and 
as a source of moral values.
Political scientists, Mr. Thompson continued, have tended to accept ab-
stract Wilsonian principles regarding international organizations and inter-
national security but often run into difficulty when attempting to apply them 
to concrete situations. For example, Wilson stood for maximizing national 
independence and self- determination, but in the present era rapid application 
of those principles in the Far East would create vacuums into which commu-
nism would surely flow.
In response to a comment regarding the relation between social science 
and natural science theory, the chairman felt that the methods of the natural 
scientist could be utilized by the social scientist. The fields of investigation are 
not analogous. The state, for example, which is the chief object of inquiry in 
political theory, is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving cer-
tain ends. Hence the concept of the state is shot through with value elements. 
The same applies to other social institutions— they exist only to the extent 
that men think they exist. They exist and have developed through history 
because human beings have construed that they should exist.
Mr. Zinner wondered whether knowledge has a cumulative quality in in-
ternational relations as it seems to have in physics. Mr. Marshall thought it 
did but only to a very small extent. With regard to the chairman’s comments 
on the state, Mr. Marshall expressed the opinion that the word is a shorthand 
expression for a complex of procedures and pressures which in themselves are 
real in nature.
The chairman noted that the state has a central organ called government. 
No one has ever touched a government, or any other social institution for 
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that matter. These are simply concepts created by men to accomplish certain 
purposes and hence are not comparable to natural facts.
With regard to Mr. Niemeyer’s comments on patterns of conviction as a 
conceptual basis for a theory of international relations, the chairman thought 
that such a theory should also allow for technological and economic forces 
which help to make developing patterns an ongoing process. Otherwise, he 
thought Mr. Niemeyer had made a promising start. Professor Wolfers thought 
that one difficulty might be that many of the convictions identified by such a 
theory would have no relevance for purposes of foreign policy. In response to 
a comment by Niemeyer, Professor Wolfers asserted that it would be necessary 
to assign priorities to the convictions in terms of their applicability to the area 
under consideration.
Mr. Thompson agreed. He was reminded that Dr. Kirk, in his work on the 
study of international relations in the US, noted that American scholarship 
at one time considered all interests to be equally important in the formation 
of policy. However there now seems to be a trend in the opposite direction: 
one major factor is selected and other factors are related to it in hierarchical 
order. Such procedure allows for differentiation between the more and the less 
important.
Mr. Lipsky, with regard to the chairman’s remarks on the state, questioned 
whether it did not exist as a fact in nature. The chairman thought not. It 
exists simply in the minds of men. The very things with which the group is 
concerned are themselves value products. The state is conceived in order to 
serve objectives considered useful. Professor Wolfers agreed. The state makes 
no sense except in terms of what it does for men.
Mr. Niemeyer thought the same true for survival. Survival has little mean-
ing except in terms of values for which one wishes to survive. Mr. Lichenstein 
agreed. International relations theory should direct attention to those values 
which people held dear above all else, including survival. Mr. Lipsky thought 
most members of the present group would prefer Siberia to extinction if given 
the choice, but Mr. Thompson thought that the problem of national survival 
was a very contingent one. Men often hold some things more dear to them-
selves than survival, yet people living in totalitarian states often seem to prefer 
survival to a suicidal resistance. The question cannot, he felt, be answered in 
an a priori manner.
Professor Wolfers noted that, in the working paper, Mr. Lipsky postulated 
that men are now confronted with a new situation in which bare survival is 
at stake. However, Professor Wolfers felt it questionable whether that consid-
eration is an operative force in foreign policy today. Mr. Lipsky felt that, as 
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a realist, he was forced to consider survival the overriding problem of world 
politics at this juncture. Mr. Lichenstein felt that if Americans were confront-
ed with the choice of a Soviet America or war, they would overwhelmingly 
choose war.
The chairman noted that war has traditionally been regarded as a means of 
advancing foreign policy but no longer could be so regarded; the consequenc-
es of war are now incalculable and unpredictable in terms of specific foreign 
policy objectives.
Mr. Thompson agreed and thought it underlined the futility of a policy of 
massive retaliation. That kind of approach is quite different from one which 
contemplates the use of naval and air support in Indo- China, for example. Mr. 
Lipsky noted that Russell had advocated a preventive atomic war because he 
had felt, at the time, that the West enjoyed a margin of safety. Mr. Thompson 
thought the US would risk major war in terms of local engagements but would 
never risk a “preventive war” no matter what current military advantage it 
might seem to have. Professor Wolfers agreed. He doubted whether the gov-
ernment had ever seriously thought in terms of preventive war.
Mr. Roberts, returning to Mr. Niemeyer’s comments on patterns of convic-
tion, thought two problems might be fruitfully explored. First, the problem of 
identifying historical phases characterized by coherent patterns. This point is 
related to the problem of whether knowledge is cumulative in international 
relations. Second, there is the problem of relating these patterns to foreign 
policy and vice versa. Convictions held to influence foreign policy would have 
to be traced back to their source. Moreover, since there appears to be an in-
ability to build up knowledge for more than a given period, there is also the 
problem of identifying the beginning of a successive period.
Mr. Thompson noted that a number of members had emphasized the 
uniqueness of the current international scene. Although international rela-
tions is characterized by a diversity of purpose and values, he did not feel a 
theory of international relations would be very helpful unless it gave consid-
eration to a few basic factors. First, there is agreement on the importance of 
interests and values and how they tend to complicate the picture. There is also 
the problem of mutuality and conflict of interest and the problem of accom-
modation. Although one historical pattern might be supplanted by another, 
these problems continue to operate.
Hence, Mr. Thompson continued, international relations can be thought 
of as an interplay between constants and variables. Real progress, he thought, 
can be made through research aimed at identifying those constants. Although 
there is not much kinship between international relations and the natural sci-
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ences, some patterns and forms appeared to recur through successive historical 
eras in a fairly basic way. Such constants might provide a skeletal framework 
upon which the variables can be hung.
Mr. Zinner agreed but pointed out that a single constant might vary in 
influence from one period to another. Nevertheless, he thought the method-
ological problem is to refine analysis in an effort to determine what are the 
common denominators and constants.
The chairman added that it should be borne in mind that one is deal-
ing with an ongoing process marked by industrial and technological change. 
Therefore, international relations is not just a dialectic between constants and 
variables but is characterized by trends. Given this ongoing quality to the field, 
he thought it would be fair to add that certain objectives are politically ad-
vanced by such trends; otherwise the field would appear to be “pretty chaotic.”
John D. Blumgart
Rapporteur
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Seventh Meeting: The Problem of Theory 
in the Study of International Relations, 
June 22, 1954
The study group on the Theory of International Relations held its seventh 
and final meeting at the Harold Pratt House on June 22, 1954, at 5:30 p.m. 
The subject was the problem of theory in the study of international relations. 
Present were: Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secre-
tary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; Charles 
Lichenstein; Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; 
Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz- Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Paul Zinner.
*****
Working Paper No. 7
Prepared by George A. Lipsky
This essay in working paper form (with modifications, it will form an initial 
portion of the volume that I am preparing) presents a conception of theory 
with which, no doubt, many will disagree. It is offered as a point of departure 
for the group’s discussions. The contentions of this essay must be tentative 
because I admit the impossibility of absolutely rejecting other philosophical 
premises. But I nevertheless engage to discuss theory in as rigorous a fashion 
as my capacities and the scope of a short essay permit, aware that some will 
question the relevance of the study of international relations and others the 
soundness of taking such a definite position because of the danger of stimu-
lating some readers to strong negative reactions. With regard to the former 
contention, I can only hope that the essay that follows will provide an answer. 
As to the latter, some good will come from stimulating some to think about 
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theory. It would have been a forlorn hope to begin by assuming that a theory 
could have been devised upon which all could come to agreement.
Introduction
A basic concern with theory in international relations may have a variety of 
sources. Too many scholars and pundits in the field were until recently eter-
nally concerned with hod carrying, descriptive tasks behind which lay con-
scious, or unconscious, theoretical assumptions, poorly articulated and little 
above the level of primitive commonsense conjectures, that certain institu-
tions and processes were good and others bad. They gave themselves little 
inspiration and guidance for deeper speculation and constant refinement of 
view through a mature recognition of the nature and function of theory and 
the relevance of philosophical speculation. The differential between their 
method and that of the intelligent layman could largely be measured in terms 
of the additional time the scholar might devote to hod carrying the facts, as if 
the latter were self- evident and capable of organization into constructs, them-
selves self- evident and not requiring verification.
In reaction against the above attitude frequently accompanied by wish-
ful thinking, often misreading the deeper import of such men as Woodrow 
Wilson— whose taxonomy, although not adequate, was more sophisticated 
than they knew— other schools became important, especially those emphasiz-
ing the central significance of power. The emphasis on power is often an ac-
companiment of a deep disillusionment with the failure of the promise of the 
first decade of this century, and above all the devices of the 1920s, to achieve 
fulfillment in greater political stability and a more lasting peace. The disillu-
sionment was felt by those whose optimism had been rudely disturbed by the 
turn of deteriorating events. It was natural for them, if they did not accuse the 
events and those ostensibly fashioning them of being out of step with princi-
ples of truth, to decide that there must be a deeper reality that must be viewed 
coldly and objectively, without flinching and with a grim determination to 
achieve survival under the best terms possible. This impulse was almost cer-
tainly associated with a sense of catharsis, a feeling that at long last the need-
less and extra baggage of confused utopian aspiration had been cast aside and 
survival pursued within the context of a theory of limits and possibilities. A 
kind of exhilaration and exaltation can accompany the feeling of viewing life 
and man’s problems as they supposedly are and perhaps finding the best results 
in a security foreseen perhaps only a few months ahead. A sense of working 
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with the tools at hand gives an impression of superiority over those who seem 
to be pursuing will o’ the wisps of political and public reform for which men 
are not psychologically ready and lack the means of achieving.
The theoretician- idol of the power theorists, whether admitted or not, 
must be Machiavelli. The statesman- idol will almost certainly be Bismarck. 
The two worked within a scheme of moral and practical limits and, above all, 
they worked with a fine sense of the tools and devices at hand, a deep concep-
tion of what the human psyche makes possible and denies. They suggested the 
existence of a power calculus by means of which a particular situation might 
be judged, out of which means might be selected for the achievement of goals, 
at once possible yet requiring a basic change in their older dispensation. The 
power theorist is not always, is perhaps not even generally, the conservative, 
unless the desire to maintain the best of old institutions must be judged inher-
ently conservative. Very often associated with this desire is a drive to create 
a new order, a new matrix within which much of an older order may carry 
forward.
The theoretician may be distinguished from the practitioner of power for 
some purposes. They should not be distinguished for all, or even main, pur-
poses. The knowledge they work with is or should be basically the same: this 
is knowledge to be understood in terms of scientific systematics. As much as 
I find to admire in the theory of theories of David Easton, I cannot agree that 
he is asserting a significant distinction between the scientific knowledge of 
the political or social theorist and the so- called prudential knowledge of the 
statesman.1 I have no way of discovering what prudential knowledge is, nor 
has any theorist ever presented me with any test for separating qualitatively 
the kind of knowledge that the scientist gathers and the kind that the states-
man should act by. If the scientist’s knowledge does not suggest sufficiently the 
nature of the world within which the statesman acts, that knowledge is simply 
incomplete or it has not sufficiently strengthened any one hypothesis through 
a process of verification so as to make it commanding. A main distinction 
between theoretician and statesman is that the former does not have to make 
decisions as to the means that are to be employed to achieve particular value 
goals or situations and the latter does have that most difficult task.
Having that task, the statesman must think of consequences without being 
deterred from his duty by fear of them. Moreover, he does not operate within 
the calm and quiet of what passes for the social scientist’s laboratory. Often he 
is submerged under an avalanche of data for which there is no time to provide 
adequate classification. A decision is demanded by the here- and- now; if he 
chooses well and achieves a fair measure of the goals that the processes of 
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society vaguely or precisely define, he is called prudent and wise. The process 
of reaction that produces the results called decision making seems so unique 
that men call its source prudence, prudential knowledge, intuition, or wisdom. 
The adequate statesman surely must be psychologically adjusted to situations 
which the average theoretician would find intolerable, or to situations that 
will not tolerate the theoretician. He must keep his eye open upon the imme-
diacy of things and drive through to some sort of decision— whether absolute 
or temporizing— without being deflected or immobilized by all the qualifica-
tions that experience or experiment make reasonable or relevant. He usually 
cannot run the risk of constant experimentation; he must be quick to read the 
experiment that exists in the historical experience itself. The theoretician 
would be, if not confounded, at least confused by the haphazardness of the 
experiment that must be found implicit in the unclassified life experience.2 A 
simple analogy, not too exact but suggestive, may be the contrast between the 
competence of the professional military drill instructor and the incompetence 
of the intellectual- turned- soldier on the parade ground. The former may nav-
igate a platoon through the most intricate patterns of coordinated maneuvers. 
The latter may have the drill manual thoroughly in mind but his thoughts 
will be on the possible, or the impossible, situations into which his power of 
command may bring his unit. It is not only a matter of familiarity; it is a mat-
ter of the difference of mental process that differing experience has produced. 
The essential knowledge is the same. The drill instructor has a “feel for the 
job”; such expressions have their place, but they should not express more than 
the fact that his conditioning has produced a capacity to react almost uncon-
sciously to all the demands of a familiar situation.
Having made the assertion that the knowledge used by the theoretician 
and the statesman is the same, I may now suggest that it appears to me dan-
gerous for either one to assume that he can be a power political realist without 
giving sufficient attention to the methodological problems that must be en-
countered and overcome in the process of acquiring the data upon which deci-
sions as to means will be based in the search for posited ends. If he fails in this 
the theoretician will fall farther short than is necessary of the scientific ideal 
as to procedure and results. He may arrive fortuitously at some generalizations 
as to causal relationships, appropriate means, and acceptable ends that appear 
subsequently to have been sound. Without a clear- cut and adequate regard 
for the theoretical problem, his success can only be fortuitous even though he 
enjoys a lifetime of it. The statesman is more concerned with devising action 
than with publicly producing meaningful and valid generalizations, but his ac-
tions will be taken inevitably in conformity, real or ostensible, with a structure 
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of short- and long- range generalizations. If he succeeds, it will be partly be-
cause his causal theory is sound or because his actions accord with what would 
be an adequate causal theory though they violate the theory he thinks he is 
following.3 In any event, his actions cannot be taken in the absence of a the-
ory, subarticulate or articulate, simple (perhaps commonsensical), or complex.
Neither the statesman nor the theoretician can willfully run the risk of 
proceeding without knowing as much of what he is doing as the situation 
permits. This is not possible without an adequate conception or theoretical 
frame of reference. As suggested above, some may run the risk successfully, 
but they must be the exceptions unless we are to conclude that man has not 
succeeded by knowing but rather through ignorance. The theoretician should 
not be content with being a better than average amateur in his field. The 
statesman cannot be content with Sermon- on- the- Mount, ad hoc, or haphaz-
ard conceptions and methods. Bismarck in editing the Ems telegram was not 
basically an artist but rather an astute analyst of cause and effect in a situation 
for which there was historical analogy or the nature of which he could un-
derstand through the educational results of his life’s experiences. The artist’s 
forte is presenting impressions concerning the nature of reality in language (or 
another medium) into a large and emotive agency. The generalizations of the 
artist in words are valid to the extent that they contain, with some precision, 
hypotheses concerning reality. They are more than that, for they must provide 
a means of stirring men emotively into a mood responsive to the truth they 
suggest. The statesman making decisions is primarily employing a calculus of 
cause and effect and is only secondarily concerned with the emotive effects 
of words and deeds upon those who must act in terms of his decisions. The 
emotive effect anticipated should be introduced as far as can humanly be done 
into the calculus. The situation within which he operates, especially today, 
may not permit the statesman to perfect and refine his calculus and therefore 
his scientific progress and method. One of his goals should be so to alter and 
restrain the course of events as to permit him to employ longer- range scientific 
and rational judgments about it. The sense in which he is the artist is not in 
his use of a qualitatively different kind of knowledge but in the fact that he 
wishes to move men emotively as the artist does. How men are moved emo-
tively is itself a subject of scientific investigation. The theoretician- scholar 
must desire to move men, or some men, but not to the same degree through 
the emotions. If he does, the possibility will arise that his poetic or literary 
flair may cut across his scientific communication. This is why the debate will 
continue as to whether Santayana was a philosopher or poet and, if the latter, 
whether that quality has not interfered with his standing or accomplishment 
Revised Pages
Seventh Meeting—The Problem of Theory in the Study of IR 247
as a philosopher, who, above all, must be a synthesizing scientist. If the law 
has any effect as a definable entity beyond an instant case, the question arises 
as to whether the spare prose of a Warren or the poetic prose of a Cardozo is 
the best vehicle for it.
Both the theoretical and research scholar and the statesman must wish 
to be informed as far as possible concerning what they are doing. This is a 
scientific enterprise concerning primarily the giving of proper attention to the 
methodological and epistemological problems. It is a problem of improving 
systematics, of refining theoretical awareness. There is tragedy in the fact that 
the scholar does not take time to make this emphasis and that the statesman 
may not have time to do so. These facts do not alter the validity of the prop-
osition nor do they permit the assertion that the scholar has another function 
called descriptive or reformist, or that the statesman can or must rely upon 
another kind of knowledge.
Philosophical Position
One is tempted to assert that a search should be undertaken to find a final 
theory of international relations. This could only be achieved in the presence 
of total knowledge. Man will not achieve this result in the foreseeable future. 
In fact, in terms of the premises of this paper, there is an unbridgeable hiatus 
between the kind of knowledge given to men to know and total knowledge or 
comprehension of essence. A universalist in pattern of thought will assert the 
identity of thinking and being. Essence in this view is immediately revealed 
and subject to the classificatory capacities of the mind. Revealed truth and 
scientifically gathered data reflecting truth do not convey merely the appear-
ances of things to the sense but their inner reality. This reality may be ideal 
or material, but it is inherently knowable, and as men proceed forward in the 
quest for truth they approach the condition of total knowledge. Knowledge 
is knowable, in effect, because it has dimensions, dimensions understandable 
and meaningful to the mind.
On the other hand, if it is assumed that all things are not inherently know-
able, then there can be little or no justification of the contention that one can 
build a final theory of international relations. This proposition does not at all 
conflict with giving major emphasis to theory of international relations. The 
nominalist position or pattern of thought denies the identity of thinking and 
being. The cognitive process involves ways of thinking about reality that you 
can only assume exists. The dimensions that are found in reality are dimen-
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sions given meaning and relationship by the cognitive subject, but it can only 
be assumed that the dimensional statements made are the most meaningful 
statements that can be made about the aspect of reality under consideration. 
And meaning itself is related to the mind and not to what is observed, for 
meaning has relation only to human existence and purpose. If these proposi-
tions are true, there cannot be a theory of international relations that will be 
sufficiently operational for all men as to deserve the designation the theory of 
international relations. From the nominalist position there can be a theory of 
theories of international relations, but the theory of theories of international 
relations can only be discovered by those of a universalist or similar pattern 
of thought, who assume that they can know a revealed essential truth or that 
they may scientifically gather the data of an essential truth. Their theory of 
theories is either revealed in terms of an authoritative natural law or is implic-
it in their philosophical postulates. The nominalist, on the other hand, must 
at the very least recognize that there are no grounds of authority upon which 
he may assert the unquestionable validity of his theory of theories. Nor has he 
evidence to support the assertions of authority made by others of a different 
persuasion, or made by those who believe their science reveals the essential 
truth. The very fact that there remains more to be discovered demonstrates 
that we have not achieved essential truth. It is meaningless to use the term 
except to suggest the totally elusive confines of areas of future discovery. Even 
the data we have concerning causal juxtapositions can always be increased as 
we view events contemporaneously; when events become history the problem 
of verification is formidable, so much so that presumptions or categorical gen-
eralizations are unwarranted.
In this paper, proceeding from this generally stated philosophical position, 
we may stress the utmost importance to be attached to an inspection of what 
one is doing in making generalizations concerning international relations. 
Some analysts will not welcome or accept this proposition, if we may judge 
by the methodology they employ in their work. It is possible to accept the 
view that the methodological and theoretical counsels supported are the road 
to madness, particularly if one is initially too optimistic about what may be 
accomplished. If that is the case, the future of the social sciences is bleak and 
the prospect of their making a significant contribution as policy sciences weak 
indeed. But it would be premature in the light of present knowledge, before 
the advent of madness, to assume that it is inevitable. Therefore, one should 
conclude that a maturation of the social sciences will go on just as such a 
process has characterized the natural and physical sciences. This process will 
witness the refinement of their method and classification of the role they can 
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fulfill in advising those in positions of political and social authority how they 
may select means to their ends.
Theory of Theories
David Easton, cited above, makes a powerful plea for a determined consider-
ation of the problem of theory as the means of developing a scientific aware-
ness of what one is doing in research, advising as to appropriate means, or 
setting forth social goals.4 He begins with a distinction between value theory, 
which is concerned with statements of political goals or values, and causal the-
ory, which attempts to show (I should prefer “to state”) the relations “among 
political facts.” Although Easton is at pains to make it clear that the “distinc-
tion between these two classes of propositions is logical only,” I believe that 
the effect of separating them for the sake “of convenience in discourse is apt 
to be misleading. I should prefer to state at the outset that a theory proposing 
to explain or describe physical events in terms of causal nexus on a time con-
tinuum is of necessity compounded of both value elements and descriptive ele-
ments (generalizations related to fact or the ‘is’).” Political philosophy cannot 
be concerned solely, therefore, with value. If it means the attempt by referring 
to absolute conditions of goodness, it refers to conditions in an empyrean that 
cannot be known to man in this world. Its concern becomes metaphysical and 
non- scientific. Verification becomes impossible; the data of the field are the 
elaborations of human aspiration. On the other hand, if political philosophy 
refers to events in history, events presently unfolding, or events desired or 
promised in the future, it must be descriptive and, therefore, concerned with 
relations presumed to be causal. But a theory cannot be exclusively descrip-
tive or causal. As long as knowledge is not or cannot be total, the process of 
refining the knowledge we have or acquiring new knowledge must continue. 
Interstices of ignorance remain; these are the primary areas within which val-
ues may function to shape and influence hypotheses and even to influence the 
course of verification.
Easton suggests that it is important to refer to a type of theory as causal in 
order to have a “device for improving the dependability of our knowledge.”5 In 
other words it is important to bring to the level of consciousness the logic “be-
hind the selection and accumulation of facts.” This latter contention is true, 
but it is questionable whether the purpose is pursued best by establishing an 
artificial dichotomy between value and fact. Considering all theory as descrip-
tive and yet compounded of value preferences and more obvious statements of 
250 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
fact, one has presented an even stronger case for refining “the techniques for 
collecting and collating data” in order to reduce the areas of ignorance. There 
is a more definite charge, not only to see that a description of a “fact” can nev-
er be complete, but also to see that there are always gaps in our present knowl-
edge, or that the scientific process cannot produce knowledge upon which to 
base easy assurance or dogma. In addition, the risk is reduced that scholars 
will assume that there is a descriptive function through the performance of 
which “facts” are produced that speak for themselves. This latter conclusion 
is important for pedagogy, pure scientific research, or the policy maker. The 
pedagogue will more candidly recognize the function of values. The scientific 
researcher will have a sounder theory and subsequent stimulus to clarify meth-
odological problems. The policy maker, without losing decisiveness, can more 
easily avoid undemocratic dogmatism and those adamant, fanatical postures 
breeding conflict. The dichotomy between realism and utopianism is trans-
formed into a relationship, as with the definitions of Carr it cannot be, much 
as he might desire it. This is a necessary concomitant of our conclusion that 
every generalization can only be theoretical, that is, “a statement of a relation-
ship which is only probably, not certainly and finally, true.”6
Easton properly asserts that scientific theoretical formulations “attempt 
to bring to the surface what common sense leaves permanently concealed.”7 
In the social sciences, as in the natural sciences, the aim must be a form “in 
which all propositions are logically or mathematically connected by laws or 
principles.”8 Every scientific theory then is not only empirical and inductive, 
but it must else aim to enlarge significant and valid generalizations and make 
them applicable to as large a number of particular cases as possible; that is, the 
theory must aim to provide deductive points of departure for the judgment 
and evaluation of particular situations about which decisions must be made. 
In every theory there must be some opportunity to deduce some significant 
relationship between the variables in a situation. The caution must be em-
phasized, however, that the social scientist proceeding from the nominalist 
position must be careful to keep the scope of his generalizations under control 
so that he does not prophesy more than can be verified in terms of the relevant 
particular cases. If he does not do this, he passes beyond the function of the so-
cial scientist (or the democratic statesman) and becomes the religious leader, 
metaphysician, or political fanatic preoccupied with imposing his values upon 
reality. He will not be so much concerned with hypothetical statements of fact 
as with conversion. The interstices of his theoretical generalizations have be-
come so enlarged that these areas within which values become predominantly 
operative allow value to override the impulse to verification. In fact, plausible 
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statement comes to take the place of verification, for the reason that the gen-
eralizations have become so enlarged that they do not submit to verification 
in terms of the research tools and procedures now at man’s disposal. The so- 
called social scientist of a non- nominalist persuasion who is content with or 
intent upon such large- scale generalizations must be criticized by the nominal-
ist on this account; from the nominalist premise it is justified to point out the 
risk he runs of coming to sell nostrums rather than stating facts hypothetically.
Theories (descriptive, or as Easton would have it, causal) may be classi-
fied in terms of the number of variables (cases) they are concerned with as 
embodied in statements of uniformity of relationship or causal connection. 
The number or complexity of the variables or cases has direct bearing upon 
their importance for men on the basis of their values. In each case some de-
duction may be made from the generalization in terms of a sufficient number 
of instances to permit an anticipation of a similar or identical result whenever 
variables of a like nature appear. For example, theory may refer rather easily to 
“two isolated and easily identified variables,” to the synthesization of the “data 
in an unorganized body of scientific generalizations,” or to “the conceptual 
framework within which a whole discipline is cast.”9 No qualitative difference 
exists between the various levels of theory; the distinction is as to the number 
of variables and the line of distinction will be placed in terms of classification 
of problems or research activity that have been rather fortuitously established 
in the history of a discipline or the history of the study of a problem.
Theories are not only important in presenting hypotheses proposing ex-
planations of particular segments of reality. They will suggest lines of future 
investigation by indicating what is left unexplained. Explanation of one part 
of a situation, a trend, or a discipline is, in effect, a revelation of the variables 
for which meaningful classifications have not yet been attempted. The same 
impulse for the improvement of the reliability and the extent of their knowl-
edge must exist in the theoretician- scholar and the statesman if not for the 
same reasons. Knowledge should not be random and haphazard; only sound 
theoretical classification can give it understandable order. The order in the 
social sciences will not be so precise nor will the results be so revealing as in 
the natural or physical sciences, but they will be an improvement over those 
that have gone before.
Easton makes a distinction between pure theory and applied theory. Pure 
theory is concerned with establishing conceptual frames of reference and in-
dicating causal relationships. It is descriptive, then, in the best sense. Applied 
theory is concerned with determining what are or should be consensuses as 
to social goals and with generalizing concerning the appropriate means of 
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achieving them.10 This distinction is superficially useful for it at least refers 
to actual distinctions of historical research activity. But it is questionable if it 
implies that applied theory, in generalizing about means, is not basically con-
cerned with generalizations about causal relationships. The search for means 
is, of course, the search for such relationships. Referring again to the historical 
sources of this distinction, we may assume that applied theory usually has re-
ferred to those areas where social engineering has been deemed feasible and, 
therefore, where the variables are sufficiently simple and few in number to 
permit meaningful generalizations that have been or can be subject to verifica-
tions. This is probably why so much descriptive and applied theory has seemed 
to deal with trivia, perhaps involving entire lifetimes devoted to the study 
of the victualing of the British Army in the thirteenth century. The young 
scholar, perhaps early filled with grandiose ambitions to be significant on a 
grand scale, comes face- to- face with the difficulty of theoretical precision and 
learning and applying new techniques for suggesting or establishing causal re-
lationships. He comes early to terms with his own abilities and, finding a long, 
self- righteous tradition of what is called scientific, empirical investigation, he 
does not pass on to the more important or equally important task of improving 
his deductive generalizations which are the means of getting sights on what 
remains to be done. Descriptive theory on a larger scale (or causal theory in 
Easton’s terms) must, it seems to me, do the hod carrying of stating goals and 
demonstrating the validity of means within those areas where experience and 
techniques show we may anticipate some success. It must also set itself the task 
of enlarging the area of experiment concerning which generalizations may be 
proposed or attempted.
Easton, to recapitulate, divides theory into types as follows: value theory; 
causal theory, which is what political scientists have been working with mainly, 
a fact forming a basis of criticism and an item of failure. The second type, causal 
or synthetic theory, is what he says must be emphasized, particularly the second 
of three levels on which such generalizations as Michels’ theory of elites are con-
structed, as well as the third level on which is constructed the conceptual frame 
of reference for determining the data relevant to a given discipline.
For the reasons suggested in the foregoing paragraphs I would categorize 
theory in a different manner. Theory for all fields, but particularly in interna-
tional relations, may be classified as follows:
 (1) A theory of theories, or a statement of broad classifications into which 
ways of dealing with or thinking about the phenomena of international 
politics may be fitted. In effect this whole essay is the presentation of 
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a theory of theories. More directly, the refinement of the nominalist 
position herein is the presentation of a theory of theories, basically con-
cerned with the problem of epistemology. Knowledge is hypothetical; 
values are preferences. Reality is viewed in terms always of hypothesis 
and accompanying values, which can intrude because of the omnipres-
ence of ignorance. The practical importance of this level of theory for 
the study of international relations may be illustrated very simply. On 
the basis of this conception I can reject Morgenthau’s and Carr’s easy 
conclusion that there is a realist position, apart from values, that leads 
to sound conclusions and actions because it supposedly eschews moral-
istic aspiration and applies a kind of realistic principle of limitations. By 
suggesting this corrective to Morgenthau and the so- called statesman of 
realpolitik, I can suggest the possible realism of idealism through pointing 
out the functioning of value preferences in every generalization con-
cerning reality. And I may suggest the partial but inescapably subjective 
quality of every descriptive generalization and calculus of possibilities. 
The result is a charge to the self- conscious realist to proceed with cau-
tion and humility and, above all, to keep the scope of his generalizations 
under control so that he does not go dangerously beyond empirical real-
ism into the realm of metaphysics, wherein he allows his science of dis-
covering the “is” to be warped by his determination to embody the sub-
ject “ought” in history. There will be less tendency, also, to deny without 
inspection the remedies proposed by so- called idealists for establishing 
and maintaining international or intergroup peace and stability.
 (2) A second class of theories is that of the general explanation of what 
is, what has been, and what will or ought to be. This is the level upon 
which the theorist of whatever discipline is examining or hypothesizing 
causal relationships with regard to larger trends or developments in his-
tory. Easton emphasizes the importance of establishing a frame of refer-
ence for determining the confines of each discipline. It is certainly nec-
essary to maintain disciplines to facilitate the handling of data, but it is 
equally important to recognize the unity of knowledge. In fact, it would 
be a mistake to consider the theoretical classifications establishing disci-
plines to be of the first order of importance. The study of international 
relations transcends any confining discipline and is an area where data 
find focus with relation to particular problems that cannot be called 
exclusively or even basically political. In fact, this paper is meant to 
suggest that basic philosophical problems are immediately involved in 
this field.
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The major danger to be encountered, at least from the nominalist 
position, is that in the name of science or some sort of transcendental 
idealism the theorist on this level will seek meaning and security in gi-
gantic generalizations and abstractions. He will neglect the fact that as 
a scientist he is pushing the boundaries of knowledge. Of course, his the-
ory of theories may justify generalization suggesting unequivocal truth 
and stating its unfolding in terms spanning centuries. The point of view 
supported in this paper is that such a theory of theories is in error and 
such a descriptive theory is therefore unwarranted, regardless of whether 
history appears to validate the generalizations. Given the human mind 
and available techniques, the validation can only be fortuitous. Marx 
and the Marxists come immediately to mind as the major transgressors 
in our epoch, and they reveal how in the name of science and presump-
tuous generalizations monstrous tyrannies are made real and inevitable. 
Even Easton in calling for an improvement in our techniques on this 
large level of abstraction comes dangerously close to suggesting that the 
political scientist and theorists in other fields should anticipate a fu-
ture in which their generalizations can span and forecast conditions for 
centuries ahead. No one should charge social scientists with confining 
themselves to niggardly piecemeal and short- range generalizations. As 
techniques are improved the resultant generalizations may be enlarged, 
but it is reasonable to anticipate that the variables will remain too many 
and too complex to form the basis of assured long- range prophecy. The 
scientist may state with some, although not complete, assurance the 
geological condition of the Western hemisphere ten thousand years 
from now. But the social scientist is dealing with a vastly more complex 
body of data; the task of prophecy, while not of a different order, is equal-
ly more difficult.
 (3) At some point the theorist may be able to say that he is working with 
explicit, detailed explanations of what is, has been, will, and ought to 
be. This is the level of more conventional, habitual, and facile theo-
retical investigation. That is not to say that a great deal of painstaking 
labor is not required for the development of the date out of the order-
ing of which generalizations on this level proceed. No charge to the 
theorist can be made that he provide a general test for revealing what 
level he is working on. Since the distinction between levels (2) and (3) 
is quantitative rather than qualitative, the decision can be an ad hoc 
one, determined in response to a simple question. Is the theorist dealing 
with variables which, for the social sciences, may be precisely described 
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verbally or mathematically? Or, put another way, do current techniques 
for the evaluation of data permit easy description of the area of concern 
so that a rather higher order of prediction (a better word than prophesy 
on this level) is possible? Description is a basic concern here, but this 
involves a statement of so- called causal relationships or juxtapositions. 
Every datum may be expected to be a complex of such relationships 
and, in turn, a part of an infinite complex of relationships isolated in 
the descriptive process for purposes of evaluation. It is isolated not only 
contextually but also in time, so that it is inevitable that some sort of 
prediction will be associated with reference to it. Marx, the scientist, 
burrowing in the British Museum and viewing the British economic and 
social order of his time or the time immediately preceding him could do 
an effective and pioneering job of describing the operation of that order. 
One must assume with some degree of faith the reliability of the sources 
one employs. The tests are commonsensical. Do the sources represent 
the best efforts of men and organizations to provide descriptions of in-
stitutions and processes? Can the motives for mishandling statistics and 
descriptions be assumed to be at a minimum? Do the predictions one 
founds on the hypotheses suggested by the data ordinarily come to pass 
and thus provide some sort of verification of the causal relations embod-
ied in the descriptions?
On every one of the three levels of theory suggested above, value 
may be presumed in some degree to operate. On the level of theory of 
theories, the universalist is expressing some sort of preference for seeing 
the universe as an approximate or exact manifestation of the mind’s 
orderings. The protagonist of each philosophy will assert that logic and 
assured analysis underlie his position. In fact, he may assert that, while 
preferring to believe or conclude one thing, his analysis and logical pro-
cesses require a contrary conclusion. In any event, once the major phil-
osophical premise and its eschatological consequences are accepted, the 
working out of the details of the position will be more influenced by val-
ues. The other two levels of theory will more obviously be compounded 
partly of values or value preferences. This means ultimately that every 
cognitive act or event cannot be a value- free act or event. The viewing 
of a chair and its qualities through the senses is an immediate assessment 
of the chair as to beauty of configuration, design, softness, color, use, etc. 
The words used as the medium of understanding can only be abstract 
items of nominal quality, with respect to which the observer will stand 
in some degree of value assertion or statement. Particularly where an 
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object is viewed in terms of its possibilities of use, and, quite obviously, 
its aesthetic quality, cognition cannot be value- free. It is even possible 
to argue that every cognitive act has a value component. But that is not 
necessary to the argument, for what we are concerned with is the social 
situation, a description of which cannot be value- free even in the pres-
ence of the highest degree of professed detachment.
Reform and Theory
Political scientists are often criticized for their reformist zeal. The implication 
is often conveyed that it is not the function of the scientist to posit the goals 
in terms of which it may be said that reform either is or is not accomplished. 
It may be admitted at the outset that a main function of the scientist is to 
describe what “is,” that is, smaller or larger situations which are complexes 
of causal relationships. These situations cannot be viewed apart from values; 
therefore, they are viewed in terms of a calculus of their place in a process of 
goal achievement. The situation is also viewed as an end, that is, an event 
to which a quality of goodness or badness must be attached, and, at the same 
time, a means or an understandable causal event in the time continuum lead-
ing to future events, both ends and means. The act of viewing what “is” and 
what “is becoming” is not value- free and is part of an inevitable reformist 
purpose. A theorist may conceivably desire the holocaust or extinction, but, 
even though he is eccentric, extinction becomes “good” and is, in fact, reform 
for him. The vast majority of men will not, however, equate reform with ex-
tinction, but rather with human survival within the best possible situations as 
judged by value preferences. They will inevitably and naturally be occupied 
with the task of discovering, through magic, metaphysics, or science, the best 
means to achieve those situations of survival, which are at the same time 
means to future ends. The theorist cannot be excluded from the process of 
determining the ends or social goals that will be sought. In fact, a major part 
of the theorist’s function will be determining the nature and variety of social 
goals, to the definition of which he also makes a contribution as a social being. 
The physician seeking through experiment to discover the means of achieving 
a cancer- free world does not have the goal established by other agencies alone. 
He himself places a personal imprimatur upon the good as one which will con-
duce to human survival, which, as a scientist— unless he is a rare eccentric— 
he will ordinarily seek with some degree of his skill and energies. The scientist 
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and pedagogue who essays the role of evaluator and describer of means, pure 
and simple, is fooling himself if he believes it. This is tragic enough, but if he 
is taken seriously the damage he does may be grievous. He may misuse a whole 
generation of students whose reformist awareness may be crushed under an 
erroneous and arid scientific pretense.
Both the theorist and the statesman must and will seek to achieve situ-
ations deemed compatible with survival in terms of defined values. The em-
phasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon producing ends and 
means; in the role of statesman, upon applying means to desired ends. The 
ideal would be a combination of capacity to discover and apply in the same 
person or persons. An approach to the ideal is the collaboration of the theorist 
whose expertise includes the capacity to gather sufficient and relevant data 
and organize them, particularly those relating to the political conditions in-
fluencing the statesman’s activity, and the statesman with the capacity to rec-
ognize necessary expertise when he sees it. This collaboration requires some 
combination of amateur and professional capacity in both.
The refinements of theoretical capacity called for in the preceding para-
graph could become infinite. Not the least requirement is that both theorist 
and statesman have some insight into the self- fulfilling and self- denying ca-
pacities of theory itself. As theory becomes self- conscious it may conduce to 
the production of ends not foreseen in the theory itself. In other words, the 
existence of the theory may set in motion so- called causes which are part of 
altering events, but in directions that either could not be or were not foretold 
in the theory as description or prophecy. To take into account such potentials, 
in other words, to improve the theory of theories requires advance mainly in 
the field of individual and social psychology, although other fields of related 
investigation will be involved as well. The search will be to discover means 
of making theory more complete, so that its manipulative effect as well as its 
immediate descriptive function may be more thoroughly understood and ac-
counted for in the continuing human calculus.
Theory of International Relations
The plea here, in terms of the major premises, is for greater awareness on the 
part of the natural collaborators, theorist (scientist), and statesman (practi-
tioner of theory), for greater awareness of the nature of the scientific process, 
for greater awareness of what they are or should be doing. The theorist in 
international relations considering modern India as a factor in international 
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politics must be as well- grounded as possible in the human and general ecolo-
gy and the demography of the subcontinent. The statesman who neglects the 
identical data in his calculus regarding India would be inadequate; his making 
the right decisions would be fortuitous. Both the theorist and the statesman 
should drive to improve the available descriptive (causal) data on the various 
levels of theoretical investigation involved. They will or should recognize the 
component of value in the data as they were gathered, as they are evaluated, 
and as they may be used to describe means or conditions within which means 
will be employed.
On the level of choice, lying especially before the statesman but also before 
the theorist, the premises here suggest that there must be a priority of value 
preferences in terms of achievability. Eschewing the idea of moral absolutes, 
the nominalist will not be concerned with acting in accord with a consistent 
and symmetrical structure of moral norms. He will be concerned with acting 
within the process through which moral goals are given expression. This is a 
social process. Some moral statements have precision and a long historical 
pedigree. The real content of the norm is only understood in each and for 
each case and then only as scientific statement can give each case precision. 
The theorist and the statesman should avoid therefore the use of such words or 
expressions as “democratic dynamism,” “democratic purity,” etc., for they are 
not only philosophically unsound but they are positions around which people 
may build myths of absolute value, obstructive to policy implementation. Max 
Lerner several years ago criticized the Truman Doctrine and its application 
to Greece, since Greece was not a democracy and we were in consequence 
shoring up an undemocratic regime there. This is the very kind of liberal ab-
solutism that has served the cause of democracy so poorly in modern times. In 
terms of a sounder epistemology and value theory, Lerner should have asked 
himself some relevant questions. Was a stupid or inept undemocratic regime 
in Greece more essential for the survival of the major democracies than a 
communist regime based on Moscow? Could the Greek regime more easily be 
made democratic than a communist regime? The danger must be clearly seen 
that the moral relativism supported here could be used by some as a disguise 
for a real intention to destroy democracy. But that fact does not mean that 
democratic theory or values cannot be relativistic. What must be avoided is 
the loss of all because of a refusal to seek the possible.
The question of more choice is not one that, in our terms, can be answered 
out of context, in a vacuum. The Greek question could be approached, even 
from the moral standpoint, only on the basis of a host of other factors. Assum-
ing the major goal to be the safety, security, and survival of the Western polit-
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ical and social order as it is and as we may want it to become, we may bring in 
a great many experts to assist us in establishing the moral and value priorities. 
They will assist us in deciding those values and situations that are threatened 
immediately, those that must be sacrificed, those that can be defended. We 
ourselves have to apply a rude calculus concerning the degree to which we 
will modify moral principles, that is, apply them relatively, in seeking the safe-
guarding of the maximum values we assume the situation makes possible. The 
geographer will have much to say about the importance of Greece from the 
strategic standpoint, its intrinsic qualities as a base, its defensibility, and so on. 
Other experts with a differing expertise will have reports on the morale and 
ethos of the Greek people, the stability of their government, the viability of 
their economy. The ideal would be the fusing of these expertises into one and 
the extrapolation therefrom of a general descriptive and manipulative theory 
related to the whole of one’s instant theory of international relations.
This whole approach implies a caution against playing a situation by ear, 
especially when doing so creates the impression of an unguided policy and 
the myth of ineptness. The struggle for awareness will pay dividends in creat-
ing the appearance if not the reality of efficiency. The spreading knowledge 
of the existence and function of the National Security Council, whether or 
not there is a consistent or self- conscious theory underlying its operation, is a 
boost to the success of American policy. The myth of the Kremlin brooding 
over and weighing Soviet foreign policy with a high degree of awareness of the 
whole operation has served that policy well. Opposite peoples and statesmen 
are frozen into a kind of terror and sense of futility by the impression of glacial 
inexorability created by the myth concerning its major sources. Such knowl-
edge is deemed akin to the deity which both foresees and creates the future 
events. And the myth may in the same degree express the reality. Oxenstier-
na’s aphorism concerning the stupidity with which the world is governed may 
become relevant primarily to the past. At the least we cannot remain content 
with the processes that have brought us so close to the precipice. John Foster 
Dulles, Eden, Acheson, Schuman, even Eisenhower and Churchill playing by 
ear in the formulation of policy under the shadow of the hydrogen bomb is a 
spectacle that suggests, if it must be continued, that man is little beyond the 
capacity of his infancy in dealing with the problems of choice in struggling for 
survival. A sounder theory as well as scientific investigative technique may 
alter the metaphorical spectacle in some degree and, who knows, see us safely 
weather the end of the century.
*****
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Digest of Discussion
The chairman opened the meeting and suggested the group first turn its atten-
tion to the working paper before it and then proceed to further considerations 
of international relations theory in general. He asked Mr. Lipsky to summarize 
the interesting exposition contained in the working paper.
Mr. Lipsky pointed out that, as noted in the first paragraph, the paper 
was not intended as a theory of international relations. He agreed with David 
Easton, however, that the data of international relations has to be studied in 
terms of systematics and the working paper was, therefore, an attempt to sug-
gest a methodology applicable not only to theories of international relations 
but to all fields within the social sciences. The basic assumptions made in the 
paper might be summarized as follows:
 (1) The knowledge of the scholar is essentially the same as that of the prac-
titioner. There is no real distinction between the so- called prudential 
knowledge of the statesman and the scientific knowledge of the scholar. 
In this respect, Mr. Lipsky could not agree with Easton who made such 
a distinction.
 (2) A theory of theories should comprehend all that it important to say 
about a philosophical system. There, epistemology is important and the 
theorist must direct his attention to it.
 (3) A theory should say something meaningful about policy. He used Lern-
er’s criticism of the Truman Doctrine as an example. Lerner’s absolutist 
moral position drove him to denounce the doctrine because Greece was 
not a simon- pure democracy. The nominalist, on the other hand, seeks 
to establish a hierarchy of values with regard to a given situation and 
chooses those he wishes to defend at all costs and those he is willing 
to sacrifice, if need be. The selection process is partly the result of the 
environmental conditioning of the individual in question.
 (4) Finally, it is appropriate to mention the distinction made between the art-
ist and the statesman. The artist is primarily concerned with the emotive 
factor on the basis of some hypothesis concerning reality. To that extent, 
the artist tends to be non- scientific and runs a genuine danger of impreci-
sion in expressing reality. But, however, the artist’s function is the same as 
that of the statesman in that both wish to move men emotively.
Professor Holborn wondered whether Mr. Lipsky’s proposition is to be tak-
en as the basis for a theory of “social action,” applicable to all the social sci-
ences, rather than simply the basis for a theory of international relations. Mr. 
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Lipsky confirmed this and went on to say that a burden of the paper was that 
such a distinction should not be made. That is, there are no peculiar types of 
data in the international relations field which necessitate a theory of theories 
especially for that field. There might be peculiar problems in the international 
relations field but the epistemological basis for a theory of international re-
lations should be applicable to political science, sociology, and so forth. Mr. 
Niemeyer said he took exception to Mr. Lipsky on that point but would defer 
comment until later in the discussion.
Some Definitions of Terms
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered whether Mr. Lipsky used the term “nomi-
nalist” in the sense of Thomist philosophy. Mr. Lipsky confirmed this. It refers 
to a refusal to identify thinking and being and implies a rejection of Platonic 
philosophy. The professor and Mr. Lipsky agreed that “operational philoso-
phy” might convey the same meaning. Professor Holborn felt such terminol-
ogy to be somewhat obscure and archaic.
The chairman wondered whether the substance of the working paper of-
fered a criterion for distinguishing between types of theory in international 
relations. Would a so- called “nominalist school” agree on a common way of 
approaching international relations, or in identifying a theorist like Morgen-
thau as a non- nominalist? Mr. Lipsky thought it impossible, in any case, to 
classify Morgenthau as a nominalist. Morgenthau postulates a realism which 
anybody can identify yet which actually obscures a definite system of values.
Professor Strausz- Hupé thought it dangerous to attempt to classify theo-
rists into various schools. Just as philosophers of Thomist days wrangled over 
who was a nominalist and who was a realist, so such an attempt now might 
become a mere “dialectical exercise.”
Mr. Lipsky said he assumed that a war is raging involving conflicting pat-
terns of thought. In large measure, those who identify thinking with being 
represent the apologists of authoritarian systems while nominalist theorists, by 
and large, assert concepts which tend to support democracy. Mr. Zinner won-
dered how Mr. Lipsky knew this dichotomy to be correct. Mr. Lipsky asserted 
that, as a political scientist, he had observed, analyzed, and classified a sub-
stantial number of theories and had verified that authoritarian theoreticians 
assert values as a large, if not decisive, area of reality and strive to impose these 
values on the external world. Nominalist theoreticians recognize the role of 
value primarily as an expression of ignorance.
Professor Holborn remarked that Mr. Lipsky’s nominalist position has nev-
262 American Power and International Theory at the cfr, 1953– 54
Revised Pages
ertheless led him to assert a universalist position. The working paper asserts, 
for example, that all statesmen should act in a prescribed manner and in con-
formity with a prescribed theory.
Mr. Lipsky thought that the working paper had attempted to differentiate 
between the moral absolutism of a person like Lerner and the relativist posi-
tion argued therein. The relativist assigns priorities of value in a given foreign 
policy situation and decides which should not be protected and which may 
have to be sacrificed.
Mr. Lichenstein observed that a decision to go to the aid of Greece could 
just as well grow out of a universalist theoretical position— that is “absolute 
containment”— or it might be the result of a variety of “theoretical postures.” 
Conversely, the fact that Lerner and the communists both opposed the Tru-
man Doctrine does not necessarily mean that their epistemological positions 
are identical. He doubted, therefore, the relevance of such questions to the 
group’s enterprise.
Mr. Lipsky said that the working paper strove to establish a theoretical 
framework for decision making conducive to survival over the long haul of 
history. By survival he wished to make clear that he meant not mere physical 
survival but survival in terms of moral values, thus implying the preservation 
of certain conditions necessary for the functioning of such values.
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered whether the group could not more read-
ily “back into the future” rather than attempt to argue the validity of goals be-
forehand. The absolutist projects absolute values into the future while the pos-
itivist does not. But the group is concerned, first, with identifying the causes of 
international phenomena; second, with finding uniformity and laws in these 
phenomena; and third, with being able to manipulate developments on the 
basis of such knowledge. Theory develops through observation and experi-
mentation whereas if too much attention is placed on goals one runs the risk 
of confusing the results of theory with its beginnings. Professor Strausz- Hupé 
thought it quite possible to assume a theory which contains no moral goals 
whatsoever but which offers the policy maker practical guidance for dealing 
with future situations.
Mr. Lipsky doubted whether it is possible to provide a formula which 
would give a statesman any certainty that he could succeed through time. 
One of the requirements of better decision making is the need for statesmen 
to give greater time and thought to the more basic theoretical considerations 
of a given policy situation. Professor Holborn noted that statesmen, especially 
in the present day, have very little time to do this. Mr. Lipsky felt that this was 
a tragedy of the current situation. Professor Holborn observed that Mr. Lipsky 
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had made a moral judgment but that the difficulty itself was not remedied by 
the theory presented in the working paper. Mr. Lipsky noted that the working 
paper expressed concern about the need to slow down the tempo of diplomacy 
so that statesmen would have time to consider the knowledge which must be 
considered before decisions are reached and to examine fully the experiment 
inherent in a developing policy situation. The chairman agreed but wondered 
whether it did not amount to the commonsense observation that the more 
time men have to weigh a given situation the more apt they are to come to a 
better- considered decision. He questioned the need to refer to a fundamental 
philosophical position in order to reach that conclusion.
Referring to Lerner’s opposition to the Truman Doctrine on the ground 
that Greece was an imperfect democracy, the chairman agreed that the US 
should nevertheless have gone to the aid of Greece on the basis of other over-
riding considerations. However, he questioned the need to refer back to nom-
inalism in order to reach that conclusion. It is simply a matter of judging the 
consequences of failure to aid Greece. Many of the problems raised in the 
working paper appear to be of that nature.
Mr. Lipsky thought that all decisions must be related to a fundamental 
body of knowledge. Professor Holborn thought it unnecessary for the builder 
of the George Washington Bridge to know Einstein’s theory of relativity or to 
be conversant in advanced theoretical physics. Similarly, he doubted whether 
an understanding of epistemology is as necessary a tool for the practitioner of 
international relations as it is for the interpreter of international relations.
Mr. Lipsky inquired as to the criteria a scholar would refer to if asked by a 
statesman to evaluate a given foreign policy situation. The scholar would have 
to refer to many of the finer points of philosophy discussed in the working 
paper.
Professor Holborn thought the working paper needed to distinguish more 
clearly between theory and action. Furthermore, a continuity in the social 
process must be shown. That is, the theorist who advises the statesman should 
be able to identify certain regularities or trends in the historical development 
which are apt to project themselves into the future. These postulates would 
have to be proved. It other words, he would need a theory of social change, 
such as a theory of progress. The theorist needs to be able to analyze how 
novel elements enter the process of history and past trends tend to influence 
that process. Therefore, continued Professor Holborn, the statesman has little 
use for an Olympian epistemology, though Professor Holborn, on the whole, 
agreed with the position taken in the working paper. The statesman needs a 
theory for action and not a theory for interpretation and that problem is not 
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sufficiently discussed in the working paper. It is not simply a question of ob-
serving and analyzing facts but the moral content of the social process as well. 
Therefore, values should not be mentioned as though they were disturbing 
elements to pure analysis.
The Relation of Fact and Value
Professor Strausz- Hupé suggested the following example for distinguishing 
fact and value in policy formation. Assume that an academician, hired by the 
government of Costa Rica as an advisor to the foreign minister, is called upon 
to draw up a resumé of the Far Eastern situation for the purpose of preparing 
Costa Rica’s position at a forthcoming meeting of the Economic and Social 
Council. The advisor analyzes the situation and observes the existence of cer-
tain trends and forces by deductive processes. Up to that point, the advisor is 
little concerned with value. But when the foreign minister asks “what should 
I do about it?” then the advisor’s values come into play.
Mr. Marshall agreed. In the first instance the advisor is performing the 
intelligence function of briefing the foreign ministers. The advisor would 
probably have ten minutes in which to give the busy minister a précis of an 
enormously complex situation and he would have to select his facts on the 
basis of relevancy and importance. The advisor might also suggest what Costa 
Rican policy should be in the light of the data. But if the foreign minister re-
plies, “no, the US wants me to vote this way and I shall,” that is where value 
enters policy.
Mr. Lipsky doubted whether the function of description could be per-
formed free of value since it involves selectivity. Professor Holborn thought 
that a simple but important fact, such as the high birth rate in India, could be 
reported without concerning oneself with values.
Mr. Niemeyer observed that the fact had meaning only in terms of value. 
Thus, a high birth rate is “good” in relation to France and “bad” in relation 
to India. While it might be useful for purposes of discussion to distinguish 
between values and cause- effect relationships, these are really not separable. 
Cause- effect is inextricably linked with value, and value gives meaning and 
selectivity to sheer observation. On the other hand, he disagreed with Mr. 
Lipsky’s position that values are attributable primarily to individual “preju-
dice” or “ignorance.”
Continuing, Mr. Niemeyer thought that in approaching a theory of in-
ternational relations, it might be more fruitful to start with general political 
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theory and then proceed to international relations theory. Since Plato, the 
theory of government has been concerned with societies characterized by a 
sharing and a common adherence to a nexus of values, under the “umbrella” 
of a common government. This is a fundamental characteristic of political 
phenomena as related to the state.
International relations, on the other hand, has a peculiar quality denied 
in the working paper. International relations differs from government in the 
sense that government refers to common institutions as repositories for com-
mon agreement on values while the working out of the international political 
process involves the working out of differing systems of agreed values. Hence, 
international relations theory is the science of pluralism. Each state seeks ways 
of relating and pursuing its values vis- à- vis the others. Policy decisions are 
made in terms of the extent to which the “good life” is furthered or hindered 
from the standpoint of the nation concerned and in terms of how that deci-
sion would reverberate through the international scene. In the last analysis 
the two aspects are only synthetically separable.
Mr. Lipsky ventured that Mr. Niemeyer overestimated the strength of con-
sensus in the nation- state.
The chairman thought that Mr. Niemeyer’s remarks had potentialities for 
developing a theory of international relations. He thought it useful to explore 
the applicability of political theory to international relations theory. Within 
the state, there exists a unity of jurisdiction and a basic nexus of common 
values. At the international level there no longer exists the same area and 
range of shared values nor is commitment to those values shared with the 
same intensity.
Mr. Marshall observed that both levels are characterized by coercion and 
consent but that, in international relations, one deals with a multiplicity of 
jurisdictions, of cultures, and of areas and shared values. Mr. Niemeyer agreed 
and felt that this makes for an entirely different problem for which a different 
type of theory must be devised.
Is Value­ Free Theory Possible?
Professor Strausz- Hupé asked the chairman whether it is not the essence of 
theory that it be free of teleological or value- directed content. The chairman 
disagreed and pointed out that most theorists tend to identify teleology with 
causality. Mr. Niemeyer thought it possible to develop a value- bound theory 
which is in itself free of value— that is, perfectly systematic and scientific. 
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Mr. McClellan thought that was what Mr. Lipsky had been driving at in his 
working paper.
In response to Mr. Lipsky’s assertion that even the descriptive function 
cannot be entirely divested of value, Mr. Diebold wondered whether Mr. 
Lipsky was not confusing relevance with value. Mr. Marshall agreed; the con-
sultant to the Costa Rican foreign minister has to select from countless data, 
those facts and trends which are of importance to Costa Rica. He doubted 
whether establishing orders of relevance is synonymous with injecting person-
al values into the reporting function.
Mr. Lipsky thought that the best way of reducing the function of value 
is to increase man’s knowledge of cause- effect relationships. Mr. Lichenstein 
noted that many analysts warn the reader of personal biases contained in their 
works. This is a practical method of reducing the value element, as it impinges 
on scientific analysis.
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered whether Mr. Lipsky held, as a logical 
example of his position, that a Roman Catholic would be unable to make a 
value- free analysis of demographic trends in India. Mr. Lipsky said this was so. 
The chairman thought description could and should be value- free, but this is 
not to say that selectivity does not enter the descriptive process. Mr. Marshall 
agreed. It is not the describer’s values but the nature of the problem being 
described which guides the selection of data. Mr. Niemeyer observed that val-
ues preferences often enter the very selection of the problems the describer 
chooses to describe.
Professor Holborn noted that Hitler had once asked his intelligence ad-
visors about US capacity to bring military power to bear upon Europe if it 
entered the war. When he was advised of American potential in that sense, 
the dictator flew into a rage, denouncing the officials as traitors and defeatists. 
This, remarked Professor Holborn, is a good if crude example of fact vs. value; 
Hitler paid for those value preferences. The chairman agreed. Mein Kampf, 
for example, contains gross misstatements and errors of facts due to the value 
preferences of its author.
Professor Holborn observed that at a certain level of analysis one has to 
deal with “stubborn facts.” On the other hand, ideological forces have exerted 
a tremendous influence on the historical process by their very influence upon 
the minds and actions of men. For example, the war aims of the Second Ger-
man Empire were by their nature unable to attract allies to the cause of the 
Central Powers because they offered nothing to the non- Germanic nations 
and contained no concept of a postwar international order. The result had a 
realistic impact on history. The same could be said today about the inadequacy 
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of democratic ideology for enlisting the loyalty and enthusiasm of the colonial 
peoples.
Mr. Zinner wondered whether Mr. Lipsky conceived of values as having 
the same value or whether values arrange themselves in a hierarchical order. 
He was inclined to the latter interpretation and felt that the hierarchy of val-
ues which come into play would differ as between differing situations; more-
over, it is often necessary to choose between competing values.
On the other hand, Mr. Zinner continued, Mr. Lipsky held that values are 
the product of individual conditioning. Mr. Zinner asserted that either this 
concept was not true or, if true, would lead to complete anarchy in attempt-
ing to theorize about international relations. Mr. Lipsky also held, Mr. Zinner 
noted, the concept of overwhelming insight on the basis of shared values; this 
is contradictory to the previous concept.
Mr. Marshall, reverting to the example of the advisor to the Costa Rican 
foreign minister, felt that when the advisor was called upon to brief the min-
ister on the Far Eastern situation, his function would not be affected by value 
but by relevance; when the advisor is asked to make suggestions as to pol-
icy, only then would his function be affected by value preferences. Mr. Lipsky 
thought that even the first function was not merely the relating of “stubborn 
facts” but of data organized in terms of a personal value system.
Mr. Lichenstein disagreed with Mr. Lipsky’s denial of a distinction be-
tween prudential and scientific knowledge. Mr. Marshall’s illustration had, he 
felt, indicated the difference. Prudential knowledge is related to the selection 
of goals— that is, policy making— where the operation of value preferences is 
at a maximum.
Mr. Roberts wondered where judgment entered the epistemological pic-
ture. It seems somewhat oversimplified to assert that knowledge is simply the 
relating of causal relationships to value goals. Somewhere one has to take into 
account some important facts as a sense of timing, the ability to maneuver 
adroitly, the “something” which distinguishes the good poker player from the 
poor one. The two facets previously discussed do not, by themselves, consti-
tute all the necessary requisites for statesmanship. The chairman agreed. It is 
a kind of skill which allows one to relate the facts in a meaningful way. Mr. 
Marshall thought that the element of judgment entered both the descriptive 
and the policy- advising functions of his previous illustration, but in different 
degrees.
Professor Holborn thought that his reference to “stubborn facts,” which 
must be taken into consideration regardless of value preferences, could be 
illustrated by two examples from German history, namely, the severe losses 
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suffered by the German population around 1350 and again around 1650 as a 
result of the Black Death and the Thirty Years War. Those were basic devel-
opments which no historian can neglect. The first altered the whole weight 
of town- country relationships in Germany in favor of the towns; new trade 
routes developed while the nobility lost part of their previous power and au-
thority. The second loss tended to strengthen the countryside at the expense 
of the towns and saw the ascendance of the nobility and Junkers, this process 
being facilitated by the Great Elector’s policy of benefiting the Junker class. 
Historians might differ on the importance of those facts but such difference 
could be discussed in terms of the facts themselves.
Mr. Lipsky ventured that the descriptive function might have a different 
significance for history than it does for the other social sciences. Professor 
Holborn thought his observations equally applicable to international relations 
where a body of facts also exists, having nothing to do with value preferences. 
The chairman thought, on the other hand, that the selection and arrange-
ment of facts in orders of importance is a value operation. Mr. Marshall reit-
erated his belief that the selection of data is an operation based on relevance 
to the problem at hand; one selects the facts as they relate to the problem 
one is faced with, not in terms of how one wishes the problem to be solved. 
Mr. Niemeyer thought that some of these difference in opinion were largely 
semantic in nature.
Upon reconvening, the chairman expressed the opinion that a partial con-
sensus had been reached on the basis for a theory of international relations: 
the combining and relating of causal interpretation to some kind of value sys-
tem. The nature of that value system was still in dispute. It is recognized that 
the field deals with states as entities. Value operates in terms of state policy 
goals as well as in conflicts between states. International relations theory deals 
with the phenomenon of international relations and their relation to govern-
mental goals or values.
Mr. Lipsky, with reference to Professor Holborn’s previous remarks, felt 
that while facts can certainly not be denied, they are not important per se. 
They become important by virtue of their being organized by a theory which 
accords them importance and, hence, in order of value. The moment one 
introduces causality, one introduces the role of value.
The chairman questioned the necessity for making this assertion in terms 
of elaborating a theory of international relations. Moreover, the theory of 
physics shows causal relationships which are free of value. Mr. Lipsky doubted 
whether natural science theory is relevant to the problems of social science 
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theory because the areas of ignorance are so much broader in the social sci-
ences. The chairman expressed skepticism on that point. The difference, he 
thought, is more a matter of difference in the nature of the data under consid-
eration. Phenomena in the social sciences are concerned with human beings, 
their plans, and the results of their plans.
Mr. Lipsky thought that a problem of the social scientist was his ability 
to detach himself from the field he was observing. To the extent that the 
social scientist can extract his personal prejudices from his observation, he 
is approaching the position of the natural scientist. Mr. Lichenstein felt an 
acceptable alternative method was for the social scientist to indicate his per-
sonal preferences to his audience and allow the audience to do the extracting. 
Gunnar Myrdal in The American Dilemma, for example, warned the reader 
about his prejudices with regard to the Negro problem in the United States 
and asked him to discount, therefore, for bias.
Special Difficulties in Social Science Theory
Mr. Marshall noted that the way people may revoke their will in the face of 
facts is itself a datum which the social scientist has to take into account. One 
might liken the problem to that of the football coach who is training his team 
in tackling. No amount of practice in tackling stationary dummies will enable 
the players to learn the technique of tackling an opponent since the oppo-
nent, unlike the dummy, will adjust and redress in the face of the approaching 
tackler. Part of the data of the social sciences is the way people redress in the 
face of other data.
The chairman agreed and thought the analogy illustrated the point neatly. 
But the human element influenced all the sciences, even the natural. For ex-
ample, a full generation went by before physicians adopted the practice of 
washing their hands before delivering babies, despite the fact that the rela-
tionship between natal mortality and lack of hygiene had become common 
knowledge among midwives.
Mr. Lipsky wondered whether the difference between the problem of the 
natural and the social scientist is one of degree or of a qualitative nature. 
The chairman thought this would introduce a problem doubtful relevance to 
the group’s purposes. Mr. Lipsky expressed the opinion that that problem was 
relevant for determining whether the social scientist could employ identical 
or merely similar methods to those of the natural scientist. The chairman 
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thought this was an ultimate problem which might best be deferred until the 
group had dispensed with the more immediate problems arising in interna-
tional relations theory.
Mr. Thompson held that the most common points at which that particular 
issue is joined is with reference to the dogmatists in both camps. One school 
asserts that the transfer of methods is simple and unimpeded while the oppo-
site school firmly denies that such a transfer is remotely possible because man 
is both the observer and the phenomena observed. The first school leans to a 
radical systematization of fact and value while the latter school merges the two 
facets so absolutistically as to be equally unrealistic.
Mr. Lipsky thought that perhaps the social scientist could so refine his 
methods and extract his personal prejudices from his functions as to be able to 
approach a common goal of knowledge on the same level as that of the natural 
scientist. One great peril to achieving this, he felt, is the assertion of a special 
prudential knowledge, apart from scientific knowledge, expressed as an artistic 
grasp of “feel” for a situation.
Professor Strausz- Hupé thought that the group had covered that ground 
previously. Dr. Rabi had already noted the presence of an artistic element 
in the scientific approach and this was being increasingly acknowledged by 
science. The important question, Professor Strausz- Hupé thought, is whether 
the field of observation the social or natural scientist stakes out for himself is 
small or vast.
Mr. Lipsky said he agreed with Professor Holborn that “stubborn facts” in 
themselves do not make up a theory or knowledge. One cannot know unless 
one can relate observed data to questions of right or wrong.
Mr. Zinner observed that one must also be able to verify what is right and 
what is wrong. Mr. Thompson felt it appropriate to point out that people had 
been discussing right and wrong since classical times but that is not to say that 
such questions can be verified by social scientific techniques like public opin-
ion polls. One can, however, undertake some verification in terms of causal 
consequences and thus reach a primitive or low- grade morality. Sensible men 
have differed on the finer points for centuries.
Professor Strausz- Hupé said it is obvious, for example, that the interna-
tional communist movement is morally bad, yet the important question for 
the group is whether the Politburo acts on the basis of Marxist ideology. Mr. 
Niemeyer felt that even if that question could be answered with certainty it 
would constitute only a fragment of the knowledge necessary for dealing with 
the Soviet Union. Most of the other questions could only be answered with 
reference to moral factors.
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Professor Holborn observed that Hitler had never been able to understand 
why Britain had not come to terms with Germany after the fall of France. By 
every measure of world politics Britain had been defeated, yet Churchill was 
resolved to fight on. Although the possibility existed that the US would come 
to Britain’s aid in time to help, this could not be counted on. The decision was 
made in terms of faith and ideals.
Mr. Marshall agreed. The decision was beyond what the existing data 
then supported. Politics is something akin to navigating a ship. Ever since 
the days of dead reckoning, the science of navigation has been closing in on 
the area of guesswork as the compass, celestial navigation, and radar became 
available. Yet no one has been able to devise a substitute for the skipper on 
the bridge who must be able to make decisions beyond the reach of known 
data when the situation warrants. Likewise, politics is sometimes a question 
of moral guesswork.
Professor Holborn said that statesmen at supreme moments in history must 
act largely on faith. Some elements of shrewd calculation might have entered 
the British decision to fight on— that is, that Hitler was a fool and that the US 
might eventually become a fighting ally— but it was largely a decision based 
on moral fortitude. Mr. Lipsky agreed that on the basis of the knowledge then 
available, the British had been defeated although he was inclined to place 
greater stress on the probability of American intervention than was conceded 
by Professor Holborn.
Mr. Zinner felt that the discussion was moving in ever- converging circles 
and becoming less and less fruitful in the process. Two questions occurred to 
him which might be more profitably considered: first, can existing knowledge 
of the international political process be systematized into a theory of interna-
tional relations? And second, what is that nature and the boundaries of the 
field one wished to have knowledge about; what set of phenomena can be 
delineated as the subject matter about which one desires greater knowledge?
The “Purpose” of Theory
The chairman felt that analysis of why the British acted in a certain manner 
at a particular juncture had little relevance for a general theory of internation-
al relations; it was simply an act of statesmanship at a particular moment of 
history. He wished to add a third question to those of Mr. Zinner: what is the 
objective of international relations theory; what purposes would such a theory 
be designed to serve?
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Mr. Niemeyer noted that Plato had speculated about the purposes of the 
state and had found the answer in the concept of justice. The purpose of a the-
ory of international relations might be defined as the “good life” and the pur-
pose of democratic foreign policy might be defined as a foreign policy which 
promotes the good life of that nation.
The chairman observed that this raised a fundamental problem. In theo-
rizing about the state one is theorizing about communities bound by certain 
underlying consensus systems and traditions which can be evoked and which 
designate the state as an ethical complex. However, when one enters the in-
ternational relations field with the purpose of putting forward a hypothesis 
designed to advance thinking about that field, one is dealing with a system 
of relations among states and not with the foreign policy of a particular state. 
Each state embodies a more or less unique ethical complex and the first prob-
lem for international relations theory seems to be to define what value ele-
ments, if any, are common to all states. One must assume, he thought, that one 
value which international relations serve is the desire of people to be related 
to other peoples in various ways; on the other hand, each state wishes to pre-
serve a certain degree of autonomy in its relations with the rest. Therefore, the 
problem seems to be a matter of how one can establish a system in which both 
these values will be assured.
Mr. Thompson thought this might offer a better start toward a theory of 
international relations. One first ought to deal with the uniformities of the 
field before proceeding to the variables. It did not seem fruitful to start with 
the higher values and aspirations of men— such as justice— for different na-
tions interpret these values in different ways. The quest for security, however, 
is a more basic and universal value which appears to be a constant motivation-
al guide in international behavior. The question as to why Churchill decided 
not to make terms in 1940 could be answered by reason of the lack of security 
which Britain would face in an Axis- dominated Europe.
Professor Strausz- Hupé wondered how such a general principle would 
guide US policy makers in deciding whether to jettison the EDC and rearm 
Germany regardless of French wishes or whether to continue supporting EDC. 
Mr. Thompson said that the major threat to US security comes from the So-
viet Union and the US reaction is to create a position of strength in Europe 
to counter that threat. This implies some arrangement in which Germany can 
contribute to the common defense. If the EDC arrangement is viable in these 
terms it should be supported; if not, then other means will have to be found. 
Professor Strausz- Hupé ventured that a security- oriented theory of interna-
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tional relations appears to signify “maximizing what one likes and minimizing 
what one does not like.”
The chairman thought that the question was not how any one state should 
act in a given situation but the construction of a world of states in which they 
could live together and retain certain common minimal values while preserv-
ing their own richer national values.
Mr. Thompson felt that if the pursuit of security was the lowest common 
denominator of international relations, the next basic phenomenon was the 
merging of national interests in cooperative configurations.
Mr. Niemeyer held that a security- oriented theory of international rela-
tions would be inadequate as a guide for some of the most vital problems in 
foreign affairs. If a man meets a tiger in the jungle, a theory based on the uni-
versality of the security drive will not be much assistance as a guide for coping 
with the situation. Similarly, such a theory would be inadequate for helping 
U.S. policy makers cope with the aggressive expansionism of Soviet Russia.
Mr. Thompson questioned whether Mr. Niemeyer’s classification of na-
tions into “tigers” and “non- tigers”— and logically, into “bad” and “good” 
states— would carry things very far in terms of theorizing about international 
relations. Mr. Niemeyer thought the analogy of the Soviet “tiger” confronting 
the American “non- tiger” an apt one in terms of the realities of world politics. 
Mr. Marshall observed that the American “non- tiger” has managed to coexist 
with the Soviet “tiger” for some thirty- seven years without being gobbled up 
and they even sit together side by side in the UN.
The chairman thought that a theory of international relations ought to 
deal with the minimum conditions necessary for nations to live together in 
the same world; it should postulate the minimum relationships having suffi-
cient support to produce a viable world order.
Mr. Lichenstein discussed problems of approach and content of interna-
tional relations theory. He felt that theory should not only have abstract epis-
temological value but should be of concrete assistance to the policy maker. 
He thought the approach should begin with the foreign policy problems of a 
particular state, such as the US, and move into the broader field of multina-
tional relationships.
The chairman was of the opinion that international relations theory dealt 
with the behavior of some sixty- odd nations. Mr. Niemeyer thought that the 
substance of international relations, however, is the quest for fulfillment of 
autonomous value systems.
Professor Holborn felt that a security- oriented theory would offer little 
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content except raison d’état. Mr. Thompson said that he was not suggesting 
security considerations as the only basis for theory but as one of the essential 
minimal bases. Mr. Niemeyer observed that the expectation of war is not the 
only context in which nations relate to other nations. This might be true for 
US- Soviet relations but that is but one phase of the international field. Mr. 
Thompson observed that US- Soviet relations is a fairly dominant phase of 
current international relations and affects many other phases, such as East- 
West trade.
Mr. Zinner thought that two different and opposed concepts were under 
discussion. The first creates a goal and strives to work out a theory for approx-
imating that goal under some kind of pluralistic arrangement. The second 
assumes that one is dealing with two political systems and that the likelihood 
of war between these systems cannot be denied. He thought it would be help-
ful if the group could decide which of these propositions should be pursued, or 
attempt to find a neutral ground which would accommodate both.
Mr. Lichenstein wondered whether it was necessary to lay down the value 
premises of a theory before elaborating the rest of the structure. He felt that, 
regardless of the premises, some consideration should be given to the steps 
one has to go through in elaborating a coherent theory— i.e. its methodology.
The chairman agreed that two different kinds of theory were under con-
sideration. He thought it necessary to reach agreement on premises before 
proceeding with their consequences. Ultimately the correct premise would 
tend to be verified by historical evidence.
Mr. Lipsky wished to know, before the meeting ended, why the group had 
objected to his assertion of survival as a goal of international relations theory. 
Mr. Lichenstein and Mr. Zinner thought that it had been questioned because 
it had carried a connotation of being the ultimate value— hence survival at 
any price, even slavery. Mr. Lipsky said this had not been intended; he had 
always thought of survival in a value context.
The chairman, on behalf of the group, thanked the Council on Foreign 
Relations for having made this study possible. Regardless of the value the 
group’s work might have for Mr. Lipsky, for individual members, and for the 
Council, it had certainly been a most enjoyable experience.
Mr. Diebold, on behalf of the Council, expressed his cordial appreciation 
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